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In 1876 and 1879, the American and British armies suffered extremely similar disasters at, 
respectively, the Battles of the Little Bighorn and Isandlwana. Though these two colonial 
reversals have often been compared to one another in passing, no serious comparative work on 
them has been done. This paper aims to change that, while placing both battles within the larger 
frameworks of their respective wars and arguing that it was the similarities in American and 
British perceptions of their Indigenous foes that led to the defeats at the Little Bighorn and 
Isandlwana, as well as the other difficulties that both campaigns encountered. It will be argued 
that both the American and the British battleplans relied upon the assumption that their enemies 
would flee from an army of white men and planned accordingly, a belief that led to catastrophic 
reversals when the Lakota, Cheyenne, and Zulu instead took offensive action. Only by 
overcoming this detrimental prejudice and adjusting their plans accordingly were the colonial 
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Introduction: Reversals and Scapegoats 
 
 At the end of June 1876, Lieutenant-Colonel George Armstrong Custer, the famed “Boy 
General” of the American Civil War, died near a bend in the Little Bighorn River. He and six 
hundred troopers of the 7th Cavalry Regiment were detached from his superior officer, Brigadier-
General Alfred Terry’s column and sent out with orders to hunt down the Hunkpapa Lakota 
medicine man Sitting Bull, who acted as a spokesman for those Native Americans who opposed 
American expansion into the Black Hill country. Custer found Sitting Bull, all right, but he also 
found 3000 Lakota and Northern Cheyenne warriors—far more than his single regiment could 
handle. Commanded by some of the most famous names on the Northern Plains, including war-
chief Gall of the Hunkpapa Lakota, war-chief Two Moons of the Northern Cheyenne, and an 
enigmatic Oglala Lakota war-leader named Crazy Horse, this Native American force destroyed 
half of the 7th Cavalry before the battle was over. Custer was killed alongside his brothers, his 
nephew, his brother-in-law, and all the men who had fought under his immediate command.1  
 On January 22nd, 1879, Brevet Colonel Anthony Durnford of Great Britain’s Royal 
Engineers rode into the 24th Infantry Regiment’s camp at Isandlwana, a few miles beyond the 
frontier of British South Africa. He was told to take charge of the camp from Lieutenant-Colonel 
Henry Pulleine, commanding officer of the first battalion of the 24th. A few hours later, 
Durnford, Pulleine, and a majority of the men of the 1/24th were dead. Killed alongside them 
were a company of the 2/24th, several units of South African Volunteer Cavalry and Border 
Police, and hundreds of African auxiliaries. Unknown to either Durnford or Pulleine, an army of 
 
1 Note on terminology: as few scholarly sources can make up their mind as to whether “Indigenous” or “Native 
American” is the more appropriate term, both have been used here interchangeably. The slur of “Indian,” has been 
avoided, save in quotes, as has the name “Sioux,” which was given to them by their Indigenous adversaries. As far 
as the individual names of the Indigenous combatants go, the author has used those with which an audience is most 
likely to be familiar, though critiques of these names are offered where it was felt necessary.  
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20 000 Zulu, led by the aristocratic general Ntshingwayo kaMahole, had slipped through the 
British scouts, and concealed themselves only a few miles from Isandlwana. On the morning of 
the 22nd this host enveloped the plains around the British camp, engulfing most of the soldiers 
left to hold it. Over 1300 men were killed, as were all but five of their officers. When the news 
was brought to Lord Chelmsford, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in South Africa, he 
initially refused to believe it could have happened.  
 The Battles of the Little Bighorn and Isandlwana were not the worst reversals ever 
endured by the colonial armies of the United States and Great Britain, but they are undoubtedly 
the most famous. Greater disasters, like Saint Clair’s Defeat on the Wabash or Britain’s 
nightmarish retreat from Kabul, have faded from popular memory, but the Little Bighorn and 
Isandlwana remain cultural touchstones. In the United States Custer’s name remains synonymous 
with foolishness and defeat and more books have been written on (and more bad movies made 
about) his Last Stand than the nation-defining Battle of Gettysburg. If Isandlwana is not quite as 
important in the British consciousness, it is not far behind and is regularly revisited in the 
popular and scholarly press, as well as film and television. Asides comparing the two battles are 
not uncommon in the literature and one scholarly work, The Dust Rose Like Smoke, attempted to 
contrast the two directly, though with decidedly flawed results.2  
 Given the wealth of sourcing available, their chronological closeness to one another, and 
their prominence within the public consciousness a scholarly military comparison of the two 
battles is long overdue. George Custer’s career and his treatment in the press after his demise, 
should be compared to the career and treatment in the press of Anthony Durnford, his immediate 
counterpart in rank, and in tragedy, at Isandlwana. Meanwhile, Lord Chelmsford, as 
 
2 James Gump, The Dust Rose Like Smoke, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016). 
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Commander-in-Chief of British South Africa should be contrasted with Philip Henry Sheridan, 
Lieutenant-General Commanding the Division of the Missouri, and the mastermind behind the 
Great Sioux War. Likewise, not only the Little Bighorn and Isandlwana, but the whole of the 
Great Sioux War and the Anglo-Zulu War need to be analysed, to better determine whether any 
similarities between the two battles that may be uncovered are simply coincidental or are 
products of broader trends shared across both conflicts. Testimony from Custer and Durnford’s 
Indigenous foes, the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne, and the Zulu must be incorporated into 
such a project as well, and the Native American and African militaries subject to the same 
comparative scrutiny as their Anglo-American contemporaries.  
 What emerges from such a comprehensive study of these two wars is this: the inescapable 
conclusion that neither Custer, byword for military incompetence that he may have become, nor 
Durnford, still subject to resounding criticism in the secondary literature, was the author of his 
own defeat. Both men were far nearer the bottom of the chain of command than the top and were 
acting on orders handed to them by superior officers, some of whom were, in turn, acting on the 
commands of their own superiors. Custer, at the Little Bighorn, adhered to Terry’s instructions to 
attack any Lakota or Cheyenne encampments he found before they could scatter, while Terry 
himself was only passing along the outline of the campaign as conceived by Sheridan. Durnford 
was told to take over a camp that Chelmsford, and subsequently, Pulleine, failed to fortify, and 
his death at the hands of the waiting Zulu Army was even less his own fault than was Custer’s. 
When news of the defeats became public, Sheridan and Chelmsford sought to avoid 
responsibility for disaster by foisting the blame onto Custer and Durnford, who, being dead, 
could not defend themselves. In this objective, Sheridan succeeded spectacularly, while 
Chelmsford, unable to evade all the culpability himself, forced Durnford to share it with him. 
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 This pattern of behaviour is not atypical for imperial projects that have suffered 
embarrassing reversals in conflicts with enemies too “primitive” to earn their respect. In doing 
so, colonial empires are able to refrain from reassessing their opponents or admitting that they 
may be able to produce generals every bit as capable as their own. The Lakota-Cheyenne 
coalition that dominated the Northern Plains had in their ranks many experienced war-leaders, of 
whom the aforementioned Crazy Horse, Two Moons, and Gall were the most prominent. In 
Zululand, Chief Ntshingwayo kaMahole was a man with a forty-year military career behind him 
and led the army of an imperial people as expansionist and professional as any in Europe. The 
stories of the Little Bighorn and of Isandlwana, and of the Great Sioux and Anglo-Zulu Wars as 
a whole, are replete with other great Indigenous military commanders as too, including Gall’s 
compatriot Crow King, a fierce Northern Cheyenne warrior named Yellow Nose, an elderly 
Southern Cheyenne war-chief called Lame White Man, and Prince Mbilini waMswati, a rogue 
member of Swaziland’s royal family. Just how competent all these men were was obscured by 
Sheridan and Chelmsford’s spin doctoring, and their efforts to persuade the historical record that 
only a particularly inept white officer could be beaten by “primitives.” 
 In reality, it was Sheridan and Chelmsford’s perception of the likes of Crazy Horse and 
Ntshingwayo as their racial and cultural inferiors that ensured the defeats at the Little Bighorn 
and Isandlwana—and all the other defeats of the wars as well. One of the better kept secrets of 
the Great Sioux and Anglo-Zulu Wars, at least outside of the scholarly community, is the fact 
that American and British arms were beaten not once, but multiple times. American columns 
under Brigadier-General George Crook were bested at the Battles of the Rosebud and Slim 
Buttes, while Zulu forces destroyed a British company at Ntombe Drift and killed hundreds of 
British and auxiliary cavalrymen at the mountain fortress of Hlobane. Crook, who served ably in 
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the American Civil War, and put an end to the first round of Apache Wars in Arizona, was not a 
stupid or inexperienced officer. Neither were Sir Evelyn Wood and Sir Redvers Buller, 
commanding the ill-fated expedition to Hlobane. In fact, none of the leading officers who served 
under Sheridan and Chelmsford were obviously lacking in talent. Neither, for that matter, were 
Sheridan and Chelmsford themselves. 
 The problem, as a clear reading of the primary sources reveals, was not inadequate 
military ability, but an abundance of Victorian Era racism, which blinded Sheridan and 
Chelmsford to the possibility of facing skilled Indigenous generals. Steeped in the colonial 
reasoning of the day, both Lieutenant-Generals assumed their Indigenous enemies were too 
cowardly to stand and fight and devised plans based on preventing escape by small Native bands, 
rather than battling sizeable Indigenous armies that were prepared to risk a head on 
confrontation. Sheridan never believed his columns would face more than a few hundred Lakota 
or Cheyenne and was stunned when he learned that nearly 3000 Native American warriors had 
faced Custer at the Little Bighorn. Chelmsford, who saw his career damaged when he could not 
easily capture the guerilla forces of the Xhosa bush fighters, was equally shocked when he 
realised that 20 000 Zulu had struck Durnford and Pulleine at Isandlwana. Both generals should 
have—and could have—known better but discarded any information that contradicted their ideas 
about how Native Americans or Africans would make war. Having engineered their respective 
wars for what were essentially personal, rather than military, reasons, Sheridan and Chelmsford 
left their subordinates entirely unequipped to prosecute those wars against the enemy as they 
actually existed outside the generals’ imaginations. Even the vaunted technological superiority of 
the Anglo-American armies could not attain victory when deployed in service of plans entirely 
ill-suited for confrontations with lethally efficient Indigenous militaries. 
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 When American and British arms finally achieved success, it was by throwing out 
Sheridan and Chelmsford’s original schemes and coming up with new plans that worked against 
the enemy as they were rather than as they were supposed to be. Here the differences between 
Sheridan and Chelmsford are perhaps the strongest: Lord Chelmsford overhauled his own plans, 
while Sheridan’s subordinates, most notably Colonel Nelson Miles, went behind his back and 
overhauled them for him. Yet the tactics employed by Miles and Chelmsford were remarkably 
similar, and moreover, grounded in a hard-won respect for the capabilities of the Lakota-
Cheyenne alliance and the Zulu Army. These plans maximised the advantages American and 
British soldiers derived from their technological edge, creating a gap in military effectiveness 
that their Indigenous adversaries could not cross on tactical or strategic skill alone and posed 
interesting questions about what the formula for a successful colonial military campaign was. 
 The Great Sioux War and the Anglo-Zulu War are stories of military blundering caused 
not by the unique incompetence of any individual officer, but by colonial bigotry that pervaded 
nearly the whole of the American and British Armies at the institutional level. They are also the 
stories of brilliant Indigenous generals like Crazy Horse and Ntshingwayo who constantly 
frustrated and defeated white opponents who did not take them seriously because of their 
perceived cultural inferiority and the colour of their skin. They are stories that deserve to be told 
in their entirety, shorn of the racially motivated propaganda that has so often distorted how they 
are remembered, and that must be examined in detail in order to draw conclusions about the 
nature of colonial military operations and the ways in which the thinking of the day could 









 Both wars have attracted the attention of noteworthy academics. Robert Utley, dean of 
Western historians, did some excellent work on the Great Sioux War, and the characters involved 
with it, while Ian Knight, Adrian Greaves, and John Laband are among the most distinguished 
scholars to examine the Anglo-Zulu War. The fact remains, however, that both subjects have, for 
years, been the stomping grounds of primarily amateur historians. While some of these writers 
have done good work, many have not, and sifting through the wreckage that some of them have 
left in their wake can be an agonising process. 
 To this day one can still purchase books on the Great Sioux War that utilise not the 
concealed or even unconscious bigotries that sometimes distort academic works, but overt racism 
towards the Lakota and Cheyenne. One recent book on the life of Custer, printed by a 
mainstream publisher, goes so far as to openly call the Lakota and Cheyenne ‘savages’ and 
‘primitives’ and to opine that they should have been destroyed by the government.3 More 
insidiously, the figure of Custer himself continues to dominate discussions of the Great Sioux 
War to a detrimental effect. Writers on the Great Sioux War can be divided into the categories of 
“Custerphobes” and “Custerphiles,” the former taking the stance that Custer was a bad person 
and a bad general, the latter that he was a competent officer and, at least by the standards of the 
day, a relatively decent human being. Glory-Hunter, written in 1933, after Custer’s widow 
Libbie had died, and one could criticize the Lieutenant-Colonel without being threatened with a 
lawsuit, was one of the first Custerphobic books to see print, and the vitriol that it directed 
towards Custer, painting him as an insubordinate, a coward, an egomaniac, and a criminal 
lunatic, has influenced almost every work in that camp, for good or ill. The above-mentioned 
 
3 The deeply uncomfortable book in question is Thom Hatch’s The Last Days of George Armstrong Custer (New 
York: Saint Martin’s Press, 2015). 
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series is in turn, a particularly venomous example of Custerphilic literature, with its bile towards 
the Indigenous population stemming from the author’s open hero worship of Custer. Neither 
attitude is healthy (for the author or the discourse), and the works cited in this paper will come 
from more tempered places. Still, the worst material is out there, and everything published about 
the Great Sioux War, is published with that kind of hackery lurking in the background. 
 Even the best secondary material remains deformed by the obsession with Custer, to the 
detriment of the other figures involved in the Great Sioux War. As long ago as the 1950s, these 
problems were recognized as infecting the discourse around Custer and the war. William 
Alexander Graham in his book, The Custer Myth, stated that “To those persons who think that 
Dis-solution of the Custer Myth is easy, and particularly to those who are quite sure they have 
Di-solved it, This work is dedicated (with malice aforethought, express and implied).”4 
Graham’s bitter joke reflected a life spent trying, and often failing, to sift through the 
mythologizing that had grown up around the figure of Custer. Graham’s work in the field was 
pioneering; his The Story of the Little Bighorn, which went through four print runs between 1926 
and 1952, is probably the oldest secondary source that can be relied upon, while The Custer 
Myth, described in his own words as “a sourcebook of Custeriana,” remains a valuable collection 
of primary material, including newspaper articles, statements from military experts, and a 
number of interviews with Lakota and Cheyenne combatants and Custer’s few surviving scouts. 
It can fairly be said that Graham was the first author who tried to take an objective look at 
Custer, and most books written since the 1950s in his debt. 
 Dee Brown’s Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, first published in 1970, was not 
specifically about Custer, but the book, never out of print, reignited discussion around the US 
 
4 The Custer Myth, edited by W.A. Graham (New York: Bonanza Books, 1953).  
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Army’s role in the subjugation of the Native American population and prompted renewed 
discussion of Custer and the Little Bighorn, positioning the Lakota and Cheyenne as victims of 
the American government, rather than enemies to be heroically subdued. Of the books written in 
its wake, the works of Robert Utley are an obvious standout, as is Stephen Ambrose’s Crazy 
Horse and Custer, which attempted a comparative study of Custer and one of the men who killed 
him. Utley and Ambrose’s writings are hardly free of bias, but they were among the first modern 
works to draw attention to the fact that the battle was not only lost by Custer but won by his 
Native American opponents. Ambrose offered a reconstruction of the battle that tried to show 
how not only errors on the part of Custer, but intelligent decisions on the part of Crazy Horse, 
influenced how events played out.5 His description of the battle is echoed in Nathaniel 
Philbrick’s The Last Stand, and James Donovan’s A Terrible Glory, likely the two best recent 
works on the Little Bighorn, and among the secondary sources which were most important to this 
study due to their nuanced examinations of both Custer and his Indigenous adversaries.6  
 It is when one steps away from the Little Bighorn and into the historiography of the rest 
of the Great Sioux War that the damage the Custer obsession has done is made clear. Where 
there are dozens of biographies of Custer, far less has been written on the other American 
officers involved in the conflict. Biographies of Sheridan typically focus on his Civil War 
service, while George Crook, Nelson Miles, and Ranald Mackenzie have been fortunate to attract 
biographers at all. If biographies of Alfred Terry or John Gibbon have been written, they have 
not long remained in print, and information on the careers of these two men is best gleaned from 
the primary documentation or studies of the Civil War battles that they participated in. On the 
 
5 Stephen Ambrose, Crazy Horse and Custer: The Parallel Lives of Two American Warriors (New York: Doubleday 
and Company, Inc., 1975): 446-447. 
6 James Donovan, A Terrible Glory (New York: Back Bay Books, 2008). 
Nathaniel Philbrick, The Last Stand (New York: Penguin Books, 2010). 
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Native American side, lives of Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse are common enough but are often 
shot through with the assumptions of the white authors, reliant on Anglo-American sources, or 
filled with gaps where no such sources exist. The Journey of Crazy Horse, by Lakota historian 
Joseph Marshall III is probably the best of the biographies of the Oglala Lakota war-leader, 
drawing on Oglala oral tradition and the existing documentation to compile as accurate a view of 
Crazy Horse’s life as can probably be reconstructed, a view that places the famous warrior in all 
of the necessary contexts, both American and Native American.7 Other Lakota and Cheyenne 
leaders, such as Gall, Crow King, and Two Moons await the same treatment.  
 In the same way men not named George Custer have suffered from his pride of place in 
the historiography, so too have battles at which Custer was not involved—which is to say every 
battle other than the Little Bighorn itself. When the Powder River and the Rosebud are 
discussed, it is usually as preludes to the Little Bighorn, when Slim Buttes, Cedar Creek, or Wolf 
Mountain come up, it is as codas to it. Jerome Greene’s book on Slim Buttes, first published in 
the 1980s remains the only full-length monograph on that engagement, and it is a severely 
flawed work that privileges American propaganda over Native American perceptions to a 
detrimental degree.8 Recently, the Powder River, the Rosebud, and Bad Hand Mackenzie’s 
attack on Dull Knife have each received a full-length book, welcome additions to the field that, 
nevertheless, must be used with care because of the lack of anything to compare them with. No 
such books have been written on Cedar Creek or Wolf Mountain, whose best analyses are found 
in Nelson Miles’ lone modern biography, A Hero to His Fighting Men.9 Studies of the whole of 
 
7 Joseph Marshall III, The Journey of Crazy Horse: A Lakota History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005).  
8 Jerome A. Greene, Slim Buttes, 1876: An Episode of the Great Sioux War (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1982). 




the Great Sioux War, placing each battle in the broader context of the war, are all but unheard of. 
For anyone who hopes to use the secondary literature on the Great Sioux War as a gateway to the 
primary sources, disappointment awaits. If Custer and the Little Bighorn are not involved, the 
hunt is liable to turn up empty. 
 This is a shame, because primary sources on the Great Sioux War are readily available to 
anyone who wishes to access them. Sheridan authored an autobiography, and most of his 
surviving papers (many were destroyed in the Chicago Fire) are available through the Library of 
Congress, including, most vitally, his annual reports for each year that he was Commanding 
Officer, Division of the Missouri. Nelson Miles wrote not one, but two sets of memoirs, in which 
he not only gave his own opinions, but reprinted numerous Army documents relating to the 
conduct of the wars he was involved in, including the Great Sioux War.10 George Crook’s 
autobiography was abandoned partway through, but has been supplemented from his letters. 
Crook’s aide de campe, John Gregory Bourke published his own memoir, On the Border with 
Crook, which is an invaluable source for the general’s career, as are Bourke’s two volume 
diaries.11 Charles King, who served with Crook and Bourke at Slim Buttes left a memoir as well, 
entitled Campaigning With Crook.12 The field diaries of Alfred Terry and Richard Irving Dodge 
(the infantry commander during Crook’s Dull Knife campaign), and several collections of the 
writings of John Gibbon have all been published, and the papers of Ulysses S. Grant, President 
during the opening stages of the war, have been edited and released in a multivolume set. W.A. 
Graham, as noted previously, included both Native American and Anglo-American testimonials 
 
10 Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections of General Nelson A. Miles (Chicago: Werner and Company, 1896); 
Nelson A. Miles, Serving the Republic (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1911). 
11 John Gregory Bourke, On the Border with Crook (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971);John Gregory 
Bourke, The Diaries of John Gregory Bourke Volumes 1 & 2, edited by Charles M. Robinson (Denton: University 
of North Texas, 2003). 
12 Charles King, “Campaigning with Crook,” in Campaigning with Crook and Stories of Army Life (Ann Arbor: 
University Microfilms Inc, 1966). 
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about the Little Bighorn in his Custer Myth, while Jerome Greene edited two separate 
collections, one consisting of documents pertaining to each major engagement of the Great Sioux 
War, the other a companion volume of Lakota and Cheyenne eyewitness accounts of those same 
battles. Further Native American views of the Little Bighorn itself can be found in the three 
volumes worth of interviews with Lakota and Cheyenne witnesses edited by Richard Hardorff.  
 The primary difficulty with Great Sioux War historiography then, lies not in the material 
that is available, but in the ways that material has been used, and which sources have been 
privileged. The overwhelming focus on Custer, for instance, has resulted in writers hunting 
through Indigenous testimony for evidence of what happened to the Lieutenant-Colonel 
personally, even though Custer would have been just another anonymous officer to the Lakota 
and Cheyenne participants. The men who collected that testimony in the first place were plagued 
by many of the same issues, and consequently, the Native American record is littered with 
contradictory statements about what happened to Custer—as is only to be expected when a 
beaten foe is interrogated about questions that they cannot possibly answer by a captor who has 
the power of life or death over them. These contradictions in turn, fuel the already present (and 
very bigoted) notion that Indigenous accounts are of lesser value than those of white 
eyewitnesses, and the entire body of Lakota and Cheyenne evidence about not only the Little 
Bighorn, but the whole Great Sioux War, is often distrusted. With Custer’s immediate command 
having no survivors, writers have had to use Indigenous testimonials for the Little Bighorn, but 
have done so in haphazard fashion, picking and choosing whatever stories will fit their version of 
Custer; when it comes to the other battles of the Great Sioux War, the Lakota and Cheyenne 
commentaries are ignored even more often than the battles themselves.  
13 
 
 Even authors who extensively use Indigenous sourcing, tend to do so in a manner that 
aims more to discredit the witnesses than support them. W.A. Graham included Indigenous 
material in his collection, but did so for the sake of “completeness,” outright telling his audience 
to trust none of it.13 Lakota Noon, a book that attempts to reconstruct the play-by-play of the 
Little Bighorn from Native American accounts, opens by telling its audience that the material is 
all terribly flawed and that they must trust the (white) author to reinterpret it all for them; one 
wonders why he bothered to write the book in the first place.14 Yet an openminded reading of the 
Lakota and Cheyenne interviews reveals that, when they were not being asked unanswerable 
questions about Custer personally, their accounts line up remarkably well with one another. 
Individual details may differ, but that is normal; one can hardly expect, after all, that a 
description of Waterloo or the Somme or the Battle of the Bulge based entirely on the testimony 
of privates and low-ranking officers would be comprehensive or void of contradictions, yet it is 
those very contradictions that Anglo-American academics have indicted their Lakota and 
Cheyenne witnesses for. By reading through the sources first, without a preconceived idea about 
Custer, or the Little Bighorn, or the inherent unreliability of oral Native American accounts in 
mind, one can easily reconstruct not only the general outlines of the battle, but also the 
Indigenous chain of command, such as it was, and from this, figure out whose stories should be 
given the most weight. That few writers have tried to do so is a travesty. 
 Then again, Anglo-American historians have often failed to take full advantage of even 
the US testimony they have access to. Jerome Greene’s work on Slim Buttes, for instance, takes 
John Bourke and Charles King’s claims about having won a great victory over Crazy Horse at 
 
13 Graham, The Custer Myth, 3-4. 
14 Gregory Michno, Lakota Loon: The Indian Narrative of Custer’s Defeat (Missoula: Mountain Press Publishing 
Company, 1997).  
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face value, but spends comparatively little time looking at how the movements described by 
Bourke and especially King, give the lie to both their boasts of an unqualified triumph. Perhaps 
no source, however, has been as thoroughly ill-treated as the memoirs of Nelson Miles, used, if 
at all, to discuss the battles that Miles himself was involved with, and then ignored. Miles, 
probably the US Army’s most effective frontier general, did not confine himself to writing about 
his own personal experiences, but offered a number of critical comments about the conduct of 
the war and its operations, identifying that problems on the ground began not with any of the 
officers present but with Sheridan’s outline for the campaign. Miles’ reflections—and the 
similarly caustic comments made by John Gibbon in a series of magazine articles—are not 
simple grousing, but the cogent observations of an experienced field commander and ‘Indian’ 
fighter, baffled by the instructions he was getting from the top. Miles’ analysis of the Little 
Bighorn battle maps well onto the best modern outlines of the disaster, and demonstrates in detail 
how poor decisions by Terry, Sheridan, and at times, their boss, William Sherman, limited 
Custer’s choices, and reduced his agency, to the point where his calls were a nonfactor in the 
unfolding catastrophe. Since Miles was the officer who ultimately won the Great Sioux War for 
the government it seems safe to say that he knew what he was talking about, and his criticisms of 
the war as conceived by Sheridan need to, and will be, given full consideration here. 
 The historiography of the Anglo-Zulu War has, thankfully, attracted a higher percentage 
of professional historians than the Great Sioux War, which in turn has ensured that a higher 
degree of professionalism in works by their non-academic colleagues. Scholars like John 
Laband, Adrian Greaves, and especially Ian Knight have contributed a great deal to our 
understanding of both the war and the Zulu nation. Knight’s Anatomy of the Zulu Army is not 
only key to understanding the Zulu military, but one of the few extant works to assume that it is 
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possible to analyse, in depth, the structure of an Indigenous army.15 Non-academics like Ron 
Lock have also done much to advance the study of the Anglo-Zulu conflict, with Lock’s writings 
on Isandlwana and Hlobane giving the Zulu more tactical credit than even Knight’s work does.16 
However, many of the same issues that trouble the historiography of the Great Sioux War remain 
in play here. Anthony Durnford is not nearly as polarising a figure as Custer, and Lord 
Chelmsford never escaped the blame for Isandlwana in the way that Phil Sheridan evaded 
responsibility for the Little Bighorn, but the slurs that Chelmsford threw at Durnford remain 
entrenched in the literature and still turn up in descriptions of the battle. Knight and Lock, on 
opposite sides of a debate about whether Isandlwana was an opportunistic attack or a deliberate 
ambush, make almost identical criticisms of Durnford’s leadership, with Lock, whose assertions 
about the British high command being taken in by a Zulu deception plan do not require Durnford 
to be incompetent, being the harsher of the two.17 Despite the well-informed disregard that both 
historians have for Chelmsford’s generalship, they both still draw on comments from his 
defenders when looking to criticize Durnford, speaking to how deeply engrained the notion that 
white officers must be buffoons in order to be defeated by Indigenous peoples truly is. 
 More importantly, while the scholarship on the Anglo-Zulu War lacks a personality as 
destructive to objectivity as George Custer, it has been just as deformed by the British 
propaganda surrounding the skirmish at Rorke’s Drift. Lionised by Chelmsford as saving Natal 
from a Zulu invasion, the stand of a hundred and fifty British soldiers at a trading post has 
become the most recognisable, and for many, the most important battle of the war. Films have 
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been made about it, and it outpaces even Isandlwana itself when it comes to recognition and the 
number of popular works written about it. Most academics in the field know better, yet they still 
cannot help being affected by the mythology surrounding Rorke’s Drift. Ian Knight rightfully 
describes the battle as being of little importance to the Zulu, yet still devotes the latter portion of 
his book Zulu Rising to a detailed analysis of it.18 Full histories of the war, of which there are 
many, do the same, and this enables Rorke’s Drift to retain its inflated import in the scholarship, 
even when those same authors subject its status to rightful criticism.  
 In contrast, most of the other battles of the Zulu War are virtually unknown. Adrian 
Greaves’ book Forgotten Battles of the Zulu War, encompassing Nyzane, Ntombe Drift, 
Hlobane, Khambula, Gingindhlovu, and Ulundi, as well as many lesser skirmishes, was very on 
point in its title.19 While full histories of the Anglo-Zulu War are plentiful (in contrast to the near 
nonexistence of full histories of the Great Sioux War), they all tend to say similar things about 
these less famous battles, rarely differing from one another in anything other than minor details. 
Ian Castle and Ian Knight’s Fearful Hard Times, examining the Siege of Eshowe, and the battles 
at the Nyzane and Ginghindhlovu that bookended it, is an exception to these rules, as is Ron 
Lock’s Blood on the Painted Mountain, the only full monograph dedicated to the twin battles of 
Hlobane and Khambula. Both are valuable works, but with nothing to compare them to, must be 
used carefully. That the Zulu War’s officers are not nearly as well known as those of the Great 
Sioux War is another weakness in the scholarship; there are no modern academic biographies of 
Anthony Durnford, Lord Chelmsford, Charles Knight Pearson, or even Evelyn Wood and 
Redvers Buller, both of whom had distinguished careers after the war. The closest substitute is 
Victoria’s Generals, a compilation of miniature biographies that includes Wood, Buller, and 
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Chelmsford; the chapter on Chelmsford is by John Laband, showing again that the personalities 
of the war are not well known outside of it. 
 As with the Great Sioux War, these difficulties are exacerbated not by an absence of 
primary sources, but by an overreliance on certain ones. Perhaps no primary source has exercised 
a greater influence on the historiography of the Anglo-Zulu War than From Midshipman to Field 
Marshal, the two volume memoirs of Field Marshal Evelyn Wood, who served in the Anglo-
Zulu War as a colonel, and one of Chelmsford’s most trusted subordinates.20 That Wood was an 
incurable egotist who had many reasons to obfuscate details of the war is readily admitted to by 
most researchers, and in Blood on the Painted Mountain Ron Lock demonstrates, in convincing 
and excruciating detail, the ways in which Wood, after the reversal at Hlobane, twisted the 
casualty figures in order to suit the narrative he wished to present. Yet for all Wood’s 
acknowledged mendacity on this front, his claim to have singlehandedly won the war at 
Khambula has largely gone unexamined. Knight, Lock, and Greaves all accept Wood’s 
characterisation of Khambula as a one-sided battle that he could never have lost, and his boast 
that after Khambula, all the fight went out of the Zulu—though this assertion flies in the face of 
Knight’s own work on Gingindhlovu. Only John Laband breaks from this orthodoxy, noting that 
Ulundi, the final battle of the war was a strongly contested action, in which the Zulu fought 
incredibly bravely, and came close to breaching the British square.21 Even then, Laband does not 
dispute Wood’s assessment of Khambula as a great triumph and the key battle of the war, only 
the colonel’s claims about its effect on the Zulu army’s overall resolve. A consultation of other 
primary documents, many of them made available by Laband and Knight themselves in their 
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Archives of Zululand project, would quickly call almost everything Wood says into question, yet 
this has not been done. Wood’s portrait of Khambula—rather like Crook’s positioning of Slim 
Buttes—is taken as received wisdom, even by those who should know better. 
 This is not to suggest that scholars have relied solely on Wood, but rather that they have 
allowed him to guide the narrative of Khambula and have then gone to find other sources that 
verify him. This has been easy enough to do, since most veterans of that battle—of whom Sir 
Redvers Buller, Wood’s cavalry commander, and Commandant Schermbrucker of the Kaffrarian 
Rifles are the most prominent—felt, as Wood did, that they had achieved something great. Buller 
and Schermbrucker did not, however, feel the need to alter their recollections to the extent Wood 
did, and reading their descriptions of the battle, rather than their feelings about it after the fact, 
one quickly reaches the conclusion that the action was much harder fought, and the threat of a 
Zulu triumph far more realistic, than anyone involved wanted to consider. This again makes for a 
strong parallel with Bourke and King’s memoirs of Slim Buttes and point to one of the major 
dangers when investigating any military action: the threat of taking a witness’ feelings at face 
value, even when those emotions conflict with the facts as lain out by that same witness. This 
danger is, perhaps, amplified still more when dealing with colonial military actions, as the 
prejudices of the witness are liable to be all the stronger; not only must defeats at the hands of 
Indigenous foes be flukes, but victories over those same foes must be crushing. That logic drove 
Evelyn Wood, and it has driven those historians who have come after him, and who have 
allowed his thinking to cloud their perception, even as they dispute individual details. 
 Fortunately, other primary sources on the Anglo-Zulu War are easily accessed. Mention 
has already been made of Archives of South Africa-Zululand, a series of five voluminous tomes 
containing vast numbers of government documents relating to the war. Included within these 
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volumes are reports from officers to both Lord Chelmsford and Sir Bartle Frere, correspondence 
between Chelmsford, Bartle Frere, and the Colonial Office and War Office in London, the 
minutes of Parliamentary debates, and articles published by veterans of various battles. John 
Laband, who was the series editor for Archives of South Africa-Zululand also published his own 
primary source collection, comprising Lord Chelmsford’s outgoing correspondence during the 
Zululand campaign. While Chelmsford himself did not write a memoir, his aides William 
Molyneux and Henry Hallam Parr, and his pet reporter, Charles Norris-Newman did.22 Loaded 
with colonialist language, and written with an eye to exonerating their patron, Molyneux, Hallam 
Parr, and Norris-Newman’s books echo the excuses used by Chelmsford and Sir Bartle Frere at 
the time and provide an important glimpse into the coterie of sycophants that surrounded Lord 
Chelmsford. Writing years after Isandlwana, Molyneux, Hallam Parr, and Norris-Newman were 
still searching for scapegoats, and their attempts at fixing the blame to Durnford mimic those of 
their chief, showing just how tight a grip Lord Chelmsford continued to exercise on his men long 
after the war. More positively, these autobiographical works, when compared with one another 
and with Lord Chelmsford’s correspondence, offer a slanted, but important look into 
Chelmsford’s decision-making process. Molyneux especially kept careful track of how many 
troops Chelmsford had available and the condition they were in, making him an important 
resource when it comes to assessing the strength of the Lieutenant-General’s invasion columns.  
 Another important memoir comes from Commandant George Hamilton-Browne, an Irish 
soldier-of-fortune whose outsider perspective is invaluable when trying to pick apart the closed 
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world of the British officer class.23 Hamilton-Browne’s claims of seeing service in New Zealand 
before the Anglo-Zulu War have been called into question, but his honesty about what happened 
on the ground in South Africa has never been in doubt, and he has seen regular use by historians 
when looking for details on Isandlwana and Gingindhlovu, both battles he was present for. The 
mercenary’s perspective on the men he served with has been less frequently utilised; here it will 
be given fuller consideration. Whatever his real antecedents, Hamilton-Browne was still a 
professional soldier, and his critique of Lord Chelmsford’s staff is well-worth incorporating. 
Much the same might be said for the Narrative of Field Operations Connected with the Zulu 
War, compiled at the War Office by Captain J.S. Rothwell in the 1880s, with the goal of figuring 
out what had gone wrong in the field.24 While the Narrative is mostly a dispassionate summary 
of the available facts, the opinion of the author, and therefore of the War Office, often bleeds 
through, revealing Rothwell, and his patron, the Duke of Cambridge (commander-in-chief of the 
British Army, and cousin to Queen Victoria), largely shared Hamilton-Browne’s opinion of Lord 
Chelmsford’s staff officers. The Narrative and Hamilton-Browne’s A Lost Legionary in South 
Africa overlap a great deal in their examination of the failure at Isandlwana, with Hamilton-
Browne providing the perspective of an auxiliary field officer and the Narrative the opinion of 
the top brass. One would not necessarily expect Hamilton-Browne, an Irish expat and soldier-
for-hire, and Rothwell, proxy for a royal scion like Cambridge, to agree on much, and their 
shared opinions go a long way towards legitimising one another as sources.  
 Perhaps the most underutilised of the major primary sources for the Anglo-Zulu War, 
however, is one of the oldest. The History of the Zulu War and Its Origin first appeared early in 
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1880, less than a year after the end of the war.25 Its author, Frances Ellen “Nell” Colenso, was 
the daughter of the Bishop of Natal, and had a close relationship with Anthony Durnford, a 
relationship that some characterize as romantic. Colenso reacted strongly to Bartle Frere and 
Chelmsford’s attacks on Durnford and with the assistance of his brother Edward, published her 
own book defending the deceased colonel. Drawing on state documents, newspapers, personal 
interviews with soldiers, and her family’s longstanding connections in Zululand, Colenso 
mounted a furious attack on Bartle Frere and Chelmsford, establishing their guilt for not only the 
defeat at Isandlwana, but for conspiring to start the war in the first place. While Colenso’s book 
is usually mentioned by historians, there is a tendency to write her off as biased, and therefore of 
limited use, a tendency which may sadly stem from ill-concealed sexism, rather than any genuine 
basis. All the primary sources for the Anglo-Zulu War are biased, some more than others, and 
whatever her relationship with Durnford may have been, Colenso was certainly no less objective 
than Evelyn Wood, or the likes of Molyneux, Hallam Parr, and Norris-Newman. Hamilton-
Browne considered Colenso’s book to be extremely accurate, and in his own memoirs, referred 
his readers to it, noting that Colenso could say things in it that he wished to, but could not. The 
War Office Narrative does not mention Colenso by name but uses many of the same primary 
sources that she does, many of which would not have been readily available in Great Britain; 
evidently the Horse Guards considered her a worthy authority on what had happened at 
Isandlwana. There is little reason that a modern historian should not do the same. 
 With that in mind, this dissertation draws heavily on Colenso’s investigation into the 
outbreak of the war and her criticism of Lord Chelmsford and Sir Bartle Frere’s coverup after 
Isandlwana, as well as her reconstruction of events at Isandlwana itself, which rivals the War 
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Office Narrative and exceeds that of most eyewitness accounts when it comes to summarising 
the battle. Only a very few Zulu were ever interviewed about Isandlwana, and those same few 
depositions consequently appear across most sources that wish to consider the Zulu viewpoint. 
Colenso, however, was able to offer commentary on these Zulu interviews that others were not, 
drawing on her family’s personal relationship with King Cetshwayo, and her assessment of his 
character, to provide important contexts that white writers then and now have often missed. 
Likewise, soldiers and staff officers who were too afraid to speak out against Chelmsford or 
Bartle Frere publicly, were willing to talk to Colenso, and these private exchanges allowed her to 
pinpoint the worst sources of malfeasance and misconduct in Chelmsford’s staff. Her description 
of the action at Isandlwana therefore not only equals or exceeds that of the War Office Narrative 
in detail but grants insight into the decisions made by Durnford and by the Zulu that are missing 
from the Narrative, and from the individual testimony of survivors like Hamilton-Browne. The 
Narrative itself, as noted above, clearly drew heavily on Colenso in its sections on Isandlwana, 
and Hamilton-Browne outright told his readers that if they wanted to understand the battle, they 
needed to read The History of the Zulu War and Its Origin. The current author has taken their 
advice, and Colenso’s work is given its due weight in the pages that follow. 
 In light of all the historiographical problems outlined above, it should not be a surprise 
that the only previous effort at a full comparison of the Great Sioux and Anglo-Zulu Wars, James 
Gump’s The Dust Rose Like Smoke, was severely flawed. Like most historians looking at the 
Great Sioux War, Gump was unable to put Custer in his proper place as a Lieutenant-Colonel 
and commander of a single unit, and instead ended up attempting a one-for-one comparison 
between the roles of Custer and Lord Chelmsford, a Lieutenant-General, and the man in charge 
of the entirety of Britain’s South African forces. Neither Phil Sheridan nor Anthony Durnford 
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featured in a major way in The Dust Rose Like Smoke, even though a proper comparison of the 
officers involved can only be done by contrasting Sheridan with Chelmsford, and Custer with 
Durnford. The Dust Rose Like Smoke likewise engaged with few of the debates in the field of 
either war, missing the chance to note the overlap between those debates, and instead accepting 
the most general consensus as being all that was needed to found a comparison on. This is not to 
say that Gump’s work lacks value: it is an excellent social history, and his use of the similarities 
between the conflicts to launch an assault on the idea of American exceptionalism is worth the 
time of any reader who wishes to see that academic dead end appropriately aerated. His book, 
however, offers almost nothing to the military historian, saying little about the tactics employed 
on all sides, and giving only a cursory look at the coverup and press response.  
 There are lessons to be learned from a comparative study of the Great Sioux War and the 
Anglo-Zulu War, lessons about the nature of colonial warfare, lessons about the impact of 
bigotry on military planning, lessons about how empires reacted to defeat in the nineteenth 
century, lessons about what tactics were most effective against Indigenous adversaries and which 
were not. There are lessons to be learned on the other side too, about what enabled some 
Indigenous polities to stand up to their would-be conquerors, about the organisation of the 
military in non-white societies, and how those militaries were able to defeat, however briefly, 
technologically superior opponents. These lessons, however, cannot be learned from The Dust 
Rose Like Smoke, or even from most of the existing secondary literature on the two wars. A new 
study that puts both the Great Sioux War and the Anglo-Zulu War side by side as military 







Chapter 1: Imperial Armies and Frontier Generals 
 
  Few men could, at first glance, have as little in common as Lieutenant-Generals Philip 
Henry Sheridan and Sir Frederic Augustus Thesiger II. The first was the working-class son of 
poor Irish immigrants to the United States and rose to power through a combination of good 
luck, patronage, and a talent for the application of brute force without empathy. The American 
Army’s most dedicated proponent of total war, he had little time for social or military niceties. 
The second was the cultured, classically educated son of German-English nobility, who wore a 
monocle, played the clarinet, and viewed war as a gentleman’s sport with clear rules of conduct. 
He was a personal friend of Queen Victoria, staged amateur theatricals for the amusement of his 
men, and on the death of his father, ascended to the rank of Baron, becoming the Right 
Honourable Lord Chelmsford. Given their respective class, ethnic, and military backgrounds, it 
is fair to surmise that, had Phil Sheridan and Lord Chelmsford ever been forced to endure one 
another’s company, they would have taken an instant and hearty dislike to one another. 
 Yet for all their differences in background, military experience, and moral outlook, Phil 
Sheridan and Lord Chelmsford played much the same role in their respective wars. Both acted as 
the supreme military authorities in their area of operations: Sheridan as Commanding Officer of 
the Division of the Missouri, Chelmsford as Commanding General South African Forces. 
Moreover, both men served in political, as well as military capacities, and were not only 
responsible for waging wars against their nation’s indigenous enemies but were at the heart of 
the conspiracies to start those wars. The Great Sioux War was Phil Sheridan’s pet project, which 
he began working toward from the moment he assumed control over the Division of the 
Missouri, his conflicts against other Plains tribes serving as testing grounds for the war he truly 
wanted to fight. The Anglo-Zulu War, likewise, came about as a product of Chelmsford’s desire 
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for military glory, which saw him conspire with Sir Henry Bartle Frere and Sir Theophilus 
Shepstone to bring about an invasion of Zululand. Sheridan and Chelmsford, in wading into 
these politicised waters, show how integrated the military elite was into the ruling class of 
American and British society, as well as demonstrating the power that a frontier general could 
unilaterally wield in his theatre of operations. Any checks and balances meant to stop the army 
from interfering in civilian affairs were decidedly absent in the American West or the South 
African borderlands, and Sheridan and Chelmsford could, and did, assert their authority over 
civilian (and military) opponents with relative impunity. 
 More interestingly still, once Sheridan and Chelmsford were able to launch their wars 
they conducted them according to what was, for all intents and purposes, the same plan of 
campaign. The two generals shared a fear that their non-white enemies were too cowardly and 
weak to meet Anglo-American soldiers in conventional, head-to-head warfare, and that they 
might therefore be in for a long, grueling guerilla war, a situation they wished to avoid at all 
costs. Both were involved in previous counterinsurgency campaigns against Native American or 
African adversaries, and both were afraid of the expenses and bad press such operations 
generated, and the time they wasted. Trying to allay these concerns, the American and the British 
general came up with operational schemes that relied on using small, theoretically self-sufficient 
columns to run down fleeing enemies. As future chapters will demonstrate, it was this disposition 
of forces that created the circumstances under which American and British officers would be 
beaten at the Rosebud, the Little Bighorn, Slim Buttes, Isandlwana, Ntombe Drift, and Hlobane.  
 That Sheridan and Chelmsford came up with the same mistaken notion for their 
campaigns says a great deal about the bigotry and colonial reasoning that pervaded both the 
American and British officer class in the 1870s. With little in their personal histories that would 
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have resulted in their thinking being so aligned, one must look to the institutions the two generals 
were part of, and the ideas that were prevalent in those institutions to explain their actions. 
Neither Sheridan nor Chelmsford were fools, and neither, despite the claims of some historians, 
were their subordinates. As brief summaries of their careers will show, Phil Sheridan and his 
field commanders, of whom the most important were George Crook, Alfred Terry, John Gibbon, 
and George Armstrong Custer, were all veteran American Civil War officers with records 
ranging from the solidly competent to the outright spectacular. Similarly, Lord Chelmsford, 
Charles Knight Pearson, Sir Evelyn Wood, Sir Redvers Buller, and Anthony Durnford were all 
veterans of either the Crimean War or of Britain’s many colonial wars around the world. None of 
these men were particularly or uniquely incompetent, and none had anything in their personal 
histories to suggest that their behaviour in the field would be anything other than exemplary.  
 The problems that these officers experienced lay not in their personal failings, but in the 
system they were a part of and the limits it placed on their capacity for reasoned decision 
making. Imperial armies, which is what the American and British militaries were in the 1870s, 
before they were anything else, put serious restraints on the ability of officers to engage with 
reality, providing them with a set of stereotypes about indigenous foes that were to be used in 
place of military intelligence. Some officers bought into this way of thinking wholeheartedly 
while others were more suspicious, but so long as the men at the top accepted these ideas, the 
ability of men further down the totem pole to push back against them was badly impaired. 
Sheridan and Chelmsford, at the start of their respective wars, were both true believers in this 
style of colonial reasoning, and they imposed their way of thinking on the men below them, 






 From 1868 onward, the man who most influenced American “Indian” policy was Philip 
Henry Sheridan, Lieutenant-General and Commanding Officer of the Division of the Missouri. 
Responsible for administering a military fiefdom stretching from Montana, Wyoming and the 
Dakotas down to the Texas border, Sheridan’s domain included more than 300 000 of those 
Native Americans who had not yet been confined to reservations. It was a situation rife with the 
potential for conflict, as Sheridan—“Little Phil” to his admiring men—owed his entire career to 
his ability and willingness to inflict violence on others. The son of Irish-Catholic immigrants to 
the United States, Sheridan grew up impoverished, his father, a manual labourer, barely able to 
provide for his large family. While the senior Sheridan did improve his lot somewhat, becoming 
a freelance contractor with paid employees, he never held onto the money for long, and this 
financial instability left a definite mark on his younger son. By the time Phil Sheridan was in his 
early teens, he was already afflicted with the legendarily bad temper that became a hallmark of 
his military career, rendering the boy unsuited for life at the bottom of the social ladder in small 
town Ohio. Dropping out of school, Sheridan found work as a clerk in a dry goods store, where 
the teenager struck up an unlikely friendship with the local Congressman. Exploiting this 
relationship, eighteen-year-old Sheridan wrangled himself a place at the United States military 
academy at West Point in 1848, escaping from Somerset, Ohio for good, and bringing only his 
new uniform and a great deal of emotional baggage with him. 
 West Point was established in the 1790s, after a string of embarrassing reversals in the 
Northwest Indian War of 1790-1795 persuaded the government the country needed a 
professional army and officer corps. Despite its origins, West Point’s curriculum offered little in 
the way of an education in unconventional warfare, preferring instead to focus on classical 
military history and, by the time Sheridan got there, the campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte. 
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Between the year of its foundation and Sheridan’s arrival in 1848, the American Army was 
involved in dozens of operations, both large and small, against Indigenous adversaries, with even 
its two conventional wars—the War of 1812, and the Mexican War—folding in, respectively, 
lengthy campaigns against the Shawnee Confederacy and the Comanche and Apache. Yet the 
emphasis remained on warfare against European-style enemies with the academy’s top graduates 
owing their high placements to the memorisation of Napoleonic stratagems and tactical ploys, 
rather than material that might be relevant to the foes they were most likely to face in the field. 
Robert E. Lee and several other future Confederate generals were typical of the kind of graduates 
West Point was looking for and got top marks, while Ulysses S. Grant, whose embrace of a 
modern strategy of attrition defeated Lee and his compatriots in the coming Civil War, 
consistently placed in the bottom of his class. 
 Retrospectively, it was a strange outlook for an army and an academy that owed their 
very existence to colonial wars on the frontier. In the immediate aftermath of the American 
Revolution, George Washington and the other Founding Fathers aimed to disband the American 
Army, viewing permanent militaries as instruments of tyranny, rather than defense. The 
protection of the nation, they thought, would rest with militia companies who could be raised 
when needed and dismissed afterwards. The Northwest Indian War, which saw American 
militiamen and volunteer generals brutally defeated by Shawnee and Miami fighters, taught the 
Americans they needed a standing army and a professional officer corps, though even then, they 
tried to keep this force as small as possible. The militia had to fail the United States several more 
times, most notably in the War of 1812, before the USA considered enlarging the army, and 
increasing the number of admittees to West Point. These reforms remained insufficient, however, 
and in the Mexican War the regular troops were augmented with significant numbers of 
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Volunteers, a process that played out again in the American Civil War. This vicious cycle, 
wherein the army was strengthened in the immediate aftermath of disaster or difficulty, then 
reduced in size once peace was made, is the subject of numerous books and scholarly articles and 
is largely outside the purview of this study. It is mentioned here, however, to provide context for 
the education which Sheridan and his peers received at West Point in the 1840s and 1850s.  
 Admittedly, educating Sheridan proved to be of immense difficulty for most of the 
professors at West Point. Arriving angry and agitated, Sheridan left much the same way, having 
accumulated one hundred eighty-nine demerits—eleven short of the number needed for 
permanent expulsion. His grades were consistently in the bottom third of the class, and he only 
just barely scraped together enough of an average to graduate. These lacklustre grades may be 
explained by the fact that Sheridan was too busy fighting with other students to study—many of 
those demerits were awarded for fistfights, assaults, and other acts of violence against fellow 
members of the student body. When the short, surly Ohioan was graduated in 1853, the best that 
West Point Superintendent Robert E. Lee could say of him was that he was “well qualified for all 
corps.” Sheridan was immediately shipped out West, where less than 7000 soldiers were tasked 
with guarding half the continental United States. 
 From 1853 until the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, the newly commissioned Second 
Lieutenant Sheridan served in the Pacific Northwest where his interactions with discontented 
Native Americans shaped his perceptions of frontier warfare for years to come. The early pages 
of Sheridan’s memoirs are littered with invective against the Pacific peoples, whom he 
repeatedly described as “cruel,” “treacherous” and “savage.”26 In an 1855 expedition against the 
Yakima, Sheridan, leading a party of mounted infantry, struck at a Yakima campsite, but only 
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destroyed part of the Yakima food supply, the tribesmen making good their escape. Days later, 
Sheridan encountered a body of Yakima warriors, yet could not induce them to stand and fight 
against his dragoons; in his memoirs he complained that “all our efforts were in vain, for as we 
advanced, they retreated, and as we drew back they reappeared and renewed their parade and 
noisy demonstrations.”27 Unable to bring the Yakima to battle, Sheridan fell back and rejoined 
the infantry under Brigadier-General Rains, who Sheridan felt had been of little use in the 
fighting.  
The next day Sheridan begged Rains to let him charge a Yakima war-party that was 
harassing their advance but Rains’ “extreme caution led him to refuse the suggestion.”28 Later 
Rains did permit Sheridan to drive the Yakima from a nearby hill, but then immediately ordered 
him to fall back, allowing the Yakima to retake the hill. In the end, the Yakima fled before 
Rains’ advance, yet Sheridan was again not allowed to pursue, a fact that bothered the aggressive 
young officer for years afterward. In his memoirs Sheridan denounced Rains as incompetent and 
the expedition as a “dismal failure”, one that could have been rectified if only he and his 
mounted men had been allowed to attack the Yakima.29 On the former point, he may have been 
onto something; shortly after the expedition’s conclusion Rains and Captain E.O.C. Ord, 
Sheridan’s immediate superior, charged one another with incompetency, with courts-martial of 
both falling through because of a lack of officers with which to form a jury to try them.30 
 Sheridan blamed Rains for subsequent difficulties with the tribes of the Cascades region, 
believing Rains’ inability to bring the Yakima to heel encouraged other tribes to turn hostile. 
Sheridan was involved in skirmishes against bands of Cascades and Yakima, and after the war, 
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in the sentencing of Cascades he believed guilty of murdering settlers.31 Left in charge of a post 
at Rogue River, Sheridan spent the next several years of his career adjudicating tribal disputes 
and trying to suppress local traditions relating to “witch-doctors”. Relegated to this most 
backwater of backwater duties, Sheridan’s respect for the Indigenous tribes of the Pacific did not 
increase, and his remembrances of this period are filled with contempt for the “senseless and 
monstrous practices” of the Rogue River bands.32 When considering Sheridan’s future attitudes 
towards the Lakota and Cheyenne and the plans he drafted for battling them, these formative 
experiences in the Pacific Northwest should be kept in mind. While far from the most congenial 
or likeable of men, Phil Sheridan was not incompetent, and as his Civil War record demonstrates, 
was an immensely successful officer in his own milieu. He was never, however, able to move 
past his initial impressions of what he believed all Indigenous peoples were like, and this had 
important ramifications for his future frontier campaigns. 
 It was the American Civil War that propelled Phil Sheridan to the heights of power. 
Before it broke out he was a Second Lieutenant in a remote post with little chance of promotion. 
When it ended he was a Major-General, and even more importantly, the third ranking man in the 
American Army behind only Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman. Sheridan was 
not the only officer to achieve rapid promotion during the Civil War—the Army expanded by 
orders of magnitude, and the defection of many of West Point’s aristocratic best to the newborn 
Confederate States of America, meant trained Union officers were in short supply. Men who 
began the war as Lieutenants and Captains often finished it as Brigadier-Generals and Major-
Generals, and new officers with no prior military employment could end up commanding tens of 
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thousands of men by 1865. Every American officer of import to this study was a Civil War 
veteran, and they all rose from obscurity as a product of their service therein.  
Even by these standards Sheridan’s rise was meteoric and unlike many of his 
contemporaries, he kept his new position after the war was over. In order to deal with the influx 
of new recruits, the Union armies created a two-track system with the Regular Army maintaining 
its prewar structure while new units were funnelled into the Volunteer Army, which existed 
solely for the duration of the Civil War. Officers assigned to the Volunteer units ran the gamut 
from former soldiers returning to duty like Grant, to new hires with no formal military 
experience like Alfred Terry, to Regular officers like Sheridan who were seconded to the 
Volunteer formations. Those who had been Regulars before the war, or who intended to stay in 
the Army after the war was over, accordingly held two separate ranks: their rank in the 
Volunteers, which they kept for the war, and their rank in the Regulars, which they reverted to 
during the postwar downsizing. When the war was over most of the men who held general 
officer status were reduced in rank by at least one grade, and sometimes by many more. This 
situation fueled rivalries in the postwar army as Regular officers found themselves serving under 
men who held equivalent rank to them in the Volunteer Army. Sheridan, however, finished the 
Civil War a Major-General of Volunteers and a Major-General of Regulars, something that few 
other officers save Grant and Sherman accomplished. How Sheridan achieved this is a 
fascinating story in its own right, and provides insight into his future approaches to warfare. 
 Within weeks of the South’s secession Sheridan was promoted to First Lieutenant and 
then to Captain, all without firing a shot. Sheridan was intended to serve as a Captain in the 13th 
United States Infantry, but never reached his regiment, being pulled for duty as a quartermaster 
and commissary by Major-General Henry Wager Halleck, commanding the bulk of Union 
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operations in the West. Sheridan’s teenage experience as a clerk came in useful here and the new 
Captain eventually found himself as Halleck’s Chief Quartermaster. In his memoirs, Sheridan 
recalled that Halleck always treated him well but that he chafed to get into action.33 He got his 
chance on May 27, 1862, when a letter arrived from the Governor of Michigan, appointing 
Sheridan as Colonel of the 2nd Regiment Michigan Volunteer Cavalry. Sheridan was never sure 
how his name was sent to the Governor in the first place but there is a solid chance that then 
Brigadier-General William Sherman, whose wife Sheridan knew as a child, and who previously 
tried to get Sheridan a position as Colonel of an Ohio regiment, had something to do with it.34 
 The appointment to the 2nd Michigan was a turning point in Sheridan’s career, with 
accolades and promotions soon following. In a raid into Confederate territory around Booneville, 
Sheridan’s Union cavalry busied themselves with wrecking Confederate railway 
communications “by tearing up the track, bending the rails, and burning the crossties.”35 While 
Halleck’s army drove on Corinth, Sheridan raided Confederate supply lines and railroad depots, 
taking only minimal losses and inflicting significant damage to Confederate General P.G.T. 
Beauregard’s army in the process. “The results of the expedition,” Sheridan remembered, “were 
important; the railroad being broken so thoroughly as to cut off all rolling stock north of 
Booneville, and to place at the service of General Halleck’s army the cars and locomotives of 
which the retreating Confederates were now so much in need. In addition, we burned twenty-six 
cars containing ten thousand stand of small arms, three pieces of artillery, a great quantity of 
clothing, a heavy supply of ammunition, and the personal baggage of General Leonidas Polk. A 
large number of prisoners, mostly sick and convalescent, also fell into our hands.”36 As the 
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Confederates pulled out of Corinth, Sheridan harassed their rearguard; years later he wondered 
why Halleck did not allow a more aggressive pursuit, believing that “it would largely have aided 
in disintegrating his [Beauregard’s] forces, and I could never quite understand why it was not 
ordered.”37 When Sheridan’s immediate superior was promoted, command of the brigade fell to 
him, and after a series of skirmishes with the Confederate cavalry, the District Commander, 
William Rosecrans recommended Sheridan for promotion to Brigadier-General. Sheridan, 
transferred on Rosecrans’ suggestion to Louisville, did not find out about his new title until he 
arrived there and his new superior, Major-General “Bull” Nelson, ordered him to change the 
insignia on his shoulder straps and to take charge of his new division.38 
 As a divisional commander, Sheridan fought with Don Carlos Buell at Perryville, and 
with William Rosecrans again at Murfreesboro, Bridgeport, and Chickamauga. At Murfreesboro, 
Sheridan’s Division held the line when Braxton Bragg’s Confederates launched a surprise assault 
that sent all the rest running. Sheridan lost all four of his brigade commanders and a third of his 
men and shot away almost all his ammunition before Rosecrans stemmed the bleeding and sent 
up reinforcements to stabilise the front.39 It was probably this incident that led Rosecrans to 
promote Sheridan to Major-General and to send Sheridan to cover Major-General George 
Thomas’ withdrawal from Chickamauga several months later. Of the 4000 men and officers 
Sheridan had at the start of the action at Chickamauga, he lost 1517, including two of his new 
brigade commanders. Retreating inside Chattanooga alongside Thomas’ command, Sheridan 
endured the Confederate siege of the town, relying on his attached cavalry to smuggle food into 
the entrenchments for his men.40 Soon after, Ulysses S. Grant, fresh from his triumph at 
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Vicksburg and newly appointed to command of all forces in the Western theatre, took over 
operations around Chattanooga and replaced Rosecrans with Thomas. Sheridan, a favourite of 
Rosecrans’, survived the transition due to the services he rendered Thomas, and came to Grant’s 
attention during the breakout from Chattanooga, when his division not only took the Missionary 
Ridge defensive positions from the Confederacy, but scaled the entire mountain. Reinforced by 
Grant before the breakout, Sheridan assaulted Missionary Ridge with 6000 men, losing 1181, 
and the young officer’s eagerness to fight and willingness to endure high casualties caught 
Grant’s eye.41  
 No officer Sheridan served with or under had a greater effect on his worldview than 
Ulysses Grant did. A failure and an alcoholic in civilian life, Grant reinvented himself as the 
Union’s most capable general during the Civil War, throwing aside all he learned of Napoleonic 
wars of maneuver at West Point, and engaging the Confederacy in a grinding war of attrition he 
knew the Union would eventually win. While neo-Confederate historians have tried their best to 
obscure this point, Grant was not callous with the lives of his men, nor did he sustain especially 
high casualties in relation to other officers, Union or Confederate. Rather, Grant understood, as 
many previous Union officers had not, that high casualties were inevitable in a war as 
technologically and tactically transformative as the American Civil War, and that they were not a 
reason to call retreat. Where his contemporaries deceived themselves into believing the 
Confederacy was not taking anything like the casualty rates the Union was, Grant knew they had 
to be, and that unlike the Union, the Confederacy did not have the manpower or the resources to 
make up the losses. Rather than trying to take the enemy’s cities, Grant focussed his war effort 
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on the physical destruction of the Confederate armies, aiming to bring the conflict to a close by 
terminating the CSA’s ability to make war. Those closest to Grant, of whom Sherman and 
Sheridan were undoubtedly the two he trusted most, absorbed much of his philosophy of war and 
refined it according to their personal dispositions and the situations they found themselves in. 
 When Grant was promoted to General-in-Chief Sheridan was one of the officers he 
brought East with him. Sheridan was made chief of the Army of the Potomac’s cavalry, and his 
aggressive personal style saw the Union horsemen win their greatest victory over their 
Confederate counterparts at Yellow Tavern, where the infamous Southern cavalier J.E.B. Stuart 
was killed by troopers under George Custer. Some historians have criticized this operation, 
writing that it was of little practical value to the Union’s war goals, but there is no denying that it 
revitalised the spirits of the Northern cavalry which, up to that point, had been flagging low 
indeed.42 It also convinced Grant that Sheridan could be trusted with an independent command, 
and on August 1, 1864, Sheridan was transferred again, sent to the Shenandoah Valley to 
consolidate the region’s multiple commands into a single Army of the Shenandoah.  
Sheridan was not Grant’s first choice for the job. When he first got news that Robert E. 
Lee had sent his henchman, Jubal Early, to raid the Shenandoah Valley and that Early was 
getting the best of the Valley’s disunited defenders, Grant had thought to send Major-General 
George Gordon Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac. These intentions lasted until 
Grant was made aware of how Early was conducting his march up the Valley. A slaver and a 
social pariah in civilian life, Jubal Early was never overly burdened with scruples, and his 
Shenandoah campaign was characterised by what can best be described as aimless brutality. 
 
42 Even Eric J. Wittenberg, whose work is hardly complimentary of Sheridan, grants that with him in charge the 
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Early’s men robbed towns, lynched or enslaved African-Americans, and burned homesteads 
seemingly at random.43 Lee, it would seem, let Early off his leash, with orders to cause as much 
pointless atrocity as possible, in the hopes it would force the Union into diverting resources to 
protect the Valley’s civilians. Grant, thoroughly displeased with Lee’s tactics, decided to reply in 
kind, wanting someone who would match Early transgression for transgression, in order to teach 
Lee this sort of behaviour would not be tolerated by the new Union leadership. Grant suspected 
that Sheridan, with his history of violent behaviour and his demonstrated willingness to torch 
Confederate infrastructure, might be the man for this task. “In pushing up the Shenandoah 
Valley,” he told Sheridan, “as it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirous that 
nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock 
wanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot be consumed, destroy.”44 
 Sheridan vindicated Grant’s trust in him, burning the Shenandoah Valley to the ground 
and, almost as an afterthought, smashing Early’s army while he was at it. One of the Civil War’s 
most controversial campaigns, Sheridan’s rampage through the Valley attracts defenders and 
detractors in equal numbers. The latter, repelled by Sheridan’s self-serving memoirs and his 
continuously abusive treatment of his subcommanders, have often tried to give all credit for the 
triumph in the Valley to those subordinates. They have also tended to insist that Sheridan was 
only victorious because of his vast superiority in numbers and that Early outgeneralled Sheridan 
at every turn.45 These assessments, however, are reliant on the recollections of Early himself, and 
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if Sheridan is to be deemed untrustworthy, Early is doubly so. After the war was over, Early 
became a ‘historian’ in name, if not in fact, and helped to create the myth of the Lost Cause, 
which deified Robert E. Lee and the other Confederate leaders, downplayed the role of slavery in 
starting the war, and tried to paint all Union generals as incompetents and buffoons. Not content 
with perpetuating a historical fraud, Early also lent his name to the corrupt Louisiana Lottery 
system which bilked thousands of his fellow Southerners out of millions of dollars during the 
Reconstruction years. Tellingly, Lee, who Early attempted to raise to sainthood and who was 
perennially incapable of publicly criticizing the character of any of his officers, always seemed 
faintly disgusted by Early, describing him as “my old, bad man.”  
 Sheridan never doubted that he won a great victory over Early and boasted of it in his 
memoirs. He was not shy about the material destruction he wreaked in the Valley, and was, if 
anything, downright proud of it. “I endorsed Grant’s programme,” Sheridan wrote, “for I do not 
hold war to mean simply that lines of men shall engage each other in battle, and material 
interests be ignored. This is but a duel, in which one combatant seeks the other’s life; war means 
much more, and is far worse than this. Those who rest at home in peace and plenty see but little 
of the horrors attending such a duel, and even grow indifferent to them as the struggle goes on, 
contenting themselves with encouraging all who are able-bodied to enlist in the cause, to fill up 
the shattered ranks as death thins them. It is another matter, however, when deprivation and 
suffering are brought to their own doors. Then the case appears much graver, for the loss of 
property weighs heavy with the most of mankind; heavier often, than the sacrifices made on the 
field of battle. Death is popularly considered the maximum of punishment in war, but it is not; 
reduction to poverty brings prayers for peace more surely and more quickly than does the 
destruction of human life, as the selfishness of man has demonstrated in more than one great 
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conflict.”46 It was a description of what we would now term ‘total war’, in which no distinction 
is made between civilians and military personnel, and all parts of a society become legitimate 
targets. When Sheridan left the Shenandoah Valley it was a smoking crater. He would try to 
apply the same stratagems against the Plains tribes years later. 
 With the Valley campaign over, Sheridan returned to the Army of the Potomac and 
resumed control of its cavalry, seeing out the rest of the war under Grant. As the Confederate 
States fell apart and Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia collapsed in the face of relentless pressure 
from Grant, it was Sheridan who led the pursuit of Lee, his vanguard hounding the Confederate 
general and not allowing his army a minute’s rest, until Lee, trapped at Appomattox, was left 
with no choice but to surrender to Grant. During those last weeks, Sheridan was everywhere, 
regularly exposing himself to fire, and galvanising his men into action through sheer force of 
personality. On one occasion a Union Private, fatally shot through the throat, followed 
Sheridan’s bellowed command to “Pick up your gun, man and move right on the front,” and 
staggered forward several steps before keeling over dead.47 Eric J. Wittenberg, an anti-Sheridan 
historian who wrote an entire book debunking the general’s career nevertheless admitted that 
Sheridan’s pursuit of Lee was his finest moment. “During the war’s final campaign,” Wittenberg 
wrote, “Sheridan showed that he could effectively command a combined arms operation. The 
cavalry, along with infantry corps from two different armies, led the chase across the Virginia 
countryside. The coordination and logistics of such an effort required skill, and Sheridan 
demonstrated that skill successfully.”48 Quoting another historian hostile to Sheridan, Wittenberg 
added, “‘there is no finer instance of a pursuit than that of Lee’s army by Sheridan in 1865.’”49 
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 In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, Sheridan spent three unhappy years as the 
military governor of Reconstruction Texas, battling Comanche raiders and Confederate diehards 
while trying to protect the local African-American population from the Klan. It was bitter, 
unfulfilling work, and prompted Sheridan to declare that “If I owned Texas and Hell, I would 
rent Texas, and live in Hell.”50 Sheridan’s willingness to hang both members of lynch mobs and 
those who tried to protect them endeared him to elements of the African-American community, 
but earned him the hatred of local whites, and led President Andrew Johnson to demand 
Sheridan’s transfer out of the state. He was sent to the Department of the Missouri, where, 
despite the recent cessation of hostilities between the United States government and a Native 
American alliance led by the Oglala Lakota Red Cloud, tensions continued to run high. 
Sheridan’s solution to these ongoing problems was to mount a winter campaign against the 
Southern Cheyenne, using George Armstrong Custer’s 7th Cavalry as his main striking arm. The 
resultant attack on a friendly Southern Cheyenne encampment under Black Kettle on the banks 
of the Washita River was a success insofar as the Americans killed a large number of Cheyenne 
while taking few losses themselves, but was a failure in all the respects that actually mattered. 
Black Kettle, who was killed in the assault, was a peace chief, albeit one of the most victimized 
in the history of the United States; the 1864 Sand Creek Massacre, where several hundred of 
Black Kettle’s followers were murdered by US Volunteers under John Chivington helped to 
inaugurate the hostilities that Sheridan was supposedly trying to put an end to now. Never one 
for admitting to a mistake, Sheridan insisted that Black Kettle only pretended to be friendly to 
the United States, and that the Battle of the Washita was an unqualified victory, a sentiment that 
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was echoed in the Western press.51 Eastern papers, traditionally more friendly to Native 
Americans than their frontier counterparts, decried it as another massacre in the tradition of Sand 
Creek. 
 Battle or Massacre, the Washita was the last time Sheridan took the field. In 1869, 
Ulysses S. Grant became President of the United States, William Tecumseh Sherman became 
General-in-Chief of the Army, and Phil Sheridan became the Lieutenant-General Commanding 
the Division of the Missouri. Encompassing the Departments of the Platte, the Dakotas, the 
Missouri, Texas, and, eventually, Arizona, the Division of the Missouri was the largest and most 
active of the United States’ military Divisions. It was also among the most independent. The 
Districts, Departments, and Divisions of the United States Army were, in many ways, near feudal 
fiefdoms in which the Commanding Officer, whatever his rank, enjoyed considerable leeway to 
implement whatever policies he saw fit, constrained only by whatever influence the officer 
immediately above him cared to exercise.  
In Sheridan’s case, the only officer above him was William Sherman, who, after quickly 
embroiling himself in a feud with Grant’s Secretary of War, functionally abdicated his 
responsibilities as General-in-Chief, moving his headquarters to Saint Louis and limiting his role 
in making policy. With the Grant administration preoccupied with issues of civil rights and 
Reconstruction, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs plagued by scandals, Sheridan gathered 
increasing amounts of power into his own hands. Sheridan’s close personal relationship with 
President Grant helped him immensely in this respect: while Grant was personally sympathetic 
to Native Americans, he trusted that Sheridan knew what he was doing, and regularly ordered his 
Secretaries of the Interior and Commissioners of Indian Affairs to suspend their own judgement 
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and do what Sheridan told them to.52 Thus, while Grant officially advocated for a Peace Policy, 
in which Native Americans would be “civilised” by Quakers and other missionaries, in practice, 
the Division of the Missouri became an active warzone for most of Sheridan’s tenure as 
Commander. 
 Sheridan went to war with the Southern Cheyenne in 1869, the Apache in 1871, and the 
Comanche, Kiowa, Southern Arapaho and Southern Cheyenne again in 1874 through 1875. 
Between these officially declared wars there were a lengthy series of skirmishes, raids, and 
massacres, with Sheridan turning a blind eye to, or even endorsing, genocidal actions on the part 
of his subordinates. In 1870 an expedition under the alcoholic Major Eugene Baker butchered 
three hundred friendly Piegan tribesmen when they could not find the hostile Piegans they were 
after. Sheridan obfuscated the nature of Baker’s activities in his reports while accusing those 
who criticized Baker of wanting whites to be slaughtered instead.53 Throughout these years, 
Sheridan constructed and refined his strategy for defeating hostile tribes, creating a military 
formula he insisted on having followed through thick and thin. Using the Battle of the Washita as 
a template, Sheridan determined the best way to defeat Native Americans was to strike them in 
the winter, when snow impeded their mobility. Cavalry, he believed, had to be the arm of 
decision, since no infantry force could ever catch up with swift moving Native horsemen. 
Moreover, to best limit the ability of the Natives to flee, this cavalry force needed to be broken 
into small columns that would converge on a central point, cutting the enemy off from their lines 
of retreat. Camps were to be burned, and supplies destroyed, leaving the Indigenous peoples of 
 
52 Grant’s changing attitudes towards his own Peace Policy, and Sheridan’s role in it, are documented in excerpts 
from correspondence in The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant Vol. 26, pages 68-1163. 
53 Peter Cozzens, The Earth is Weeping, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016): 117. 
43 
 
the Plains destitute and starving through the severe Western winters. This would confront the 
independent Native American tribes with two choices: submit to the US government or starve. 
 It is easy to see the influence of Sheridan’s Valley campaign, with its destruction of 
Confederate resources and food stock on his thinking here. It is equally easy to see the influence 
of the Yakima wars of the 1850s, especially in Sheridan’s belief, which was unwavering, that the 
greatest threat facing the US Army was their enemies getting away, drawing out the campaign 
and turning it into an expensive failure. Throughout his service in the 1850s Pacific, Sheridan 
was frustrated when he was prevented from pursuing fleeing Yakima, and, in his mind at least, 
deprived of the opportunity to bring them to battle and inflict a decisive defeat on them. Fusing 
these ideas with his experience of total war in the Shenandoah Valley, Sheridan created his 
rubric for winter campaigning, which he first tried at the Washita. His mission at the Washita, 
Sheridan wrote, was to disabuse Native Americans of the idea that winter provided them with 
any protection from the American government, shattering their morale while they were at their 
most vulnerable.54 Convinced this test run vindicated his theories, Sheridan instituted them 
throughout the Division of the Missouri, and was again—at least in his mind—proven right to 
have done so when Colonels Ranald “Bad Hand” Mackenzie and Nelson Appleton Miles crushed 
the Comanche, Kiowa, and Southern Cheyenne in the 1874-1875 Red River War, trapping the 
Indigenous warbands between their units.55 True, the Comanche and Kiowa had recently been 
devastated by smallpox, and Miles did the bulk of his fighting using infantry, but Sheridan did 
not see that. He saw only that his notions for frontier warfare had again paid off, and that a once-
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powerful alliance of southern tribes had been brought to heel. He expected, therefore, that this 
same strategy would be equally effective in a war with the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne. 
 And a war with the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne was something that Phil Sheridan 
very much wanted. Sheridan came to the Great Plains at the end of 1868, just after the closing of 
Red Cloud’s War, in which the Lakota-Northern Cheyenne coalition beat the Civil War weary 
US Army and won a peace on their own terms. To Sheridan’s way of thinking, this was a 
disastrous outcome, one that weakened not only the position of the white race vis-à-vis the ‘red’ 
but that weakened the power of the federal government, and with it the state’s ability to impose 
its will on everything from other Native American tribes to recalcitrant neo-Confederates in the 
Reconstruction South. His report on the Washita campaign specifically cited the need to 
reinforce settler confidence in the federal government as a primary reason for launching the 
attack. Railroads and ranches must be defended, he said, and the Western tribes reduced to a 
remnant on the reservations.56 In his first annual report as Commanding Officer, Division of the 
Missouri, published November 1, 1869, Sheridan declared that the Lakota—or Sioux as he, and 
most American officers of the day called them—needed to be punished for defying the 
government the previous year. Despite the ongoing violence on the Southern Plains, Sheridan 
insisted the Washita campaign had silenced Southern Cheyenne opposition to the American 
state, and that similar measures needed to be taken on the Northern Plains to bring the Lakota in 
line. Complaining that the Natives were being given “special treatment” by being confined to 
reservations he considered too large and comfortable for them, or worse yet, being left 
unconquered altogether, Sheridan demanded additional troops so he could take the war to the 
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Lakota. He also began a programme of building blockhouses throughout his Division, and 
especially in the Dakotas, which he saw as having been under siege by the Lakota for years.57  
Sheridan spent 1870 and most of 1871 observing the Franco-Prussian War in Europe, but 
when he returned to the Division of the Missouri in 1872, he again began beating the drums of 
war against the Lakota. War, he maintained in his annual report for that year, must be made upon 
the Lakota so they could be taught the difference between right and wrong. He also bragged 
about the construction of railroads through their territory and the amount of Native land absorbed 
by the state in the process.58 Modern historians may debate whether the American Army of the 
1870s was a colonial or imperial force, but Phil Sheridan would not have. He unequivocally saw 
himself as an agent of American colonial expansion, and Native American lands as new imperial 
acquisitions to be annexed to the growing domains of the United States. His 1873 report 
continued this theme, detailing the construction of the Northwest Pacific Railroad and the 
expeditions he mounted into Native territory along the Yellowstone to find depots for the 
railroad. This, Sheridan wrote, was part of his duty to civilisation and the United States. An 
advocate for transferring control of the Native American reservation system from the Department 
of the Interior to the Army, Sheridan wanted permission to attack any Indigenous persons found 
off the reservation. He also suggested the government should construct fortresses in the Black 
Hills, which were guaranteed to the Lakota as inviolable territory in the treaty ending Red 
Cloud’s War.59 In 1874, even as Miles and Mackenzie battled the Comanche and Kiowa on the 
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Southern Plains, Sheridan sent George Custer into the Black Hills to scout out places for these 
forts, forts that, according to treaty and current policy, he was not supposed to be building at all. 
When Custer’s expedition discovered gold in the Black Hills, Sheridan made sure to not 
only mention it in his 1874 report, but to insist the amount of gold found there—at the time 
entirely unknown—was of national importance.60 At Sheridan’s connivance Custer, whose own 
report was significantly more restrained than his boss’, informed the press of the gold in the 
Black Hills, and the American public, desperate for money after the economic crash of 1873, 
demanded Grant seize the Black Hills.61 Grant did not want to do it, as outlined in his personal 
letters, but public outcry gave him little choice, particularly with Sheridan, whom he still trusted 
implicitly, joining it.62 Sheridan’s letters to Grant (and to Sherman) echoed the public clamour 
for the opening of the Black Hills, and Grant, against his own better judgement, pressed Lakota 
leaders Spotted Tail and Red Cloud to name a price for the sale of the Black Hills.63 While these 
negotiations dragged on, white settlers illegally flooded into the hills. Departmental 
Commanders George Crook and Alfred Terry, did their best to evict these outlaw miners from 
what was still legally Lakota territory, but Sheridan granted them little support, while continuing 
to write to Grant on the urgent need for the Black Hills to be mined. When Red Cloud and 
Spotted Tail stalled the negotiations and hostile leaders like Sitting Bull made it clear they would 
fight for the Black Hills rather than cede them to the US Army, President Grant reluctantly 
realised it was going to come to war. On November 1-2 of 1875, Sheridan and his favourite 
Departmental Commander, George Crook, came to the White House to meet with Grant, the 
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Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Interior to lay plans for seizing the Black Hills.64 
William Sherman, who despised Native Americans but was a stickler for obeying the letter of the 
law, was not at this meeting, and noted sourly in his own correspondence that he was kept out of 
the loop for the duration of the war, with orders from the Secretary of War and Grant going 
directly to Sheridan and bypassing Sherman.65 With Grant’s blessing, Sheridan sent an 
ultimatum to the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne bands on the Great Plains, ordering them to 
confine themselves to the reservation by January of 1876 or face an armed response.  
With the American Army downsized after the Civil War, and much of its remaining 
forces on duty in the Reconstruction South or monitoring a very ugly federal election season, 
Sheridan had to fight the Great Sioux War with the troops at his own disposal in the Division of 
the Missouri. The Lieutenant-General, who had sought to provoke this war for years, was 
entirely fine with that. Anticipating most of the fighting would be in the Departments of the 
Platte and the Dakotas, Sheridan instructed the Departmental Commanders, George Crook and 
Alfred Terry, to make ready for a winter campaign against the unconquered Lakota.66 Crook, 
who was at the November meetings in the White House and knew for sure that the war was 
coming, was already making his preparations. A West Point classmate of Sheridan, Crook served 
with him in the Pacific against the Yakima and under him in the Shenandoah Valley. A taciturn 
man who, in his heart, was far more sympathetic to Native Americans than his friend and boss, 
Crook would one day fall out with Sheridan over a range of issues including, but not limited to, 
which of them deserved the most credit for their victories in the Shenandoah and whether Native 
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Americans ought to be granted the same rights as white men (Crook, a member of the Indian 
Rights Association, firmly believed they should). At this point, however, Crook was still 
Sheridan’s most loyal subordinate, and was widely regarded as the Army’s best “Indian” 
fighter.67  
Crook’s Civil War record was solid, with some embarrassing blunders but also some 
incredible highlights. At the Battle of Cedar Creek, Virginia (not to be confused with a similarly 
named battle of the Great Sioux War), then Major-General Crook amply demonstrated both these 
aspects of his personality. Poor scouting on his part enabled Jubal Early to launch a surprise 
attack that threw the entire Army of the Shenandoah into disarray, yet it was Crook’s courage 
under fire and unwavering determination to hold fast that got not only his men, but those of 
Sheridan’s other corps commanders, to get back in line and hold out until Sheridan could return 
with reinforcements.68 After the Civil War, Crook returned to his prewar rank of Lieutenant-
Colonel but was, in 1871, surprised with a promotion of two grades to Brigadier-General. This 
sudden jump in rank came courtesy of Sheridan, who wanted to make his old friend the 
Commanding Officer of the newly created Department of Arizona, believing Crook’s experience 
against the Yakima and his extensive study of Native American warfare made him the perfect 
man to put an end to the Apache war raging there. The decision earned Crook few friends in the 
army, where peacetime promotion was based on seniority rather than merit; Colonel Nelson 
Miles in particular never forgave Crook for jumping the line and taking a place meant for more 
senior (and in Miles’ opinion, more talented) men. Still, Sheridan’s violation of military protocol 
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proved seemingly justified as Crook did not disappoint his one-time classmate; his campaign 
against the Apache, using small companies of men to run down and corner the warbands loyal to 
Cochise and other Apache war-leaders, proved very successful, and may have further reinforced 
Sheridan’s idea that this was the proper, and indeed, only way, to fight Native Americans. Crook 
was praised in the Western papers for his suppression of the Apache marauders, and in the 
Eastern press for the humane way he dealt with the surrendered Apache after the shooting was 
over; all the positive attention catapulted Crook into the forefront of the Army’s list of perceived 
“Indian” experts and made his opinion on the topic of frontier campaigning much sought after. 
When Sheridan began gearing up for the Great Sioux War he brought Crook to the Northern 
Plains and gave him the Department of the Platte. Between his good service in the Civil War and 
his exemplary performance in Arizona, there was no reason to think Crook would be anything 
less than successful in his new endeavour.69  
Brigadier-General Alfred Terry, Sheridan’s other chief subordinate, has often been 
written off by historians sympathetic to George Custer and other “fighting generals” as little 
more than a desk soldier and bureaucrat.70 In doing so, they fundamentally misunderstand who 
Alfred Terry was. A lawyer and self-taught military historian before the Civil War, Terry, one of 
Connecticut’s richest men, raised a Volunteer regiment on his own dime and was commissioned 
as its Colonel, rising to Major-General of Volunteers over the course of the war. Ulysses S. 
Grant rated him as the finest Volunteer soldier in the American Army.71 In 1865, Terry, who 
spent most of the war to that point assisting in the siege of Confederate cities, was given his first 
independent command by Grant: he was to seize Fort Fisher, the Confederate bulwark protecting 
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their last free port. It was a complex operation, requiring Terry collaborate closely with Rear-
Admiral David Dixon Porter, as the Navy’s ships were vital to the assault on Fort Fisher. To this 
point in the Civil War most Union generals, barring Grant himself, struggled to cooperate with 
the Navy, and previous efforts to take Fort Fisher had foundered because of that.72 
Terry not only cooperated with Porter and the Navy, he integrated their commands so 
closely that at times he, a Major-General, was giving orders to gunboats while Porter and his 
Captains were commanding troops on the ground. The speed and efficiency of Terry’s attack 
took the Confederates entirely off guard, and in a bloody day’s worth of fighting in which almost 
all of Terry’s regimental commanders became casualties, Fisher fell.73 Terry was awarded the 
rank of Brigadier-General in the Regular Army, a signal honour for an amateur soldier. 
Remaining in the Army after the war, Terry did duty in the Reconstruction South and on the 
Great Plains and was one of the authors of the Fort Laramie Treaty that ended Red Cloud’s 
War.74 One might question Sheridan’s wisdom in sending a siege engineer to pursue Indigenous 
cavalry across the Plains, yet it is not at all hard to see why Sheridan liked Terry who, as a quiet 
man who treated his troops and his enemies respectfully, was otherwise his total opposite: at Fort 
Fisher, Terry showed he was a hard fighter and that was what Sheridan respected. 
While Crook kept his men close at hand, two of Terry’s subordinates had important 
independent commands during the Great Sioux War. The first of these was Colonel John Gibbon, 
who, as a Major-General during the Civil War held the Union centre against Pickett’s Charge 
 
72 Grant, Personal Memoirs, 662. 
73 Grant, Personal Memoirs, 662-665. David Dixon Porter’s The Naval History of the Civil War is similarly 
complimentary of Terry, showing the deep respect that the Admiral had for his Army counterpart.  
74 John Bailey’s Pacifying the Plains: General Alfred Terry and the Decline of the Sioux, 1866-1890, first published 
in 1979 by Westport’s Greenwood Press is the only extant biography of Terry, and provides a solid analysis of his 
role on the Plains prior to the Great Sioux War. 
51 
 
during the last apocalyptic day at Gettysburg.75 Cold and austere, Gibbon earned a reputation for 
“telling the truth, no matter whom it hurts,” a fact that makes his writings on the Great Sioux 
War a very useful resource to the historian.76 A veteran of several years on the frontier, Gibbon 
was the only officer in the Department of the Platte or the Department of the Dakotas to express 
doubts about Sheridan’s plan of campaign. Unlike Sheridan, Gibbon had grave concerns about 
the ability of white troops to fight Native Americans head on. Three years after the Great Sioux 
War, in an article entitled “Arms to Fight Indians,” Gibbon expressed his opinion that the 
postwar United States Army was not up to the task of combatting Native Americans effectively. 
He had a point. Following the Civil War, the American Army was downsized to 25 000 men who 
had to occupy the Reconstruction South and confront Native Americans in the Division of the 
Missouri and the Division of the Pacific. Worse yet, most of the Civil War veterans among the 
troops mustered out after the war, and the bulk of the men available to frontier officers were 
those who could not find reliable employment in civilian life. Add to this a refusal by the 
Quartermaster’s Corps to allocate ammunition for practice, and the Army’s ability to fight 
Indigenous enemies was, in Gibbon’s view severely curtailed. When the results of the Great 
Sioux War led some to insist the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne must have somehow obtained 
better guns than their white foes, Gibbon scoffed, “the principle superiority in using them [guns] 
will be found to reside in the character and skillful attainments of the men who handle them.”77  
Gibbon wrote those words regarding the ability of the infantry to fight Native Americans. 
Concerning the cavalry, which Sheridan saw as the arm of decision in frontier warfare, he was 
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outright caustic. “Any Indian from twelve years of age and upwards,” he said, “can ride, without 
saddle or bridle [italics in original], or at most with nothing more than a rope tied around the 
lower jaw of his horse, or at full speed [italics in original] alongside of a buffalo, and, generally 
at the first shot, from revolver or carbine, kill or mortally wound his game, picked out at pleasure 
from the running herd. The men in any one of our cavalry regiments who can do this can be 
counted on the fingers of one hand, and with the average white hunter it is ludicrous to look on 
and witness his frantic efforts to reload his firearm when once emptied.”78 The cavalry, Gibbon 
said, would never be as effective as their Native counterparts, and the only solution to this was to 
give them a good gun and drill them relentlessly; “unfortunately,” he complained, “the number 
of our troops is not great enough to enable the authorities to withdraw even a small part from 
active service in the field long enough to give this instruction, and we will probably continue to 
fight the Indian with inadequate means as often as the encroachment of the white settler and the 
impositions practiced upon him by agents of the government force him into rebellion.”79  
How much of Gibbon’s attitude was the product of the Great Sioux War, and how much 
of it he held beforehand we cannot know for sure, but his writings offer a critical, if scathing, 
glimpse into the frontier army Sheridan planned to send against the Lakota and Cheyenne. “The 
day, then, for our troops to meet these warriors when outnumbered ten to one is past,” Gibbon 
said. “Nay, more than that, they cannot contend against them successfully man for man, except 
under the most favourable circumstances, and then only by adopting the improved tactics of the 
Indians themselves.”80 Gibbon was convinced the only way for the American Army to decisively 
defeat Native Americans was for the whites to have the advantage of numbers. At the start of the 
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Great Sioux War, as Gibbon later admitted, he and most other officers, assumed, as Sheridan had 
told them, that they had that advantage in numbers. As Custer discovered, they were wrong. 
 That, of course, then brings us to the subject of Terry’s other, more famous subordinate: 
George Armstrong Custer. Custer’s defeat and death in the Great Sioux War made his name a 
shorthand for incompetence and many authors have gone through his Civil War record, trying to 
find evidence of his supposed inability during the early days of his career. These efforts have 
mostly fallen flat, because Custer, while undoubtedly flamboyant and eccentric, had a Civil War 
record that was perfectly good, and better than many. A newly commissioned Lieutenant when 
the Civil War began, Custer ended it a Major-General of Volunteers, and one of the Union 
Army’s most decorated cavalry officers. It was Custer’s brigade that, at Gettysburg, broke an 
entire Confederate cavalry division with a charge dead into their centre, shattering the 
overextended Confederate line and stopping J.E.B. Stuart from flanking Major-General George 
Gordon Meade’s Army of the Potomac. It was Custer’s men who led Sheridan’s assault on 
Yellow Tavern the following year, killing Stuart and wrecking the morale of the Confederate 
cavalry. It was Custer who, with classmate Wesley Merritt, spearheaded Sheridan’s drive 
through the Shenandoah, doing incalculable damage to the Confederate state’s ability to make 
war in the Valley. Along the way he showed that, despite his portrait as a hard-charging cavalier, 
he was not willing to be callous. Much of his reputation for insubordination stemmed from his 
repeat refusals in 1863 and 1864 to follow suicidal orders from Judson “Kill-Cavalry” Kilpatrick, 
who was as much a menace to Custer’s men as the Confederacy. When the war ended, Sheridan 
told Custer’s wife, Libbie, that no one had done more than her husband to close it out.81 
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 Following the Civil War, Custer, the youngest Major-General in Union service, was 
reduced to his Regular Army rank of Captain. Sheridan, who saw Custer as something of a 
protégé, promoted him to Lieutenant-Colonel and gave him a post in the 7th Cavalry Regiment. 
With the 7th’s Colonel consistently deployed on detached service, Custer was the de facto 
commanding officer of the Regiment. Bored on the frontier, Custer earned several reprimands 
and was suspended from duty when he abandoned a fruitless scouting mission to visit his wife. 
He also, however, gained a reputation as a great “Indian” fighter, which, while untrue in many of 
the details, did reflect his knowledge of the area. Custer saw action at the Battle of the Washita, 
where he served as Sheridan’s striking arm, and, unlike his commanding general, tried to limit 
the loss of non-combatant life.82 During the Yellowstone and Black Hills expeditions of 1873, 
1874, and 1875, he blazed new trails through unmapped frontier territory, struck up working 
relationships with friendly Native American tribes, and had a series of increasingly menacing 
skirmishes with the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne.83 In all these operations he made 
considerable use of Native American scouts, another point on which he differed with Sheridan, 
who disliked the Army dependence on Native American auxiliaries and tried to discourage their 
use. For all their differences, Sheridan still saw Custer as a useful tool and Terry believed in him 
wholeheartedly; when Custer’s political differences with the Grant administration made it look 
as if he might not be available for the Great Sioux War, Sheridan and Terry both requested his 
return to his regiment.84 
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 As these brief biographies show, none of the officers in Phil Sheridan’s Division of the 
Missouri were incompetent. Neither, for all the unpleasantness of his personality, was Sheridan 
himself. He, Crook, Terry, Gibbon, and Custer were all Civil War veterans, with personal 
military histories indicating they should give good to great service in future conflicts. What then, 
stopped these men from being as successful against Native Americans as they were against the 
Confederacy during the Civil War? What for that matter stopped Sheridan and Crook, who 
fought Native Americans many times in their careers, from accomplishing as much this time? 
Some of the problem, as will be demonstrated in coming chapters, had to do with the exceptional 
capabilities of the Native American leadership they were confronting. Sitting Bull’s growing 
coalition of hostile Lakota and Northern Cheyenne had access to the very best chiefs and war-
leaders the Great Plains had to offer, and in them, the likes of Crook and Custer met their match. 
But there were other problems, closer to home, that handicapped Sheridan’s campaign before it 
started. To narrow it down to one cause would be disingenuous but it is unavoidable that many of 
Sheridan’s difficulties stemmed from his belief that all Native Americans fought the same way. 
 Scholars on British interactions with the Natives of South Africa have used the term 
“colonial reasoning” to describe the ways in which British officers and administrators 
reinterpreted African behaviours to fit the stereotypes they already had in mind. A particular 
military facet of this colonial reasoning, explored below, was an assumption that all Africans, 
whether Xhosa, Zulu or otherwise, would go into battle in the same manner.85 A similar type of 
thinking was at work on the American plains. Neither Sheridan, nor any of his subordinates, had 
served in Red Cloud’s War or the frontier battles of the Civil War, the last time American 
soldiers battled the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne on a grand scale. Sheridan had not come to 
 




the Plains until the fighting with Red Cloud was over, and his understanding of that conflict was 
coloured by his own ensuing “defeat” of the Southern Cheyenne at the Washita. Crook was in 
Idaho and Nevada during Red Cloud’s War, and had since spent all his time in Arizona, battling 
the Apache. Terry arrived on the Plains at the end of Red Cloud’s War, but in the capacity of 
diplomat and peacemaker, not soldier. Only Gibbon and Custer had any practical experience 
warring with the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne, and even theirs stemmed from after 1868, in 
the endless series of raids that characterised the Army’s interaction with the hostile tribes before 
1876. As a Colonel and a Lieutenant-Colonel they were not consulted by Sheridan anyway; the 
whole of the planning for the Great Sioux War was done by Sheridan and George Crook, with 
Terry and the men under him being handed the plan after the fact and told to go along with it. 
 Phil Sheridan’s conception of the Great Sioux War rested on the premise that the Lakota 
and Northern Cheyenne were no different from the Yakima he fought in his youth—or from the 
Paiute and Apache George Crook fought in Idaho, Nevada, and Arizona. These tribes, while far 
from identical to one another, fought, to Sheridan and Crook’s eyes, in much the same way: in 
small raiding parties that sought to avoid contact with large numbers of American troops, waging 
guerilla wars that sapped American time and resources but killed comparatively few soldiers. 
Crook bested the Apache bands by using company sized formations to pursue them over the 
badlands and Sheridan was sure the same methods would have worked against the Yakima in the 
1850s. That Crook’s accomplishments were aided by Apache auxiliaries whom he turned against 
the hostile forces, was something Sheridan ignored, and, extrapolating from Crook’s experience 
he decided a similar strategy would work against the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne. Combining 
details of Crook’s Arizona campaign with his own efforts at the Washita, Sheridan created a 
template for war against Native Americans, one that he was sure had been integral to the winning 
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of the Red River War in 1874 and 1875. In reality Nelson Miles and Bad Hand Mackenzie 
significantly modified Sheridan’s instructions to meet the realities of that war, but Sheridan, 
from his perch at Division headquarters in Chicago, did not see that. He saw what he wanted to 
and did not care that it was not reflective of what combat against the Southern Cheyenne, Kiowa, 
and Comanche had been like. It was not reflective of what war against the Lakota and Northern 




 Sir Frederic Augustus Thesiger II, the future Lord Chelmsford, hailed from German 
stock, his family emigrating to England when the House of Hanover became Kings of England. 
His father, also Frederic Thesiger, was made First Baron of Chelmsford in recognition of his 
loyal service to the Crown as a hardline Conservative Member of Parliament. This elevation to 
the peerage allowed the first Lord Chelmsford to become a member of the House of Lords, from 
which he secured a position as England’s Lord Chancellor. With an estate worth more than four 
million pounds at the time of his death, the senior Lord Chelmsford did extremely well for 
himself and could assist his son and heir in doing extremely well in turn.86 
 The younger Frederic Thesiger entered the British Army in 1844, using his father’s 
money to purchase a position as a Second Lieutenant in a Rifle Brigade. Promotion at the time 
was dependent not on seniority or merit, but on purchase: officers were promoted when they 
could gather enough funds to sell off their old rank and buy one a rung higher up the social and 
military ladder. The younger Thesiger, hereafter referred to as Lord Chelmsford for the sake of 
simplicity, served long enough to see the day purchase was abolished, but reached the senior 
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branches of the service under the old system, spending a great deal of money in the process. A 
year after joining the Army, Chelmsford purchased an exchange into the elite Grenadier Guards, 
with whom he saw action in the Crimean War, though not before first buying his way into a 
captaincy. Breveted Major after the Siege of Sebastopol, at which he was mentioned in 
despatches, Chelmsford sold his position in the Grenadiers to become Lieutenant-Colonel of the 
95th Foot Regiment in 1858, seeing the last moments of the Indian Rebellion in the process.87  
 Lord Chelmsford remained in India for several years, serving as Deputy Adjutant General 
of the Bombay Presidency and then Adjutant General of the Indian Army, both signs of the 
esteem the high command held him in. Between these appointments he was Deputy Adjutant 
General on Sir John Napier’s Abyssinian Expedition of 1868, where he was again mentioned in 
despatches. This deployment to Ethiopia was Chelmsford’s first taste of campaigning in Africa, 
though what, if any, impact it had on his thinking remains blurry. Napier was extremely grateful 
to his DAG for his assistance in overcoming the logistical hurdles of the operation, which proved 
far more of an impediment to the British soldiers than the disorganised Ethiopian military.88 
Chelmsford saw combat at the capture of the Ethiopian city of Magdala, which earned him 
accolades from Napier, and secured the promotion to Adjutant General on his return to India.89  
 Lord Chelmsford went back to England in 1874 and held a succession of increasingly 
senior posts as Colonel, Brigadier-General, and finally, Major-General. During this period 
purchase was abolished, and obtaining a Major-Generalship was the product of seniority and the 
patronage of his superiors rather than his fiscal resources. Though Chelmsford had not seen a 
great deal of action, that was typical for senior British officers of the era: outside of the Crimean 
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War and the Indian Rebellion, the wars in which Queen Victoria’s Army involved itself were 
small scale affairs. In fact, between his service in the Crimea, the last days of the Indian Mutiny, 
and Napier’s Abyssinian venture, Chelmsford was under fire more times than many of his 
contemporaries, and his peers and superiors alike awarded him high marks for bravery in the face 
of danger. If most of his service was as a staff officer, adjutant, aide, or subordinate, rather than 
in independent command, that too was normal for the colonial British Army. From the fall of 
Napoleon to the outbreak of World War I, the only general European conflict was the Crimean 
War, which did not last long, and involved far less manpower than the Napoleonic Wars. During 
this period, the British Army was geared towards small scale operations in Britain’s overseas 
possessions, limiting the opportunities for officers to hold independent commands against 
strategically threatening foes. Therefore, when the need for a new General Officer Commanding 
in South Africa came up in 1878, Lord Chelmsford was a logical choice for the job. Promoted 
Lieutenant-General, Chelmsford was shipped off to South Africa with a selection of handpicked 
staff officers and instructions to terminate the ongoing guerilla campaign in the Cape Colony.90 
 The Ninth Frontier War, as it came to be known, was the last in a lengthy series of 
conflicts between white settlers and the Xhosa tribesmen of the Cape Colony region. The early 
wars were between the Xhosa and the Dutch Boers, the latter viewing the former as not only 
impediments to their ‘civilisation’ of the area, but as subhuman animals. For a time, Sunday 
afternoon ‘Kaffir hunts’ and other barbaric practises were a norm in the Cape, as the Boers 
sought to enslave or exterminate the whole of the Xhosa people.91 The British annexation of the 
Cape put an end to the worst of these atrocities and drove many of the Boers further inland, but 
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did nothing to reduce the tensions between the white colonial elite and Xhosa tribesmen who 
adamantly did not wish to be colonised—a problem that worsened after the discovery of the 
region’s mineral wealth. The character of the Cape Colony became more British than Boer, yet 
the fighting with the Xhosa ground on, as Boer irregulars, English settler Volunteers, Cape 
policemen, African Mfengu auxiliaries, and the occasional unit of British regulars battled Xhosa 
bush warriors for control over the Cape borderlands. Chelmsford’s predecessor at the Cape, Sir 
Arthur Cunynghame managed to knock one of the belligerent tribes out of the war, but a final 
solution to the conflict eluded him. Now Chelmsford and his Special Service officers, who 
included Sir Evelyn Wood, Sir Redvers Buller, his Assistant Military Secretary John North 
Crealock, and his aides William Molyneux and Henry Hallam Parr were tasked with restoring 
order in South Africa.92 The campaign had a marked effect on Lord Chelmsford and his officers, 
and, more than any other war, influenced their expectations of the Anglo-Zulu War. 
 Chelmsford and his Special Service officers arrived in the Cape Colony knowing next to 
nothing about the Xhosa or how the war was progressing. As William Molyneux recalled, “we 
learned what we could of the history, the language, and the manner of the country we were 
bound for, but I am afraid that it was not very much…”93 In the absence of detailed intelligence, 
the British officers were free to absorb the local colonists’ opinions of the Xhosa undiluted, and 
Molyneux, Wood, and Hallam Parr’s memoirs all brim with stereotypes about the Xhosa. Rather 
than accepting that the Xhosa tribes had fluid leadership with chiefs beholden to numerous 
special interest groups within their society, colonists, be they Boer or British, chose to portray 
the Xhosa chiefs as despots, with any changes in policy or inability to meet British demands 
positioned as evidence of their duplicitous nature, rather than the result of chiefs having to 
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mediate internal disputes in order to hold onto their status. This portrait of the Xhosa leadership 
is present in Molyneux, Wood, and Hallam Parr’s writings, with all three men taking a very dim 
view of the Xhosa as both human beings and soldiers.94 This distrust of Africans was extended to 
Britain’s Mfengu auxiliaries; Hallam Parr granted that the Mfengu were necessary to help British 
forces track down the Xhosa, but Molyneux and Wood considered the Mfengu cowards who 
were more hindrance than help.95 This attitude did nothing to aid the British in winning the war, 
for without them, white troops were left extremely vulnerable to ambush by Xhosa forces.  
 Chelmsford’s war against the remnant of the Xhosa resistance dragged on for the better 
part of a year and left the Lieutenant-General and his aides deeply frustrated. Molyneux, in 
trying to explain the facility with which the Xhosa moved through the bush, surprising British 
forays, resorted to biological racism, claiming that “The fellow has a hide like a rhinoceros; the 
wait-a-bit thorn that tears pieces out of your clothes, merely makes a white scratch on his bronze 
or reddened skin.”96 The war saw few significant battles, and the longer it wore on, the smaller 
the battles became. Complained Hallam Parr, “the operations during the remainder of May 
dwindled down to a succession of small combats between the troops and parties of half-starved 
and desperate men, who would not give themselves up, but who only fought when they could 
neither hide nor escape.”97 Wood agreed with this assessment, and his memoirs of this time 
period are essentially a list of skirmishes with Xhosa bands, in which his men rarely caught the 
Africans, and Redvers Buller’s horsemen had to run them down.98 Chelmsford had to divide his 
force into ever smaller units to cover the whole of the territories in dispute, the single greatest 
 
94 Hallam Parr, A Sketch of the Kafir and Zulu Wars, 37; Molyneux, Campaigning in South Africa and Egypt, 34-35; 
Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal Vol. 1, 318. 
95 Hallam Parr, A Sketch of the Kafir and Zulu Wars, 43; Molyneux, Campaigning in South Africa and Egypt, 56-58; 
Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal Vol. 1, 324. 
96 Molyneux, Campaigning in South Africa and Egypt, 37. 
97 Hallam Parr, A Sketch of the Kafir and Zulu Wars, 94. 
98 Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal Vol. 1, 331, 335, 337-343. 
62 
 
difficulty of the war being preventing the Xhosa from fleeing once an encounter went against 
them.  
All three of Chelmsford’s subordinates were annoyed by the refusal of the Xhosa to fight 
them in the open. Molyneux said that when any sign of the Xhosa was spotted, the only thing to 
do was “to go straight at him into the bush with a cheer. You are then both in semi-obscurity and 
on more even terms, and he is almost sure to run.”99 Said Wood, “to enter the Bush boldly in the 
face of Kafirs [sic] is not only the most efficacious, but the safest method.”100 Hallam Parr 
described a battle between forty Connaught Rangers and seven hundred Xhosa, in which “Major 
Moore, whenever the Kafirs [sic] got unpleasantly near the position, ordered bayonets to be 
fixed, and charged out with his gallant little band of redcoats, amongst whom were some of the 
more sombrely clad frontier police; and the Kafirs [sic], with their traditional dread of coming to 
close quarters with the ‘red devils,’ drew back each time a charge was made.”101 Hallam Parr 
also thought that the new Martini-Henry rifle made it impossible for the Xhosa to stand up to the 
British at range, writing “Since the Kafirs [sic] have found out the difference between Brown 
Bess and the Martini-Henry, they say it’s no good fighting, as the soldiers can ‘shoot them out of 
another world’—alluding to the long range and the new weapon.”102 The trio concurred that the 
Xhosa could never stand up to British riflery or bayonet charges and that it was pinning the 
Xhosa down before they could run that was the challenge. Once the Africans were cornered, 
Hallam Parr, Molyneux, and Wood all recorded that they were easily beaten. 
 The Ninth Frontier War ended with the deaths of the leading Xhosa chiefs in a series of 
skirmishes; once these firebrands were gone, the war burned itself out. It was not the kind of 
 
99 Molyneux, Campaigning in South Africa and Egypt, 37. 
100 Wood, From Midshipman to Field Marshal Vol. 1, 344. 
101 Hallam Parr, A Sketch of the Kafir and Zulu Wars, 79. 
102 Hallam Parr, A Sketch of the Kafir and Zulu Wars, 80. 
63 
 
campaign that Lord Chelmsford envisioned for his first independent command. There was little 
in this border raiding and skirmishing to add lustre to his reputation; while Molyneux, Hallam 
Parr, and Wood all wrote admiringly of the energy and organisational ability Chelmsford brought 
to the operations, the government back home noted mostly the length of the war and the costs it 
ran up, an opinion shared by many of the Cape’s colonial civilians.103 The war did, however, 
introduce Lord Chelmsford to a figure who played a key role in the events of 1879: Sir Henry 
Bartle Frere, High Commissioner for South Africa, and the prime political mover and shaker 
behind the prosecution of the Xhosa conflict. Having made his name in the foreign service in 
India, Bartle Frere came to South Africa with the objective of unifying the colonies of the Cape, 
Natal, and newly annexed Transvaal into a single South African Confederation, not unlike the 
one recently established between the Canadian territories of British North America. It was a plan 
that did not have a place in it for independent African polities like the Xhosa tribes or Zululand, 
and as Chelmsford finished off the Xhosa War, he and Sir Bartle Frere began forming an alliance 
with one another and with Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Governor of the Transvaal, with the end 
goal of destroying Zululand and achieving Bartle Frere’s plans for South African Confederation.  
 Each of the three conspirators had his own motivation for pursuing a war against the Zulu 
Kingdom. Bartle Frere, in the twilight of his career, sought a final triumph to retire upon, and 
saw the Zulu presence as the primary obstacle in his path. In letters to Colonial Secretary 
Michael Hicks Beach, Bartle Frere said that the African population would never be reconciled to 
British rule while the Zulu King Cetshwayo was free to give them hope, and that the Boers of the 
recently acquired Transvaal would only acquiesce to Imperial designs if the British assisted them 
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by eradicating their old enemies, the Zulu.104 Shepstone, who arranged for the seizure of the 
Transvaal, and whose future career was dependent upon it becoming a compliant British 
possession echoed these same positions in his own correspondence; he and Bartle Frere regularly 
referenced one another, and both took up the line that all Boer/Zulu boundary conflicts must be 
resolved in favour of the Boers, a stance Shepstone, formerly a supporter of the Zulu, never held 
before becoming the Transvaal’s governor.105 Shepstone also nursed a set of deeply personal 
(and deeply petty) grudges against Cetshwayo for refusing to relinquish his independence and 
decision-making powers to Shepstone. In 1873, when Cetshwayo succeeded his father, Mpande, 
to the throne of Zululand, Shepstone presented the Zulu King with a tinsel crown ordered from a 
theatre company in London. In Shepstone’s head, this translated to his owning Cetshwayo, and 
the Zulu King was therefore obligated to run all his decisions past Shepstone. When Cetshwayo 
did not do so—there having never been a pact between them to that effect—Shepstone was 
embarrassed, and lobbied his superiors to remove Cetshwayo, insisting the Zulu King was 
backing out of their nonexistent deal.106 Sir Bartle Frere echoed Shepstone’s lies, telling Hicks 
Beach the Zulu King had transgressed a solemn treaty with the British government, and citing 
clauses Cetshwayo supposedly violated. Bartle Frere consistently cited Shepstone as an expert in 
Zulu affairs and told Hicks Beach the governor’s stances must be accepted as the absolute 
truth.107 
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 As for Lord Chelmsford, his motivations were the simplest of all. He wanted a war that 
would bring him more renown than the Ninth Frontier War. He also accepted uncritically the 
claims of Bartle Frere and Shepstone that the Xhosa War was started by Zulu spies as part of a 
pan-African plot orchestrated by Cetshwayo to destroy white power in South Africa. This 
supposed scheme appeared in Chelmsford’s letters to the Secretary of War, and filtered down to 
his subordinates, with Hallam Parr, Molyneux, and Wood all dutifully repeating it in their 
memoirs.108 In correspondence with Bartle Frere and Shepstone, Chelmsford elaborated on the 
need to demonstrate white superiority over Africans by removing the Zulu.109 In letters to the 
Secretary of War, he insisted the Natal frontier would never be secure against marauding 
Africans as long as Zululand maintained its independence.110 Exaggerating the threat from the 
Zulu, who had no hostile intentions towards the British, Chelmsford repeatedly asked Secretary 
Stanley for more men to defend Natal from the Zulu hordes.111 As proof of the Zulu menace, he 
passed along many of Bartle Frere and Shepstone’s supposedly cogent political insights into the 
Zulu situation; at the same time, Bartle Frere and Shepstone cited Chelmsford’s military opinions 
to prove their political analyses were correct.112 Together the triumvirate built a tautology where 
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the political situation in Zululand showed the Zulu military was menacing Natal, and the Zulu 
military menace was demonstrative of political instability in Zululand. In a masterclass in 
projection the trio openly discussed their imperial ambitions for South Africa, while continuing 
to tell Hicks Beach and Stanley they were only making defensive preparations in the event of a 
Zulu attack.  
 Not everyone fell for the triumvirate’s deception plan. Hicks Beach pushed back against 
Bartle Frere, sending memorandum after memorandum reminding the High Commissioner that 
Britain had a friendly relationship with King Cetshwayo, and that he had no authority to start a 
war in Zululand.113 Hicks Beach never changed his opinion on this, and Bartle Frere, in the end, 
started the war without obtaining the Secretary’s permission. Sir Henry Bulwer, Governor of 
Natal, protested openly against the drive to war, telling Sir Bartle Frere it would cost them far 
more than it would gain and declining to allow Chelmsford to raise auxiliary troops from among 
Natal’s African population.114 When Bulwer’s objections became too obstructive for Bartle 
Frere’s taste, he sent Chelmsford to Natal with orders to supersede Bulwer as the de facto 
governor and raise a Natal Native Contingent and as many colonial Volunteers as he could from 
the populace.115 The strongest voice in opposition to the conspiracy was from Bishop Colenso of 
Natal, who held, for the day, liberal views on the rights of Africans and knew Cetshwayo well 
enough to see through most of Bartle Frere, Chelmsford, and Shepstone’s claims about the 
danger he posed. The Bishop’s daughter, Frances Ellen “Nell” Colenso, later authored a book 
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denouncing the invasion, and correctly identifying Sir Bartle Frere, Lord Chelmsford, and Sir 
Theophilus Shepstone, as the conspirators behind the fiasco. Jeering at the excuses offered by the 
triumvirate, Colenso put forth that none of the Zulu “crimes” were any worse than anything the 
British themselves had done, be it in Africa or elsewhere, and that the conflict stemmed from the 
incompetence of three men out to make a name for themselves whatever the cost in lives.116 
Unfortunately, she, her father, and most others who opposed the war were easily written off by 
Bartle Frere, Chelmsford, and Shepstone who, as the most powerful men in South Africa, could 
stifle dissent in the colonies while treating instructions from London as little more than 
guidelines. Sir Henry Bulwer and Bishop Colenso were described in the trio’s correspondence as 
being soft on Africans and hopelessly naïve as to the imperialist intentions of the Zulu Crown. 
Eventually, the testimony of men like Bulwer and Colenso brought down the conspiracy, but for 
the moment, their commentary was kept out of the public eye, as the triumvirate readied for war. 
 The only thing Bartle Frere, Chelmsford, and Shepstone now needed was an excuse for 
war. They hoped to obtain it through the findings of the South African Boundary Commission, 
created to resolve border disputes between the Boers of the Transvaal and Zululand. Since 
Shepstone’s brother, John, and Lord Chelmsford’s subordinate, Brevet Colonel Anthony 
Durnford, were on the Commission, it was anticipated they would find in favour of the Boers and 
that this outcome could be used to provoke the Zulu into taking hostile action. Instead, the 
Commission found in favour of the Zulu, reducing Bartle Frere to trying to force Cetshwayo’s 
hand by awarding him the land only on the condition he meet a list of British demands which 
included, ludicrously, the disbanding of the Zulu Army.117 Cetshwayo would not do this, but 
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while he began preparations for a British invasion, he did not oblige Bartle Frere by taking 
aggressive action against Natal. Finally, when Mehlokazulu kaSihayo, son of one of 
Cetshwayo’s leading chiefs, launched a cross border raid to capture a pair of women who fled his 
father’s harem, Bartle Frere decided he had his casus belli, never mind that these kinds of pursuit 
actions had been commonplace along the Natal/Zululand border for decades and that the British 
had, as Nell Colenso observed, taught the Zulu this was acceptable behaviour. Bartle Frere 
ordered Cetshwayo to turn Mehlokazulu over for punishment, and when Cetshwayo demurred, 
offering instead to pay a fine, Bartle Frere declared a state of war now existed between Zululand 
and British South Africa and gave Lord Chelmsford permission to launch his invasion.118 
 Chelmsford had spent months transferring troops from the Cape to Natal, raising the 
Natal Native Contingent, and recruiting Volunteer cavalry. His plan of attack, clearly modeled 
on his experience with the Xhosa, was for five separate columns to enter Zululand and, working 
in tandem with one another, prevent the Zulu from escaping. Circumstance and distrust of some 
of his subordinates saw this plan overhauled, with the columns in the field reduced from five to 
three, as the men meant to be under Colonel Hugh Rowlands were reassigned to Evelyn Wood, 
and the decision was made to utilise Anthony Durnford’s column, comprising mostly NNC 
troops, as a reserve, rather than a part of the active field force.119 Chelmsford himself travelled 
with the Centre Column, and his penchant for micromanagement reduced Richard Glyn, Colonel 
of the 24th Infantry Regiment and the column’s ostensible commanding officer to little more than 
a member of Chelmsford’s staff—and not an especially prominent one either, given Assistant 
Military Secretary John North Crealock’s dislike of Glyn, which Chelmsford soon came to share.  
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Considering the deleterious effect that Crealock’s dislikes had on the campaign, one 
would like to know more about the man and his relationship to Chelmsford, yet sources are silent 
on the matter. We know he was the younger brother of Major-General Henry Hope Crealock, a 
Companion of the Bath who served in the Opium and Crimean Wars. We know John Crealock 
followed his brother into the army and saw service in the Indian Rebellion, where he was 
wounded in combat. We know he served with Lord Chelmsford at Aldershot when the general 
was briefly assigned there in the 1870s, and we know that when he wrote to Chelmsford, asking 
to accompany him as AMS, Chelmsford rather diffidently agreed to bring him along. We know 
he and his brother were both talented painters, and that his journals on the Indian Rebellion and 
the Ninth Frontier War (though alas, not the Anglo-Zulu War) are valuable primary sources. 
Information on the rest of Crealock’s early career, and why Chelmsford came to trust him 
implicitly, is not readily available. The only other things that can be known for sure about 
Crealock are that he came from a middle-class background, affected an aristocratic lisp that 
drove the rest of Chelmsford’s officers to distraction, and was cordially—and at times 
uncordially—detested by about as diverse a group of human beings as could be imagined. 
Evelyn Wood considered him incompetent.120 Irish mercenary George Hamilton-Browne saw 
him as the rot at the heart of Chelmsford’s staff.121 Nell Colenso accused him of actively 
engineering the defeat at Isandlwana by concealing information from Chelmsford.122 Sir Henry 
Bulwer blamed his influence over Chelmsford for causing the war.123 Truly, Crealock seems to 
have had a unique and incomparable talent for uniting people who would otherwise agree on 
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nothing in shared dislike for him—which perhaps says more about his character and 
qualifications than any amount of biography could. 
 With Glyn sidelined by Crealock and Rowlands relieved of command, only three of 
Chelmsford’s column commanders and one of his cavalry officers were of sufficient rank to have 
an important impact on the campaign. The most famous of these was undoubtedly Colonel 
Evelyn Wood, whose Number 4 Column was meant to move into the Zulu borderlands 
controlled by the abaQulusi (a group of mixed Zulu and Swazi descent) and the renegade Swazi 
Prince Mbilini waMswati. Of Chelmsford’s immediate subordinates, Wood was the only one to 
have Chelmsford’s full confidence, and letters between the two men reveal a trust and intimacy 
absent in Chelmsford’s correspondence with his other field officers. Chelmsford confided in 
Wood, bringing him into the invasion planning early and providing him with a full outline of not 
only his own invasion route, but of the routes of the other columns.124 The micromanagement 
that characterised Chelmsford’s memoranda to Charles Pearson and Anthony Durnford, his other 
column leaders, is absent in his conversations with Wood, and during the early days of the 
campaign, Chelmsford made a point of riding from his column to Wood’s to confer with his 
favourite underling face-to-face.125 Wood played along with Chelmsford’s assumption of 
friendship, responding to his letters with equal warmth, but, when the time came to make or 
break reputations, was only too happy to promote his own career at the expense of Chelmsford’s. 
Wood’s memoirs, From Midshipman to Field Marshal, are a monument to egotism, and the 
sections on the Anglo-Zulu War, which award himself all the credit for every victory in the 
conflict are too often taken at face value. Wood’s account, even more than most memoirs, aimed 
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at painting himself in the best possible light and frequently disagrees with both the testimony of 
other Zulu War veterans, and with his own contemporary reports. Reading Wood becomes an 
exercise in academic caution, as the researcher attempts to prise out the relevant information 
from the claws of Wood’s apparently inexhaustible supply of narcissism. 
 In fairness to Evelyn Wood, he did have a lot to be narcissistic about. As the title of his 
memoir indicates, Wood was originally a midshipman in the British Navy until his bravery in the 
Crimean War, serving with the Naval Brigade, brought him to the attention of Lord Raglan, the 
British Commander-in-Chief during that conflict. Raglan nominated Wood for the Victoria 
Cross, and while the naval officer failed to win it, he obtained something even more valuable: 
Raglan’s patronage, which enabled his transfer from the Navy into the Army. Joining the 17th 
Lancers, Wood went to India, where his bravery in the Rebellion earned him a second Victoria 
Cross nomination, which he won. Wood’s performance in the Crimea and India marked him as 
an officer to watch out for, and his ability to win patronage for himself did not end with Lord 
Raglan.126 When Sir Garnet Wolseley was putting together his staff for the Second Anglo-Asante 
War of 1873-1874, Wood was one of the Special Service officers assigned to accompany him. 
Despite a predilection for illness that suggests a compromised immune system, and an accident 
proneness that enters the realm of the comical (he once reported for duty with his arm in a sling 
and his finger held together with bandages after being losing a battle with a folding chair), Wood 
performed well in the Asante conflict, leading a unit of Fanté auxiliaries that came to known as 
Wood’s Irregulars. Wolseley, in despatches at the time and the memoirs he wrote years later, 
spoke highly of Wood, and made him a part of the army clique known as the “Wolseley 
Ring.”127 These types of “Rings” were common in the British Army of the 1880s, with factions 
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of junior officers forming around a single senior officer who dispensed patronage and promotion 
to them. During the era of purchase, these patrons often lent their acolytes money to defray the 
costs of buying their way into their next rank; later they provided a means of bypassing 
promotion by seniority, allowing talented young officers to gain advancement on the strength of 
their patron’s recommendation.128 Wood was one of the officers who accompanied Chelmsford 
to South Africa on Special Service, and led numerous patrols and columns in skirmishes with the 
Xhosa, earning Chelmsford’s permanent respect and a key role in the Lieutenant-General’s 
scheme for the Anglo-Zulu War. Admired, if not always liked, and with years of experience in 
battling Africans, he seemed an inspired choice as a column commander.  
 If Wood was Chelmsford’s main confidante among the Special Service officers, his 
cavalry commander, Sir Redvers Buller, was Wood’s. Buller occupies an interesting place in the 
Zulu War: never a column commander or holder of an officially independent command, yet held 
in too high esteem by Chelmsford and present for too many of the war’s most important actions 
to be relegated to secondary status. As Wood’s chief of Volunteer cavalry, Buller was a vital part 
of the counterinsurgency effort that No. 4 Column waged against Prince Mbilini and the 
abaQulusi. At the catastrophic Battle of Hlobane it was Buller whose cavalry bore the brunt of 
the fighting, and at Khambula it was he who served as the decoy to draw the Zulu Army into 
Wood’s trap. During the final invasion of Zululand, it was Buller who guided Chelmsford’s 
entire army and Buller who pursued the Zulu after Chelmsford’s ultimate victory at Ulundi. His 
importance, out of proportion to his rank, is borne out by Chelmsford’s correspondence with 
Wood, which contains numerous messages that the Lieutenant-General wanted passed onto 
Buller. When the situation was at its darkest for Chelmsford, in the days immediately after 
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Isandlwana, it was on not only Wood, but on Buller that he placed his hopes for repairing the 
situation; a great deal of confidence for a commanding general to repose in a Lieutenant-Colonel. 
Chelmsford and Wood, however, thought Buller warranted that trust.129 
 The son of a Member of Parliament, Buller opted to join the Army instead of following 
his father into politics. He did his first tour of duty in China during Britain’s seizure of Hong 
Kong before being transferred to Canada. As a Captain, Buller joined the 1870 Red River 
Expedition, where he impressed his chief, Sir Garnet Wolseley, with his management of the 
1200-mile journey’s logistical tangle. In 1873, when Wolseley was sent to the Gold Coast for the 
Second Anglo-Asante War, Buller was one of the officers he requested for Special Service. 
Appointed Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, Buller functioned as an intelligence officer, 
leading recon missions in the African jungle for Wolseley. In his memoirs Wolseley spoke in 
extravagant terms of Buller’s performance against the Asante, stating his belief that the young 
officer would “brush off lightning bolts,” and that his triumph in one of the war’s most important 
battles hinged on intelligence brought to him by Buller.130 Now a full-fledged member of the 
Wolseley Ring  Buller was promoted to Major, and in 1878, was chosen by Lord Chelmsford for 
Special Service in the Ninth Frontier War. Buller raised a detachment of Volunteer cavalry 
known as the Frontier Light Horse who became famous throughout the Cape Colony for their 
daring pursuits of Xhosa guerillas, and established a firm friendship with Evelyn Wood. Wood’s 
autobiography, like Wolseley’s, singles Buller out for substantial praise as one of the best 
officers Wood ever fought alongside.131 On Chelmsford’s recommendation, Buller was promoted 
Lieutenant-Colonel and brought east to Natal, where his Frontier Light Horse joined Wood’s 
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column. Like Wood, he was a veteran colonial soldier, and the two of them had more varied an 
experience of Africa under their belts than any of Chelmsford’s other officers. 
 The commanding officer of the Coastal Column, Colonel Charles Knight Pearson, is less 
well-known to historians than Wood, his lack of a self-aggrandizing autobiography hurting his 
chances of earning their recognition in the same way as Wood. He was, however, another 
competent veteran officer with years of campaigning behind him. He came from a military 
family, his father a Commander in the British Navy and a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars. Like 
Chelmsford and Wood, he first tasted battle in the Crimean War, participating in the Siege of 
Sebastopol and the taking of Redan. He was mentioned in despatches during the latter, and 
earned medals from the British and the Ottoman governments for his bravery against the 
Russians.132 Whether he met Chelmsford or Wood during his time in the Crimea is unknown, but 
his record there would certainly have drawn their attention to him and marked him, like them, as 
an officer who had not only participated in colonial wars but had gone up against a “civilised” 
European enemy in the only general war of the mid-nineteenth century. Officers who had been 
through the Crimea together tended to look out for one another and sought to bolster one 
another’s careers—a good thing for an officer like Pearson, who was not a member of one the 
Army Rings and therefore did not possess the same sort of powerful patron as Wood and Buller.  
Pearson spent the years after the Crimea steadily, if not rapidly, climbing the ranks by 
way of purchase. When his regiment was sent to South Africa in 1876, Pearson, now its Colonel, 
went along with them. Along the way their ship ran aground, stranding Pearson and his men on a 
remote Cape Colony beach for two days while the authorities in the colony struggled to find 
them. Pearson was commended for his calm manner in handling the accident and it paved the 
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way for his receiving further responsibilities from the colonial government. In November of that 
year, Pearson was pulled from his regiment and made Commandant of Natal, responsible for the 
militia defense of the colony, a task at which he remained for two years until transferring back to 
his regiment just before the Anglo-Zulu War.133 As someone who had been in South Africa and 
even more importantly, on the Natal/Zululand border for two years, Pearson was an obvious 
choice to lead one of the invading columns, as one of the few officers available to Chelmsford 
who had both the rank and the knowledge of the terrain. While Pearson did not gain the notoriety 
of a Wood or a Buller he was well-thought of in the British Army, and Chelmsford’s letters to 
and about him, while not especially warm, demonstrate full confidence in his competency.  
That leaves only the last, and the most controversial of Lord Chelmsford’s leading 
subordinates: Brevet Colonel Anthony Durnford, the loser at, and soon after the scapegoat for, 
Isandlwana. Durnford’s career was by all accounts one of the unluckiest in the history of the 
British Army. Born to a family of minor Irish gentry who had served in the Royal Engineers 
since 1759, Durnford’s career was set out for him from birth. Commissioned into the engineers 
in 1848, he spent several years building roads in Sri Lanka before requesting a posting to the 
Crimean War. Illness, however, prevented him from reaching Russia until the fighting was over. 
He also entered a deeply unhappy marriage, marred by fighting and the deaths of two of their 
children; in order to escape a relationship he knew was over, Durnford asked to be sent to 
Gibraltar in 1860 and spent several years there, avoiding his wife. This cost him the chance for 
service in the Maori Wars or the Northwest Frontier in India; he applied for a posting on General 
Gordon’s expedition to China but fell sick on route and again missed out. In 1871, he 
volunteered for South African duty, not in hopes of seeing action there, but because it was as far 
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away as he could be sent from anyone who knew him without stepping off the edge of the 
world.134 
Durnford spent two years in the Cape Colony before being promoted to Major and sent to 
Natal to command the Royal Engineers at Fort Napier. As a new arrival in an incestuous frontier 
society, he attracted the attention of the colonial elite, including then Governor Sir Theophilus 
Shepstone, Bishop Colenso of Natal, and the Bishop’s daughter Nell, who formed a close and 
possibly romantic, relationship with Durnford. Durnford was with Shepstone at Cetshwayo’s 
coronation; brought along to map the routes into Zululand he found the crowning as silly as 
Cetshwayo himself did. In 1873, Durnford was sent with a unit of the Natal Carbineers to stop 
the rebellion of the amaHlubi people, who had revolted when one of Shepstone’s deputies 
stupidly tried to confiscate their guns. Durnford faced the amaHlubi at Bushman’s River Pass 
where, save for five junior officers and a lone African auxiliary, his men, all Volunteers from 
Natal’s civilian population, abandoned him to face the oncoming tribesmen alone. Durnford lost 
the use of his left arm in the skirmish and all respect for Shepstone and the people of Natal when 
they sought to punish a different tribe for the amaHlubi’s revolt; his defense of innocent Africans 
from unfair colonial retribution making him an outcast in Natal’s high society.135  
Durnford’s stand did win him friends amongst Natal’s Africans however, and when the 
time came to raise the Natal Native Contingent (NNC) he was one of the officers placed in 
charge of the effort. Durnford not only proved an able recruiter, but an innovative one; in 
addition to the hundreds of men he persuaded to join the NNC, he also created the Natal Native 
Horse, an auxiliary cavalry force of mounted Basuto tribesmen who regarded him as a friend and 
a benefactor. Unlike many British officers of the day, Durnford actively attempted to prevent his 
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white officers from abusing their men, telling one prospective lieutenant (sent to him with a 
recommendation from John North Crealock) that if he made good on his threats to whip his 
African troops, “if you’re not stabbed by your own men, you will deserve it.”136 Neither 
Shepstone nor Chelmsford especially trusted Durnford, whom they saw as having “gone Native”, 
with his sympathy for Africans on both sides of the border, an impression his role in the 
awarding of the disputed territories to the Zulu did nothing to alleviate. Evelyn Wood, however, 
thought Durnford a good soldier and a brave man, and given Wood’s usual self-centredness, that 
Durnford managed to make such an impression spoke well of him.137 
If Lord Chelmsford’s officers were not quite as distinguished as their American 
counterparts, they were certainly not, aside from John North Crealock, a pack of incompetents, 
and neither was Chelmsford himself. He, Wood, and Pearson all served in the Crimea, the largest 
war of the mid-nineteenth century, and acquitted themselves excellently, while Wood and Buller 
had fought against the Asante, and thus knew what it was like to face a powerful African empire 
in the field. Pearson had not fought Africans before, but he had been in South Africa for two 
years, and knew the Natal terrain as well as anyone. Durnford had led men against the amaHlubi 
and with eight years in South Africa (six of them in Natal) was uniquely positioned to inform 
Chelmsford about the territory. Chelmsford, Wood, Buller, and Crealock had just completed the 
last of the Xhosa Wars, ending a conflict that had been a bleeding wound in the Cape Colony’s 
side for decades. Surely then, these men, with all their collective years of experience were ideal 
to lead the British Army in South Africa. Surely, with the possible exemption of Crealock, a 
more qualified group of men could not have been assembled 
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It would most definitely have been a challenge for Chelmsford to put together a more 
solid coterie of officers. Indeed, the problems that would so upend the invasion in its first months 
had little to do with the competency of any of these officers (save, again, Crealock). The problem 
lay instead with how Lord Chelmsford, and those around him, viewed Africans. Lord 
Chelmsford’s plan to invade Zululand, with its reliance on detached columns of men with which 
to pursue mobile guerilla bands was not a strategy for invading Zululand: it was a strategy for 
fighting the Xhosa again. The Zulu Army, as will be explored next chapter, was not an insurgent 
force. It was a regimented army of heavy infantry that confronted its enemies in the open and 
sought to crush them in pitched battle. Yet in all of Chelmsford’s letters to Stanley, Bartle Frere, 
Shepstone, and Wood, there was no mention of any worry that his divided columns might be 
overrun by a Zulu attack. Instead, the anxiety that appeared time and again, defining 
Chelmsford’s concerns about the operation he was about to embark upon, was that the Zulu 
would not stand and fight at all. It was assumed by Lord Chelmsford, and by Sir Bartle Frere and 
Sir Theophilus Shepstone, that the British Army, with its Martini-Henry rifles and disciplined 
infantry, would easily overcome the Zulu if they dared to fight the British in the open, and that 
therefore the Zulu would not fight the British in the open, or would only do so once. It was 
anticipated they would run, and the chief thing Chelmsford needed to plan for was a way to stop 
them from getting away, and dragging out the war the way the Xhosa had. 
Anthony Durnford could have told Chelmsford better. He had been stationed in Natal for 
six years and knew how the Zulu fought. But Durnford’s loyalties were suspect in Chelmsford’s 
eyes, and his known sympathy for the Zulu made it easy to treat his opinion as designed to 
protect Cetshwayo. Evelyn Wood and Redvers Buller, who had combatted disciplined African 
troops in the Second Anglo-Asante War could have told Chelmsford that all Africans did not 
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fight the same way, but they, and Wood in particular, were too busy denouncing their own 
African auxiliaries for cowardice to push back against the idea that every African was a coward. 
To say otherwise might have meant Wood needed to re-examine his own leadership of the Fanté 
and Mfengu levies he had commanded in the past. Bishop Colenso and his daughter, Nell, Sir 
Henry Bulwer, and various Natal Border Agents could, and did, try to tell Chelmsford better, but 
were not listened to because they were opponents of the conspiracy. As the date for the invasion 
of Zululand came closer, Chelmsford, Bartle Frere, and Shepstone rejected all information that 
did not fit their backwards ideas about what Africans were like, and how the Zulu could be 




Phil Sheridan and Lord Chelmsford could not have been more different from one another 
in personal background or attitude. Yet they held the same anxieties regarding their opponents, 
fearful not of Lakota and Cheyenne or Zulu military prowess, but that the Natives might run 
away, and in doing so, turn their plans for swift conquests into drawn out guerilla stalemates. 
Sheridan’s writings, and those of his subordinates, contain a word, “scatteration” that comes up 
time and again as something to be avoided more than anything else. Chelmsford’s letters, 
likewise, are filled with doubts as to the Zulu willingness to engage in pitched battle and a 
nagging terror of having to waste time and money catching them. Both men, therefore decided 
that the thing to do was to break up their armies into small, independent commands under the 
subordinates they trusted most and to use those commands to converge on the enemy’s perceived 
location, crushing their Native adversaries between multiple forces before they had a chance to 
get away. In drafting these schemes, Sheridan relied heavily on his early experience fighting the 
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Yakima, and on George Crook’s battles with the Apache; Chelmsford drew on his earlier 
campaign against the Xhosa, which he anticipated repeating in Zululand. 
Both Sheridan and Chelmsford should have known better. They were the ones who 
pushed for war in the first place and one would have expected them to know their enemies well. 
Sheridan deliberately sabotaged Grant’s Peace Policy and from almost the minute he arrived on 
the Great Plains was determined to stir up a war against the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne to 
secure the land needed for further development by white colonists. Chelmsford joined forces 
with Bartle Frere and Shepstone to manufacture a nonexistent Zulu threat and achieve South 
African Confederation and military glory in one fell swoop. Sheridan and Chelmsford were not 
neutral military men suddenly handed an assignment they were unprepared for; they were both 
deeply entrenched members of the imperial political and military establishment using their 
positions and the power that came with them to neutralise opposition to war on the frontier and 
force a conflict into being through sheer willpower. Both collaborated with or suborned 
cooperation from other civil and military authorities to realise these ambitions and both knew 
from the start that war was going to be the result of their activities. How is it then, that neither 
man was truly prepared for the war he was going to wage? 
It was not because they lacked access to expert advice. George Crook was an 
acknowledged expert on Native American affairs, as was John Gibbon, and Sheridan had the 
cooperation of the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, both of which 
had plenty of information on the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne. He also had the opportunity to 
speak to officers like Nelson Miles and Bad Hand Mackenzie about how they prosecuted the Red 
River War. Yet Crook went along with Sheridan’s assumptions and Gibbon, never consulted by 
the generals, made the error of assuming they knew what they were doing, while Miles and 
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Mackenzie’s experience was left untapped until far later in the war. Similarly, Chelmsford had, 
in Anthony Durnford, an officer who was on the Zulu frontier for six years. He also could have 
talked to Sir Henry Bulwer or Bishop Colenso and received from them detailed analyses of Zulu 
capabilities. Chelmsford, however, saw Bulwer and Colenso as enemies and Durnford’s loyalty 
to the imperial military as dubious at best, and thus relied on his own stereotypes about the 
Xhosa to inform him about the Zulu. Wood and Buller, who had fought the Asante as well as the 
Xhosa, were, at least in theory, aware that not all Africans made war in the same way, but were 
too distracted by their own bigotry to contradict Chelmsford who does not seem to have ever 
asked about the Asante campaign, or if he did, never folded any lessons from it into his own. 
None of these men were stupid. They were all veterans and about as able a group of 
officers as the American and British Armies of the day could produce. Yet none of them could 
comprehend the reality of their situation or see past the notion that Indigenous people were 
Indigenous people and that Yakima and Lakota or Xhosa and Zulu must fight in the same 
manner. The issues lay, not in the individual personalities of the men involved (though those 
interacted with the broader problem in all manner of counterproductive ways), but in the 
institutional thinking of the militaries they belonged to. As frontier organisations the American 
Army in the Division of the Missouri and the British Army in South Africa were gripped by 
colonial thinking and their top officers saw the Indigenous world through that prism, and forced 
subordinates who might have other ideas to go along. Colonial thought permeated the political 
and military establishment of the United States and Great Britain and it placed restrictions on the 
power of even capable officers to see things the institutions did not wish to see. It was a serious, 
unexamined problem in both the Great Sioux War and the Anglo-Zulu War: especially when the 
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Lakota, Northern Cheyenne, and Zulu proved unwilling to play the parts Sheridan and 













































Chapter 2: Underrated Adversaries 
 
Phil Sheridan and Lord Chelmsford both believed they were going to war against 
primitives. It is an ugly word and an uglier sentiment, but one that must be engaged with to 
properly comprehend how both generals’ calculations went so disastrously awry. It was that 
assumption of primitivism on the part of their enemies that underwrote Sheridan and 
Chelmsford’s ideas about who the Lakota, Cheyenne, and Zulu were, and made them believe that 
if you had fought one Native American tribe or African people you had, in effect, fought them 
all. The Yakima and Apache, Sheridan thought, were a fine template for facing the Lakota and 
Cheyenne. The Xhosa, Chelmsford was convinced, were an appropriate test run for making war 
upon the Zulu. For with all Native Americans and Africans being ‘primitives’ they must share a 
culture and an approach to warfare that would differ only in the minor details. 
Spotting the bigotry that informed this line of thinking is not difficult, but what made that 
bigotry so toxic to Sheridan and Chelmsford’s chances for success was the ways in which it 
caused them to draft plans that bore no resemblance to observable reality. Had the Lakota and 
Cheyenne fought like the Yakima or Apache, Sheridan’s prejudice would not have been 
detrimental to his war-effort. Had the Zulu been just a slightly tougher version of the Xhosa, 
Chelmsford’s beliefs about Africans would never have mattered. It was the refusal of Sheridan 
and Chelmsford’s Indigenous enemies to conform to the white generals’ expectations, in ways 
both small and large, that made their racism dangerous to their own troops, rather than simply a 
regrettable character flaw, or a sign of the times that they lived in. 
Sheridan should have known that his skirmishes with the Yakima and Crook’s bush war 
with the Apache were not rubrics for going to war with the Lakota or Cheyenne. Neither tribe 
was a stranger to the American Army, and as Lieutenant-General Commanding the Division of 
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the Missouri, Sheridan had easy access to all the army records relating to previous battles against 
the peoples he now proposed to go to war with, peoples who, between 1866 and 1868 won a war 
against the American government and forced concessions from it. The Army had no shortage of 
veterans of those campaigns, and it is a curious thing that Sheridan did not employ any of those 
men in his scheme for conquering the Northern Plains. 
Chelmsford’s British Army had not fought the Zulu anything like the number of times 
that the Division of the Missouri had engaged the Lakota and Cheyenne, but Chelmsford still 
benefitted from an extensive regional intelligence network and from the advice of local 
administrators, Boer commandos, and allied African auxiliaries about how to best take on the 
Zulu Empire. Before the war, Chelmsford commissioned an intelligence report that, in a tribute 
to the data collecting ability of the Victorian Era British Army, provided a largely accurate 
history of the Zulu military and correctly identified some of its regiments by name. Yet almost 
none of the information in this report was incorporated into Chelmsford’s campaign plan; it was 
as if, having read the report, he could not bring himself to believe it. 
Had Sheridan or Chelmsford done their research, they would quickly have realized that 
they were proposing to make war on complex societies with highly sophisticated military 
systems. The Lakota and Cheyenne, while nomadic and lacking a central government, were 
possessed of a strong sense of unity, and were led by chieftains and war-leaders who, rather than 
being hidebound traditionalists, were perfectly capable of innovating new tactics and strategies 
as the situation called for them. Some of these war-leaders had defeated American soldiers in the 
past and were perfectly capable of doing so again. The Zulu King Cetshwayo, in the meantime, 
was the ruler of an imperial society that made him the commander of a vast army that was much 
more disciplined, and much more daunting to face, than the disunited Xhosa tribesmen 
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Chelmsford battled in the Ninth Frontier War. Neither Indigenous polity lacked the ability to 
respond to the colonial adventuring of the Americans or the British at the societal level, and 
when they did so, Sheridan and Chelmsford were caught completely off guard. 
Neither should have been. The relevant details were readily available to Sheridan and 
Chelmsford had they ever bothered to look. Colonial reasoning intervened, however, and stopped 
the generals from using the data points available to them to question their predetermined beliefs. 
The ‘primitives’ they had set out to subjugate would surprise them again and again, not because 




By the time Phil Sheridan took command of the Division of the Missouri in 1869, the 
United States Army already had a great deal of experience in warring against the Lakota and 
Northern Cheyenne—almost all of it bad. Relations between the US federal government and the 
two Native American nations, friendly enough in the 1850s, degenerated into a series of 
increasingly violent episodes in the 1860s, that saw significant casualties on all sides. During the 
American Civil War, the Union and the Confederacy fought not only one another, but the Native 
American tribes occupying the border regions between the United States, the Confederate States, 
Canada, and Mexico, in a little remembered sideshow that killed far more civilians than it did 
Union or Confederate soldiers or Native American warriors.  
In Union New Mexico and Confederate Arizona, Apache bushwhackers waged a guerilla 
struggle against whichever American Army occupied their territory at the time, while in Texas 
the Comanche and Kiowa knocked the frontier back more than a hundred miles, leaving a swathe 
of torched homesteads and ambushed pioneer wagons across the northern part of the state. The 
Comanche patronage and trade network encompassed the Southern Cheyenne and Southern 
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Arapaho as well, and they too were dragged into the ongoing border wars with the United and 
Confederate States of America as Native polities took advantage of the white collapse to regain 
lost territories and drive out unwanted settlers. Both Washington and Richmond, needing their 
regular troops elsewhere, responded by deploying quickly raised mobs of ill-trained militia 
Volunteers, whose heavy-handed tactics, bitter hatred of Native Americans, and sheer blundering 
stupidity all conspired to make the situation worse, rather than better.   
Until 1864, the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne largely sat the fighting out. The most 
powerful tribe on the Northern Plains, the Lakota, or “Sioux” as the Americans usually referred 
to them, were comparatively recent immigrants to the territory, arriving as part of a westward 
migration in the early 1800s. Their relatives, the Dakota and Nakota settled further east, 
becoming semisedentary farmers and hunters, but the Lakota continued west, pushing out onto 
the Plains and adopting the nomadic, horse-borne lifestyle already entrenched there. Their 
livelihood tied to access to the herds of American bison roaming the Plains, the Lakota—now 
subdividing themselves into the seven subgroups of Brulé, Oglala, Hunkpapa, Sans Arcs, 
Miniconjou, Blackfeet, and Two Kettles—fought many wars with the Crow, Shoshone, Arikara, 
Arapaho, and Cheyenne tribes that ruled the Plains before them, capturing the best hunting 
grounds for themselves. The Lakota onslaught earned them the permanent enmity of the Pawnee, 
Arikara, Shoshone, and Crow who regarded them as usurpers, but won them allies in the 
Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapaho who, seeing the way the wind was blowing, threw in 
with the new hegemons of the Northern Plains. The Southern Cheyenne and Southern Arapaho, 
unable to reconcile themselves to having the Lakota as overlords, broke off from their Northern 
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relatives in the 1840s and moved southward, falling into the Comanche and Kiowa orbit 
instead.138 
In contrast to the Comanche, who treated the Mexican and American settlers of New 
Mexico and Texas as enemies from the get-go, the Lakota initially had no interest in opposing 
the United States and the first hostilities between the tribes and the US government were initiated 
by the American Army. In 1854, Lieutenant John L. Grattan, a young, ambitious, and 
frighteningly dimwitted officer, decided the appropriate response to the theft of a cow was to 
order the bombardment by artillery of a nearby Brulé Lakota camp. That the camp’s headman, 
Conquering Bear, was friendly to the government and had already offered to pay restitution for 
the cow, did not matter to Grattan, who swore he could defeat the entire Lakota nation with one 
company and a few cannons. As it turned out, he could not, and his ill-considered actions 
succeeded only in mortally wounding Conquering Bear and getting himself, and twenty-nine of 
his soldiers killed by the rightfully incensed Brulé. The American government, deciding this was 
the fault of the Brulé, sent out Colonel William S. Harney to avenge Grattan; in 1856, Harney 
overran a Brulé camp, earned himself the nickname “Woman-Killer” and convinced the Brulé to 
sue for peace. After that, all was quiet—until another thuggish officer stepped onto the scene.139 
In 1862, as the Civil War raged further east, several bands of Dakota and Nakota, brought 
to the brink of starvation by government policy on the reservations, went up in revolt. They 
killed several hundred settlers before the army brought them to heel and spread panic and 
paranoia throughout the American West. Governor Evans of Colorado and his chief military 
advisor, the preacher-turned-soldier, Colonel John Chivington, saw an opportunity to exploit this 
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paranoia to their own ends, and in 1864, invited Southern Cheyenne peace chief Black Kettle to a 
parlay, then waylaid and murdered most of his party near Sand Creek. Chivington, a committed 
genocidaire, ordered his men to kill every Southern Cheyenne they found, down to the infants, 
on the premise that “nits make lice.”140 His men paraded through Denver with the genitals of 
their victims harpooned on their bayonets; these grisly trophies were subsequently displayed in 
the town theatre for all to see. Chivington and the Volunteer cavalrymen of the “Bloody Third” 
left Union service soon after, but the damage was permanent: the Southern Cheyenne declared 
war on the state of Colorado, destroying hundreds of miles of telegraph lines and raiding every 
stagecoach and wagon train they could find. Invoking old alliances, the Southern Cheyenne 
called the Northern Cheyenne into the war, and the Northern Cheyenne, in turn, brought in the 
Lakota tribes who swore to “raise the battle-axe until death,” to avenge Black Kettle.141 
John Pope was the officer sent to take over the Division of the Missouri and fix the 
wreckage Chivington and Evans left in their wake. Pope’s plans for extensive campaigning 
against the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne foundered, however, in the face of inadequate 
resources, bad weather, and the discovery that one of his chief subordinates, Brigadier-General 
Patrick Connor, was an exterminationist and aspiring genocidaire in the same vein as 
Chivington. When Connor ordered his men to kill every ‘Indian’ they encountered over the age 
of twelve, Pope countermanded these instructions, informing Connor his career would come to a 
quick end if anything resembling his original orders were carried out. Connor—who later won 
infamy ordering his own men shelled with cannister—took the field against the Lakota in 1865, 
but his expedition floundered in the snow, was encircled by Lakota outriders, and only narrowly 
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avoided annihilation.142 Pope’s other subordinates, Henry Sibley and Alfred Sully did not fare 
much better. In 1864, Sully skirmished with the Lakota at Killdeer Mountain, but failed to corner 
them; during his retreat back to his line of supply he was harassed the entire way by Lakota 
horsemen, who picked off stragglers and raided his wagon trains. Sibley’s experience was much 
the same; weather permitting it was a rare occasion when he could even find the Lakota and 
Northern Cheyenne, let alone force them to fight. In 1865, with the army downsizing and the 
Division of the Missouri passing from Pope to Sherman, American efforts to make war against 
the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne petered out without any kind of victory being obtained.143 
If the first full scale war between the United State Army and the Lakota nation was 
inauspicious, the second was flat out embarrassing. Through the early 1860s, even as they fought 
against white encroachment into their turf, the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne completed the 
final phase of their own expansion, driving the Crow nation from the rich hunting grounds along 
the Powder River. This was land the United States government, fresh from the Civil War and 
aiming to rebuild the Union, wanted for the new states and territories emerging in the American 
West. Under William Sherman, the American Army conceived of a program of fort construction 
in the Powder River country, intent on opening the passage that became known as the Bozeman 
Trail to pioneer families moving West from the rapidly urbanising North and the economically 
and physically devastated South. It was a project the Johnson administration, which drew what 
little political support it had from poor landless whites, looked upon as being of considerable 
importance, and which the Army, needing to justify its own existence in the face of Johnson’s 
opposition to Reconstruction, went along with eagerly enough.  
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In 1866, the Army and the Bureau of Indian Affairs met with some of the leading chiefs 
of the Lakota subdivisions, hoping to persuade them to sell the Powder River country. Amidst 
the negotiations, however, a group of Lakota scouts rode into the meeting and informed the 
Oglala war-chief Red Cloud, then emerging as the leading man amongst the Native American 
chieftains who opposed selling the land, that white surveyors were already engaged in mapping 
out the topography. Red Cloud stormed out of the negotiations, though not before accusing the 
government of negotiating in bad faith and trying to steal the land out from under the Lakota. 
The bulk of the other chiefs went with Red Cloud, but one or two minor dignitaries remained 
behind and were convinced to sign the treaty. Sherman, Grant, and eventually, President 
Johnson, were told these lesser men spoke for the whole Lakota nation and an agreement to sell 
had been finalised. Sherman, who envisioned a new role for the Army in “civilizing” the West (a 
belief he passed onto Sheridan), immediately ordered the start of construction on the Bozeman 
Trail forts. As Stephen Ambrose noted in the 1970s, “Sherman evidently believed that the 
Indians would sit and watch while he established forts, reorganized the Army, raised new cavalry 
regiments for Indian warfare, and then attacked the Sioux in their villages at a time of his own 
choosing.”144 This analysis holds up fifty years on; more than anything else, what blinded 
Sherman to the nature of the task ahead was the idea that the Army, not the Lakota, held the 
initiative. 
In making this assumption, Sherman underestimated Lakota resolve and badly 
underestimated Red Cloud. The Oglala war-chief was not someone who could be safely written 
off, yet that was precisely what the Army and the Bureau of Indian Affairs tried to do, dismissing 
him as the leader of a small band of malcontents. In truth, Red Cloud was one of the preeminent 
 
144 Ambrose, Crazy Horse and Custer, 228. 
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men amongst the whole Lakota people, his status as a war-chief of the Oglala (along with the 
Brulé the largest of the Lakota subdivisions) and the de facto leader of the Bad Face band giving 
him a great deal of social power, even in a society that lacked authoritarian leadership. His own 
careful diplomacy added to his prestige, and his position; among his strongest allies were Sitting 
Bull, medicine man of the Hunkpapa Lakota and leader of the Strong Hearts and Midnight Eaters 
societies, Young-Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses, widely regarded by Lakota and white men alike as 
a rising star within the Oglala, and the young men of the Shirt-Wearers society who if they had a 
leader, it was probably a quiet, strangely intense twenty-something named Crazy Horse.145 This 
gave Red Cloud a basis from which to work, but it was not enough for the Bad Face chief who 
grasped better than any of the Lakota chiefs before him the strength the white men could bring to 
bear. Red Cloud was a young man when Woman-Killer Harney descended onto the Lakota and 
was one of the Oglala who went south to fight alongside the Cheyenne during the border wars of 
1864-1865. He understood the American Army, while easily lost and misdirected on the Great 
Plains, was enormous and that he needed more men. He sent runners to all the Lakota 
subdivisions, to the Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapaho, the Southern Cheyenne and 
Southern Arapaho, and even their traditional enemies, the Crow, to try recruiting allies. The 
Crow declined, but warriors from all the Lakota subtribes and from the Cheyenne and Arapaho, 
Northern and Southern alike, turned out in support of Red Cloud. It was a major diplomatic 
stroke on Red Cloud’s part, and one all too often misunderstood by non-Indigenous historians. 
Despite the best efforts of American authorities and historians to assign someone to the 
role, there was no one chief of all the Lakota, or even of the Oglala, the Hunkpapa, or the other 
tribal subdivisions. The same held true for the Northern Cheyenne, who, while having notable 
 
145 The Midnight Eaters derived their name from their custom of holding feasts under cover of darkness.  
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cultural differences from the Lakota, adhered to much the same system of tribal government. 
Chiefs were tied to their bands, rather than the other way around, and only held power as long as 
their followers granted it to them. A chief who proved inept or a tyrant quickly lost support, and 
eventually, his band, as the constituent members drifted apart and joined up with the bands of 
more capable or enlightened leaders. The size of these bands varied immeasurably as well, with 
some consisting of only a dozen people, while others encompassed hundreds of families. Further 
complicating matters, bands might have more than one chief: the Bad Faces, one of the largest 
Oglala Lakota bands, answered to the cheerful and amiable Old Smoke during peacetime, but 
turned to Red Cloud as war-chief when their enemies threatened them. This system of leadership 
was one of the things that allowed Indian Bureau officials and Army officers to misrepresent the 
power and authority of the Native American leaders they encountered to suit their own personal 
ends: minor chiefs with bands of a few dozen could sign away territory belonging to Lakota who 
had never heard of them, while a man like Red Cloud was misconstrued as having no following, 
a statement that was technically true in peacetime, but not when it came to war.146 
The lack of political unity among the Lakota and Cheyenne could be, and sometimes was, 
a problem when it came to organizing for war. Just as there were no chiefs with absolute power, 
there were no generals with the inherent military authority to enforce discipline among the 
warriors. A man like Red Cloud might hold the position of war-chief within a band, but he could 
not force other men to follow him in the manner that Grant, Sherman or Sheridan could, by using 
rank and the threat of punishment to compel obedience. Rather, Red Cloud’s power as a war-
 
146 Most secondary histories of the wars on the Plains will include a summary of this information. For the best of 
those by white historians, see The Earth is Weeping.  For a version that incorporates Lakota oral tradition as well, 
see The Journey of Crazy Horse. As an aside one might note that the cultural blindness here has to have been 
deliberate on the part of the American leadership: it was not as though the United States was not thoroughly familiar 
with the concept of having one set of leaders in wartime and another in peacetime.  
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chief, like Old Smoke’s power as a peace chief or Sitting Bull’s power as a medicine man 
stemmed from the moral authority he wielded over those who knew him and were attracted to his 
personality. When a warband or raiding party was put together, the man leading it might not even 
be a war-chief. There were plenty of examples of war-parties spontaneously assembling 
themselves with no one clearly in charge or being pulled together by the magnetic personality of 
a leading warrior who, while possessed of a great reputation, did not hold any official rank. At 
the Battle of the Little Bighorn the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne opposition to George Custer’s 
attack came together around Gall and Crow King, both Hunkpapa Lakota war-chiefs, Lame 
White Man, a visiting Southern Cheyenne elder and former war-chief, Two Moons, a Northern 
Cheyenne chief, and the Northern Cheyenne Yellow Nose and the Oglala Lakota Crazy Horse, 
who while famous war-leaders, held no official positions—Crazy Horse had, in fact, lost his 
status as a Shirt-Wearer for trying to run off with another man’s wife.  
This is not to say there was no military organisation whatsoever among the Lakota or 
Northern Cheyenne. Young men were typically mentored by older warriors who tried to make 
sure they got out of their first skirmishes alive. Warriors kept careful running counts of their 
great deeds, of the scalps they had taken and, most importantly, of the coups (touching a live 
enemy with a hand or a stick) they had counted, which helped to determine their standing in 
society. Warriors who earned impressive reputations often clubbed together to form elite secret 
societies with elaborate initiation processes and rituals. These were common among the Lakota 
and approached the level of governmental institution among the Cheyenne, with the infamous 
Dog Soldiers being best known among the whites. Not all of these societies had long lives—the 
Shirt-Wearers imploded and were then abolished after Crazy Horse was kicked out—but while 
they lasted they provided a source of leadership, and unified leadership at that, for their people, 
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particularly given that membership stretched across bands, and at times, tribes. There were also 
aspects of formal military organisation that simply were not relevant to the Lakota and 
Cheyenne. Their American enemies needed to be taught to ride a horse and shoot a rifle, but 
Plains tribesmen (and women) were all but born on horseback and learned how to shoot from a 
young age. John Gibbon considered Plains horsemen to be the best natural light cavalry in the 
world and one-for-one thought them more than a match for even crack American troops.147 
It was at the higher levels of warfare, then, that Native American leadership could break 
down, and at times there were real problems. Keeping a Lakota and Cheyenne army in the field 
was an act of willpower on the part of its leaders, who had to generate a consensus among 
themselves about what course of action to take and persuade their followers, whether by fast-
talking or force of personality, to go along with it. Coalitions were held together not by treaties 
or national feeling, but by the loyalty of each band member to their leaders, and the loyalty of 
those leaders to one another and the broader cause. Often the death of an important war-leader 
could see the Lakota or Cheyenne break off from an action, or even end a conflict entirely, as the 
animating force behind the war effort was lost. In this context any defeat, however minor could 
be devastating, if it persuaded the leader of a warband to surrender or convinced his followers to 
abandon him. Books on Lakota and Cheyenne warfare are filled with anecdotes about how the 
tribes, despite their fearsome reputations, lacked staying power and abandoned combats if they 
lasted too long, and even when winning refused to go in for the kill for fear of losing too many of 
their own. To an extent these statements are true, and some US Army officers, most notably 
Nelson Miles, made full use of these traits of Native American military command, exploiting 
them to end battles and wars with a minimum of casualties on either side.148 These issues were, 
 
147 Gibbon, “Arms to Fight Indians,” 233-234. 
148 For Miles’ contemporary analysis of Lakota and Cheyenne strengths and weaknesses see Chapter 7, below.  
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in many ways, natural products of a decentralized society and should be taken as such, rather 
than as evidence of weakness of moral character among Native Americans. 
What often goes unsaid—or even unexamined—however, is that the nature of Native 
American leadership could produce precisely opposite effects to those listed above. Under gifted 
war-chiefs and war-leaders who understood how to motivate the warriors and keep a coalition 
together, the Lakota and Cheyenne could defy Army expectations. Warbands that purportedly 
feared taking casualties and would not press their advantages might suddenly push home a 
charge under near suicidal circumstances if given the proper motivation. At the Battle of Beecher 
Island in 1869, Southern Cheyenne war-leader Roman Nose leapt over a barricade and plowed 
through the defenses beyond it, trampling over the soldiers who got in his way before he was 
finally downed in a hail of bullets. The horsemen who followed him ran when he died—but up to 
that point they willingly charged right into the barrels of the Americans’ rifles, seemingly 
heedless of life and limb.149 At the Grattan Massacre of 1854, the death of Chief Conquering 
Bear did not knock the fight out of the Brulé Lakota, but instead spurred them onward, resulting 
in the deaths of Lieutenant Grattan’s whole command at the hands of the enraged warriors. And 
when enough chiefs gathered with one goal in mind, the level of tactical and strategic 
sophistication displayed by the allied war-parties could grow by leaps and bounds. Such 
concentrations of personality were rare, but when they happened, the Army could and sometimes 
did find itself physically and strategically outmatched by the assemblage of Native American 
talent. 
Such an assemblage happened from 1866 to 1868, in what became known to Anglo-
Americans and Native Americans alike as Red Cloud’s War. For two years, Red Cloud kept the 
 
149 Cozzens, The Earth is Weeping, 89. 
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Bozeman Trail forts under a state of permanent siege. This was not something Native Americans 
were supposed to be able to do, but no one told Red Cloud this, and with as many as two 
thousand Lakota and Cheyenne warriors answering his call to arms, he had the manpower to do 
it. Telegraph lines were cut for hundreds of miles in every direction. Foraging parties from the 
forts were attacked on setting out, and both the Army and the local settlers lost hundreds of cows 
and horses to Native raiders, who made a point of leaving no stock that could feed their foes. 
Wagon caravans attempting to move through the Powder River country were waylaid and 
attacked, pioneers and settlers killed, wagons burned, and goods made off with. Before the end 
of 1866, all travel along the Bozeman Trail had halted, with civilians too fearful to chance it and 
the Army powerless to protect them. When Colonel Henry B. Carrington, commander of Fort 
Phil Kearny and the highest-ranking officer in the Powder River region, led a sortie from his 
stronghold, he was driven back into the fort by hundreds of Lakota and Cheyenne warriors who 
descended on him from seemingly out of nowhere. Adding insult to injury, Red Cloud’s 
marauders made fifty-one separate forays against the fort itself, stealing livestock from its pens, 
burning outlying buildings, and otherwise making nuisances of themselves.150  
Carrington’s second-in-command was a young Captain named William Fetterman. A 
Civil War veteran who failed to earn the promotions he thought he deserved, Fetterman insisted 
that “with eighty men I could ride through the entire Sioux nation.” After petitioning Carrington 
one too many times for the right to prove it, Fetterman with three officers, seventy-six soldiers, 
and two civilian volunteers was allowed to ride out into the December snow in search of Red 
Cloud, whose scalp he promised to Carrington. Soon after leaving the fort they caught sight of a 
band of Native outriders, apparently fleeing from them. With his mixed group of infantry and 
 
150 Cozzens, The Earth is Weeping, 32-46. 
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cavalry struggling after him, Fetterman and an even more impetuous cavalry officer named 
Grummond set off after the Lakota and Cheyenne. The men they were chasing, however, were 
decoys, led by Crazy Horse, and including his fellow Shirt-Wearers American Horse, Young-
Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses, and He Dog, the latter of whom was perhaps Crazy Horse’s closest 
friend. Two more of Crazy Horse’s associates, Lone Bear and High Back Bone, and the Northern 
Cheyenne warriors Wolf Left Hand and Little Wolf joined the Shirt-Wearers, who had orders 
from Red Cloud to draw Fetterman away from the fort and deeper into the snow.151 Sheridan 
later spent a great deal of time trying to hit the Lakota and Cheyenne in the winter, when he 
thought them vulnerable, but here it was Red Cloud who used the season to his advantage. When 
Crazy Horse pulled Fetterman far enough from the fort, one thousand Lakota and Cheyenne 
horsemen appeared on the Captain’s flanks. Outnumbered more than ten to one, Fetterman’s 
soldiers were slain to a man. Fewer than a dozen Native Americans were killed, mostly by 
friendly fire.152 
News of the “Fetterman Massacre” provoked outrage in the Western press, and Sherman 
sent additional troops to the frontier to break the siege of the Bozeman Trail forts. Congress, 
however, was controlled by the Radical Republican peace party, which, in the aftermath of the 
Civil War, wanted to downsize the Army still further and put an end to the violence for good. 
Denied the funding and he needed to strengthen his forces, Sherman was unable to get through to 
Fort Phil Kearny and its neighbours, which remained under siege for two years, the soldiers 
inside battling Native patrols just to get food and water into the forts. Sherman’s soldiers did 
 
151 Little Wolf, on the basis of his performance here, would be a Northern Cheyenne war-chief by the time of the 
Great Sioux War. See The Journey of Crazy Horse for more on the Lakota war-leader’s role here and on that of his 
friends. 
152 “Chronological list of actions &c. with Indians from January 1866, to January, 1891,” in Indian Battles and 




score one minor victory, at the so-called Wagon Box Fight, when a convoy of wagons repelled 
several hundred of Crazy Horse’s Oglala, but that minor triumph did not relieve the siege or 
otherwise impact the outcome of the war. In 1868, as Johnson was being pushed from office, and 
Grant, a Radical Republican and proponent of the peace policy was moving in, the Army 
surrendered to Red Cloud.153 The Bozeman Trail forts were destroyed, a massive reserve of land 
was set aside for Native American use, and Red Cloud moved onto a reservation, promising not 
to go to war again. Red Cloud, who was taken east on a train to meet with Grant, and thus saw 
the size of the United States, kept that promise. The white men did not keep theirs. 
One might have expected that Red Cloud’s War, as the last major conflict between the 
Army and the Lakota-Northern Cheyenne coalition, would have been a topic of serious study by 
Sheridan and his compatriots during the leadup to the Great Sioux War, yet it was not. Sherman 
chose to view Red Cloud’s War as an aberration, brought on when the government refused to 
back the Army properly, and instead made a deal with its foes behind its back. Sheridan, who 
was not yet on the Great Plains during Red Cloud’s War, remembered it the same way, and 
insisted that the government giving into Red Cloud was the main reason why the rest of the 
tribes did not simply surrender to the Army on sight.154 In the Washita Campaign of 1869, 
Sheridan aimed to demonstrate to the Lakota and Cheyenne that they had not bested anything 
like the full strength of the United States. By striking out at the hostile tribes in the winter, 
Sheridan thought he would show them he could do what they could not, waging war in the deep 
snow.155  
 
153 Grant’s campaign slogan was literally “Let Us Have Peace.” 
154 Sheridan, “Report of Operations of the Campaign Against Indians in the Department of the Missouri in the 
Winter of 1868 to 1869,” 9. 
155 Sheridan, “Report of Operations of the Campaign Against Indians in the Department of the Missouri in the 
Winter of 1868 to 1869,” 10, 27, 31-34. 
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That the Fetterman Massacre, as the Army called it, took place during the winter was 
something Sheridan did not take under consideration. Nor did he truly examine the results of his 
own Battle of the Washita. The destruction of the friendly Southern Cheyenne camp at the 
Washita did nothing to placate the Lakota or Northern Cheyenne, who were angered rather than 
frightened, by the assault on their ally. The Battle also failed to demonstrate the overwhelming 
might of the US Army in the way Sheridan wanted it to, for, immediately after sacking Black 
Kettle’s camp, he and Custer were forced to retreat by the arrival of significant Southern 
Cheyenne, Kiowa, and Comanche reinforcements, drawn from the actual hostile encampments 
further down the Washita River.156 Rather than ending Lakota and Northern Cheyenne resistance 
to American expansion, Sheridan’s prized Battle of the Washita inaugurated a new round of 
fighting with the Southern Cheyenne, Kiowa, and Comanche, one Sheridan did not put an end to 
until 1875, when disease and the efforts of Ranald Mackenzie and Nelson Miles forced the Lords 
of the Southern Plains onto the reservations. 
The Lakota and Northern Cheyenne, in sharp contrast to Sheridan, took lessons from Red 
Cloud’s War. They learned that, when they put factionalism aside and fought as one, they could 
defeat Anglo-American soldiers. Red Cloud himself might have retired to the reservations after 
the war, but a generation of Lakota and Cheyenne leaders emerged from the conflict with 
enhanced reputations that were not confined to their own bands or subdivisions, but were known 
across the whole of the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne territories. Sitting Bull (more properly, 
Tatanka-Iyotanka, ‘Great Buffalo Bull Who Resides Among Us’), the Hunkpapa Lakota 
medicine man who served as one of Red Cloud’s chief advisors from 1866 to 1868, filled the 
void in the Lakota political world left by Red Cloud’s retirement. American sources from the 
 
156 Custer, “Report of Lt. Col. G.A. Custer, 7th Cavalry, Bv. Maj. Gen. etc of the Attack on Black Kettle’s Camp,” 3. 
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time often describe Sitting Bull as the head chief of the Sioux, a title that, according to most 
Native American testimony could not possibly have existed (though some rather humorous 
Lakota accounts do suggest they allowed the whites to think Sitting Bull was the ‘head chief’ if 
only to stop the endless queries about who the leader of all the Lakota was).157 The truth was 
Sitting Bull did not need to hold an official position any more than Red Cloud had. Respected by 
all the Lakota subtribes and their Cheyenne allies, Sitting Bull was the man around whom further 
resistance to the invaders coalesced, with a general consensus that he should be the face of the 
coalition emerging among the leaders who were opposed to the American settlers and the Army. 
Through the 1870s, Sitting Bull’s following grew immensely, as lodges of not only Hunkpapa, 
but of Oglala, Brulé, Miniconjou, Sans Arc, Black Feet, and Two Kettles Lakota, and even some 
Northern Cheyenne attached themselves to his band. During wartime, the number of lodges 
gathered around him expanded even more, as his allies brought their own followers to his camp.  
Those allies are worth considering now, for Sitting Bull, as a middle-aged medicine man 
who walked with a pronounced limp, had left his days as a war-leader behind him. While he 
served as the coalition’s primary orator and diplomat, the actual fighting of the Great Sioux War 
was done by younger men, many of whom first came to prominence during Red Cloud’s War. 
The most famous of these Lakota and Northern Cheyenne war-leaders was undoubtedly Crazy 
Horse, who while little known to the Americans at this juncture, had a standout reputation 
amongst the Lakota as the bravest of the brave. Distantly related to Red Cloud, Crazy Horse led 
the decoys at the Fetterman Massacre, and, at the Wagon Box Fight, witnessed firsthand how 
American fortifications and concentrated weapons’ fire could repel large numbers of Indigenous 
 
157 Utley offers a summary of the machinations that led to Sitting Bull being ‘declared’ head chief in his biography 
of the Hunkpapa leader, though he takes Sitting Bull’s precedence more seriously than many of his sources seem to. 
A quote from Wooden Leg on page 89, accurately summarizes the real situation.  
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cavalrymen. Widely regarded as a bit of an eccentric—his Oglala bandmates affectionately 
referred to him as “Our Strange Man”—Crazy Horse eschewed the physical trappings of status, 
disdaining warbonnets and elaborate body paint, and instead riding into battle with a single 
feather in his hair and a coating of dust over himself and his horse. A vision told Crazy Horse 
that, so long as he followed the Great Spirit’s directives to refrain from vanity, he would always 
be victorious in war, and the thirty-five-year-old warrior’s reputation bore out his embrace of this 
vision and its accompanying rituals. Expelled from the Shirt-Wearers for his theft of fellow 
warrior No Water’s wife, and never made a chief, Crazy Horse nevertheless amassed a major 
following among the younger Lakota warriors and their Northern Cheyenne allies. Much of this 
admiration stemmed from his personal bravery—he once rode his horse off a cliff to escape an 
enemy patrol—and his individual prowess in combat—he counted more coups than any other 
living Lakota warrior—but some of it was also attributable to his personality, and indeed, his 
intellect. A quiet man who rarely spoke unless it was necessary, Crazy Horse was possessed of a 
keen mind and he saw better than perhaps any other Lakota leader that the threat posed by the 
American Army and the settlers it guarded, would require a complex military response.158 
A cultural and religious traditionalist, Crazy Horse was a military innovator, a distinction 
that past historians like Stephen Ambrose and Robert Utley have—even while paying tribute to 
his abilities—struggled to make. The portrait of Native American warfare as an essentially 
changeless institution does not easily survive contact with Crazy Horse’s actual career, during 
which he consistently undertook military actions Lakota were not supposed to be capable of. He 
Dog recalled wryly that his friend was one of the few Lakota leaders to prize accuracy over 
mobility, leading Crazy Horse to fire his rifle dismounted to aim more precisely and waste less 
 
158 See Ambrose’s Crazy Horse and Custer for the classic Anglo-American view of Crazy Horse. See The Journey 
of Crazy Horse for a view more strongly rooted in Lakota oral tradition.  
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ammunition.159 Favouring a repeating rifle for long-range fighting and a classic Lakota warclub 
for close-up work, Crazy Horse combined traditional Lakota warfare with Anglo-American 
novelties in both his person, and his tactics. The Fetterman Fight, where the Lakota forwent their 
usual reluctance to exterminate an enemy force, seems to have left its mark on Crazy Horse, for 
at the Battles of the Rosebud, the Little Bighorn, and Slim Buttes he enacted variations of his and 
Red Cloud’s Fetterman strategy, dividing enemy commands from one another before attempting 
to encircle and destroy them. We know little about what, if any, internal debates on strategy and 
tactics were held within the hostile coalition, but a simple examination of how he fought singles 
out Crazy Horse as the Lakota’s leading proponent of the battle of annihilation—a form of 
warfare that, according to American military thinking of the day, was entirely beyond Lakota or 
Cheyenne capabilities. How Crazy Horse’s approach to warfare worked out in practise and the 
assistance he required from men like the Northern Cheyenne chief, Two Moons, and the 
Hunkpapa Lakota war-chiefs Gall and Crow King, will be relayed below, but for now the key 
thing to understand is that as Sheridan was laying the groundwork for the Great Sioux War, he 
had no conception that anyone on the other side was thinking in those terms at all.  
The Army recognized Sitting Bull as the leading hostile, but it failed to appreciate the 
extent of his influence and the number of his friends and allies. They knew the name “Crazy 
Horse,” but nothing about the man himself or the military techniques that he and other veterans 
of Red Cloud’s War were liable to utilise. Sheridan’s estimates of Lakota numbers never 
exceeded a few hundred, and his strategy was constructed on assuming the Native American 
forces would flee rather than fight. Army records show that, following the military’s violation of 
the Black Hills treaty zone, skirmishes between Anglo-American and Native American forces 
 
159 Quoted in Ambrose, Crazy Horse and Custer, 134. 
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increased rather than falling in number, yet Sheridan remained committed to his preconceptions. 
There is no evidence Sheridan ever examined Red Cloud’s War, or even spoke to its veterans in 
any kind of detail. Red Cloud recruited 2000 warriors to attack the Bozeman Trail forts, yet 
Sheridan assumed Sitting Bull had only a few hundred men. Red Cloud kept his force on the 
offensive for two years, yet Sheridan expected his enemies to flee at the sight of the bluecoats. 
Red Cloud and Crazy Horse ambushed Fetterman and defeated him in detail, yet Sheridan 
anticipated that Native American leadership could not take offensive action against his columns, 
let alone engage them in a battle of annihilation—despite Red Cloud’s protégé, Crazy Horse, 
being one of the key players in Sitting Bull’s camp. How could Sheridan, one of the Civil War’s 
most successful generals, know so little about the people he was about to fight? 
The answer that emerges is that he did not know much about them because he did not 
want to know much about them. Sheridan was drafting plans for a rerun of his Washita 
Campaign on the assumption that the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne were just like the Yakima, 
the Apache, and the pacifist elements of the Southern Cheyenne, and was not looking for 
information that contradicted that premise. His disdain worked its way down the ranks and 
affected most of the other officers in his employ—a primary example of this was John Bourke, 
George Crook’s aide de campe, who was normally highly sympathetic to Native Americans, yet 
wrote about Sitting Bull and the Lakota in starkly racist terms. Bourke was an ethnographer by 
nature, and wrote extensively on Apache customs, yet took little interest in the Lakota or 
Cheyenne whom he regarded as barbarians, an attitude that appears in his journals and memoirs 
when the Great Sioux War begins and vanishes just as abruptly when it ends.160 Sheridan made a 
tautology, wherein the Lakota and Cheyenne could not defeat the Army because they were 
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cowards and the Army had to avenge its defeat by the Lakota and Cheyenne in Red Cloud’s War, 
because the Lakota and Cheyenne were cowards. Sheridan was not searching for a way to break 
that tautology, and most of the men under him dutifully followed along with his thinking, 
whatever private doubts that some might have had. When hostilities commenced in 1876, the 




Where Sheridan was warring against an old enemy of the American Army, Sir Bartle 
Frere, Lord Chelmsford, and Sir Theophilus Shepstone were hellbent on embroiling the British 
Empire in a conflict with its oldest friends in South Africa. British adventurers first made contact 
with the Zulu Kingdom, then under the rule of its founder, Shaka kaSenzangkhona (better 
remembered to history as simply Shaka Zulu) in the early 1800s, and established a friendly 
trading relationship between the new Natal Colony and Shaka’s growing empire. This friendship 
was briefly ruptured in the 1830s, when the settlers at Natal unwisely joined the Boer Republics 
of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State in their war against Shaka’s brother, King Dingane, a 
move which earned the British nothing and saw Natal sacked by the Zulu monarch’s warriors. 
From thereon out, peaceful coexistence between Natal and Zululand became the order of things, 
and to the day that Shepstone annexed the Transvaal, the official policy of Britain’s High 
Commissioners in South Africa was always to use the Zulu as a counterweight to the Boers, 
exploiting the enmity between the Dutch expatriates and the African empire as a means towards 
bloodlessly expanding British influence. When Shepstone took over the Transvaal, British 
military policy in South Africa, previously aimed at containing Boer expansionism, was left 
somewhat adrift—at least until Shepstone persuaded Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford to 
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adopt the Boers’ old grudges against the Zulu as their own, and begin preparations for war 
against an enemy the British Army in South Africa never expected to fight.  
Neither Lord Chelmsford nor any of his subordinate officers had any experience of 
battling the Zulu. The Volunteer units recruited from the Cape Colony and Natal were likewise 
inexperienced in Zulu warfare; those officers who had seen action previously had either fought 
against traditional local enemies like the Boers and the Xhosa, or seen service overseas against 
Britain’s foes in India and Oceania. This does not, however, mean information on the Zulu 
military was difficult to come by. Chelmsford might not have had access to any British sources 
on the Zulu, but the Boers and the black Africans of the Natal had fought the Zulu many times, 
and could provide Chelmsford with valuable data on the enemy he had chosen, had he asked.  
Zululand, as it was commonly known, was founded in the 1810s by Shaka, the son of a 
regional chief named Senzangkhona. Through a series of coups d’état and military conquests, 
Shaka united first his father and mother’s tribes and then almost all the other local powers into a 
single imperial state encompassing a population of several hundred thousand people. In doing so, 
he radically altered the ethnic makeup of South Africa, with refugees from his campaigns fleeing 
south into what would become Natal, east into Portuguese Mozambique, and as far north as 
Kenya, Tanzania, and the Congo. Early monographs on the Zulu state (with Donald Morris’ The 
Washing of the Spears being a particularly well-known example) tend to paint this as an 
extraordinarily violent and bloody process, with a body count in the tens of thousands or higher. 
More recent historians have been more restrained, with Ian Knight especially suggesting that 
early white settlers deliberately blackened Shaka’s name, painting him as a tyrant to justify their 
participation in various court intrigues against him.161 The extent to which Shaka’s reforms were 
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specific to Zululand has also generated a lively debate; older material tends to portray him as a 
unique innovator, while more recent writings have suggested he was a part of a wider trend 
towards military revolution that took in much of South and Central Africa. What is not in 
dispute, however, is the efficacy with which Shaka deployed these alterations in warfare in the 
construction of his new Zulu Empire.  
Shaka’s half-brother Dingane overthrew and murdered him in 1824, but the systems put 
in place during Shaka’s era survived him and were adopted by his brothers, Dingane and Mpande 
kaSenzangkhona, and by his nephew, Cetshwayo kaMpande. Prior to the nineteenth century, or 
so the stories go, warfare in South Africa was a comparatively harmless affair in which the 
participants lined up, exchanged javelins, and occasionally participated in heroic single combats. 
Shaka, the oral traditions of the region claim, changed all that, replacing the light throwing 
spears or javelins that were the primary weapons of the local warriors, with a short, broad-bladed 
stabbing spear the British dubbed an assegai and that the Zulu themselves called an iklwa, an 
onomatopoeic rendering of the sound it supposedly made when pulled out of an enemy’s body. 
Lighter javelins became secondary weapons, hurled at the enemy line as the Zulu warriors 
charged in, with the bulk of the killing being done at close quarters with the iklwa, or with the 
iwisa, a heavy club (usually called a ‘knobkerrie’ in British accounts) carved from a single piece 
of wood and used in precisely the manner one expected: as a bludgeon with which to beat out an 
adversary’s brains. Both the iwisa and the iklwa were made to high standards of craftsmanship 
and neither was the product of a Stone Age society. The blades of the iklwa were made of steel, 
forged by smiths at armories across Zululand, while the ball head of the iwisa was frequently set 
with metal studs or hollowed out and filled with molten metal. In addition to his spear or club 
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and his supply of javelins, each Zulu warrior was also outfitted with a cowhide shield as tall as 
he was bearing the markings of the regiment to which he belonged.162 
These ‘regiments’ or ‘impis’ (as the British sources sometimes called them) proved to be 
the most important of the nineteenth century reforms. Before Zulu hegemony was imposed over 
their corner of South Africa, it was common practise for local chiefs and headmen to organise 
their young men into loose units based on their date of birth. These units of youths, known as 
amabutho (singular: ibutho) could be called up by the chiefs when they needed assistance with 
the harvest or constructing new homesteads, and also acted as the de facto militia. Shaka 
formalised this system, assigning an official name to each ibutho and reserving the right to call 
them up for himself. While on active duty, the ibutho regiments were quartered at Shaka’s royal 
homesteads which acted not only as residences for the king, but as barracks or amakhanda 
(singular: ikhanda) for the young warriors in his service. This not only gave Shaka a far larger 
and more impressive army than was possessed by his local rivals, but also granted him much 
greater control over Zululand’s labour pool than had been held by any hegemon before him.163  
Unwilling to let that kind of power slip away from him easily, Shaka kept the regiments 
on duty much longer than was traditional. Previously, young men left the service of their chiefs 
when they were married and could establish homesteads of their own. Shaka, accordingly, 
dictated that none of his warriors were to marry without his permission. Organising Zululand’s 
unmarried girls into amabutho of their own, Shaka typically waited until the men in one of his 
regiments had reached their thirties, then selected a female ibutho containing girls in their 
twenties and allowed the warriors to select their wives from amongst it. In yet a further alteration 
to the original system, however, Shaka did not disband a regiment once its men had married and 
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left to found their own homesteads: instead, these senior regiments of married men formed 
Zululand’s military reserves; they were not called upon to perform manual labour or police work, 
as was often the case for the younger amabutho, but could still be mustered for the defense of the 
kingdom in times of crisis. Competition for honours among contemporary amabutho was often 
fierce, the rivalries between the married and unmarried regiments even more so, and during the 
Anglo-Zulu War, it would, contrary to some expectations, be the units of senior men who served 
as the Zulu monarchy’s shock troops, regularly incurring frightening casualties in their drive to 
show up the younger generation.164 
Shaka’s army quickly became the most effective and disciplined indigenous military in 
his corner of South Africa. His regiments all had unique dress uniforms and were sufficiently 
drilled to fight in formation, something the Xhosa, the Swazi, and the other local powers of 
South Africa did not usually do. The favourite formation of the Zulu, supposedly invented by 
Shaka himself, was a pincer movement known as the ‘Horns of the Buffalo,’ in which the two 
wings, or horns, of the Zulu force tried to envelop the enemy from the flanks and the rear while 
the Zulu centre (sometimes called the ‘chest,’ other times dubbed the ‘boss’ after the central join 
of a buffalo’s horns) held the foe in place or pressed home a charge. Additional units, referred to 
as the ‘loins’ might be deployed in the rear of the boss as a tactical reserve, and it was reported 
Shaka often had them sit with their eyes facing away from the battle so that they would not 
become too excited or worn out before entering combat.165 Victorious over most of their black 
African adversaries, the Zulu military was supreme in eastern South Africa until the 1830s, when 
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a flood of Boer trekkers migrated from the Cape Colony, recently annexed by England, into the 
South African interior. 
The conflicts between the first Boer settlers and King Dingane of Zululand entered into 
local tradition as myth. Most Boer accounts eulogise the heroism of their ancestors in fending off 
Dingane’s endless Zulu hordes and record it as a victory for the white man over the treacherous 
and savage Dingane. Zulu oral tradition, conversely, recalls the conflict as a victory for the Zulu, 
with the Boers being forced out of Zululand and into the territory of Dingane’s enemies further 
into the interior of South Africa, where they eventually founded the Transvaal Republic and the 
Orange Free State. A glance at the skirmishes, for there were few large-scale battles in this 
conflict, shows the Boer-Zulu Wars were closer to a draw than anything else. The Boer habit of 
forming their caravans into wagon circles or ‘laagers’ often confounded the Zulu who were 
unused to siege warfare and did not have a ready-made plan for how to assault a mobile fortress. 
In the open veldt however, Boer commandoes, even mounted on horseback, made easy prey for 
Dingane’s warriors, most of whom were veterans of decades of campaigns and were led by 
experienced generals like Ndlela kaSompisi, Dingane’s right-hand man.  
It was against the Boers that the Zulu first faced white men armed with guns, and when 
the Zulu attempted to force their way through a Boer laager, as they did at the infamous Battle of 
Blood River, they were driven off by concentrated musketry. Ndlela, recognising this problem, 
countered through traps, suborning the Boers’ black scouts and using Dingane’s cattle herds as 
bait to lure would-be Boer rustlers out of their laagers and into ambushes. It was in one of these 
ambushes that Zulu forces slew Boer leader Piet Uys and destroyed his men; in another ambush, 
sometime after Blood River, the Zulu wiped out a unit of Port Natal settlers who came to aid the 
Boers. In his chapter on Ndlela in Great Zulu Commanders, Ian Knight identifies the elements of 
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a classic Zulu ambush as practised by Ndlela: “talkative scouts, difficult ground, and a 
vulnerable herd of cattle.”166 These tactics, used by Ndlela against the Boers and their few 
English allies, were used by Zulu commanders against the British during the Anglo-Zulu War 
with similar results.  
The Boer-Zulu Wars came to an end not with victory by either side, but when a revolt by 
King Dingane’s brother, Mpande, threw Zululand into a civil war. Mpande, who briefly took 
refuge with the Boers when he was in disfavour with his brother, ended the conflict with the 
trekkers, and over the course of his thirty-year reign Zululand was largely at peace with the 
Boers, the British, and their black African neighbours. Having ceded significant power to local 
chiefs to win their support against Dingane, Mpande spent most of his rule rebuilding the power 
of the royal house in hopes of passing on a united Zululand to his son and heir, Cetshwayo, and 
in this he was largely successful. While Cetshwayo and one of his brothers fought a civil war, it 
took place during Mpande’s reign and was limited to the personal retinues of the two princes, 
with the bloody defeat of the pretender firmly establishing Cetshwayo as Crown Prince of 
Zululand. During the last years of Mpande’s kingship, the elderly monarch began transferring 
power to Cetshwayo who ruled alongside him as a junior king. When Mpande died in his bed—
the only son of Senzangkhona to do so—Cetshwayo was the logical choice to succeed him.167 
The Zululand Cetshwayo ruled was different in a few ways from the Zululand of Shaka 
and Dingane’s day. Neither he nor his father held the full autocratic power enjoyed by Shaka or 
Dingane. The civil war between Dingane and Mpande undid the idea that any one man could rule 
Zululand unchallenged; the subordinate Zulu chiefs knew they had the power to play kingmaker 
and were not about to give that up. Being practical men, neither Mpande nor Cetshwayo forced 
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the issue. Instead, they welcomed the greatest of the chiefs into their inner circle, making them 
members of the royal council that advised the monarch on all important matters of state and 
granting them military commands in times of war. Oaths of personal fealty were sworn between 
the great chiefs and the king, and between lesser chieftains and the great chiefs who outranked 
them. Local rulers regained a great deal of their autonomy, including the authority to call up 
some of the amabutho, though they were expected to do so only at the king’s request or if their 
own territory was invaded. What emerged in Zululand was, in many respects, a feudal society in 
which various homesteads owed their loyalty to a chief, that chief owed his loyalty to a great 
chief, and the great chiefs, finally, owed their loyalty to the king. Some British observers, 
recognising similarities between this system and the one that dominated Europe’s Middle Ages, 
referred to the greatest of the Zulu chiefs as the “Zulu barons” which was about as accurate a 
term as any ever used by a colonial power to understand its Indigenous neighbours.168 
Cetshwayo’s army was similar, but not identical to the one Shaka bequeathed to Dingane. 
It totalled perhaps 40 000 men, of whom 20 000 to 25 000 could be mobilised at any given time 
without having an undue negative impact on Zululand’s economy. Size wise, this made the Zulu 
army’s manpower comparable to that of some contemporary European states, and significantly 
greater than that of the medieval European states to which its organisation and equipment might 
best be compared. Its men were still organised into amabutho regiments and still had unique 
dress uniforms they wore when appearing before the king. They were still armed primarily with 
the iklwa spear and iwisa club, though many Zulu warriors had chosen to replace their javelins 
with guns. Shaka and Dingane did not have a high opinion of firearms, but Mpande and 
Cetshwayo did, and thousands of guns were imported into Zululand from Natal, the Transvaal, 
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and Portuguese Mozambique, while royal armourers at the amakhanda barracks added the 
manufacture of ammunition and black powder to their skill sets. The Zulu army that faced the 
British at Isandlwana contained more than 6000 firearms of various makes and manufactures, 
and if the Zulu were not always the most accurate of shots (a difficulty which has often been 
reported to stem from their imperfect understanding of the sightings on their weapons), they 
made for enthusiastic ones, and the air on both sides of the Anglo-Zulu War’s battlefields was 
filled with black powder smoke. Shields were still carried by Zulu warriors, though some of 
these had shrunk in size from Shaka’s day, large enough to still turn aside a sword, spear, or 
bayonet thrust, but small enough to avoid hindering the warriors when evading enemy gunfire.169  
The most valuable resource available to Cetshwayo, however, was his generals. While 
the Zulu King was himself a most able warrior (his triumph over his brother during their brief 
civil war being incredibly one-sided), he did not take the field during the Anglo-Zulu War as his 
presence was needed on the throne to determine overall strategy and provide the Zulu army with 
the mystical aid required to triumph over his enemies. Whether Cetshwayo resented these 
limitations on his participation in the field is unknown; the Zulu King and his advisors were 
rarely asked about their strategies or personal feelings once the war was over. There was nothing 
unusual about his remaining on the throne; since Shaka’s death that had become the rule rather 
than the exception for Zulu Kings, and both Dingane and Mpande made war through their 
subordinates rather than on their own. Just as Dingane had Ndlela to conduct his campaigns for 
him, Cetshwayo too had a very capable body of surrogates to draw from, of whom the two most 
important were Chief Ntshingwayo kaMahole, and Prince Mbilini waMswati.  
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Ntshingwayo’s early career is something of a blank, but it has been posited by Ian Knight 
that he first saw service under Ndlela during the Boer-Zulu conflict and may even have been a 
protégé of that famous Zulu general. Surviving the transition between Dingane and Mpande’s 
regimes, Ntshingwayo, who was one of the greatest of the Zulu barons, became close friends 
with Mpande and a mentor to his son, Cetshwayo. When Mpande passed away in 1872, 
Cetshwayo confirmed Ntshingwayo’s old position as a senior member of the royal council and 
made the older man, now pushing seventy, his chief military advisor. Ntshingwayo gave his 
monarch little cause to regret this decision. He defeated the British at Isandlwana and Hlobane 
and ran them close at Khambula and Ulundi, proving himself one of the greatest Indigenous 
African generals of the nineteenth century. A traditionally minded Zulu general, Ntshingwayo 
nevertheless made it clear that, like Ndlela, he understood the danger posed by European 
firearms, and in all of his battles he did what he could to minimise their threat to his men.170 
Cetshwayo’s other chief military surrogate, Prince Mbilini, was not a Zulu. A renegade 
member of the Swazi royal family, Mbilini fled Swaziland after a coup d’état against his father, 
the king, failed. Offered protection by Cetshwayo, Mbilini settled his followers along the 
Zulu/Swazi border, established a close working relationship with Manyanyoba, chief of the half-
Swazi abaQulusi Zulu, and made himself infamous for his raids into Swazi and Boer territory. 
The Boers, especially, came to hate Mbilini, and repeatedly demanded that Cetshwayo hand him 
over to them for execution, but Cetshwayo always declined saying he had given his word to 
protect Mbilini and could not go back upon it. He did, however, grant the Boers permission to try 
to capture Mbilini, which led to one of the Transvaal’s greatest military fiascos, in which 
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Mbilini’s Swazi guerillas routed a Boer commando that significantly outnumbered them.171 
Grateful to Cetshwayo for his support, Mbilini answered the King’s call to arms in 1879 with a 
force of Swazi raiders that became the nemeses of Chelmsford’s No. 4 Column under Colonel 
Evelyn Wood. Having beaten the Boers for years, Mbilini also beat the British at Ntombe Drift 
and Hlobane. Captain Tommasson, who fought under Wood and against Mbilini, dubbed him a 
“savage chief of freebooters,” but also, “one of the most dashing of all the Zulu generals.”172  
The question then becomes how much of this information did Lord Chelmsford have 
access to? Surprisingly, the answer is almost all of it. During the leadup to the war Chelmsford 
commissioned a massive intelligence report on the Zulu Army which drew from British, Boer, 
and black African sources alike. In an era in which the British Army often struggled with 
intelligence gathering, the results were well above the normal standard and could have told Lord 
Chelmsford a great deal. The report placed the effective strength of the Zulu Army at 40 400 
fighting men, with 22 500 between the ages of twenty and thirty, 10 000 between thirty and 
forty, 3400 between forty and fifty, and 4500 between fifty and sixty.173 It acknowledged the 
existence of the Zulu officer corps, noting that each regiment had a senior staff comprising a 
commanding officer, his second-in-command, and the commanders of the left and right wings, 
and that each company of fifty men was officered by a captain and between one and three junior 
officers.174 The intelligence officers who compiled the report even looked into Zulu drill, noting 
that “in the ordinary acceptation of the word, drill is unknown in the Zulu army. They, however, 
perform a few simple movements with some method, such as forming a circle of companies or 
regiments, breaking into companies or regiments from the circle, forming a line of march in 
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order of companies, or in close order of regiments. The officers, however, have their duties and 
responsibilities according to their rank, and discipline is most rigidly enforced.”175 Referencing 
the opinion of naval officer Commodore Sullivan, the report concluded this section by adding 
that, “He states that the regiments are so well disciplined that the men never fall out of the ranks 
on the march under any pretext; they march at the double, and are said to keep up from 50 to 60 
miles daily, carrying their own provisions.”176  
The report included a list of Zulu regiments, identified (at times accurately) by name and 
accompanied by estimates of their strength and the average age of the men in each unit.177 The 
report also went into considerable detail on Zulu tactics and strategy, correctly identifying the 
‘Horns of the Buffalo’ formation as their principle mode of attack and noting the role of the 
‘boss’ as both a decoy and to deliver the final hammer blow once the horns pinned an enemy in 
place.178 Drawing on testimonials from the Boers, the report also made note of the usual Zulu 
ambush tactics, describing how they would “hide a large force in the bush and then show a few 
solitary individuals to invite an attack. When the troops enter the bush in pursuit of the latter the 
hidden men rise and attack them,” or how, when targeting cavalry, they used cattle to lure the 
horsemen into advancing too far ahead of the main army where they could be cut off and 
eliminated by the Zulu infantry.179 In light of what happened during the Anglo-Zulu War, one 
has to wonder whether any of the British officers, including Chelmsford himself, read the report. 
The report praised the discipline of the Zulu, yet Lord Chelmsford believed they would 
flee at the first sight of Martini-Henry fire. The report stated the Zulu preferred to meet their 
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enemies in open combat, yet Chelmsford planned a bush war in the vein of his Xhosa campaign. 
The report described all the warning signs of a Zulu ambush, yet British officers repeatedly 
blundered into those same ambushes, with Sir Evelyn Wood and Sir Redvers Buller’s attempted 
cattle raid on Hlobane mountain a particularly obvious and tragic example. The report, in its 
totality, described the Zulu Army as a formidable, well-led, and highly regimented force, 
equivalent to most medieval or early modern armies, yet Chelmsford conducted his campaign as 
if he were facing ‘primitive’ bushmen. There may be no greater example of the damage colonial 
reasoning and bigotry wrought on Chelmsford’s planning than the short-sightedness that caused 
the Lieutenant-General to ignore his own intelligence report. Chelmsford and his officers were 




Phil Sheridan went into the Great Sioux War almost entirely blind to his enemy’s 
capabilities. Lord Chelmsford entered the Anglo-Zulu War the same way. Neither man had to. 
The American Army boasted many veterans of battles against the Lakota and Cheyenne and 
Sheridan could have taken advice from any one of them about how to conduct his campaign. He 
chose not to do so. Lord Chelmsford did interview veterans of fighting against the Zulu and 
constructed an admirable report on the strength of the Zulu Army, but then decided the report did 
not meet his preconceived ideas about how Africans fought, and tossed the report aside, basing 
his plans on his own personal experience against the Xhosa, and not the information his 
intelligence chiefs worked so hard to gather for him.  
Sheridan and Chelmsford both fell into the trap of prioritising their own experiences—
and the ways prejudice coloured their memories of those experiences—over the hard facts in 
front of them. A cursory examination of Red Cloud’s War would have told Sheridan these were 
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not the Yakima or the Apache he was preparing to fight and that he needed a different strategy to 
handle them. An even briefer reading of his own intelligence report would have told Lord 
Chelmsford the Zulu would not fight the way the Xhosa had and that his scheme for the 
campaign was fatally flawed. Neither man, however, could break free of the colonial worldview 
they subscribed to; when the data they received did not fit the narrative they had already 
constructed for themselves, it was the data, rather than the narrative, that was dismissed. 
This would be a dangerous mistake against any enemy, but it was especially so against 
the Lakota-Cheyenne coalition and the Zulu Army. Both indigenous polities had long warrior 
traditions and significant reserves of manpower to draw upon. Both were led by capable 
generals, who were easily the intellectual matches of their Anglo-American counterparts. Both 
had access to at least some firearms and possessed the political will to confront the colonial 
invaders head on, and neither was overly familiar with defeat. The Lakota and Northern 
Cheyenne bested the Crows, the Arikara, the Shoshone, the Pawnee, and all the other tribes that 
contested with them for control of the northern plains. The Zulu built an empire encompassing a 
sizeable portion of modern South Africa, defeating or subjugating all the other Bantu speaking 
peoples and penning the Swazi up in the mountains. They also won their share of victories over 
the white men: the Lakota and Cheyenne beating the Americans during Red Cloud’s War, while 
the Zulu resisted the Boer incursions and burned Port Natal in their one clash with the British 
settlers. The Lakota and Cheyenne and Zululand were ready for war, and neither was a foe to 









Chapter 3: Warning Signs 
  
 If there was a key flaw that bedeviled Phil Sheridan and Lord Chelmsford’s campaigns, it 
was an inability to improvise. Sheridan and Chelmsford, as detailed over the last two chapters, 
based their assumptions about the capabilities of their Indigenous enemies not on military 
intelligence, but on preconceived, racialized notions about how “primitives” fought. Terrified 
their targets would scatter rather than face white men in direct combat, Sheridan and Chelmsford 
divided their forces into small columns, spread out across the Great Plains and the South African 
veldt, intent on preventing the Lakota and Cheyenne or Zulu from escaping their nets. Having 
disregarded what tangible evidence they had on their foes, the two generals had no doubts about 
the willingness of the Native American and African militaries they faced to play along. Sheridan 
and Chelmsford were sure they knew what their adversaries would do, and, in fact, that there was 
nothing else they could do. The Natives would flee from the white armies, to find themselves 
entrapped between converging columns with nowhere to run. It was, according to the colonial 
reasoning that governed both officers’ thinking, the perfect strategy. 
 When the Lakota, Cheyenne, and Zulu refused to do what they were expected to do, 
Sheridan and Chelmsford were caught flatfooted, unable to change their plans of campaign to 
match newly revealed realities. This ossification was the product of not only bigotry, but of the 
very plans that had been outed as unworkable. Strung out over vast areas of space, Sheridan’s 
Departmental Commanders and Chelmsford’s column leaders were severely limited in their 
capacity to communicate with one another or their superiors. The integrity of the operations was 
at the mercy of the honesty of individual field commanders who often disguised reversals as 
triumphs. Even when officers were honest with their bosses, delays in communications meant 
crucial data might not be disseminated until it was far too late.  
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 In the United States, George Crook’s March campaign against the Lakota was a 
miserable waste of time and resources whose only results were a court-martial and the hardening 
of Lakota and Cheyenne resolve. Crook obscured these facts by claiming to have attacked and 
defeated Crazy Horse himself, an untruth that was accepted by Sheridan and the rest of the army 
higher-ups at face value. Several months later, Crook encountered the real Crazy Horse at the 
battle of the Rosebud and endured the first strategic defeat of the war, the Lakota war-leader 
halting Crook’s army dead in its tracks. Crook swore in his after-action report that he won the 
Battle of the Rosebud, misconstruing the facts of the matter to safeguard his own career. Even 
had Crook been more forthcoming about events, his report did not reach Sheridan until a week 
later, by which point Custer and the 7th Cavalry were already on their way to the Little Bighorn.  
 In South Africa, Lord Chelmsford won a small skirmish at the homestead of Chief Sihayo 
and relished in the glory this accomplishment brought him, ignoring what the incident might 
have told him about Zulu intentions or competency. A week later, and only hours before 
Durnford found himself defending Isandlwana, Colonel Charles Pearson of the Coastal Column 
faced Zulu Chief Godide at Nyezane River, and found out for certain just how hard the Zulu 
were prepared to fight. By the time Chelmsford read Pearson’s report, the Battle of Isandlwana 
was long over, and Durnford and most of the 1/24th Infantry were dead. Had Chelmsford kept 
Pearson closer to him, the colonel’s despatch might have arrived in time for the general to make 
some use of it; as things stood, Chelmsford believed he would never need to be in close contact 
with Pearson—or Durnford for that matter—and information arrived too late to be of use. 
 These circumstances were the result, directly and indirectly, of Sheridan and 
Chelmsford’s assumptions about Native American and African armies. Since the enemy would 
not fight, he would need to be run down. Since the enemy would need to be run down, the 
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American and British armies would have to operate in separate columns. Since the American and 
British armies would have to operate in separate columns, communications between those 
columns would be impaired. It could have been an acceptable risk, had the Lakota and Cheyenne 
and Zulu not been entirely willing to fight. The battle readiness of Native American and African 
forces cut the legs out from under Sheridan and Chelmsford’s plans but the generals, sure in their 
prejudices and deprived of critical data, did not see this. Their blindness, stemming from both 
ingrained preconceptions and battle plans that prevented the dissemination of information, had 




 Phil Sheridan’s one contribution to the annals of frontier warfare was the winter 
campaign. The 1868 Washita campaign was Sheridan’s first foray into “Indian” fighting as a 
general officer, and in his mind, was a tremendous success. That Black Kettle’s band was 
friendly to the United States, and that Sheridan and Custer attacked him by mistake was beside 
the point, and something Sheridan immediately went into denial about. In his reports and 
memoirs both, Sheridan ascribed the “victory” at the Washita to his own innovation of striking at 
the Southern Cheyenne during the winter when the snow immobilised them and food was scarce 
enough to prevent them recovering from the destruction of their supplies. There was a logic to 
Sheridan’s thinking, though he seemed unaware of the fact his chosen arm for the job, the US 
Cavalry, would be every bit as impeded by the snow as their enemies.  
 Sheridan’s outline for the 1876 campaign was a virtual repeat of his 1868 campaign: 
converging columns, led by his Departmental Commanders and their immediate subordinates 
would set out into the winter to find and eliminate the camps of the hostile Lakota and Northern 
Cheyenne. It was the commanding general’s intention that George Crook in the Department of 
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the Platte, and Alfred Terry in the Department of the Dakotas, lead these columns themselves, 
and that by moving in tandem with one another, finish the Lakota and Cheyenne by spring. 
Unlike in 1868, Sheridan himself would not take the field; having gotten his war, the 
Commanding General of the Division of the Missouri remained in Chicago, to oversee the war 
effort, preparations for the centennial and the 1876 election. Crook and Terry would keep in 
touch with each other, and with Sheridan, through despatches and telegrams. How Sheridan 
anticipated this system would be enough to help Crook and Terry coordinate their movements in 
the field is not known; his orders told the generals to cooperate but left little notion as to how 
that cooperation should be achieved aside from a promise to cable Crook about Terry’s 
movements whenever possible.180 The Departments of the Platte and the Dakotas were separated 
by miles of rough, snowbound country, making communication between Crook and Terry, and 
between the two generals and Sheridan, extremely complicated. It may be that Sheridan’s 
experience of the Civil War, in which hundreds of thousands of men were kept moving in 
tandem with each other by means of telegraph lines and railroads, kept him from seeing that the 
situation was very different out on the frontier. Telegraph lines were sparse, the railway 
unfinished, and the territory in question vast and thinly populated. Alternately, Sheridan’s 
disregard for Lakota and Cheyenne military strength may have let him assume that any 
cooperation between Crook and Terry would be enough to overawe the disparate warbands and 
familial parties he predicted they would encounter. Regardless of his reasoning, Sheridan’s plans 
for the winter campaign saw his Departmental Commanders divided from one another and 
himself and struggling with communications problems for which there were no easy answers.  
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 Crook and Terry’s ability to communicate with one another became a moot point when 
Terry’s foray failed to get off the ground. Terry was not nearly as sold as Sheridan on the 
concept of winter campaigning and found the inclement weather prevented him, and his leading 
subordinate, John Gibbon, from assembling the resources they needed to succeed. When the 
snows stopped them from putting together a supply system for the men, Terry cancelled the 
expedition, refusing to expose his soldiers to conditions he could not adequately prepare them 
for. Just the act of assembling soldiers for the expedition led to multiple cases of severe frostbite, 
and for Terry that was enough evidence that a full scale march into the winter would produce 
numerous casualties to little result.181 With Terry and Gibbon out of the picture, Sheridan’s call 
for converging columns could not be answered, yet George Crook was not recalled and told to 
cancel his own expedition. Instead, Sheridan decided any winter attack was better than none, and 
expected Crook to find the Lakota and Cheyenne on his own. 
 George Crook was deeply involved in Sheridan’s planning of the Great Sioux War, and 
had a reputation, unequalled in the army at the time, as an expert in Indigenous warfare. During 
his sojourn in the Department of Arizona, Crook spent months, and even years at a time in the 
field, leading small units of soldiers in tracking renegade Apache bands. Crook was used to long, 
physically punishing pursuits of Indigenous quarry, and the fighting in Arizona conditioned him 
to view bad weather, inhospitable climates, and broken terrain as obstacles to be overcome. 
Crook fully agreed with Sheridan’s strategic concept and, based on his time hunting the Apache, 
helped his academy friend fine-tune it—a decision that, given the differences between the 
Department of the Platte and the Department of Arizona, should have been more open to 
question than it was. In his diary, Crook’s aide de camp, biographer, and veritable alter-ego, John 
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Gregory Bourke, observed that in the Platte Crook was lacking the things that made him so 
successful in Arizona: namely, familiarity with the territory and compliant Indigenous guides.182 
During the war for Apacheria, Crook enlisted scouts from one Apache band to help him track 
down the members of another, a policy he and Bourke both believed instrumental in pacifying 
Arizona.183 The Lakota and Northern Cheyenne were not nearly as divided as the Apache, 
however, and Crook had no luck recruiting scouts from their reservations. Bourke was still 
optimistic though, reminding himself that Crook was the master of “Indian” warfare.184 That 
there might be more than one kind of “Indian” warfare, was not a thought that seems to have 
crossed Bourke’s mind. It did not appear to cross Crook’s mind either, or the mind of Philip H. 
Sheridan.  
 In justice to Crook he was not entirely unfamiliar with the rigours of winter warfare. In 
1866 and 1867, while still a lieutenant-colonel, Crook led troops in a string of skirmishes with 
the Paiutes of northern Nevada and Idaho, where the weather was cold enough that “his pack-
trains had been obliged to break their way through snow girth deep, and his whole command had 
been able to make but thirty-three miles in twelve days.”185 Winter in Nevada and Idaho was a 
far cry from winter in Montana and Wyoming though,. Accompanying the Brigadier-General 
into the snow were five companies of the Second Cavalry, another five companies of the Third 
Cavalry, two companies of the 4th Infantry, and a train of scouts, packers, and teamsters for a 
total of eight hundred eighty-three soldiers and civilians. In keeping with Sheridan’s orders and 
the orthodoxy of the day, it was expected that the cavalry, rather than the infantry, would do the 
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fighting when the Lakota and Cheyenne were caught. On the march, Crook gave command of 
this force to Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds, a former Brevet Major-General of Volunteers and 
Crook’s one-time superior officer in their Civil War days. Reynolds, breveted for gallantry 
during the Civil War, lost much of his reputation in an 1871 scandal when Colonel Ranald “Bad 
Hand” Mackenzie accused him of fraudulently awarding army contracts. According to Bourke, 
Crook wished to give Reynolds the opportunity to redeem himself, and thus placed the colonel in 
charge of the expedition.186 Crook himself officially accompanied the column as an observer 
only and spent most of his time riding alongside the motley array of white and mixed-race scouts 
he had hired on for the expedition. In his memoirs Bourke spoke highly of these men, whose 
ranks included such fantastical characters as “Big Bat” Pourrier, “Little Bat” Garnier, and Frank 
Grouard, a Native Hawaiian who was once captured by the Lakota and spent some years living 
among them.187 In theory, these woodsmen knew the Platte river region as well as any of the 
Lakota and Cheyenne; in practise they all failed Crook at crucial moments in the endeavour. 
 Crook’s column left camp on March 1, 1876, and quickly found itself bogged down in 
the snow. They first encountered the Lakota in the early hours of March 3, when a war-party 
stole into their camp and critically wounded one of the civilian herders before making off with 
some of the cattle. Another brief skirmish with Lakota outriders on March 5 wounded one of 
Crook’s corporals and put the whole command on alert for a half an hour before it was 
determined the Natives had left the area.188 Despite Sheridan and Crook’s assumptions that the 
winter would paralyse them, the hostile Lakota were clearly out and about and far more mobile 
than the soldiers; in the aftermath of both raids, Crook and Reynolds decided against mounting a 
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pursuit, as it could only result in their men getting lost in the snow. On March 7, the column 
reached the Crazy Woman Fork of the Powder River and Crook, frustrated by the slow pace, 
decided some changes were in order. According to Bourke, Crook instructed his officers “we 
should now leave our wagons behind and strike out with the pack-trains; all superfluous baggage 
must be left in camp; every officer and soldier should be allowed the clothes on his back and no 
more; for bedding each soldier could carry along one buffalo robe or two blankets; to economize 
transportation, company officers should mess with their men, and staff officers or those 
‘unattached,’ with the pack-trains; officers to have the same amount of bedding as the men; each 
man could take one piece of shelter tent, and each officer one piece of canvas, or every two 
officers one tent fly. We were to start out on a trip to last fifteen days unless the enemy should 
sooner be found, and were to take along half-rations of bacon, hard tack, coffee, and sugar.”189 
The infantry was also cut from the expedition and, under Captain Edwin Coates, detailed to 
escort the wagons and teamsters back to Fort Reno. 
 The decision to abandon the wagons sped Crook and Reynold’s advance, but it also led to 
incredible suffering among the men of the Powder River expedition. Confined to half rations and 
deprived of shelter and firewood, the soldiers came down with hypothermia and frostbite. Robert 
Strahorn of the Rocky Mountain News, recalled “every few minutes some poor fellow would 
drop into the snow, ‘just for a minute, you know,’ and when at once shaken up by his more 
determined comrades, would make all sorts of excuses to be allowed to enter that sleep which, if 
undisturbed, would know no waking. Officers were everywhere on the alert to keep their men 
upon their feet, and, thanks to this general watchfulness, no cases of amputation are yet known to 
be necessary on account of freezing, although nearly all of us are now nursing frostbitten feet, 
 
189 Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 259. 
126 
 
faces, or ears.”190 Despite the cold, Crook denied the men permission to “enkindle a single fire, 
however small, on account of the danger of alarming the foe,” which only increased the rate at 
which the cold injured his men.191 John Bourke’s diaries and memoirs dutifully recorded the 
falling temperatures endured each day until the night of March 10 when his thermometer froze, 
the mercury having “passed down into the bulb and congealed into a solid button.”192 From that 
point on, the only thing Bourke and the rest of the command knew about the temperature was it 
was lower than minus thirty-nine degrees Fahrenheit: the temperature at which mercury freezes. 
 On the same day Bourke’s thermometer froze, Crook and Reynolds’ scouts uncovered the 
remnants of an Indigenous camp. Frank Grouard, a favourite of both Crook and Bourke, 
informed them this meant the Lakota were camped on the Powder River. It was at this point that 
one of the major misconceptions of the Powder River expedition became locked in. During the 
planning phase of the campaign, Sheridan told Crook he was to go after Crazy Horse while Terry 
was expected to locate Sitting Bull. Crook, after a week and a half of fruitlessly searching the 
frozen wilderness for Crazy Horse, now believed it was indeed Crazy Horse whose trail they had 
found. Bourke and the other members of Crook’s staff likewise believed it was Crazy Horse they 
were trailing, and Grouard and the other scouts, eager to please Crook, confirmed this belief. The 
idea it was Crazy Horse, once lodged in the minds of Crook’s officers could not be easily 
dislodged. Crook, in his after-action reports, told Sheridan it was Crazy Horse they struck at the 
Powder River, and repeated this claim in newspaper interviews and his aborted autobiography. 
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Bourke declared in both his private diaries and public memoirs it was Crazy Horse they attacked, 
and Robert Strahorn of the Rocky Mountain News printed it was Crazy Horse in his paper.193 
 Alas, it was not Crazy Horse. Neither he nor Sitting Bull were camped at the Powder 
River. Neither were Dull Knife, Little Wolf, Lame White Man, Gall, Crow King, or any of the 
other leading men among the hostile Lakota and Cheyenne. Instead, the camp at the Powder 
River belonged to a band of neutral Northern Cheyenne under the aging peace chief Old Bear, 
and their Oglala Lakota allies led by He Dog, a notable Oglala warrior and close friend of Crazy 
Horse. Old Bear and He Dog hoped to stay out of the war entirely, but, following the army’s 
ultimatum in January, decided their best course of action was to come into the reservations, at 
least until the violence was over. Slowed by the winter weather, Old Bear and He Dog’s people 
were gradually making their way towards American territory and the Red Cloud and Spotted Tail 
Reservations, intending to turn themselves in to the army.194 Unfortunately for Old Bear and He 
Dog, neither Crook, nor Reynolds, nor any of their scouts, could tell the difference between a 
hostile war-party and a peaceful band—a recurring problem in the American frontier army, as 
shown by the Battle of the Washita and the Marias Massacre. Lost in the snow, with Sheridan’s 
campaign plan riding on their success, Crook and Reynolds needed a triumph so they could turn 
around and go home. So Old Bear and He Dog became Crazy Horse in their minds and in their 
reports and nothing anyone said would ever dissuade them in that belief. 
 On March 16, Crook’s outriders, under Colonel Stanton, spotted, in Bourke’s crude 
terminology, “two young bucks who had been out hunting for game, and, seeing our column 
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advancing, had stationed themselves upon the summit of a ridge, and were watching our 
movements.”195 Crook halted the column, and ordered the men into camp, intending the 
watching Natives should believe the expedition was not aimed at them. That night, he instructed 
Reynolds to take six companies of cavalry and, led by Frank Grouard and the other scouts, track 
the Indigenous observers back to their camp and strike it. Bourke accompanied Reynolds and 
Grouard as an observer and brought along Strahorn to report on the glorious victory the Army 
expected to win. Strahorn, who did not know any better, was filled with praise for Grouard’s 
tracking skills, and wrote rapturously of the “unfailing celerity” with which Grouard uncovered 
“Crazy Horse’s” trail.196 Early in the morning of March 17, Grouard returned to the strike force 
and informed Reynolds he had located the Native encampment, only a few miles from where 
they were standing. Reynolds immediately divided his command into three units under Captains 
Moore, Noyes, and Mills, and made ready to win the army their first laurels of the war.  
 Reynolds’ plan of attack relied on overwhelming Old Bear and He Dog’s camp with 
strikes from his three ad hoc battalions of cavalry. “Noyes’ battalion,” Bourke remembered, “was 
to make the first move, Egan’s company, with its revolvers, charging in upon the village, and 
Noyes’ cutting out and driving off the enemy’s herd of ponies. Mills was to move in rear of 
Noyes, and, after the village had been charged, move into and take possession of it, occupy the 
plum thicket surrounding it, and destroy all the ‘tepis’ [sic] and plunder of all kinds. These 
battalions were to descend into the valley of the Powder through a ravine on our right flank, 
while Moore, with his two companies was to move to the left and take up a position upon the 
hills overlooking the village, and receive the flying [sic] Indians with a shower of lead when they 
started to flee from their lodges, and attempted to get positions in the brakes or bluffs to annoy 
 
195 Bourke, On the Border with Crook, 269. 
196 Strahorn, “The Battle of Powder River,” 5-6. 
129 
 
Egan.”197 Thanks to their night march, the Lakota and Cheyenne did not yet know of Reynolds’ 
presence, and it was expected the sudden charge by all three sections would catch the Native 
warriors completely by surprise. Bourke and Strahorn both accompanied Noyes’ battalion, and 
rode alongside Egan’s company in the subsequent engagement, providing two eyewitness 
accounts to a piece of the battle, but obscuring historians’ views of the remainder of the action. 
 The sudden charge of Egan’s unit certainly caught Old Bear and He Dog by surprise, 
though given the nonviolent intentions of the two leaders, this becomes less of an 
accomplishment on the part of the American forces. Wooden Leg, an eighteen-year-old Northern 
Cheyenne warrior, recounted how the camp dissolved into chaos: “Women screamed. Children 
cried for their mothers. Old people tottered and hobbled away to get out of reach of the bullets 
singing around the lodges. Braves seized whatever weapons they had and tried to meet the 
attack.”198 Old Bear was unprepared for any sort of altercation, and few of his people were well-
armed. Wooden Leg, better prepared than most, grabbed Old Bear’s pony, mounted up, and rode 
out to meet the whites. He was one of the few who could do so. “A few other Cheyennes,” he 
said, “did the same as I had done. But most of them remained afoot. I shot arrows at the soldiers. 
Our people had not much else to shoot. Only a few had guns and also ammunition for them.”199  
 Black Eagle, another Northern Cheyenne , was one of those who fought alongside 
Wooden Leg. Years later, he described the battle to anthropologist George Bird Grinnell. While 
his wife and father-in-law, Brave Wolf, evacuated the camp, Black Eagle remained behind and 
fought a rearguard action against Captain Egan’s grey-horsed troopers. “He got behind a tree,” 
Grinnell wrote of Black Eagle’s experience, “He was shooting and turned the soldiers a little to 
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one side and presently four more young men began shooting and turned them still more. He did 
not leave camp but the soldiers swerved off and fell in line and rode back to the main command. 
His wife coaxed her father to the rest of the people who had already thrown up breastworks.”200 
Bourke, on the other side of that same fight, credited Black Eagle’s small band of warriors with 
being crack shots: “the Indians did not shoot at our men, they knew a trick worth two of that: 
they fired deliberately at our horses, with the intention of wounding some of them and rendering 
the whole line unmanageable.”201 Strahorn echoed Bourke’s analysis of Black Eagle’s shooting, 
saying “the beautiful grey horses were a splendid mark for the Indians, and four or five dropped 
before we got through the village, Captain Egan’s own animal being among the number. Then, 
with the desperate foe pouring in bullets from behind every convenient cover in the shape of 
rocks, trees, thickets, etc., we were ordered to dismount, turn our horses over to every fourth 
man, and continue the fight with our carbines.”202 Driven from the main camp, Old Bear and He 
Dog’s fighters took up covered positions in the surrounding terrain and fired on Noyes’ and 
Egan’s detachments. “Bullets and casualties were then bestowed upon us with a will,” Strahorn 
said ruefully, “that showed plainly we were not to sweep the field without paying a penalty.”203 
 Clearing the camp of the hidden Native gunners and archers proved a much harder task 
than Reynolds’ plans envisioned. Captain Moore, expected to ride to the support of Noyes, failed 
to do so, for which Bourke and Strahorn roundly condemned him.204 Noyes did capture the 
Cheyenne horse herd, but it was only with the aid of Colonel Stanton and Captain Anson Mills, 
the latter of whom was supposed to be cleaning up after Noyes’ charge had already succeeded, 
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that the campsite was cleared of enemy snipers. Bourke especially was furious about what he 
saw as Moore’s misconduct, saying “the Indians, under fire from Stanton and Sibley on our left, 
and Egan’s own fire, had retired to the rocks on the other side of the ‘tepis’ [sic] whence they 
kept plugging away at anyone who made himself visible. They were in the very place where it 
was expected that Moore was to catch them, but not a shot was heard for many minutes; and 
when they were it was no help to us, but a detriment and a danger, as the battalion upon which 
we had relied so much had occupied an entirely different place—one from which the fight could 
not be seen at all, and from which the bullets dropped into Egan’s lines.”205 Egan was now 
caught in a crossfire between Moore’s battalion, and those Northern Cheyenne who remained 
within shooting distance. Wooden Leg, and his compatriots Bear Walks On A Ridge and Two 
Moons were among those still fighting. “We centered an attack upon one certain soldier. Two 
Moons had a repeating rifle. As we stood in concealment he stood it upon end in front of him and 
passed his hands up and down the barrel, not touching it, while making medicine. Then he said 
‘My medicine is good; watch me kill that soldier.’ He fired, but his bullet missed. Bear Walks 
On A Ridge then fired his muzzle-loading rifle. His bullet hit the soldier in the back of the head. 
We rushed upon the man and beat and stabbed him to death.”206 Along the line, small, intimate 
and ugly encounters like this played out between Egan and the Cheyenne as the Battle of Powder 
River lost cohesion and became a series of skirmishes up and down the edges of the camp. 
 Reynolds technically had possession of Old Bear’s camp, but casualties among his 
cavalrymen were mounting, and not just from Cheyenne bullets and arrows. Friendly fire, like 
that dropped by Captain Moore into Captain Egan’s lines, caused its share of injuries. So did the 
weather. “In order to make the charge as effective as possible,” said Bourke, “we had disrobed 
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and thrown to one side, upon entering the village, all the heavy or cumbrous wraps with which 
we could dispense. The disagreeable consequence was that many men had feet and fingers, ears 
and noses frozen.”207 Five hours of fighting in temperatures below thirty-nine degrees, it turned 
out, had a negative effect on the health of the soldiers, and much of their stocks of iodine were 
used up rubbing frozen limbs back to life and trying to avert amputations. Reynolds, deciding in 
Strahorn’s phrasing, that “the more the engagement was prolonged after the prime object of the 
expedition was accomplished, the more serious and useless were our losses,” withdrew, though 
not before firing the contents of the camp the troops could not carry away with them.208 Bourke 
could not comprehend how this order was given and fumed about Reynolds’ decision, “that no 
man can explain,” in his diary and again in On the Border with Crook.209 Those soldiers killed in 
action were left behind on the battleground, and so too, rumour had it, was a wounded soldier, 
who “fell alive into the enemy’s hands and was cut limb from limb.”210 Whether this was true, 
Bourke told his readers, he could not say, “I can only say that I believe it to be true.”211 Crook 
believed it was true too, saying in his autobiography “our troops left so precipitously that our 
wounded men were left to fall into the hands of the Indians.”212 Also lost in the retreat were the 
Cheyenne’s stores of dried meat, which were burned instead of being carried along, despite 
Crook having specifically requested Reynolds capture them for the starving men. 
  The retreat from the Powder River camp was soon marred by the same army blundering 
that characterised the battle—and the rest of the campaign—thus far. Reynolds’ force captured 
more than seven hundred ponies from the Cheyenne, leaving the Natives unhorsed and without 
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transport. Reynolds, however, failed to post a guard on the horses, and the first night out from 
the battle site a band of Cheyenne warriors, including Wooden Leg, slipped into the army camp 
and stole almost all the horses back.213 Strahorn excoriated Reynolds for this in his article, mad 
that the Colonel had not only neglected to guard the horses, but that, “when at daylight, this 
morning, the ponies were reported as being driven off by the Indians, the general declined 
sending a force in pursuit, although they could easily have been recovered.”214 Bourke was as 
angry as Strahorn, though he at least tried to explain Reynolds’ choice not to pursue Wooden 
Leg and company, as “the cold and exposure had begun to wear out both horses and men, and 
Doctor Munn had now all he could do in looking after the numerous cases of frostbite reported in 
the command; my recollection is that there were sixty-four men whose noses, feet, or fingers 
were more or less imperilled by the effects of the cold. Added to these were two cases of 
inflammatory rheumatism, which were almost as serious as those of the wounded men.”215  
 When Reynolds’ battalions of walking wounded limped into Crook’s camp, their 
commander was greeted not as a conquering hero, but as a blithering idiot. His subcommanders 
fared no better, with Crook, likely at the behest of Bourke, accusing Reynolds, Moore, and 
Noyes of misconduct in the field. Crook, working off partial information, believed Reynolds 
nearly had Crazy Horse in his grasp, only to allow him to get away. Yet, with all the injured from 
the battle and his dearth of supplies, there was nothing Crook could do to rectify Reynolds’ 
mistakes. He abandoned the expedition, making a ninety-mile march to Fort Reno, where his 
force was disbanded. On Crook’s orders, Reynolds, Moore, and Noyes were court-martialled for 
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“misbehavior before the enemy.”216 Crook told Sheridan the mission would have succeeded but 
for the incompetence of his subordinates, which Sheridan took as true and put down in his annual 
report for 1876, describing the Powder River affair as “barren of results,” but sparing Crook and 
himself from any criticism.217 The entire problem was with Reynolds, Noyes and Moore, not 
with Sheridan’s strategy or Crook’s execution of it. Reynolds certainly had not covered himself 
in glory, and Moore’s performance at the Powder River was abysmal (Noyes seems to have been 
court-martialled for little reason beyond Crook needing a third victim) but the truth was the 
whole expedition was wrongheaded from the start. Crook headed into territory he did not know 
with incapable guides, insufficient supplies, and zero support from Terry. He went after the 
wrong Natives, and the bulk of the injuries his men sustained were not from enemy action but 
from frostbite and hunger. He did this because Sheridan wanted his winter campaign and because 
both men presumed any action against the Lakota and Cheyenne during these months, even 
unsupported by Terry, would be enough to end the war. Sheridan and Crook were wrong on all 
counts, and Reynolds, Moore, and Noyes paid the costs of those bad decisions. 
 When Sheridan said the battle was “barren of results,” he was not entirely correct. The 
Powder River engagement had important consequences for the war—all of them bad for the 
army. Old Bear and He Dog had planned to sit out the Great Sioux War, but Reynolds’ burning 
of their camp forced them to seek help from Crazy Horse, the very man Crook sought to destroy. 
Kate Bighead, a Northern Cheyenne survivor of the Powder River, summarised the political and 
military outcomes of the battle succinctly: “The Oglalas gave us food and shelter. After a few 
days the two bands together went northward and found the Hunkpapa Sioux, where Sitting Bull 
was the chief. The chiefs of the three bands decided that all of us would travel together for the 
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spring and summer hunting, as it was said that many soldiers would be coming to try to make us 
go back to the reservations.”218 Rather than weakening Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull’s position, 
the Powder River expedition strengthened their hand. Old Bear, once a peace chief, was now 
hostile by necessity, and He Dog was again riding alongside his old friend Crazy Horse. 
Psychologically speaking, the battle also furthered the belief among the hostile Lakota and 
Cheyenne that the soldiers could be beaten. From their point of view, Old Bear’s unprepared 
followers had repelled Reynolds’ cavalry from their camp and then recovered their horses, 
despite having only a fraction of the whites’ numbers.219 A determination spread amongst the 
Lakota and Cheyenne leaders to not only resist the Americans, but to defeat them.  
 Neither Sheridan nor Crook saw the problems that plagued the Powder River expedition 
as the result of anything other than the unique incompetence of Joseph John Reynolds. They did 
not re-examine their assumptions about the Lakota and Cheyenne and they did not tell any of the 
other officers in the Division of the Missouri there was any cause for concern. Instead, Crook 
prepared to renew his offensive in the spring, an undertaking Sheridan instructed Alfred Terry to 
join him in. Sheridan still believed the greatest threat confronting his command was that the 
Natives might scatter to the four winds, so his plan for the spring of 1876 was much the same as 
his plan for the previous winter: two main columns, under Crook and Terry, and another, smaller 
column under Terry’s subordinate John Gibbon, were to scour the Departments of the Platte and 
the Dakotas for the hostile Lakota and Cheyenne. By advancing on the Lakota territories from 
differing angles, these three columns would block off escape routes and stop the Natives from 
running. In Sheridan’s thinking nothing had changed—a strange conclusion for him to come to, 
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when one considers that nearly everything had changed. It was spring now, not winter, and the 
Lakota and Cheyenne again had free rein to roam over their territories as they saw fit. Their 
camps were no longer snowbound, their horses no longer starved from lack of forage during the 
winter. If they truly did not wish to fight, they would have an almost unlimited ability to flee.  
Moreover, Sheridan, and Crook for that matter, ignored the most important revelation 
from the Powder River campaign: namely, the Lakota and Cheyenne, when pushed, were 
perfectly willing to fight. Old Bear’s following was made up of Cheyenne and Oglala Lakota 
who wished to remain neutral in the conflict with the whites, but when they found themselves 
under attack by Reynolds’ cavalry their warriors, led by the likes of Black Eagle and Wooden 
Leg, made a fierce stand. Still more impressively, the day after the battle Wooden Leg’s war-
party slipped into the campsite of a far larger American force and stole back all their lost horses, 
an act that showed just how brave and militarily capable the Northern Cheyenne were. Sheridan 
and Crook, however, did not see it that way. In their colonial worldview, the Cheyenne horse-
raid was a product of Reynolds’ imbecility, not fine-honed Indigenous expertise. So long as 
Crook and Terry’s new armies did not contain anyone named Reynolds, the plan would succeed; 
to their way of looking at the world, only the decisions of white men could affect the operation.  
 The decisions of Native American leaders would have a powerful effect on the operations 
of the American Army, even if the army could not see it. For instead of fragmenting into smaller 
bands, as Army orthodoxy said they would in the face of superior force, the Lakota and Northern 
Cheyenne were coming together. As the snows thawed, winter rolled into spring, and spring 
began to roll into summer, warbands belonging to all the subdivisions of both tribes slipped away 
from the reservations and rode out to join Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Dull Knife, Little Wolf, and 
the other notable resistance leaders. Whites at the time attributed this to Native perfidy, while 
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modern historians have credited it to restlessness among the young men of both tribes forced to 
sit in idleness on the reserves at a time when their culture said they should be fighting their first 
battles.220 The latter probably was a motivating cause for some of the younger tribesmen, but 
often overlooked are the very real grievances the “agency Indians” had with their American 
overlords. Spotted Tail and Red Cloud did not want to fight the US government, but they also 
did not want to sell the Black Hills and only agreed to do so under duress. Many of their 
followers, offended by the treatment of the two chiefs and by the government’s attempts to steal 
their spiritual refuge, chose to fight against the occupation of the Black Hills, their prior desire 
for peace notwithstanding. Others were angered by the attack on Old Bear and He Dog and saw 
in Reynolds’ actions the evidence that neutrality, or even allegiance to the US government, was 
not enough to save them. Still others found reservation life itself an intolerable insult; the abuses 
of the reservation system were well-known even at the time, and when John Bourke denounced 
the US Indian Agents at most of the reserves as thieves and argued that it was their criminality 
that was to blame for the war, he was far from being wrong.221  
Added to all these stressors were the diplomatic efforts of Sitting Bull and his allies who 
aimed to persuade as many agency Lakota and Cheyenne as possible into abandoning the 
reserves and joining up with the free bands on the Great Plains. The Hunkpapa medicine man 
declared that later that summer his following would host the greatest Sun Dance ever held on the 
Plains and invited not only the other subdivisions of the Lakota but their Northern Cheyenne 
allies to attend. The Sun Dance, a vital part of the Lakota religion, was normally open only to 
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members of the tribe, so Sitting Bull’s offer to the Northern Cheyenne was a signal honour, and 
one the Cheyenne leadership appreciated. Most of the hostile Lakota and Northern Cheyenne 
warbands came, as did many of their agency brethren, and even a few parties of Southern 
Cheyenne and Northern Arapaho who wished to honour their old pacts with the Northern 
Cheyenne. By the time of the Sun Dance in June, Sitting Bull had gathered the greatest living 
chieftains and war-leaders of the Lakota and Cheyenne tribes. These men did not swear fealty to 
Sitting Bull: he was not a feudal lord, or chief of all the Lakota, but they did agree with him, in a 
general sense, about what needed to be done , and allowed themselves to be guided by his vision 
for Lakota and Cheyenne resistance. At the height of the Sun Dance festival, Sitting Bull cut fifty 
pieces of flesh from his arms, and in a rapture of agony declared he had a vision of the white 
soldiers falling into the hands of the gathered Lakota and Cheyenne. As Crook and Terry were 
retrofitting their commands for the new campaign season, Sitting Bull too, was gathering an 
army.222 
Army intelligence was good enough to recognise the number of Lakota and Cheyenne in 
the hostile camps was increasing, and Sheridan, Crook, and Terry all realised that reinforcements 
from the reservations were playing a role in bolstering the warriors available to Sitting Bull and 
his allies. Army estimates of Lakota and Cheyenne strength, however, still tended to be too low. 
It was an article of the faith in the army high command that the Plains tribes could only put a few 
hundred warriors at a time into the field as no warband or encampment could successfully feed 
or control more than that number at a time. This belief, required that the army ignore the 
evidence of Red Cloud’s War, where somewhere in the neighbourhood of 1000 warriors 
gathered under Red Cloud for the Fetterman Fight and hundreds more participated in the 
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skirmishes, sieges, and raids that characterised the rest of that conflict. As the last major war 
against the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne, Red Cloud’s War should have been a case study for 
Sheridan, Crook, and the other planners of the Great Sioux War.  
Ignoring Red Cloud’s War was, however, easy enough for Phil Sheridan and George 
Crook to do. The army had spent a decade writing off the Fetterman Fight as a product of 
Fetterman’s own, unique incompetency and structuring the Lakota victory as resulting from 
cowardice and exhaustion on the part of Andrew Johnson’s post-Civil War government. 
Sheridan, who had not come to the Plains until after Red Cloud’s War was over, had no 
experience with battling large Lakota or Cheyenne warbands. The Washita campaign struck a 
camp of a few hundred Southern Cheyenne, while the Red River War of 1874 to 1875 was 
fought against tribes devastated by recent smallpox epidemics. The largest force the Comanche 
and Kiowa were able to put in the field was about eight hundred at the Battle of Adobe Walls, a 
far cry from the thousands strong Comanche war-parties that once devastated New Spain. Crook, 
fresh from the skirmishes of the war for Apacheria, had even less experience with large 
warbands than Sheridan, and the Powder River expedition had not made him re-evaluate his 
assumptions. Terry was less sure than Sheridan or Crook about Lakota numbers, but bowed to 
their supposedly superior experience in frontier warfare. In the whole of the Division of the 
Missouri the only officer of any rank to suggest that the Lakota and Cheyenne numbers might 
run into the thousands was, ironically enough, George Custer, who told Terry that Sitting Bull 
might have as many as 1500 men to draw upon, a claim no one else was willing to credit.223 In 
the months to come, Custer proved his point, under the most tragic circumstances possible. 
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Bourke’s memoirs again provide a glimpse into the thinking of the army leadership as 
preparations for the spring campaign were made. Crook, Bourke said, “expressed himself freely 
in regard to the coming campaign, but said that while the Sioux and Cheyennes were a brave and 
bold people, from the very nature of the case they would never stand punishment as the Apaches 
had done. The tribes of the plains had accumulated much property in ponies and other things, and 
the loss of that would be felt most deeply.”224 Crook still believed the plans he and Sheridan had 
concocted were the best possible for dealing with the Lakota and Cheyenne, and Bourke, two 
decades after the war was over, still defended the generals on that count, saying “it needed no 
profoundly technical military mind to see that with two or three strong columns in the field 
seeking out the hostiles, each column able to hold its own against the enemy, the chances of 
escape for the Sioux and Cheyennes would be materially lessened, and those for the success of 
either column, or both, perceptibly increased.”225 Like his boss, Bourke thought it was the lack of 
support from Terry and the employment of a talentless failure like Reynolds that stopped the 
Powder River campaign from defeating the Lakota. With Terry and Gibbon intending to take the 
field that spring, and with Reynolds no longer in the picture, he assumed the war would swiftly 
conclude. The only thing Crook wanted to do differently this time was to secure the assistance of 
scouts from the Lakota and Cheyenne reservations, so his command would not get lost again. 
Securing that assistance, unfortunately, proved beyond Crook’s talents. Only three 
elderly chiefs assented to listen to Crook when he visited the reserves, and none of them loaned 
him their warriors. Crook, and therefore Bourke, blamed this on the Indian agent at the 
reservation, alleging the Bureau of Indian Affairs was obstructing the campaign and had 
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convinced the Native leaders they would be punished if they assisted Crook.226 While the Bureau 
was notoriously corrupt, and its agents frequently incompetent if not outright criminal, there is 
no evidence that in this specific case they had anything to do with Crook’s difficulties. The 
Apache were always divided and their clans often warred on one another long before Crook ever 
came to Arizona. The Lakota and Cheyenne may have lacked a unified government, and 
different factions and bands did not always concur with one another on policy, but their cultural 
identity was much more cohesive than that of the Apache and fighting between the tribal 
subdivisions was kept to a minimum. The peace chiefs did not want to go to war with the white 
men, but they were unwilling to make war on their own people on the white men’s behalf, and 
Crook, unable to wrap his head around the fact the Lakota and Cheyenne were not the Apache, 
blamed the Indian agents rather than alter his perspective. Crook did gain the support of the 
Lakota’s enemies, the Shoshone and the Crow, but their familiarity with Lakota territory was 
only somewhat better than that of the white and mixed-race trackers he worked with in March. 
Crook also hired Frank Grouard again, still convinced of the Hawaiian ranger’s abilities.227  
Crook took charge of his new command on May 28, 1876. His new army was larger than 
the one he led in March but had substantially the same structure, made up of five companies 
from the 4th and 9th Infantry and fifteen companies from the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry. Lieutenant-
Colonel William Royall was Crook’s number two man, and served as commander of the cavalry 
detachments which, as in March, were expected to be the army’s chief weapon against the 
Lakota and Cheyenne. The column, totalling around 1500 men once mule drivers and teamsters 
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were counted, set out on May 29, searching for the great Lakota encampment on the Tongue 
River that Crook’s scouts told him about.228 The Crow and Shoshone auxiliaries had yet to 
arrive, and Crook’s intention was to meet up with them on the march. In the meantime, their 
absence was felt as Frank Grouard, and the other non-Indigenous guides once again 
demonstrated they were inadequate to the task of properly guiding Crook’s army or alerting him 
to danger. On June 9, a war-party of Lakota skirmishers launched a lighting attack on Crook’s 
encampment, driving his cavalry pickets back into the bivouac and then firing into the tents, 
wounding two soldiers, killing three horses and two mules, and wrecking many of the tents. The 
Lakota disappeared before Crook could respond and Bourke described the encounter as, “only a 
bluff on the part of ‘Crazy Horse’ to keep his word to Crook that he would begin to fight the 
latter just as soon as he touched the waters of the Tongue River.”229 While the skirmish may 
indeed have been such a display of resolve on the part of the Lakota war-party, it was also 
evidence that while Crook did not yet know where the hostile Natives were based, the hostiles 
knew full well where he was. 
On June 14, Crook was joined by his Indigenous scouts, counting one hundred seventy-
six Crows and eighty-six Shoshone. The Crows brought news of the enemy tribes and of the 
location of their main camp between the Tongue and Yellowstone Rivers, and Otter Creek. Later 
that evening Crook decided that, encumbered by the wagons, his column would move too slowly 
to get to this campsite before the Lakota and Cheyenne moved again. As he did in March, Crook 
gave the order for his expedition to cut loose from their wagons, which were left in the care of 
the bulk of the infantry. Those infantrymen with some equestrian experience mounted spare 
horses and mules and journeyed with the cavalry and the auxiliaries to attack the Lakota camp. 
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Out of the five companies of infantry with Crook, one hundred seventy-five men were found 
who could make this transformation into ad hoc dragoons, while the rest were left with the 
wagons. Each man carried four days’ worth of food, one blanket, and a hundred rounds of 
ammunition; Crook did not believe they would have far to travel before they found the enemy.230 
In one respect, Crook was right. The army would not have to travel far before they 
encountered the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne, but that meeting would not take place under the 
circumstances Crook envisioned. The clash on June 9 alerted the hostile coalition that Crook was 
searching for them in the area and scouts were dispatched to keep an eye on the oncoming 
general. The night of June 16, a group of Northern Cheyenne outriders rode into the camp saying 
they had found Crook’s vanguard, and a council of chiefs was convened to determine what to do 
about him. “Three Stars,” as the Lakota dubbed Crook (a reference to his rank as a Brigadier-
General, with a star on each shoulder of his uniform, and one on his hat), could not be allowed to 
find the great camp gathered for Sitting Bull’s Sun Dance. It was decided, therefore, that a large 
force of cavalry, variously enumerated at between seven hundred fifty and a thousand men, 
would ride out to intercept Crook and bring him to battle before he came too near the camp. It 
was the largest war-party the Northern Plains had seen since Red Cloud’s War, and the men 
leading it were among the most distinguished warriors and commanders the Lakota-Cheyenne 
coalition had to offer: Gall, Two Moons, Lame White Man, Comes In Sight, He Dog, Bad Heart 
Bull, Wooden Leg, and Sitting Bull’s nephews One Bull and White Bull are just a few of the 
famous names present in the war-party. Sitting Bull himself rode along as well, and though he 
would not participate in the physical fighting, he would be on hand to loan his spiritual powers to 
the cause. Given the Lakota and Cheyenne traditions of collective leadership no overall 
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commander was appointed, but when Indigenous participants were asked who was in charge, the 
majority answered it was Crazy Horse who gave most of the orders and acted as first among 
equals.231 
Crook’s soldiers left their bivouac at six am on the morning of June 17 and marched up 
the Rosebud in the direction they believed the Lakota were encamped. Two hours later, the Crow 
recon team, which rode out of the camp hours before the troopers were ready to march, returned 
and informed Crook they had spotted Lakota warriors in the area. In Crook’s laconic words, 
“some of our scouts came in, said they had discovered some hostiles not far in advance, and 
asked me to halt while they went ahead to reconnoiter. So we halted and dismounted, and the 
cavalry took the bridles out of their horses’ mouths.”232 The command obeyed Crook’s 
instructions, and dismounted, stretching out along two bends in the Rosebud, while they awaited 
the return of the Crows and readied themselves for a battle they thought would be fought later 
that day. 
“Later that day,” turned out to be within a half hour. At eight thirty, the Crow scouts 
came running back to the camp, hollering that the Lakota were right behind them. Crook shouted 
to Captain Anson Mills, across the river and directly in front of the fleeing Crows, to mount up 
his men and get ready for battle. As Mills tried to obey additional Crows hurried to the aid of 
their fellow tribesmen, the Shoshone close behind. Outnumbered three or four to one by the 
oncoming Lakota and Cheyenne, the Crows and Shoshone nevertheless bought valuable time for 
Crook, letting him shake out his infantry into a line along the foot of a northern slope, and giving 
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the American horsemen the chance to get on their mounts. Frank Grouard, Crook’s favourite 
ranger, was sure the Crows and Shoshone saved the entire command, saying it was only the 
heroism of the auxiliaries that kept them all alive. Without the Native scouts, he said, “the Sioux 
would have killed half of our command before the soldiers were in position to meet the 
attack.”233  
The Crows and Shoshone could not hold the line forever, though, and it was only a matter 
of minutes before the Lakota and Cheyenne riders broke through. Crazy Horse had ridden his 
followers hard, covering twenty-two miles under the cover of darkness to reach Crook’s position, 
and neither he, nor any of the other chieftains and war-leaders who rode with him, was going to 
be stopped for long. It is often asserted by historians that the warriors of the Plains tribes fought 
entirely as individuals with no coordination between leaders, a claim that is usually backed up 
with the individualistic nature of Indigenous testimony.234 Certainly, each Plains warrior was 
primarily concerned with events taking place around him, but that is hardly different, in most 
respects, from the accounts of battles taken from private soldiers in any European or American 
army. In any case, the supposed lack of organisation among the Lakota and Cheyenne did not 
prevent them from achieving a high level of tactical coordination at the Rosebud. Multiple 
attacks were made up and down Crook’s lines, with any weaknesses in the defenses promptly 
exploited. Soldiers reported seeing Lakota and Cheyenne leaders signalling to one another with 
mirrors as they directed their men (and in a few cases, women), and the assault had a coherency 
to it that belies the notion Native American warriors were simply a mob.235 There may have been 
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no one general commanding the Lakota and Cheyenne, but with all their greatest warriors 
assembled in one place the Plains tribes had, for the first time, something resembling an officer 
corps and the courage of men like Crazy Horse, Lame White Man, and Two Moons inspired all 
those who rode with them and on occasion, even their enemies. Baptiste Pourier, one of Crook’s 
white scouts, said “you can call it medicine or anything you want to, but I saw Crazy Horse at 
the Rosebud Creek charge straight into Crook’s army, and it seemed every soldier and Indian we 
had with us took a shot at him and they couldn’t even hit his horse.”236  
Crook had the bulk of his men mounted by the time Crazy Horse punched through the 
Crow and Shoshone screen, but the Lakota war-leader’s assault still inflicted serious damage to 
Crook’s command, not in casualties, but in the cohesion of the expedition. As Crook’s junior 
officers scrambled to react to the Lakota offensive, they found themselves cut off from one 
another, while Crook, unable to see the entire field, struggled to maintain command and control. 
In the absence of direct orders from Crook, Anson Mills, William Royall, and other lower 
ranking officers had to conduct their parts of the battle alone, moving in isolation from Crook 
and from one another. Royall, gathering several companies of the 3rd Cavalry to himself, 
launched a counteroffensive on the western section of the line that seemed to drive back the 
Lakota and Northern Cheyenne, only to find the Lakota throwing a skirmish line between him 
and the rest of the army, severing Royall from support. In the centre, Crook’s troopers, after 
hurrying to the relief of the Native auxiliaries, found themselves in a game of charge and 
countercharge with the Lakota and Cheyenne. First the infantry, then the cavalry, bulled their 
way uphill towards the Native force, who appeared to disperse before them only to fall back a 
hundred and fifty yards, rally, and open fire. Over the six hours of the Rosebud battle, this 
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pattern repeated itself numerous times, until Crook, recognising the danger these repeated 
charges posed of overextending his line, ordered them halted and the troops pulled back to the 
hills…a decision Crazy Horse met by massing up again and nearly overrunning Crook’s line; 
only a nigh-suicidal countercharge by the Shoshone stopped the Lakota and Cheyenne offensive 
from cracking through Crook’s beleaguered defenders. The Lakota and Cheyenne, rolling with 
this sudden shift, immediately moved to surround the outnumbered Shoshone who were 
withdrawn by Crook who could not otherwise offer them any support for fear of friendly fire.237  
 The most hotly engaged of Crook’s units was the 3rd Cavalry under Royall who, severed 
from the main body of the army, were virtually on their own on the left. Reuben Davenport, a 
reporter from the New York Herald, rode with Royall and the article he published afterward gives 
an idea of how entrapped Royall was beginning to feel. “After checking the advance behind a 
friendly crest behind which his soldiers lay while pouring into the Sioux a hot answering fire, 
Colonel Royall was expectant of seeing the advance on his right resumed, as the latter were then 
apparently beginning to feel a panic. Seeing the long, gallant skirmish line pause, however, they 
dashed forward on the right and left, and in an instant nearly every point of vantage within, in 
front, and in the rear, and on the flank of the line, was covered with savages, wildly circling their 
ponies, and charging hither and thither, while they fired from their seats with wonderful rapidity 
and accuracy.”238 Royall, unsure if he was meant to continue his advance and if any support was 
coming, fell back before the oncoming Lakota and Cheyenne, but made several more abortive 
efforts at resuming the offensive before Crook’s aide Azor Nickerson reached him and gave the 
order to fall back. Royall conducted a fighting retreat from ridge to ridge, finding he could not 
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reconnect with Crook as ordered because “to retreat into the hollow on the right, which would be 
necessary in order to form a junction with the centre, was to risk the certain loss of nearly the 
whole battalion,” to the circling Lakota and Cheyenne.239 Royall had to take the long way around 
the line to rejoin Crook, while his Indigenous pursuers drew ever closer, and the fire got hotter.  
Royall asked for infantry support from Crook to cover his retreat, but the men could not 
be put in place in time, and it was the Lieutenant-Colonel’s rearguard that took the brunt of the 
Lakota and Cheyenne shooting. A high percentage of Crook’s casualties, both dead and 
wounded, were concentrated in that rearguard and several stragglers had to be abandoned; 
reported Davenport, “six were killed at one spot. A recruit surrendered his carbine to a painted 
warrior, who flung it to the ground, and cleft his head with a stroke of the tomahawk.”240 “The 
Sioux,” he said, “rode so close to their victims that they shot them in the face with revolvers and 
the powder blackened the flesh.”241 Once again, the Shoshone auxiliaries came to Royall’s 
rescue, driving the foe from Royall’s rear and letting him make good his escape. White Bull, 
Lakota warrior and nephew of Sitting Bull, paid tribute to the Shoshone after the battle, saying 
“of all the enemies I have fought the Shoshonis [sic] are the bravest and the best warriors.”242  
Royall’s was not the only command to have a narrow escape. Lakota and Cheyenne 
riders rode around the rear of the column and struck at the baggage train, making off with many 
of the troopers’ horses and killing the Shoshone boy left to guard them. Lieutenant James Foster 
tried to retrieve the horses, but his company was immediately encircled by the Lakota and 
Cheyenne and had to run, joining up with Royall on the left and becoming part of his retreat. 
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Crook, in an effort to relieve some of the pressure on Royall, ordered Anson Mills, on the right 
of the line, to take several companies of cavalry and ride out in the direction they assumed the 
Native encampment was in; by attacking it Crook aimed to draw off Crazy Horse’s warriors and 
split the Lakota-Cheyenne force. Since their camp was, however, more than twenty miles away, 
the Natives did not go after Mills, but instead ramped up the pressure all down the front; it was 
while Mills was absent that Royall’s retreat nearly became a rout, and a whole portion of the 
command was almost swallowed up. Azor Nickerson once more acted as Crook’s messenger boy 
and rode his horse near to collapse catching up with Mills and ordering him back to the column. 
Mills’ return, coupled with the Shoshone counteroffensive, likely saved Royall from 
annihilation, but that he needed to return at all spoke to the limits of Crook’s control over the 
battlefield. Unable to see the entire fight progressing, Crook was left giving orders to his units 
piecemeal, unable to predict how the action on any part of the field would affect what happened 
elsewhere. It was a chaotic situation, and one Crook barely had any command over.243 
Crazy Horse and the other Lakota and Cheyenne war-leaders did not have Crook’s 
problems. They were used to having a divided command and the fluidity of the Battle of the 
Rosebud did not dismay them to nearly the extent it did Crook. Historians have often doubted 
that there was ever such a thing as a Native plan of attack, and continue to insist that the Plains 
tribes did not fight battles of annihilation (the Fetterman Fight and the Little Bighorn being, in 
this version of events, freak accidents), yet a study of the movements at the Rosebud reveals a 
consistent series of tactical moves on the part of the Lakota and Cheyenne aimed at drawing 
individual portions of Crook’s expedition away from the rest of the army and encircling them. 
Since one does not generally encircle a foe one has no intention of destroying in detail, it is fair 
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to surmise that at the Rosebud, Crazy Horse and the other leading men were attempting to 
surround and destroy, in whole, or in part, Crook’s command. The seeming anarchy on the 
battlefield was the result of a pattern of Lakota and Cheyenne tactics in which a part of their 
force would pull back before the Americans, luring the white men on, before turning about and 
trying to overwhelm the overextended soldiers. It was a plan, in some senses, a decade in the 
making. At the Fetterman Fight, Crazy Horse acted as the bait, drawing Fetterman into the jaws 
of Red Cloud’s ambush. Now at the Rosebud he used his entire war-party as bait and trap both, 
splitting Crook’s army, separating them from one another, and trying to wipe them out a piece at 
a time. Fortunately for Crook, Crazy Horse did not have the resources to pull his ambitious plan 
off: with only 1000 warriors he was outnumbered by Crook’s 1500, and was never quite able to 
single out a portion of Crook’s force that was small enough for him to slaughter. It was a bold 
effort though, and it was only the Americans’ numbers and the resourcefulness of Crook’s junior 
officers that kept Crazy Horse from doing to Crook at the Rosebud what he would do to Custer at 
the Little Bighorn a week later. The Rosebud was a trial run, a first attempt at something the 
Lakota and Cheyenne had not yet perfected. In the years that followed, Crook offered many 
explanations for what happened at the Rosebud but was never able to hit on the true solution: 
that he had the bad luck to be in command of the army opposing Crazy Horse on the day the 
latter invented (among the Lakota and Cheyenne) the full-scale battle of annihilation. 
The Battle of the Rosebud ended at two-thirty in the afternoon when the Lakota and 
Northern Cheyenne abruptly broke off the engagement and rode back the way they came. The 
fight lasted six hours and saw the Natives, who were supposed to lack endurance and to be 
unable to stand and fight against a superior foe, launch repeated assaults on a larger white army. 
Casualties were comparatively light on both sides, running to around twenty-five dead and 
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wounded for both parties. On the premise he was the one holding the ground at the end of the 
battle, Crook claimed victory; as historian Stephen Ambrose wryly observed, “the United States 
government would soon go broke if the Army won many such victories.”244 Crook’s men fired 
twenty-five thousand rounds and killed a mere twenty-five Native Americans. At that rate, 
Ambrose calculated, the Battle of the Rosebud cost the federal government around a million 
dollars per dead Lakota or Cheyenne.245 His ammunition spent and his resolve horribly shaken, 
Crook turned around and retreated to Goose Creek, where he remained, immobile, for months to 
come. His Crow and Shoshone scouts, who more than anyone, had kept him alive, were 
disgusted by the retreat and abandoned Crook, returning to their reservation to mourn their dead.  
Crook did not report to Sheridan for several days. When he did, he insisted he had won 
the battle. Sheridan allowed that Crook had, but in his annual report described the Rosebud, like 
the Powder River, as “barren of results.”246 Both men bloated the number of Lakota present in 
their reports until, in Bourke’s memoirs, written twenty years later, there were 6500 Lakota and 
Cheyenne present at the Rosebud; where previously the army had underestimated the Native 
numbers to denigrate the danger they posed, they now overestimated them to justify reversals 
without having to credit Lakota or Cheyenne generalship as a factor.247 The reality was Lakota 
and Cheyenne generalship was exactly the thing that beat Crook. Crazy Horse’s goal in attacking 
Crook was to stop him from reaching the larger hostile encampment, and in that objective, he 
succeeded admirably. Crook might have survived Crazy Horse’s efforts to defeat him in detail, 
but he used up his ammunition reserves, exhausted his horses, and was forced to retreat from 
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Lakota territory. Put another way, Crook may have held the battlefield at the end of the fight, but 
Crazy Horse was the one holding the entire theatre of operations. It was a strategic victory for the 
Lakota and Northern Cheyenne, and one they achieved by outsmarting and outmaneuvering 
Crook. By splintering the larger American expedition into smaller, more manageable parts, 
Crazy Horse and his compatriots neutralised Crook’s advantage in numbers and cost the general 
control of the field, turning the battle into a chaotic melee in which their own, more fluid tactics 
gave them the initiative. They never relinquished it and that was why they won the battle.  
That night, as Crook tried to figure out what he was going to tell Sheridan, victory songs 
were sung in the hostile camp, and stories of brave deeds relayed to those who were not there. 
One story that became especially popular among the Northern Cheyenne was the tale of how 
Chief Comes In Sight, the first Cheyenne into the American camp, was unhorsed by the enemy 
auxiliaries and had to be saved by his sister, who rode into the throng of battle and pulled him 
out on her horse; in Northern Cheyenne oral tradition it is recalled as the battle “Where the Girl 
Saved Her Brother.”248 Among the Native veterans of the Rosebud, there was no doubt they had 
beaten Crook. “This was one of the hardest fights White Bull ever saw,” the Lakota warrior’s 
biographer wrote after interviewing him, “It lasted all day, but when it was over, ‘Three Stars’ 
took his troops and hit the trail back to his base.”249 It was an auspicious beginning for Sitting 
Bull’s alliance of warbands and caused even more warriors to flock to his standard. The 
American attack on the Powder River was avenged, and a white army turned around. Sitting 
Bull’s prophecy seemed more and more believable; the Plains warriors were not only relishing 
their defeat of Crook but anticipating further victories to come.   
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Within days, newspapers were arguing about whether Crook had, as he claimed, won the 
battle, or been humiliatingly defeated, with Reuben Davenport leading the proponents of the 
latter.250 The news would not, however, reach Alfred Terry or John Gibbon, for several weeks. 
This was a shame. Had Terry heard what happened at the Rosebud—even Crook’s distorted 
version of events—he might have made different choices in the days ahead. The Rosebud made 
it apparent that the Lakota and Cheyenne, contrary to predictions, were not only ready for a head 
on fight, but were in fact spoiling for it. It also made it apparent that even a column of 1500 men 
could be thwarted by a Native attack, so long as that attack was well-led and made with 
determination. Had Terry known these things, it would doubtless have influenced his decision 
making. He might have kept his men together for safety, or, as he did in March, decided 
Sheridan’s plan was not going to work and fallen back. Thanks to the distance between him and 
Crook, and him and Sheridan, though, Terry did not know these things. Still operating on prewar 
calculations, Terry was getting ready to divide his expedition into two separate units, one under 
himself, and one under George Custer, so they might cover more ground. Blissfully unaware of 
what had gone down at the Rosebud, Alfred Terry was, just as the Lakota and Cheyenne were 
proving they could handle an army of 1500 soldiers, preparing to send Custer and his six 




Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand campaign got off to a better start than Phil Sheridan’s 
Lakota operation did. Where George Crook spent weeks floundering about the Plains, searching 
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in vain for the Lakota and losing to them when they cared to mount a response, Chelmsford and 
his subordinate Charles Pearson quickly encountered and defeated two separate Zulu forces. At 
first glance, this gives Chelmsford the appearance of being the better strategist of the two 
commanders, a notion that is rather hard to swallow in light of his and Sheridan’s records. 
Beneath the surface, however, the early days of Chelmsford’s invasion of Zululand were plagued 
by many of the same handicaps and deficiencies that had so retarded Crook’s progress against 
the Lakota and Cheyenne, problems that shortly thereafter came to a head at Isandlwana. Like 
Sheridan, Chelmsford underestimated his non-white enemies, and like Sheridan, he proved all 
but immune to evidence that contradicted his built-in prejudices. Also like Sheridan, 
Chelmsford’s operational plan, conceived on false premises, worked against him, insulating him 
from important information that might have changed how he approached his war. 
An even cursory glance through Chelmsford’s letters from the waning days of 1878 
shows the primary problem he was grappling with was logistical rather than strategical. Along 
with Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Lord Chelmsford spent months intriguing 
towards starting a war with Cetshwayo, but his preparations for supplying that war had been lax. 
Between the regiments of British regulars, the Volunteer colonial cavalry, and the auxiliary 
battalions of the Natal Native Contingent, the Lieutenant-General did not lack for troops, but his 
ability to feed, clothe, and arm these men was another matter altogether. In letters to Bartle Frere, 
Pearson, and Evelyn Wood, Chelmsford made frequent complaints about, and comments on, the 
inadequacy of the logistical situation and the need to obtain more wagons and establish 
additional depots. Supply was an issue for Chelmsford during the Ninth Frontier War as well, 
when the inability to keep an army in the field for any length of time greatly aided the Xhosa, 
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dragging out the conflict and leaving Chelmsford embarrassed.251 It appears one of Chelmsford’s 
major concerns was a repeat of his experience with the Xhosa, and he saw the breakdown of his 
supply lines as a much more immediate threat to his command than the Zulu themselves—and 
the absence of adequate resources would certainly be a problem for the Lieutenant-General’s 
columns. In a missive to Commissary-General Strickland dated January 13, and posted after 
Chelmsford went into the field, the general was still unsatisfied with the logistical arrangements, 
writing that unless the supply depots were brought up to the standard he wanted his columns 
would be unable to move; “it will be a sad disgrace to the Commissariat,” he said, if the column 
“is obliged to halt short of its destination for want of supplies.”252 
Chelmsford did his best, but there were some issues with supply, that were beyond his 
power to solve. In the same letter to the War Office in which he appraised Colonel Stanley of his 
plan of campaign, Chelmsford lamented the condition of the roads leading into Zululand, and 
how “with bad roads and slow transport, 10 miles must be looked at as the longest march it will 
be possible, or even safe to make.”253 These references to the roadways appear in several other 
letters from Chelmsford to Stanley as well as to Pearson and Wood; no one offered Chelmsford a 
solution to this difficulty as there was none to offer. Zululand’s roads were under Cetshwayo’s 
control and the British could hardly cross the border and undertake work on them without 
alerting the Zulu to the invasion. Likewise, they could not request Cetshwayo keep his roads in 
better repair so invading his country might be more easily facilitated. All Chelmsford could do 
was try to keep his oxen and wagons moving as quickly as possible and hope he caught up with 
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the Zulu before they “scattered.” With repairs on the Zulu roads impossible to undertake until 
after the invasion began, Chelmsford admitted he would be marching his columns into broken 
country that would hamper his supply chain, and could do nothing about it.   
Given the want of supply, and the ongoing problems with organising the entire 
expedition, one might wonder why Chelmsford went through with his invasion of Zululand at all. 
The answers to that question remain easy to discern: Chelmsford viewed the supply situation as 
his only real problem to overcome. With an army totaling 17 173 men Chelmsford assumed he 
could easily defeat the Zulu in open combat, so long as they were prepared to stand and fight, 
rather than running.254 Writing to Wood the previous November, Chelmsford assured the Colonel 
his column would be all but invulnerable to a Zulu attack, stating that “With two British 
regiments, 6 guns, and Bullers [sic] lot—I should be sorry for the Zulu army if they attacked 
you,” later adding that “I am inclined to think that the first experience of the power of the 
Martini Henrys will be such a surprise to the Zulus that they will not be formidable after the first 
effort.”255 Wood’s Left Column, given as 2278 men strong by Chelmsford’s aide, William 
Molyneux, was the smallest of the three main prongs of Chelmsford’s advance with the Right 
Column under Pearson having 4750 men and the Centre Column, led by Richard Glyn and 
Chelmsford himself, having 4709. Another 1500 men under Colonel Rowlands remained near 
Luneberg while Anthony Durnford with 3871 troops, most of them Native African auxiliaries, 
acted as Chelmsford’s reserve and guarded their lines of communication.256  
With five separate forces either invading Zululand or waiting on the Natal side of the 
border as reinforcements, those lines of communication were of the highest import to 
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Chelmsford’s advance. As the general explained to Pearson and Wood, he wanted simultaneous 
advances by the Centre, Right, and Left Columns to pressure the Zulu on all fronts and deny 
them the chance to escape his net. In a letter to Wood, Chelmsford explained he did not want 
Wood to advance so far Glyn could not provide him support and vice-versa; the same document 
has Chelmsford attempting to micromanage Wood and Glyn’s communications with one another, 
urging Wood repeatedly to send out scouts so he and Glyn could remain aware of one another’s 
movements.257 Given the distance that separated the columns from one another, these were not 
easy instructions for Glyn, Wood, or Pearson to follow. Writing to Pearson, Chelmsford told him 
to use Durnford to keep lines of communication with Glyn open, and to make use of “the border 
police to send information from your end of the line to the others.”258 As systems for 
communication went, it was a fragile one,  insufficient for the role Chelmsford had in mind for it.  
Chelmsford’s first target upon crossing the border into Zululand was the homestead of 
Chief Sihayo, father of Mehlokazulu and, at least in theory, the man who started the war by 
refusing to hand his sons over to face British colonial “justice.” Neither Sihayo nor his sons were 
at home; the Chief himself was at Cetshwayo’s side, advising him, while Mehlokazulu and his 
brothers reported to the regiments in which they served as junior officers. A majority of Sihayo’s 
sworn men had likewise been called up for military service and were mustering with their 
regiments at various royal homesteads-cum-barracks, leaving only a few men to guard Sihayo’s 
home and herds. Chelmsford intended to make an object lesson of Sihayo for defying British 
power, and while he gave strict orders that Zulu women and children were not to be harmed, the 
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Chief’s property was considered fair game. On January 12, Chelmsford ordered an advance on 
Sihayo’s homestead with the intent of burning it to the ground. 
The brief skirmish that ensued was short, fierce, and though Chelmsford did not yet know 
it, a portent of things to come. The advance into Sihayo’s was led by the 1st Battalion of the 3rd 
Regiment of the Natal Native Contingent, under Commandant George Hamilton-Browne, an 
Irish mercenary who claimed (potentially untruthfully) to be a veteran of New Zealand’s Maori 
Wars. After the battle was over, Chelmsford reported to Sir Bartle Frere and the Secretary of 
War that the NNC performed well in their first engagement; Hamilton-Browne, whose 
distinguishing personality traits were his egotism and his unbounded hatred of his own men, 
begged to differ. Describing his men’s advance on Sihayo’s, Hamilton-Browne sneered, “we 
moved onto the Krantz in what might be called a line, but a very crooked one, as a South African 
native cannot walk in a line, draw a line, or form a line, and if placed in a line will soon mob 
himself into a ring.”259 While Chelmsford informed his superiors of the NNC’s courage under 
fire and the casualties they sustained in close-quarters combat with the Zulu, Hamilton-Browne 
recorded that all the deaths were from friendly fire, saying, “I found that my beauties had bagged 
thirty-two of themselves, but I could well spare them.”260 He also said the NNC broke and ran 
and were only herded back into combat by the advance of a company of the 24th Regiment, with 
bayonets lowered.261 Which of the officers’ accounts should be believed is a matter of some 
contention: Chelmsford, obviously, had every reason to portray his first outing against the Zulu 
as a resounding success, while Hamilton-Browne, a bigot even by the standards of the Victorian 
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Era, was so filled with loathing for his black troops as to make his memoirs read as those of a 
man deranged. Most likely the answer lies somewhere in between their accounts, with those men 
of the NNC whose officers treated them well holding firm, while those led by the likes of the 
despotic Hamilton-Browne quickly found somewhere else to be. 
However, his men comported themselves, Hamilton-Browne’s advance pushed the few 
Zulu defenders of Sihayo’s into caves in the nearby hills. Chelmsford brought up several 
companies of regulars and charged them into the caves, where they overran the outnumbered 
Zulu in hand-to-hand combat. The British Narrative of Field Operations Connected with the 
Zulu War, compiled by Captain J.S. Rothwell for the army high command two years after the 
war, put the casualties from this action as thirty dead Zulu, with four wounded and ten captured, 
in exchange for two deaths and twelve injuries among the men of the NNC; one white officer 
and one white NCO were also wounded.262 Chelmsford, in his communications with Sir Bartle 
Frere and the War Office, reduced his casualties to only two killed, and four wounded, and 
praised the performance of both his Regular soldiers and the Native Contingent. Regarding the 
Zulu, he told Sir Bartle Frere, “I am in great hopes that the news of this storming of Sirayo’s 
[sic] stronghold and the capture of so many of his cattle (about 500) may have a salutary effect in 
Zululand. Sirayo’s men have, I am told, always been looked on as the bravest in the country, and 
certainly those who were killed today fought with great courage.”263 Writing Wood the following 
day, Chelmsford deplored that so few of Sihayo’s men had been there to oppose him, and 
worried about having to hunt for the Chief’s warriors in the mountains and hills.264 Obviously, 
the Lieutenant-General was still afraid the Zulu would flee from his army and refuse to give him 
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a stand-up fight—a fear one might have thought would be lain to rest by the bravery the few 
Zulu warriors left at the homestead showed in defense of the Chief’s property. A few dozen men, 
armed with spears and obsolete muskets, stood up to four companies of the 1/24 and the whole of 
the 1/3 NNC, and managed to make a fight of it for half an hour, before being overwhelmed. As 
Chelmsford himself acknowledged, this showed the bravery of the Zulu, yet it somehow did not 
change his mind about how they were likely to fight. 
Chelmsford spent the next several days engaging in road work, the state of the roads into 
Zululand proving even worse than he feared. “The country,” he wrote Bartle Frere, “is in a 
terrible state from the rain, and I do not know how we shall manage to get our waggons [sic] 
across the valley near Sirayo’s [sic] kraals; a large working party will start to-morrow to dig 
deep ditches on each side of the road which runs across a broad swamp, and I hope that under 
this treatment it may consolidate.”265 Chelmsford also told the High Commissioner he needed 
more oxen, as many of his were already dead or worn out, and that teams of sixteen were  
insufficient ; he would need twenty, at least, per wagon.266 Writing to Pearson on January 13, he 
continued on this theme, saying, “I have already discovered that if our advance into Zululand is 
to be made without very serious delay, we must have strong working parties on the roads,” and 
urged Pearson to detail some men—drawn from both the NNC and his own Regulars—to clear 
the roads in front of him.267 “The sooner our troops understand that our success depends upon 
our supplies coming up and that depends upon the roads being in good order, the better. In fine 
weather improve them, in bad weather mend them.”268 Nowhere in his messages to Bartle Frere, 
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Pearson, or Wood did Chelmsford ever hint the fight at Sihayo’s  showed the Zulu were 
possessed of greater mettle than he anticipated; his concerns remained almost entirely with road 
work, and problems of supply. Certainly, the bad roads were an issue that needed addressing, but 
the competency of the Zulu Army was also something that should have been taken under 
consideration. Chelmsford, however, saw only what he wanted to see, and did not warn his 
subordinates they needed to lose any sleep over the possibility of a Zulu assault. 
Colonel Charles Pearson, leading the Coastal Column, discovered the Zulu’s mettle for 
himself ten days later. Since crossing the Tugela River on January 12, the same day Chelmsford 
was skirmishing with Sihayo’s house guards, Pearson knew there were large Zulu forces in his 
vicinity, but not what they were about. Chelmsford had, after all, told Pearson and Wood both 
that there was no reason they should fear an attack on their columns. Chelmsford’s plan assumed 
the Zulu would have to be entrapped or provoked into coming after the British; it did not account 
for the possibility the Zulu Army might, absent of any British provocation beyond the invasion 
itself, try to strike at one of the prongs of the Lieutenant-General’s pincer movement. 
Chelmsford , in fact, believed Zulu loyalty to Cetshwayo was threadbare and their march would 
provoke mass surrenders and defections from these groups, with steps needing to be taken to 
handle the expected flood of refugees.269 As Pearson pushed farther up the coast there were no 
defections but increasing signs of Zulu militancy abounded. On several occasions, Pearson found 
Zulu scouts shadowing his column; when several of these people were captured, they informed 
Pearson they were local homesteaders who had remained behind to observe his movements while 
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the rest of the populace evacuated.270 If Pearson was troubled by this, no concern made its way 
into his official correspondence. Perhaps, surrounded 2/3rd Regiment (aka “The Buffs”), six 
companies of the 99th Foot, two battalions of the NNC, and the Naval Brigade, Pearson felt 
invincible. Equipped with two 7-pounder guns and a 9-pounder rocket tube of the Royal 
Artillery, two 12-pounder guns, a Gatling gun, and two 24-pounder rocket tubes from the Naval 
Brigade, and a squadron of Mounted Infantry to act as his vanguard, Pearson had reason to 
believe he was up to any challenge the Zulu might send his way.271 Assuming, of course, they 
sent a challenge his way, which in Chelmsford’s calculations, they were not going to do. 
The Zulu, however, were reluctant to conform to Chelmsford or Pearson’s, expectations. 
Cetshwayo had not wanted a war with the British, but now that war had come to him he was not 
going to take Chelmsford’s aggression lying down. Since the British ultimatum, the Zulu King 
had been meeting with his advisors, calling up his levies, and mustering his troops for battle with 
the British. Far from the untutored savages Chelmsford and Bartle Frere portrayed them as, the 
Zulu aristocracy was well-aware of the power of the British military and of their limited ability 
to oppose it. They were not, however, prepared to simply give up, and despite Chelmsford’s 
expectations that support for Cetshwayo would crumble as the invasion progressed, the exact 
opposite occurred, with Chiefs who had previously counselled Cetshwayo to do whatever it took 
to make peace with the British now falling in line firmly behind the throne. There was no Zulu 
High Command as there was in the British Army, yet the council of elderly chieftains and royal 
appointees who surrounded Cetshwayo were all military men, many of them possessing far more 
direct combat experience than their British counterparts, and they worked out a strategy that, in 
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the coming weeks, crippled Chelmsford’s invasion and set his timetable back by months. There 
are no papers to go through, as there are in the British Army, but a combination of Zulu 
testimony and the simple fact of what happened, reveals Cetshwayo’s grand design for the 
campaign and how near it came to succeeding completely. 
By splitting his force into three separate columns, Chelmsford played into Cetshwayo’s 
hands. The Zulu King did not think he could defeat the whole of Chelmsford’s army at once, but 
he did believe he had a chance to best the columns one at a time. Identifying Chelmsford’s 
Centre Column as the main threat to his own homestead of Ulundi, Cetshwayo sent Chief 
Ntshingwayo kaMahole with the majority of his levies to confront and, if possible, destroy, 
Chelmsford’s detachment. At the fringes of Zululand where Evelyn Wood was leading the Left 
Column, the renegade Swazi Prince Mbilini waMswati used all his expertise in guerilla raiding 
to delay, confuse, and otherwise impede Wood’s advance (earning Wood’s eternal enmity in the 
process). To the coast, where a reliable surrogate like Mbilini was lacking, Cetshwayo sent the 
seventy-year-old Godide kaNdlela of the Ntuli clan, a long-time friend of Cetshwayo’s father 
Mpande, a member of one of Zululand’s most powerful aristocratic families, and the son of 
Ndlela kaSompisi, King Dingane’s leading general. With Godide were 3500 warriors, detached 
from the main army under Ntshingwayo. Their job was to raise the coastal Zulu and their subject 
tribes against the British and provide a disciplined core around which the coastal levies and tribal 
auxiliaries could rally. In Godide’s ranks were 2600 men of the uMxhapho regiment, in their 
mid-thirties, and nine hundred veteran warriors from the uDlambedlu and izinGulube regiments, 
in their late fifties. Godide did not disappoint his liege, and by the time Pearson crossed the 
Tugela and entered Zululand, the elderly chieftain had recruited another 6000 local men with 
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whom to contest the Colonel’s advance. Pearson did not know it yet, but he was walking into a 
Zulu ambush, as Godide aimed to strike at his vanguard with almost 10 000 men.272  
Pearson could have taken more preparations to meet Godide than he did. On January 18 
one of Britain’s border agents became aware of Zulu movements and informed his superiors in 
Natal that 10 000 Zulu had been sent from Ulundi to attack Pearson. These numbers were 
inflated but were accurate enough and were cabled to Pearson. Pearson acknowledged receipt of 
the information the following day, but otherwise displayed a thoroughly blasé attitude towards 
the possibility of a Zulu attack.273 On January 21, Pearson observed several Zulu scouts watching 
from the hills, but did nothing about it as they were not close enough to his troops to alarm 
him.274 Whether appearing in his own reports or the in the Narrative of Field Operations 
compiled at the Horse Guards after the war, the Charles Pearson of January 21 is a passive 
figure, taking no action beyond the continuation of his march. If there was any sense of danger 
among his staff or the troops of his column, it has not survived in the records. 
At eight o’clock in the morning on January 22, Pearson called for his column to halt and 
take a moment’s rest, having just crossed the Nyezane River. Spotting some Zulu scouts over the 
hillside, Pearson sent a company of the NNC to run them off. It was a good thing he did. “The 
waggons [sic],” Pearson told Sir Bartle Frere’s military secretary, “had already begun to park 
when the leading company of the Native Contingent, who were scouting out front—personally 
directed by Captain Hart, staff officer to the officer commanding that regiment—discovered the 
enemy advancing rapidly over the ridges in our front, and making for the clumps of bush around 
 
272 Ian Castle and Ian Knight’s Fearful Hard Times, the only full study of the Nyezane through Gingindhlovu, 
provides these stats. 
273 “From Major Walker to Deputy Adjutant-General, January 18, 1879,” in Archives of South Africa-Zululand: The 
Anglo-Zulu War 1879 Vol. 1, ed. John Laband, Ian Knight (London: Archival Publications, 2000): 596. 
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us.”275 The men of the NNC, having successfully dispersed the initial Zulu scouts, now found 
themselves before of Godide’s vanguard as the Zulu chief sprang his trap. “The Zulus,” Pearson 
reported, “at once opened a heavy fire upon the men of the company who had shown themselves 
in the open, and they lost one officer, four non-commissioned officers, and three men killed, 
almost immediately after the firing began.”276 The white officers sounded the retreat, but the 
African auxiliaries, only one in ten of whom had a gun, instead firmly stood their ground in the 
face of the Zulu fire. Rather than viewing this as suicidal courage or disobedience of orders, 
Pearson, perhaps rightly, put it down to language difficulties within the NNC. “Unfortunately,” 
he wrote, “owing to scarcely any of the officers or non-commissioned officers of the Native 
Contingent being able to speak Kafir, and some not even English (there are several foreigners 
among them), it has been found most difficult to communicate orders, and it is to be feared that 
these men who lost their lives by gallantly holding their ground did so under the impression that 
it was the duty of the contingent to fight in the first line, instead of scouting only, and, after an 
engagement, to pursue.”277 After several more volleys of fire from the Zulu hit home, the NNC’s 
officers got their men to withdraw, and the Battle of Nyezane officially began. 
Whatever its cause, the NNC’s refusal to retreat bought Pearson a few precious moments 
to make his decisions. The Colonel was caught in one of the worst positions a commander can be 
in for an ambush: on the march, with his men strung out in a column and unable to properly 
support one another. Moving quickly, Pearson ordered a company of “The Buffs,” under Captain 
Jackson and Lieutenant Martin, and the bulk of the Naval Brigade, under Commander H. 
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Fletcher Campbell, to take up position on a knoll overlooking the road and stall the Zulu 
advance. Campbell, describing the Zulu attack said:  “they boldly advanced to within 150 yards 
in extended order, rushing from bush to bush and firing with great rapidity. Two 7-prs. R.A. and 
two 24-prs. Naval Brigade rockets were placed on a knoll at the foot of the pass, but 
commanding the valley from which the flank attack was proceeding; these supported by two 
companies of the Buffs and A and B companies of Naval Brigade, opened a heavy fire on the 
enemy, checking their advance.”278 Pulling two more companies of the Buffs from guard duty 
halfway down the column, Pearson ordered a charge into the bush where, with covering fire from 
the knoll, they dislodged the Zulu and pushed them into the open, “which again exposed them to 
the rockets, shells, and musketry from the knoll.”279 This action freed up the remaining men in 
the centre of Pearson’s column, letting him bring up his mounted volunteers, the Royal 
Engineers, and additional companies from the Buffs and the 99th Light Infantry, funneling much 
needed reinforcements to the frontline. 
The frontal assault was only part of Godide’s plan. Even as Pearson strengthened his 
front, Zulu skirmishers appeared on his left flank, moving through the hills and threatening to 
strike his now unguarded supply wagons. The Zulu also occupied an abandoned homestead four 
hundred yards from Campbell’s position, and fired onto the knoll from the other side. A rocket 
from the knoll set the homestead aflame and forced the Zulu out, but the shooting continued, as 
did the forward movement of the Zulu right, inching steadily closer to the British line. Pearson, 
with his column in a tangle, did not have any men to direct towards this new threat, and  
concentrated on neutralising the Zulu to his front while hoping the fire from the men in the 
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centre and rear of the column—primarily NNC, supported by a company of the 99th and the 
Durban Mounted Rifles—would be enough to stall the Zulu right. The Zulu kept up a fire on the 
British from the front and left, and casualties climbed among the ranks of the European 
soldiery.280 
It was the arrival of the Naval Brigade’s Gatling gun, commanded by Lieutenant Coker, 
that turned the tide. Despite the artillery and rocketry raining on them from the knoll, the Zulu in 
Pearson’s front were massing in increasingly greater numbers, apparently gearing up for a final 
charge to take the knoll and break Pearson’s line. Coker changed all that when he parked his gun 
near the knoll and opened up. “I immediately opened fire on them,” Coker recalled, “they 
retiring into the bush. I ceased firing, having expended almost 300 rounds, and stationed my men 
to try and pick off a few natives who were annoying us consistently.”281 How many Zulu Coker 
killed is unknown, but the Gatling forced Godide to abandon his attack on Pearson’s frontline 
and let Pearson reposition his soldiers and sailors to meet the offensive developing on his left. 
Deciding that merely defensive measures were not cutting it, Pearson and Commander 
Campbell decided that a counterattack on the left flank was the only thing that would stop the 
Zulu and regain control of the battlefield . The Naval Brigade, supported by the NNC, charged 
up the hill and into the burning homestead, forcing the Zulu from the hilltop with cutlasses and 
bayonets. As the Zulu abandoned their position, Campbell requested Pearson allow him to 
continue the attack and, further reinforced by a company of the Buffs “two other hills were 
carried as soon as the men had recovered breath, thus breaking through and driving back the 
right horn of the Zulu army, dispersing it in all directions, and clearing the road to Ekowe 
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[sic].”282 Godide, with his both his thrusts stymied, withdrew after Campbell’s charge, leaving 
some three hundred Zulu dead behind. According to Campbell, the Zulu ambush killed eight 
soldiers and wounded another sixteen, some of them mortally. It also shook the Naval officer’s 
confidence in the innate superiority of white soldiers over Africans. In his after-action report to 
his superior officer, Commodore Sullivan, Campbell (who was promoted to Captain for his 
actions at Nyezane) wrote: “the force lately beaten by the 1st Division of the column are said to 
be assembled in the bush at the Umlatoo [sic] river, there to attack us on our advancing; it seems 
probable that they will not be dispersed without some loss on our side, the Zulus seem adepts at 
skirmishing, always in extended order; they rush from one bush to another, delivering their fire, 
and then retiring under cover to load, it requires a good marksman to bring them down.”283 The 
British won at Nyezane but they learned, at least in Campbell’s opinion, that the Zulu were not 
an adversary to trifle with. Godide’s strike on the Right Column came very near to taking 
Pearson completely unawares; had the Colonel not chosen at the last moment to send out the 
NNC to reconnoiter, his column might  have been taken in the flanks while still on the march. 
Pearson too, seemed rattled by what happened at Nyezane. He marched his men hard that 
afternoon and evening, making for the old British mission station of Eshowe. Arriving there on 
the morning of the 23, the Colonel set about converting the missionary post into a fortress, 
digging trenches, adding gun emplacements, and reinforcing the walls. Godide was still out 
there, and while his losses were more severe than Pearson’s, they did not make much of a dent in 
his army. Pearson, wary of being struck again, decided the appropriate thing to do was to fort up 
and wire for instructions. His report on the action at Nyezane was sent to Natal on January 23.284 
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This was, unknown to Pearson, one day too late to save the lives of Anthony Durnford and the 
men of the 1/24 who died alongside him at Isandlwana. Only hours after Pearson repelled 
Godide’s ambush, the Ntshingwayo’s Zulu force seized and destroyed the Isandlwana camp and 
killed almost every man defending it. Chelmsford, who was several miles away with most of his 
column, did not react to the news of the attack until far too late; as will be demonstrated in the 
following chapter he did not seem to believe it possible the Zulu could have attacked his 
campsite. If the Lieutenant-General had heard from Pearson about the battle of Nyezane a few 
hours earlier, he might have been more inclined to listen to what the 24th’s officers tried to tell 
him, but Pearson’s message could not be sent until the day after, a predictable outcome of an 
operational plan that scattered multiple columns across the breadth of Zululand.  
Once he got over his surprise, Charles Pearson handled his men well at Nyezane. He 
fended off a Zulu army that exceeded his own in size, and at the cost of the lives of 
comparatively few of his men. Clearly the assessment of him as a brave, conscientious, and 
capable officer held by his superiors, subordinates and peers, was accurate. Yet if that was the 
case, why had Pearson, who knew the Zulu were about and in substantial numbers, not done a 
better job of preparing for the possibility of an ambush? Either the men who served with Pearson 
were wrong about his abilities or the Colonel was blinded to the possibility of the Zulu taking 
action against him by his belief that Africans would never attack a British army, an opinion 
supplied to him by Lord Chelmsford himself. The commanding general’s misguided opinion of 
the Zulu had filtered down the ranks, where it interacted with the typically Victorian attitudes of 
his officers to create a false sense of invulnerability in Pearson and his men. Pearson’s beliefs 
about the Zulu were shaken at Nyezane, but Chelmsford, miles away and out of touch with his 
Right Column commander, had yet to have such an experience. To his mind, the fight at 
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Sihayo’s had proven not that the Zulu were willing to fight, but that if they did fight the British 
would smash them. He still thought Pearson was marching up the Coast and that his own camp at 
Isandlwana was perfectly safe, no matter how many African warriors might be in the region. 
Colonial reasoning provided the lens through which Chelmsford saw the skirmish at Sihayo’s 
homestead, while his distance from Pearson stopped him from learning of, let alone learning 
from, the lessons of Nyezane until it was hours too late. With racism and the poor planning it 
engendered, Chelmsford braided a noose. On January 22, Pearson managed to slip through it, but 




The opening phases of the Great Sioux and Anglo-Zulu Wars should have given Phil 
Sheridan and Lord Chelmsford cause for thought. Their plans of campaign, predicated on the 
notion that Native Americans and Indigenous Africans would not fight white men in straight up, 
man-to-man combat, had been shown to be riddled with errors of assumption. The Lakota and 
Cheyenne and the Zulu were fully prepared to confront the invaders head on, with Crazy Horse 
defeating Crook at the Rosebud and Godide bloodying Pearson at the Nyezane. While Crook lost 
his fight and Pearson won his, the preparedness of both their adversaries was far greater than 
Sheridan or Chelmsford had expected. The early battles of both wars were a warning that neither 
the Americans nor the British could afford to ignore. 
Yet the lessons of those first encounters were ignored, for a variety of similar reasons. In 
North America, George Crook could not bring himself to tell Sheridan the truth about the 
Rosebud, or about his earlier failure at the Powder River when he attacked the wrong band of 
Cheyenne. In Africa, Chelmsford drew all the wrong conclusions from the skirmish at Sihayo’s, 
seeing the victory as evidence he was right, and the Zulu would easily fall to his white soldiers. 
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Slaves to their own prejudices, Sheridan and Chelmsford saw what they wanted to see, and in 
Sheridan’s case, were told what they wanted to hear by their subordinates. Native Americans and 
Africans could not beat, or even threaten, white European troops, so the evidence in front of 
them was made to fit their theories, rather than the other way around. 
Sheridan and Chelmsford’s bigotry harmed the campaigns in indirect ways as well. Since 
the Lakota, Cheyenne, and Zulu were not expected to put up serious fights, and it was the pursuit 
of the fleeing refugees that was expected to be the most onerous part of the campaigns, Sheridan 
and Chelmsford both divided up their commands and spread them over the breadth of the Great 
Plains and the South African veldt. With the primitive methods of communication available in 
1876 and 1879, and with the poor travelling conditions on the frontier, any messages between 
columns would take days to travel, days that were not always available when warnings needed to 
be given or rapid decisions made. Sheridan was not made aware of what occurred at the Rosebud 
until days after it happened and it took still longer for the information to reach the Department of 
the Dakotas, leaving Alfred Terry, John Gibbon, and fatally, George Custer, to make their calls 
in the absence of important information about the enemy’s strength and tenacity. Chelmsford did 
not hear from Pearson about the Battle of the Nyezane until January 23, a day too late to save 
Durnford and 1/24th who went to their deaths at Isandlwana just hours after Pearson saw off 
Godide. While the technology of the day limited army’s abilities to quickly disseminate 
information, Sheridan and Chelmsford compounded these difficulties by spreading their forces 
out so thin, a decision they made not based on cold military logic, but on Victorian Era prejudice.  
Sheridan and Chelmsford’s inability to change their plans was a natural outcome of the 
plans themselves, and those plans were premised on a racialized and inaccurate portrait of the 
“primitives” both generals thought they were fighting. Having ignored, dismissed, or rationalised 
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away all the information on Lakota and Zulu military prowess they could access before the wars, 
Sheridan and Chelmsford concocted strategies that by their nature insulated them from any bad 
news that might allow them to adjust those strategies on the fly. The consequences of this were 
that the American and British armies were left strung out across immense enemy territories, 
unable to support one another, or even to advise their superiors of what was taking place in front 
of them. It was a situation that all but ensured disaster should the Lakota, Cheyenne, or Zulu ever 



































Chapter 4: Last Stands 
 
When empires lose battles to enemies they hold in contempt scapegoats are necessary, 
and no one makes a better scapegoat than a dead man. Where a living person may resist taking 
the blame for someone else’s mistakes, the dead are acquiescent, their actions and decisions 
easily twisted to meet their accusers’ narrative. This is especially true when those who saw the 
scapegoat in action are also dead and therefore cannot provide any explanation of or defense for 
their behaviour. When a military operation falls apart, blaming the dead becomes extremely 
tempting for their superiors, who may need to cover up their own mistakes or camouflage the 
ways their assumptions handicapped their subordinates. By shifting the blame to the deceased, 
generals and politicians avoid paying the penalty for their errors, while providing the public with 
the catharsis of knowing the “guilty party” has already paid the ultimate price for failure. 
History is replete with examples of imperial projects who, when confronted with failure 
in the field, ignored the need to address structural problems or acknowledge the competency of 
previously despised foes by attributing the defeats to the unique incompetence of a specific field 
general. Examples can be found as far back as the Battle of Carrhae, in 54 BCE when the 
Romans chose to blame the senility of the Roman general, Marcus Licinius Crassus, rather than 
the brilliance of the Persian commander, for the defeat.285 The Dutch government did the same in 
the 1600s after the loss of their Taiwan colony to the Chinese, holding their governor responsible 
for failing to fend off 200 000 Chinese troops with the few hundred men at his disposal.286 The 
British and the Americans employed a similar narrative when Major-General Edward 
 
285 See Plutarch’s “Life of Crassus” for the traditional narrative upon which most subsequent accounts were based. 
See Gareth Sampson, Defeat of Rome: Crassus, Carrhae, and the Invasion of the East, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword 
Military, 2008) for a revisionist examination of Crassus’ military career before and during his expedition to Persia 
and a highly positive analysis of Surenas’ generalship. 
286 See Tonio Andrade, Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China’s First Great Victory Over the West (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2011) for the only full length English language treatment of this topic. 
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Braddock’s column was slaughtered by France’s Indigenous allies on the Monongahela River 
during the Seven Years’ War, and both nations would adapt those tropes to fit future defeats.287 
George Washington, a veteran of the Monongahela, applied the Braddock narrative when Major-
General Arthur Saint Clair was obliterated by the Shawnee and Miami at the Battle of the 
Wabash, while the British did the same in the aftermath of colonial disasters in Afghanistan and 
the African Gold Coast.288 The pattern, in each of these cases, was the same: the white officers 
were entirely responsible for the defeat, and the decisions of the Persian, Chinese, Native 
American, African, and Afghani generals were dismissed as unimportant.  
The advantages of this framing for colonial powers are twofold. On one hand, it enables 
other participants in the endeavour to exculpate themselves of any responsibility for the 
catastrophe. On the other, it allows the colonial state to carry on without re-examining its 
assumptions about the capabilities of its adversaries. If only the general in charge had been more 
capable, the argument goes, the imperial army would have been automatically victorious on the 
basis of its innate superiority. Any advantages the enemy might hold can be written off or 
relegated as of secondary importance to the inability of one white man. It centres the 
conversation on the imperial side of the conflict, precisely where the empire wishes the attention 
to be, while simultaneously avoiding holding the broader empire to account for losing. 
 
287 There are many worthwhile monographs on the Battle of the Monongahela, but the best, and most recent, is 
David Lee Preston, Braddock’s Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to Revolution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015). Unlike most previous books on the topic, Preston makes a significant effort to understand 
the French and Native American sides of the battle, drawing extensively on overlooked French-language archives to 
do so. 
288 Colin Calloway, The Victory With No Name: The Native American Defeat of the First American Army (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015) provides a detailed examination of  Saint Clair’s Defeat from the American and 
Native American points of view, and, as is hinted at in the title, seeks to examine the processes by which Americans 
sought to forget the battle. Robert Edgerton, The Fall of the Asante Empire: The Hundred Year War for Africa’s 
Gold Coast (New York: The Free Press, 1995) and Diana Preston, The Dark Defile: Britain’s Catastrophic Invasion 
of Afghanistan 1838-1842 (New York: Walker and Company, 2012) are solid examinations of the British failures 
against the Asante Empire and the Afghan tribes respectively. 
175 
 
The Battle of the Little Bighorn and the Battle of Isandlwana are case studies in the ways 
this narrative can be employed to obscure the truth of what happened on the ground. Lieutenant-
Colonels George Armstrong Custer and Anthony Durnford, killed commanding the white forces 
at the two battles, have been ridiculed for incompetence, with Custer’s name in particular 
becoming a byword for hubris. Studies of both battles focus overwhelmingly on the decisions 
made by the white officers who were on the scene, and even those that attempt to exonerate 
Custer and Durnford tend only to recontextualize their actions, demonstrating why the decisions 
both men made were reasonable in the moment and on the basis of the information they had 
available to them. While monographs incorporating Lakota, Cheyenne, and Zulu perspectives 
and ability into their explanations are hardly uncommon, they still tend to assume that, had 
Custer and Durnford done something differently, they could have snatched victory from the jaws 
of defeat. Similarly, even researchers who blame Sheridan and Chelmsford for the fiascos, 
remain prone to examining Custer and Durnford’s tactical decisions, and identifying moments 
where they could have acted differently, and supposedly achieved success despite their superiors. 
It will be contended here that there was nothing George Custer or Anthony Durnford 
could have done to win the Battles of the Little Bighorn and Isandlwana. Both officers were 
hamstrung from the start by the colonial reasoning of their bosses and by the bigoted 
assumptions that underpinned those bosses’ campaign plans. Moreover, they were outmatched, 
tactically and numerically, by far larger enemy forces under the direction of intelligent and 
experienced Indigenous commanders like Crazy Horse and Ntshingwayo kaMahole. Throughout 
both fights, it was the Indigenous armies, not the white ones, that maintained better unit cohesion 
and battlefield control, and it was because of their superiority in this regard that they were 
victorious. Once battle was joined, Custer and Durnford became extremely constrained in the 
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options that were available to them and lost most of their ability to alter the outcome of the 
engagement. In fighting at all, Custer and Durnford lost. 
This is not to suggest that either man fought a perfect battle or made no tactical errors. 
There were certainly things that Custer and Durnford could have done to improve their chances 
of surviving longer, or in Custer’s case, escaping the battlefield to fight another day. Actually 
winning either battle, however, as opposed to merely living through it, was never an option and, 
as will be shown, it is only the belief that white men should, as a matter of course, win fights 




George Crook’s withdrawal from the Rosebud and the communications blackout that 
followed left Alfred Terry and John Gibbon blind. Messages between their columns and Crook’s, 
whether sent directly or routed through Sheridan had always struggled to get through, but the 
possibility at least had been there. Crook’s retreat from Lakota and Cheyenne territory and his 
reluctance to admit to his humiliation took his column out of the equation, and removed one 
possible source of information on Native American movements from Terry and Gibbon’s 
arsenal. Whether Crook could have sent a runner to Terry or Gibbon and alerted them to the 
willingness of the Lakota-Cheyenne alliance to fight is an open question; what is relevant is that 
he did not even try—and neither did Sheridan.289 Terry did not learn of Crook’s defeat and 
retreat until July 7, 1876, three weeks after the engagement.290 Even more embarrassingly, the 
information came to Terry not through any official military channel, but through a party of 
Crows whom Gibbon encountered that day, and who learned of the Rosebud reversal from some 
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of the Crow scouts who left Crook after the withdrawal to Goose Creek.291 Until this chance 
meeting, Terry and Gibbon continued to operate on the presumption that Crook was still in the 
field, actively seeking a confrontation with the Lakota and Cheyenne. By the time they had been 
disabused of this notion, George Custer had been dead for several weeks.  
The point must be stressed that in the week between the Rosebud and Little Bighorn 
battles, Alfred Terry, in his capacity as both a column leader and Commanding Officer 
Department of the Dakotas, was making his decisions based entirely on what scraps of 
information were available to him. With no word from Crook or Sheridan, Terry had to assume 
Crook was still in the field, any engagements he might have had with the hostiles had been 
successful, and Sheridan’s orders to find the Lakota and Cheyenne before they could “scatter” 
stood unchanged.292 So far as Terry knew, the hunt for Sitting Bull and the other Lakota and 
Cheyenne war-leaders was still on, and it was still his job to cut off their path to the north while 
Crook blocked the route south. Without looking at the situation in this light, it is not possible to 
truly make sense of Terry’s choices, or the choices of George Custer. 
Further complicating matters was Terry’s own lack of experience campaigning on the 
Plains. As previously noted, the accusation that Terry was a desk soldier with no field duty under 
his belt is untrue; as a veteran of the Union’s campaigns up and down the Confederate coast, and 
the commanding officer during the final assault on Fort Fisher, Terry had seen more action—and 
led more successful actions—than many of the army’s professional soldiers.293 As a self-taught 
siege engineer and logistician, Terry had few, if any, equals in the Union army, during or after 
the Civil War, and there was a reason why Ulysses Grant rated him the best amateur soldier of 
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the conflict.294 Terry’s skill set did not, however, easily translate to hunting for hostile Lakota 
and Cheyenne along the Western frontier. As author of the Fort Laramie Treaty, Terry saw a fair 
amount of the Plains, but he did so in his capacity as a lawyer, government representative, and ad 
hoc diplomat, rather than as the General Commanding the Department of the Dakotas. Between 
Red Cloud’s War, which the Fort Laramie Treaty closed out, and the inauguration of the Great 
Sioux War, most actions on the northern plains were comparatively small scale, and no 
expeditions requiring the personal presence of the Departmental Commander were mounted.295  
Terry was well aware of his deficiencies in this area, and his initial plan of campaign 
anticipated the two columns from his Department would be led not by himself, but by John 
Gibbon and George Custer.296 Custer’s political clash with the Grant administration, however, 
saw him temporarily removed from command by the Secretary of War. To keep the expedition 
on track, Sheridan instructed Terry to take command of the Fort Abraham Lincoln column 
originally entrusted to Custer; Terry was so distressed by this state of affairs he wrote to 
Sheridan requesting Custer be granted clemency and allowed to join the operation.297 Sheridan 
forwarded the request to Sherman, who then passed it along to Grant; after much back and forth, 
Custer was allowed to rejoin the column, but as Lieutenant-Colonel of the 7th Cavalry alone. 
Terry was retained as the titular head of the expedition, much to his own displeasure.298  
Custer may have been more familiar with the Lakota and Cheyenne territories than Terry 
was, but that was not necessarily saying much. As John Gibbon, commanding both the Fort Ellis 
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column and the District of Montana, observed in an article written after the war, none of the 
white officers truly had any understanding of what they were doing or where they were going. 
Discussing the Lakota holdings Gibbon observed, “Of the geography of this region the troops are 
almost completely ignorant, and are not infrequently entirely at the mercy of incompetent guides, 
not only in their movements, but in the discovery of what is absolutely necessary to the success 
of such movements—water.” Gibbon went on to write admiringly of the Native American 
system of espionage, which he maintained kept the  enemy war-leaders well-aware of American 
troop movements at all times. In contrast to this, Gibbon stated that the soldiers “move along 
almost without eyes, nothing beyond a very short distance from the moving column being seen 
or known, and the game is carried on very much on the principle of ‘Blindman’s Bluff.’” Gibbon 
had no answers for how these deficiencies in knowledge of the terrain were to be made up for, 
save through the same solutions recommended by Sheridan: converging columns and winter 
campaigning. Both solutions would be shown by the Great Sioux War to be inadequate to the 
needs of the army, something Gibbon, unlike Sheridan, was later prepared to admit.299  
Alfred Terry left no memoirs for posterity, but his field diary and his official after-action 
report to Sheridan give a good indication of the strain the Brigadier-General found himself under 
in the spring of 1876. Where Crook was willing to starve his command to follow Sheridan’s 
instructions, Terry was not, and he spent much of the early spring building up his supply chain. 
A steamer was used to ferry supplies up the Yellowstone River, creating supply depots Terry and 
Gibbon’s columns could utilise as need be. According to Terry, “no train of pack-mules has ever 
been organised in this department, and the marching columns were necessarily dependent on 
wagons for the transport of their supplies.” Terry did bring two hundred fifty saddles with him, 
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with which he might create an impromptu mule train if need be, but he did not favour the notion, 
preferring to rely on his wagons and on the advance depots he had set up by steamer. With all 
these arrangements to make, it took Terry until May 17 to leave Fort Lincoln; Gibbon, by this 
point, had been in the field since April 3. Wiring Gibbon of his departure, Terry told his 
subordinate he would meet up with him along the Little Missouri River, where reports told him 
the main body of “hostile Sioux” were located.300 
It took Terry until May 29 to reach the Little Missouri, loaded down as he was with his 
wagon train. The weather was of no help, with rains turning the roads to mud and hampering 
Terry’s progress still further. Scouting by a portion of the 7th Cavalry, led by Custer, revealed no 
recent Native American trails; the journey to the Little Missouri it seemed, was a goose chase. 
Having yet to contact Gibbon, Terry resumed his march on May 31, only for a late spring 
blizzard to leave his expedition snowbound through June 1 and 2. On June 3, Terry came to 
Beaver Creek, where he met despatches from Gibbon and from the steamer, Far West, which 
delivered his supplies. Gibbon had not found any trace of the Lakota or Cheyenne either; Terry 
told him to suspend further movements while he worked out a means for them to meet up. After 
several more days of marching, Terry reached the Powder River on June 7; on June 9 he boarded 
the Far West and journeyed up the Yellowstone to meet Gibbon.301  
Gibbon’s own travels through the Department of the Dakotas had been as joyless as 
Terry’s, his account of the expedition bemoaning the snow and rain that repeatedly slowed him 
up. The Crow scouts accompanying Gibbon had no more luck finding the Lakota and Cheyenne 
than those with Terry, though the Lakota had, on several occasions, found Gibbon. During their 
first raid on his encampment, the Lakota plundered the Crow horse herds, leaving many of the 
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Colonel’s auxiliaries dismounted and disheartened. Efforts to trail the thieves failed. Two weeks 
later, on May 23, two of Gibbon’s cavalrymen, accompanied by a civilian teamster, went absent 
without leave from camp. When Gibbon went searching for these deserters he discovered they 
had been waylaid and slain by Lakota outriders. The Colonel tried to track the killers, but “when 
the cavalry reached the top of the bluffs not an Indian was to be seen,” and Gibbon’s wanderings 
became increasingly aimless before he received new marching orders from Terry.302  
The following anecdote from Gibbon reveals just how hard it was for those marching 
orders from Terry to get through to him. On the morning of June 8, Gibbon’s scouts found an 
abandoned sack whose contents indicated to them that there were white men, rather than hostile 
Native Americans, about.303 At two o’clock the following morning, Gibbon was awakened by the 
arrival of a despatch from Terry, carried by a white soldier and an indigenous scout. During the 
ensuing conversation, Gibbon was informed his own scouts correctly identified the contents of 
the sack: it had belonged to a pair of white men whom Terry sent to find Gibbon the day 
before.304 These men, “had seen from a distance our Crow scouts, had taken them for Sioux, and 
had fled back to report the country filled with hostiles, and lose a reward of two hundred dollars 
which had been promised them if they got through to me [Gibbon] with their despatches…”305  
These difficulties were hardly unique to this one communique between Gibbon and his superior; 
after the Little Bighorn, Gibbon and Terry struggled for weeks to locate Crook, sending out 
multiple different parties of both white soldiers and Crow scouts, who became lost in the 
unfamiliar plains, were neutralised by Lakota or Northern Cheyenne warbands, or found Crook 
only to flee in terror from—or be chased away by—the Native scouts attached to the Department 
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of the Platte.306 Gibbon’s recollections include numerous occasions in which Crow, Shoshone, or 
Arikara auxiliaries were misidentified as Lakota or Cheyenne, both by white troopers or by one 
another, and were chased away or even killed by friendly fire.307  
At their conference on June 9, Gibbon and Terry pooled their information and 
discovered, to the irritation of both, that neither had anything constructive to report. Terry had 
not found any Lakota, Gibbon had endured two raids but had not been able to give chase, and 
neither officer had heard anything from George Crook. “The existence of any large camps of 
hostile Indians in this region,” Gibbon recorded, “was now more than ever a matter for doubt.”308 
It was decided that Terry would organise a reconnaissance of the confluence of the Tongue and 
the Rosebud; Gibbon, in the meantime, would take his men to the mouth of the Rosebud and 
wait there for Terry.309 The two of them together would guard the Yellowstone and prevent any 
hostiles Crook might have encountered from fleeing northward. Since Terry had (in Gibbon’s 
opinion) no competent guides with him, Gibbon leant him the mixed-race scout Mitch Boyer, 
then set about returning to his column and getting it moving towards the Rosebud.310 A sudden 
rainstorm, however, delayed Gibbon considerably, as “the whole alkali flat around us became 
one immense quagmire, and a gulch back of our camp, which was dry when we came, was soon 
a torrent ten or twelve feet deep.”311 With bridges washed out and fords overflowing, it took 
Gibbon until June 14 to reach the mouth of the Rosebud and set up camp.312 
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Terry had his own problems with delays. On June 11 he sent six companies of the 7th 
Cavalry out on a scouting mission of the Tongue River.313 They were under the command of 
Major Marcus Reno, Custer’s second-in-command and a man who was heartily disliked by 
nearly every other officer in the regiment. A deeply depressive personality, made more so by the 
recent death of his wife, Reno was reviled for his moodiness, sarcasm, and alcoholism in roughly 
equal measure. George Custer and his younger brother, Captain Tom Custer, egged on by 
Custer’s teetotalling wife, Libbie, found Reno’s frequent bouts of drunkenness especially 
distasteful, while Captain Frederick Benteen, often positioned by historians as the leader of the 
7th’s anti-Custer faction, had once threatened Reno with violence  after the Major insulted him 
one time too many.314 The events of the next several days added Brigadier-General Alfred Terry 
to Reno’s list of enemies, as Reno believing he had discovered a Native trail, vanished from 
contact for more than a week. None of the ranking officers in the Department of the Dakotas 
learned where Reno was until June 18, when Gibbon’s scouts discovered him, and it was not 
until the following day, June 19, that one of Reno’s despatches reached his actual superiors, 
Terry and Custer.315 Terry, extremely frustrated by this time, had to send out Custer with another 
six companies of the 7th Cavalry to retrieve the major, which was accomplished on June 21.316 
Reno had almost nothing to show for his adventuring; he found evidence the Lakota had been in 
the region at some point in the not-too-distant past, but precious little else.  
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Based on the limited evidence found by Reno and by their entire failure to find the 
Lakota and Cheyenne anywhere else, Terry determined the hostiles had to be camped along the 
Yellowstone. Later on June 21, Terry, Gibbon, and Custer held a conference aboard the Far West 
to work out their plans. The decision was made to divide their forces to increase their chances of 
encountering their enemies. Custer would separate from Terry, and, with the loan of Mitch Boyer 
and six of Gibbon’s Crow scouts (Custer’s own Arikara auxiliaries were fierce enemies of the 
Lakota, but lacked a working knowledge of their territories), range ahead with orders to track 
down and pursue the hostiles.317 Terry’s report, and his written instructions to Custer, state the 
plan was for Gibbon to take up position along the Yellowstone and Bighorn Rivers, while Custer 
felt along the Rosebud and Little Bighorn Rivers for the hostiles’ camp. Once Gibbon was in 
place, Custer was to strike the Lakota and Cheyenne, whom Terry expected were somewhere on 
the Little Bighorn, driving them towards Gibbon or south towards Terry and, presumably, 
Crook.318 Here one can again see the ways in which the inability of the Departmental 
Commanders to communicate with each other undermined their plans. Terry and Gibbon still 
thought Crook was out there, ready to act as a blockade against the Lakota and Cheyenne making 
a run for the south. In truth, the way south was wide open, and Terry’s Dakota columns were the 
only American military forces still in the field—something Terry had no way of knowing.  
Monographs like Glory-Hunter, which subscribe to the notion that Custer disobeyed 
Terry’s orders have made much of the Brigadier-General’s suggestion Custer stick to the 
Rosebud and not head down the Little Bighorn until he could be sure Gibbon was in place, yet 
the tone of Terry’s written orders, often used against Custer, makes it apparent that these were 
suggestions, not commands. This was made clear in the opening lines of Terry’s instructions, 
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where Custer was told, “It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard 
to this movement; and were it not impossible to do so, the department commander places too 
much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders, 
which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy.”319 In those two 
sentences Terry gave Custer field command over the 7th Regiment, informing the Lieutenant-
Colonel he was to use his own judgement rather than deferring to instructions from Terry. He 
also made it apparent that, should Custer find the camp, he was not to break off contact.  
Terry would later claim he had not wanted Custer to engage with the Lakota and 
Cheyenne alone, but his own order gives the lie to that statement. As Custer’s colleague and 
friend, Colonel Nelson Miles commented after the fact, Terry’s orders would have left Custer 
open to censure had he found Sitting Bull’s camp and not attacked it.320 Custer has also been 
blamed by historians, including Stephen Ambrose, for not taking Gatling guns with him and for 
refusing to take any cavalry units from outside the 7th Regiment, but these criticisms are again, 
unfair. Custer was ordered to locate and attack Sitting Bull’s camp, not to defend a fortified 
position. Terry expected the 7th Cavalry to move quickly, and Gatling guns, or any other form of 
wheeled artillery, would have impeded his advance; Terry noted Custer’s handing over the 
Gatling guns to Gibbon without adding any critical comments.321 As to the notion that he could 
have accepted aid from another unit of cavalry—or any other unit in the army, for that matter—
Terry’s own report indicates that decision was out of Custer’s hands. “It was believed,” Terry 
told Sheridan, “to be impracticable to join Colonel Gibbon’s column to Lieutenant-Colonel 
Custer’s force; for more than one-half of Colonel Gibbon’s troops were infantry, who would be 
 
319 Terry, “The Official Report of General A.H. Terry,” 4. 
320 Miles, Personal Recollections of General Nelson A. Miles, 206. 
321 Terry, “The Official Report of General A.H. Terry,” 4. 
186 
 
unable to keep up with cavalry in a rapid movement; while to detach Gibbon’s mounted men and 
add them to the Seventh Cavalry would leave his force too small to act as an independent 
body.”322 It was Alfred Terry, not George Custer, who arranged the disposition of the 
Department of the Dakotas’ forces on the eve of the Little Bighorn, and he did so according to 
the theory of frontier warfare lain out by Phil Sheridan. Terry and Gibbon’s infantry and 
artillery, being too slow to catch horse-borne Native Americans would lie in wait, while the 
cavalry, under Custer, chased the Lakota and Cheyenne towards them. The columns would then 
converge on the hostiles, preventing “scatteration” and ensuring they were all killed or captured. 
It was a badly flawed plan but its conception and execution lay not with Custer, but with his 
Departmental and Divisional superiors. As Custer set out for the Little Bighorn he was not 
carrying out his own scheme, but was adhering to Sheridan’s stratagems as implemented by 
Terry. 
Indeed, Custer, despite what his detractors have claimed about him, had a better idea of 
what he was getting into than Terry did. During the June 21 meeting, he, Terry, and Gibbon had 
hazarded their best guesses as to how many hostile Lakota and Cheyenne were out on the Great 
Plains. Terry and Gibbon, assuming that since they had not found any Native Americans there 
could not be many to find, put the number at a few hundred, in line with Sheridan’s prewar 
assertions. Custer, however, as alluded to in the last chapter, disagreed, stating that with 
reinforcements coming off the agencies, there might be as many as 1500 hostiles roaming the 
Lakota territories. As US Army estimates of Native American numbers went, that was not a bad 
call. The highest modern estimates for the number of warriors with Crazy Horse at the Rosebud 
top out at around 1500, while the lowest estimates for  those present at the Little Bighorn 
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encampment begin at that same number. Custer’s mistake, inasmuch as it was his mistake to 
make at all, was in thinking, like Terry and Gibbon, that those warriors had to be travelling in 
separate bands and would never be found all camped together. Certainly, several war-parties or 
family groups might meet up or even travel together for a time, but all the hostiles being in one 
place at the same time? It was a notion that never occurred to Custer, just as it never occurred to 
Gibbon, Terry, or Sheridan. Of those men, only Gibbon was able to own up to it, speculating, “I 
do not suppose there was a man in the column who entertained for a moment that there were 
Indians enough in the country to defeat, much less annihilate, the fine regiment of cavalry which 
Custer had under his command.”323 Custer did not suppose it either, at least at first, though there 
were some among the 7th Cavalry who recalled that as they neared their quarry, the Lieutenant-
Colonel’s outlook grew ever more downcast—some of them suggested Custer had a premonition 
of his coming doom.324 Perhaps he had. Or perhaps this was merely a case of hindsight being 
perfect, and those troopers who came out alive editing, consciously or unconsciously, their 
recollections. Regardless, the matter was out of Custer’s hands. Terry ordered him to find the 
hostiles, and with the recent trouble Custer had been in with Grant and Terry’s role in bailing 
him out of it, Custer could hardly disobey his commander.  
This is not to say that all the blame rests with Terry either. The Brigadier-General’s bet 
that the Lakota were camped in the Little Bighorn River valley proved to be a good one. 
Working with limited resources, a paucity of guides, and no information from Crook or 
Sheridan, Alfred Terry had, through process of elimination and some clever guesswork, figured 
out the rough location of the primary hostile encampment. It was a solid bit of deductive 
reasoning, and one that Terry is rarely given credit for. Just as Custer’s problems stemmed from 
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Terry’s orders rather than a lack of military skill on his own part, Terry’s mistakes were a 
product not of insufficient martial talent, but of lack of data and the military-colonial framework 
in which he was operating. As the events of the previous winter’s campaign showed, Terry was 
not a fool, and was perfectly willing to buck orders when he felt they were inappropriate—his 
refusal to participate in Sheridan’s plans for that winter without sufficient provision for his men 
amply demonstrates this aspect of his character. Had Terry known about the Battle of the 
Rosebud and how many hostiles Custer was liable to encounter, he might well have acted 
differently. John Gibbon certainly thought he would have; writing of his June 18 encounter with 
Reno’s lost reconnaissance team, he said, “Could we have known what had taken place only 
twenty-four hours before on the head waters of the very stream at whose mouth we stood, the 
information would have been invaluable to us, and probably have given a different shape to our 
whole subsequent operations. As it was, we were still groping in the dark in regard to the 
location of the hostile camps, and had every reason to believe that the Sioux with their women 
and children were solicitous only to avoid us.”325 Knowing about the Rosebud would have told 
Terry, Gibbon, and Custer their enemy had concentrated in far greater numbers than expected 
and was willing to take an offensive posture. They did not, however, know about the Rosebud, 
and their ignorance was a direct result of Sheridan’s operational scheme which placed Terry and 
Crook’s forces so far apart communication became nigh impossible. 
While Terry and Gibbon were searching for them, the Lakota-Cheyenne coalition 
continued to grow. The news that Crazy Horse had repelled Crook, which would have been so 
important to Terry, traveled quickly amongst the free tribes of the Great Plains. Additional 
recruits from the reservations rode out to swell the ranks of the alliance, while family groups and 
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warbands that had already been planning to join with Sitting Bull but had not arrived in time for 
the Rosebud, hurried to make sure they did not miss the next fight. The precise size of the camp, 
and the number of warriors in it is unlikely to ever be known; the Lakota and Cheyenne did not 
have a formal military system, and there was no individual who was in a position to count every 
fighting man present, let alone measure the length of the camp. Modern estimates, drawing on 
Native American testimony, archaeological research, and the statements of the surviving 
members of the 7th Cavalry, place the number of warriors in the camp at anywhere between 1500 
and 5000, with totals between 2000 and 3000 being the most frequently reported.326 Even using 
the lowest estimates leave Custer’s six hundred troopers outnumbered by two-and-a-half to one, 
while the highest estimates put the ratio at over eight to one. Every Lakota and Northern 
Cheyenne subdivision and warrior society was present, as were token war-parties of Southern 
Cheyenne and Northern Arapaho, and with them came every famous chief or war-leader who 
opposed the sale of the Black Hills. The Rosebud battle had seen the greatest assemblage of 
Lakota and Cheyenne military talent to date, but the Little Bighorn saw still more, and this is yet 
another point that must be taken into account when exploring the turns the battle took. American 
officers were used to facing war-parties led by only one or two experienced leaders; these men 
could not be everywhere at once, and if killed in action, their men would typically break. At the 
Little Bighorn as at the Rosebud before, there were dozens of war-chiefs and leaders, all 
experienced in Plains warfare, and all capable of directing the response to Custer’s attack.  
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White historians often dismiss Native American testimony on the Little Bighorn on the 
basis that it is contradictory, one common criticism being the Lakota and Cheyenne veterans 
could not even agree on who was leading them.327 Given the Native American tradition of 
cooperative leadership, however, this discrepancy is entirely to be anticipated: different 
warbands answered to their own chiefs and war-leaders, and depending on where they were on 
the field, came under the supervision of different members of Sitting Bull’s inner council of 
friends, advisors, and allies. What is remarkable about the Native American testimony, given the 
chaotic nature of the battle, is how well much of the testimony lines up, with one another, with 
the archaeological evidence, and with the accounts of the surviving soldiers. Even more 
interestingly, while the Lakota and Cheyenne witnesses might disagree with one another on the 
role of one warrior or chieftain, the same few key names recur again and again throughout the 
documented literature, making it quite easy to identify who the important players were. The 
insistence of some American historians that what happened at the Little Bighorn can never be 
known because none of Custer’s personal command survived is simply untrue and relies on a 
refusal to accept Native American testimony as having value without corroboration from white 
witnesses. The reconstruction of the battle that follows, though informed by some of the best of 
the secondary literature, draws heavily upon the Lakota and Cheyenne statements about the 
engagement, and uses their commentary to build a portrait of a fast-paced, high intensity clash in 
which the Native American leadership brought order to chaos, achieved battlefield command and 
control, and destroyed the better part of an American regiment that was losing all of those things. 
When Custer reached the Little Bighorn camp, some of the Indigenous commanders 
already knew he was coming. Historians have wrangled back and forth over this fact, insisting 
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that since some of the Native accounts say they were aware of Custer’s presence, while others 
say they were caught entirely by surprise, one party or the other must be lying. This ignores the 
fact that since the Native American army at the Little Bighorn was a conglomeration of separate 
warbands, some war-leaders can have known that Custer was on his way while others were still 
in the dark. The size of the camp, which has been put at anywhere from three to seven miles in 
length, also ensured that even if those who were in the know tried to tell the others, the message 
could take hours to travel from one end of the camp to the other. Further reinforcing this point is 
the fact that most of those who say they were aware Custer was coming were Northern 
Cheyenne, with those Lakota who corroborate this story all being camped near them. Shortly 
after the Rosebud, it seems, the Northern Cheyenne chief Little Wolf stole away from the Red 
Cloud reservation with a band of newly recruited followers, an act he repeated several times over 
the course of the war.328 On his way to the Little Bighorn camp, Little Wolf came across Custer’s 
trail, and, assuming it was Crook coming back for revenge, began shadowing the 7th Cavalry, 
using runners to keep some of the other Cheyenne leaders apprised of their movements.329 John 
Stands-in-Timber, grandson of both the Southern Cheyenne war-chief Lame White Man (alias 
Rabid Wolf), and the Northern Cheyenne warrior Wolf Tooth, said on June 24, the day before 
the battle, “village criers announced that no man was to leave camp, and that night the warrior 
societies held dances and the chiefs agreed on a plan of battle. The warriors prepared ritually. 
When the Indians knew that the soldiers were coming, the three Cheyenne soldier societies—
Crazy Dogs (60 members), Elks (60 members) and Foxes (60 members), each led by eight 
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leaders—began taking turns watching the soldiers.”330 The Northern Cheyenne American Horse 
(not to be confused with the Lakota leader of the same name) concurred they knew Custer was in 
the area from the day before, as not only Little Wolf’s band, but several outriders sent to follow 
Crook to Goose Creek, reported the 7th Cavalry’s presence to the Cheyenne chiefs; American 
Horse also said a party of Oglala Lakota under Black Bear had intended to return to Red Cloud 
Agency but, after spotting Custer’s fires, came back to the camp and alerted him again.331 Other 
Cheyenne veterans said their forewarning was brief, coming only minutes before the battle, when 
one of Little Wolf’s warriors rushed into the camp to tell them the soldiers were coming.332  
These accounts are sometimes positioned as mutually exclusive, but in truth are anything 
but, and the statements of Chief Two Moons of the Northern Cheyenne and Crow King (more 
accurately translated as Father Crow or Patriarch Crow), a Hunkpapa war-chief, unite the two 
versions of events quite coherently. Two Moons said the Cheyenne were surprised by when the 
attack was made and the direction it came from, but that they had known since the day before 
that Custer was nearby.333 Crow King said nearly the same thing, telling the Leavenworth Times, 
“we were in camp, not thinking there was any danger of a battle, although we had heard that the 
long-haired chief had been sent after us. Some of our runners went back on our trail, for what 
purpose I do not know. One came back and reported that an army of white soldiers was coming, 
and he had no more reported when another runner came in with the same story, and also told us 
that the command had divided and that one party was coming around to attack us from the 
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opposite side.”334 Assume these men were not deliberately distorting the truth and what comes 
out of it all is this: the highest placed leaders among the Cheyenne and their closest allies among 
the Lakota were aware Custer was nearby from the day before and accordingly placed the 
warrior societies, their elite military, on alert, but chose not to panic the camp by making the 
news general. During the early hours of June 25, the scouts then either lost contact with Custer or 
with their chiefs for a period, with communication restored only a short while before the attack. 
When the runners came into the northern end of the camp, the war-leaders in that area, already 
on high alert, began rallying their men to meet Custer’s assault. Further down the camp, the 
message became distorted or did not reach at all, and at the southern end, where the first part of 
Custer’s pincer movement landed, no one knew until the first white soldier appeared across the 
river. 
Custer’s plan for June 25 was, on paper, a virtual repeat of the 1868 Battle of the 
Washita. By dividing his regiment into three sections under himself, Major Marcus Reno, and 
Captain Frederick Benteen, he intended to strike the Lakota encampment from multiple sides, 
taking Sitting Bull and his war-leaders off guard and preventing any retreat. Custer and Reno 
each had a battalion with them and would hit the northern and southern ends of the Little 
Bighorn Valley as simultaneously as possible, while Benteen, with the remaining battalion, rode 
around the valley, cutting off escape routes and making sure there were no other Lakota bands 
nearby who might come to Sitting Bull’s assistance. Splitting his command this way was, as 
nearly every historical commentator has observed, inherently risky, but it was the only way he 
could meet Sheridan’s requirements. Preventing the Natives from scattering was the paramount 
goal of the campaign, and Custer, while familiar with the terrain of the Great Plains, did not have 
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enough experience fighting the Lakota and Cheyenne to recognise the problems with Sheridan’s 
directions. Since 1868, Custer’s battles with the tribes of the northern plains had been almost 
entirely defensive in nature, protecting government surveyors, railroad men, and cartographers 
from attack. The Washita battle, which he fought not only on Sheridan’s orders, but under 
Sheridan’s direct command, was the last time Custer took the offensive against Plains warriors, 
and it should not surprise anyone he used it as a prototype for his assault at the Little Bighorn. 
The Washita worked in large part, of course, because it was an unprovoked attack on a friendly 
band but that was not how Sheridan chose to memorialise it or how Custer remembered it.  
Custer might, of course, have chosen to act differently had he been aware of just how big 
the Lakota and Cheyenne force was, but at the time he was making his decision, that information 
was not available to him. Since parting company with Terry, Custer, with his Crow and Arikara 
scouts, had been following a Lakota trail but had yet to see any of the hostiles.335 When Custer 
told Benteen to swing round the valley, he had sufficient evidence to believe Sitting Bull was 
there, but had not clapped eyes on the camp itself. When he separated from Reno shortly after, he 
caught a glimpse of the camp, but the bluffs and the turning of the Little Bighorn River conspired 
to keep the bulk of the hostiles’ position out of view. As several of Reno’s officers later recalled, 
Custer knew there was a large camp up ahead, but had no idea just how large it was—and with 
his vision blocked by the landscape, and Sheridan and Terry’s insistence there could not be more 
than a few hundred Lakota and Cheyenne on the whole of the Northern Plains, Custer did not 
know, and had little reason to suspect, he was outnumbered.336 Once more, the costs of 
Sheridan’s converging columns strategy and the inability for information to get from Crook to 
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Terry is apparent. Had Custer known about the Battle of the Rosebud, he might have realised his 
own previous suspicions about Native numbers were correct, and Sheridan, Terry, and Gibbon 
were wrong. What he might have done with that information is open to speculation, but it 
certainly would not have hurt him to have it. Sheridan and Grant ridiculed Custer for going in 
blind at the Little Bighorn, but he truly did not have any other options: his orders and the dearth 
of military intelligence fixed the blinders to his eyes and he had no choice but to operate with 
that handicap.  
Reno struck first, his Arikara scouts in the lead, his cavalry following behind, as they 
crossed the river, rode up through the timber to the south of the camp, and then drove into the 
tipis . Before the soldiers or their enemies had fired a shot, the Arikara, led by the half-Hunkpapa 
Lakota Bloody Knife, got in amongst the Lakota civilians and carried out the first atrocity of the 
day against non-combatants, killing six Lakota women and children.337 Among the dead were 
two wives and three children of the Hunkpapa war-chief Gall. When they were young, Gall 
relentlessly tormented the adolescent Bloody Knife, and the half-Arikara took his revenge by 
proxy now, fully expecting, at least according to mixed race scout William Jackson, to be killed 
later that day.338 Based on testimony from Jackson, and several other survivors, Reno had little 
control over Bloody Knife and the Arikara, or over his own men for that matter.339 Rumours the 
alcoholic major was drunk during the battle have always circulated, though the evidence is 
insubstantial; given Reno’s depressive outlook and the swiftness with which the battle plan fell 
apart, the major may not have required any chemical assistance to give in to panic. 
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The Lakota and Cheyenne reacted swiftly to Reno’s attack. Warriors rushed out of their 
lodges, grabbed whatever weapons they could find and hurried along the river to the scene of the 
fighting. At the sight of the Native warriors massing against him, Reno temporarily called a halt, 
and it is at this moment that many witnesses, Indigenous and white alike, believed the chance of 
his charge succeeding went from a longshot to an impossibility. Rather than rushing into the 
camp, Reno took up position outside and fired into it, striking tents and tepees, but killing 
comparatively few Lakota.340 Several Lakota and Cheyenne witnesses commented on the poor 
accuracy of Reno’s shooting at this time; Crow King suggested Reno stopped too far from his 
targets, saying, “the whites commenced firing at about four hundred yards distance”, well outside 
accurate range for a cavalry carbine.341 “The Indians,” Crow King added, “retreated—at first 
slowly, to give the women and children time to go to a place of safety. Other warriors got our 
horses. By that time we had warriors enough to turn upon the whites and we drove them to the 
hill, and started back to camp.”342 
Two Moons, then a young Northern Cheyenne war-chief, described the chaos that 
engulfed the camp as Reno began his assault and the efforts made by  himself and the other war-
leaders to impose some semblance of order. Two Moons was outside the camp, watering his 
horse herd, when he “noticed a heavy cloud of dust up the river and made up his mind that the 
soldiers had arrived. He hastily collected what warriors he could and started in the direction of 
the fighting, which had already began between Gall and Reno.”343 The same scene played out 
across the Lakota and Cheyenne base, as leading men gathered their warbands and went hurtling 
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towards Reno’s gunline, forcing him from the camp and back into the timber from which he 
initially emerged .344 As the Lakota and Cheyenne surged forwards, their leaders barked orders at 
them, transforming an angry mob into a disciplined war-party that advanced on foot towards the 
timber, firing at Reno as they went. Leading the initial thrust was Gall, the Hunkpapa Lakota 
war-chief who had already lost so much to Reno’s Arikara auxiliaries. The deaths of his wives 
and children, “made my heart bad,” Gall grimly remembered. “I then fought with the hatchet.”345 
Two Moons, who enjoyed recalling his own leading role in the fight, always made sure to credit 
Gall with being the first to respond to the soldiers’ appearance.346 On Reno’s side, one of the first 
men killed was Bloody Knife, his brains blown out and into Reno’s eyes, causing the unstable 
major to, in the eyes of many of his troopers, lose what nerve he had left.347 
As the Native American forces were coming together, Reno’s command was falling 
apart. Describing the retreat to the timber, William Jackson wrote “Several hundred of the enemy 
went thundering past the outer end of our line, and, swinging in, began attack upon our rear; 
others were starting to cut us off from the river, and more and more arrivals from the camp 
swarmed in front of us.”348 The retreat was sounded as “Reno, hatless, a handkerchief tied 
around his head,” clambered up on his horse and “waving his six-shooter he shouted something 
that I couldn’t hear, and led swiftly off, up out of the depression we were in. We all swarmed 
after him, and headed back up the way that we had come.”349 Sergeant Charles White accused 
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the whole of the officer corps of being drunk, saying, “the only officer who maintained self-
control and acted like an officer should was [Captain Thomas] H French,” of M Company, 
whose men the initial gunline was centred upon.350 According to White, Reno’s order to retreat 
to the timber was when he “lost his men, for the soldiers were not instructed as to the movement 
to be executed before starting. The men rode pell-mell through the timber and as soon as they got 
outside of it they were met by the Indians and shot down like buffalo.”351 
White maintained that, had Reno stood in the timber they could have fended off the entire 
Lakota and Cheyenne force.352 Some Native American veterans agreed with this sentiment, 
remembering they could never understand why Reno, after pulling back into the safety of the 
timber, so quickly abandoned that position.353 Other Lakota and Cheyenne participants, however, 
disagreed, saying they had more than enough men available to force Reno out of the timber had 
it come to that. Which of these opinions was the correct one would never be tested, because 
Crazy Horse, absent to this point, was about to take a hand in the battle. After meticulously 
preparing his medicine for the day, the Oglala war-leader rode south through the camp, drawing 
mounted men into his wake and shouting that it was a good day to die. By the time he reached 
the timber he had several hundred warriors with him, including his brother-in-law Red Feather, 
and noted fighters Iron Hawk, Flying Hawk, and Kicking Bear.354 Reno, his control over his men 
(and, from the sounds of things, his own emotions) all but dissolved by this point, called for 
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retreat once again when Crazy Horse and his Lakota warriors—and Two Moons and his 
Cheyenne, who seem to have had much the same idea as Crazy Horse—suddenly appeared on 
their flanks.355 The soldiers hurriedly fled the timber, abandoning any who could not keep up.356  
The Lakota Iron Hawk, whose warriors played a large part in forcing Reno from the 
timber, believed the Major made the right decision in running and that had he stood to face Crazy 
Horse’s charge, he would have been wiped out.357 “The Indians,” he told an interviewer, “were 
so thick that Reno’s men would have been run over and could not have lasted but a short time if 
they had stood their ground in the woods.”358 Flying Hawk, discussing Crazy Horse’s leadership 
and the pursuit of Reno, said, “The dust was thick and we could hardly see. We got right among 
the soldiers and killed a lot with our bows and arrows and tomahawks. Crazy Horse was ahead of 
all, and he killed a lot of them with his warclub; he pulled them off their horses when they tried 
to get across the river where the bank was steep. Kicking Bear was right beside him and killed 
many, too, in the water.”359 Reno’s retreat became a rout, and the majority of his forty-nine dead 
were lost here, as the men withdrawing from the timber and trying to cross the river found 
themselves in the path of Crazy Horse’s vanguard. Elaborating on the slaughter, Flying Hawk 
said, “they got off their horses and tried to climb out of the water on their hands and knees, but 
we killed nearly all of them when they were running through the woods and in the water.”360  
Between them, Crazy Horse and Gall (and the other war-leaders who accompanied them) 
executed a textbook hammer and anvil maneuver, Gall holding Reno in place while Crazy Horse 
turned the soldiers’ flank. They would do so again over the course of the battle, demonstrating a 
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level of tactical awareness and command and control that historians all too often insist 
Indigenous armies did not have. At the same time they were doing so, command and control, and 
indeed, all discipline in Reno’s battalion, broke down entirely, making it that much easier for the 
two Lakota leaders and their allies to get them on the run. Crazy Horse and Two Moons led the 
pursuit, crossing the river and keeping on Reno’s heels as he fell back into the hills.361 As Reno’s 
men took up defensive positions along the line of bluffs, Crazy Horse broke off and wheeled 
about, taking most of his force back in the direction of the encampment. Word of Custer’s assault 
on the northern end of the camp had reached the Oglala war-leader, and he persuaded his men to 
leave off their pursuit of a fleeing enemy and return to camp to face one that was still on the 
offensive. Two Moons followed suit, though not before posting a guard of eager, though 
inexperienced, young warriors to watch Reno and ensure that he did not rejoin the fighting.362 
Both the Cheyenne chief and the Lakota warrior knew they needed their veteran men for the 
confrontation with the second American force.  
Custer descended into the valley shortly after Reno began his attack. From his original 
vantage point atop the bluffs, he could see Reno’s charge strike home and the Lakota apparently 
fleeing before the cavalry. Once he was in the valley, however, Custer lost sight of Reno. As 
Miniconjou Lakota leader High Back Bone (often rendered into English as “Hump”) later 
observed, once the battle began, Custer and Reno did not know where one another were.363 
Neither of them knew where Benteen was either, and Benteen did not know where Custer and 
Reno were. What must have become apparent, however, was the actual size of the Lakota camp 
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and that if Custer were to take it, he would need every man with him. A messenger was sent to 
find Benteen, urging him to join Custer and bring all the spare ammunition packs.364 The 
messenger found Benteen, but Benteen never found Custer; circling around the valley to the 
south of the battlefield, he linked up with Reno on the bluffs. The arrival of Benteen and his 
soldiers did a great deal to restore order in Reno’s shattered battalion, but did nothing for Custer 
and his troopers who, as Reno and Benteen tried to deduce where he was and whether fighting 
through the Cheyenne guards to join him was possible, was already in the fight of his life.365  
Custer’s first charge into the encampment carried him a long way, especially in the early 
minutes, when the Lakota and Cheyenne were occupied with repulsing Reno. The opposition 
Custer encountered was mostly made up of elderly, retired warriors defending their families, and 
men who had not been able to find their horses and  were left behind when Reno was chased into 
the hills.366 Most of them were Cheyenne, although a few Oglala under He Dog also stayed in the 
vicinity of what is now called the Medicine Trail, and engaged with Custer’s troops.367 Once 
Reno was running, however, Custer’s easy ride through the camp came to an abrupt halt. Crow 
King, Gall, and the other Hunkpapa war-leaders who blunted Reno’s first charge, had not 
bothered to give chase once the major fled the timber, leaving that to Crazy Horse and Two 
Moons. Turning around, they streamed back into camp, some clambering onto their horses, 
others remaining afoot, while all the while, latecomers came running to link up with them. Crow 
King’s warband of eighty Hunkpapa were among the vanguard of the Lakota force. “We turned 
against this second party,” he told a newspaper. “The greater portion of our warriors came 
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together in their front and we rushed our horses on them.”368 Almost all Indigenous witnesses 
agreed the army gathered around Gall and Crow King was the largest on the field that day; some 
expert estimates have put the number as high as 1500, while even lower estimates do not drop 
much below 1000.369 Moving up the centre of the camp, Gall and Crow King’s warriors pushed 
Custer back onto the ridgeline to the north. Armed with everything from bows and arrows to 
modern repeating rifles, the warriors kept Custer’s men penned up with long range fire, repelling 
his efforts to get back into the camp.370 
The way south was lost to Custer; soon the way to the west would be too. Lame White 
Man, an elderly Southern Cheyenne chief, had been in a sweat lodge when the fighting began. 
Wrapping himself in a blanket—and subsequently a stolen blue uniform—this tribal elder 
grabbed a rifle and joined the fighting with many young Northern Cheyenne warriors rallying 
alongside this venerable ally.371 Any westward movement by Custer’s right wing was blocked by 
this Cheyenne force, which was soon strengthened by the arrival of Two Moons, fresh from 
repelling Reno and looking to get back into the fight.372 As Gall drove Custer up onto the 
ridgeline, Lame White Man struck east along the ridgeline, trapping Custer’s right wing under 
Captain Myles Keogh between them.373 With that development, the battle was now obviously 
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going against Custer, and the only thing for him to do was to retreat the way he had come, by the 
northeast. Even that doorway, however, was about to close, as Crazy Horse re-entered the fray. 
While Gall was attacking Custer head on and Lame White Man was flanking him from 
the west, Crazy Horse and his followers swung wide around the camp, then came back in from 
the north, closing off Custer’s escape route. Recognising Captain Keogh’s defensive line was 
anchored on the ridge, and that a narrow gap in the rock split that ridgeline in two, Crazy Horse, 
with Sitting Bull’s nephew White Bull at his side, rode his horse through the gap, with several 
hundred Lakota and Cheyenne (some sources put it as high as 1000) right behind him.374 It was a 
surgical strike by the Oglala war-leader that dissected Keogh’s command in two and sent the 
remaining shards of it flying into the path of either Gall, who was continuing to fan out in front 
of the ridgeline, or Lame White Man, who was working his way eastwards along the bluffs, 
picking off any soldiers who could not retreat.375 As Crazy Horse’s charge broke Keogh’s 
command in half, Lame White Man launched a full-scale assault over the ridge, killing Keogh 
and most of his officers, and effectively ending Custer’s right-wing as any kind of coherent 
fighting force.376 The men on the other side of the right-wing fell back along the bluffs towards 
the left-wing under Custer himself; in the face of the Cheyenne’s numbers and evident 
determination to finish the assault, there was little else they could manage. The Cheyenne 
themselves sustained their first serious casualties of the day, including Lame White Man himself, 
who was killed, possibly by friendly fire, while leading the charge against Keogh.377 
 
374 “The He Dog Interview,” 75; “The White Bull Interview,” in Indian Views of the Custer Fight, edited by Richard 
G. Hardorff (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005): 166. 
375 “J.M. Thralls’ Interview with Two Moons,” 110. 
376 “The Little Wolf Interview,” in Cheyenne Memories of the Custer Fight, edited by Richard G. Hardorff (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1995): 90; “The John Stands-in-Timber Interview, 1956,” 170. 
377 “The John Stands-in-Timber Interview, 1956,” 170. 
204 
 
Often, in the past, Plains warbands fell apart with the death of their leader. At the Battle 
of Beecher Island, for instance, the Southern Cheyenne’s willingness to confront the Americans 
collapsed with the death of the famed war-leader Roman Nose; in Cheyenne history the battle is 
recalled as simply, ‘The Place Where Roman Nose Was Killed.’378 At the Little Bighorn, 
however, there were too many famous chiefs and war-leaders present for the death of any one 
man to have that kind of impact on Native American morale. Lame White Man might have died, 
but there were others who could lead in his place with war-chief Two Moons and the fierce 
warrior known as Yellow Nose quickly filling the void. Yellow Nose, an Ute by birth, was 
adopted into the Northern Cheyenne at the age of four after being captured in a raid, and rose to 
become one of their most formidable combatants. He was one of those who had fallen in line 
behind Lame White Man early in the battle and, in a scene recalled in many Lakota and 
Cheyenne testimonials, not only captured the 7th’s regimental flag from the officer carrying it, 
but proceeded to count coup on the man, using the flag as an outsized coup stick.379 In the eyes 
of many it was the greatest stunt of the day, and it stuck in the memories of those who witnessed 
it for years after. Now, with Two Moons cheering him on, Yellow Nose led his adopted tribe in a 
rush up the ridgeline, towards the landmark that has gone down in history as Last Stand Hill. 
Gall and Crow King had done their work well: Custer and the surviving members of his 
battalion were trapped on the top of a hill with nowhere to go. Rather than risking lives 
needlessly, Gall ordered his warriors to snipe away at the bluecoats with their rifles, muskets, 
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and bows, whittling down their numbers one shot at a time.380 Some of Custer’s men likely 
hoped to escape down the back of the hill, but while they did not yet know it, that pathway was 
already being shut off. After breaking Keogh, Crazy Horse swung north again, skirting the 
ridges, and coming in back of the camp. He was moving in a wide circle about the rear of the 
valley before cutting in and making for the back of Last Stand Hill.381 A week earlier, at the 
Rosebud, Crazy Horse tried his hardest to surround and annihilate part of Crook’s command. 
Thanks to insufficient numbers, he was not able to do so. Now, however, he was presented with 
a smaller body of white troops and a vastly larger body of Native Americans with which to 
surround them. With Gall and Crow King in their front, and Two Moons and Yellow Nose at 
their sides, all Crazy Horse had to do was close off the way out to the north and east. He did so 
now, even as Yellow Nose and Two Moons, determined to end the battle without further delay, 
launched an attack up over the ridgeline and onto the top of Last Stand Hill.382 
All the Indigenous accounts agreed that Custer died bravely. Yellow Horse said “Custer 
fought and Reno did not; Custer went in to die, and his fighting was superb. I never saw a man 
fight like Custer did.”383 Sitting Bull told the New York Herald in 1877 that a group of young 
Hunkpapa Lakota told him Custer died laughing.384 What is odd about these accounts is that, by 
the time Yellow Nose went over the top of Last Stand Hill, George Custer was likely already 
dead. When his body was found several days later, there was a rifle wound directly under his 
heart, and a revolver shot through his temple, fired at close enough range that the powder had 
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burned the skin.385 What happened is obvious, though it would have been taboo to suggest at the 
time: as the fighting around him degenerated into a brutal melee, Custer, mortally wounded and 
unable to take part in such a combat, committed suicide.  
Yet the Native American statements that ‘Custer’ died fighting bravely may well be at 
least technically true, for with the death of the Lieutenant-Colonel, command on the hilltop fell 
to Captain Tom Custer, George’s younger brother and a two-time winner of the Medal of Honour 
during the American Civil War. With a reputation for reckless bravery that made his brother 
seem downright tame by comparison, Tom often worried George, who feared his little brother 
would die before him. At one point during the Civil War, George Custer was obliged to place his 
brother under arrest when Tom tried to go back into combat despite a bleeding neck wound he 
had sustained capturing the Confederate colours.386 Now, with his older brother dead at his feet, 
and his younger brother, Boston Custer, and their nephew, Autie Reed, attempting to lead some 
of the troops to safety down the back of the hill, Tom Custer appears to have fought a rearguard 
action against the Lakota and Cheyenne, buying time for Boston to escape and doing what he 
could to avenge George.387 Dressed in the same white buckskin suit George Custer favoured, and 
with blond locks that matched the description of “the Long Hair” better than George (who had 
recently shaved his trademark hair) did, Tom Custer may well have been mistaken for his 
brother, especially since none of the warriors present had met Custer before. 
Tom Custer’s death was worthy of a dime  novel. While pursuing the soldiers to Last 
Stand Hill, the Cheyenne warrior Yellow Nose was fired on by a bareheaded officer in a white 
suit, at such close range that “his eyes and face are still speckled with the powder. The bullet 
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missed Yellow Nose, wounding his horse in the neck. Yellow Nose was struck a heavy glancing 
blow across the forehead with the gunsight, blinding him for a moment and filling his eyes with 
blood.”388 When they reached the top of the hill, Yellow Nose found the same officer standing 
guard, with about thirty men gathered around him. Yellow Nose concluded that it was only this 
man’s bravery that was keeping the soldiers from breaking, and that “to kill him would be a feat 
of more than ordinary prowess.”389 Drawing an old cavalry sabre he had been gifted, Yellow 
Nose charged the officer, whose men ran, leaving him alone. The officer fired at Yellow Nose, 
whose horse bolted at the gunshot. Getting his pony back under control, Yellow Nose again 
charged the officer, who fired again, spooking the horse once more. When Yellow Nose rushed 
him the third time, however, the soldier could do nothing: “the pistol was not fired,” the last 
time, Yellow Nose recalled, “it was empty.”390 Closing with this last man standing, Yellow Nose 
cut him down with his sabre. After the battle was over, a number of Yellow Nose’s fellow 
warriors feted him as the man who killed Custer, an honour Yellow Nose was never sure he was 
due. The honorific may have been more accurate than Yellow Nose knew; based on Yellow 
Nose’s description and the condition of the bodies afterwards, many historians have concluded 
that the courageous officer who died so hard was almost certainly Tom Custer. 
Tom Custer’s last stand was in vain. The men retreating down the back of the hill, who 
included George and Tom’s younger brother Boston and their nephew Autie Reed were all 
caught and killed by Crazy Horse.391 The Custers’ brother-in-law, Lieutenant James Calhoun, 
was killed in action earlier, during the Cheyenne drive up the ridgeline, making June 25 a terrible 
day for the Custer family. It was a terrible day for the 7th Cavalry as well: army records put 
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Custer’s dead at two hundred sixteen officers, men, and civilian volunteers, while Reno lost 
another forty-nine.392 In total, the Battle of the Little Bighorn cost the regiment two hundred 
fifty-five of its six hundred men, almost fifty percent casualties. In contrast, fewer than forty 
Native Americans were killed.393 Gall, Crazy Horse, Crow King, Lame White Man, Two Moons, 
Yellow Nose, and the other Lakota and Cheyenne leaders present conducted a brilliant defense, 
coordinating the many moving parts of their force far better than Custer, Reno, or Benteen 
managed theirs. Gall knocked the fight out of Reno, then moved north to join Crow King in 
halting Custer. Crazy Horse and Two Moons broke Reno’s command and made him retreat into 
the hills. Lame White Man rallied the Cheyenne and put Custer on the defense, then eliminated 
Keogh after Crazy Horse broke his wing in half. Two Moons and Yellow Nose took over when 
Lame White Man was slain, and finished off Custer, while Gall and Crow King held him still, 
and Crazy Horse cut off the last lines of escape.  
Despite persistent myths about how Native Americans did or did not fight, at the Little 
Bighorn the Lakota and Cheyenne fought a nearly perfect battle of annihilation, splintering, 
surrounding, and then exterminating Custer’s command. Crazy Horse is the one who is most 
often given credit for this, and his role was vital: on three separate occasions he flanked the 
soldiers, making their encirclement and destruction possible. However, the roles of the other 
leaders should not be overlooked: Lame White Man, and subsequently Two Moons and Yellow 
Nose, did most of the killing against Custer’s battalion, their warriors a spear that punched 
through Custer’s side and turned the refuge of the hilltops into a deathtrap. As for Gall and Crow 
King, their huge blocking force was the reason Custer was in position for Crazy Horse to trap 
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him and for the Cheyenne to finish him off. The two Hunkpapa war-chiefs were the anvil against 
which the hammers of Crazy Horse, Lame White Man, Two Moons, and Yellow Nose beat 
Custer to death. Now all that was left to do was decide what to do about Reno and Benteen.  
With Reno in no emotional state to take charge, Captain Frederick Benteen was left in 
command of the men who fled to the bluffs. Whatever his quarrels with Custer and Reno, 
Benteen came through for his men at this juncture, reorganising the tattered remains of Reno’s 
battalion into a fighting force that could hold off probing attacks from the Lakota and Cheyenne 
left to watch the hills.394 Many of the surviving soldiers testified to Benteen’s courage under fire, 
and both Sheridan’s annual report and the official “Record of Engagements with Hostile 
Indians,” give nearly sole credit for the survival of the force to Benteen, praising him for keeping 
the men on the hilltop where their guns could hold off any Lakota or Cheyenne advance up the 
bluffs.395 Throughout the rest of the afternoon, Benteen’s command of three hundred or so men 
dug in, using earthworks and their guns to repel a series of increasingly severe sorties from the 
Indigenous warriors below, until the coming of night brought a respite. Their rest, however, 
promised to be brief, for on the plains beneath them they could see more campfires springing up 
as more and more Lakota and Cheyenne, having recuperated from the fight with Custer, 
assembled under the hills. William Jackson, attempting to make his way back to Reno’s camp 
after being separated from him during the fighting, overheard Lakota sentries discussing Gall’s 
plans to seize the hills.396 The stage was set for another fierce engagement the next morning. 
Historians often accuse the Lakota and Cheyenne of lacking a ‘killer instinct’ and being 
unwilling to finish off an enemy once he was beaten. If such a reluctance ever existed among the 
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two Plains tribes, it was absent in the aftermath of the Little Bighorn. Crow King, in an 
interview, stated it was his intention, and the intention of the other Lakota and Cheyenne war-
leaders, to take Reno Hill and eliminate the last remains of the 7th Cavalry.397 The conversation 
Jackson overheard, which places Gall with Crow King at the foot of the hills readying for an 
attack, supports the Lakota leader’s contention.398 It was Custer’s Crow scouts, not anything 
Reno or Benteen did, that prevented that plan from coming to fruition. After fleeing the scene of 
the battle on the afternoon of June 25, the Crows tracked down Gibbon and Terry, who had 
reunited to discuss transportation difficulties. Neither Terry nor Gibbon was sure they believed 
the Crows’ reports that “Custer’s command had been entirely cut to pieces by the Sioux, who, 
said the interpreter, ‘were chasing our soldiers all over the hills and killing them like buffalo,’” 
but they decided they could not ignore them.399 In a forced march that exhausted their 
commands, Terry and Gibbon went in the direction Custer had gone, reaching the Little Bighorn 
battlefield and a very relieved Reno and Benteen, early on June 26.400 Lakota and Cheyenne 
scouts caught wind of both columns’ coming, and at Sitting Bull’s suggestion, the coalition 
forces withdrew from the area, not wishing to risk an encounter with Terry’s 2000 men.401 Crow 
King believed that, had Sitting Bull not given this order, they could have dealt with Reno and 
Benteen before Terry got there. “If this command had not been given,” he said, “we could have 
cut Reno’s command to pieces, as we did Custer’s.”402 Sergeant Windolph, who fought under 
Benteen at Reno Hill, agreed with the Hunkpapa chieftain’s assessment.403 
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The Battle of the Little Bighorn has been refought in the pages of history books and 
articles more than any American battle save perhaps Gettysburg. Many criticisms have been 
levelled at Custer’s leadership, some of them fairly, some far less so. The charge that Custer 
would have saved his own life, and those of the men in his detachment by bringing along Gatling 
guns is fanciful at best, disingenuous at worst. Gatling guns were a defensive weapon, not an 
offensive one. They were slow, cumbersome, and required significant setup to use effectively. 
Certainly, the presence of a Gatling gun on Last Stand Hill could have made a difference during 
the last desperate moments, but Custer would never have had a Gatling gun on that hill, even had 
he brought one with him to the Little Bighorn. Custer’s orders from Sheridan and Terry were to 
assume an offensive posture, and he would never have gone charging into the encampment while 
trying to drag an artillery piece behind him. He would have left it outside the camp and the 
resultant battle would have played out much the same way as it did in real life—provided, of 
course, that the camp was still there for Custer to charge. Given how much the transport of 
Gatling guns slowed down a cavalry column, it is not at all unreasonable to speculate that the 
only way they would have saved Custer’s life was by making him arrive too late to the Lakota 
campsite. In any case, for Custer to have Gatling guns with him at Last Stand Hill would have 
required he be aware he was going to be forced on the defensive and to have attacked anyway. 
Put another way, had Custer possessed sufficient information to know he needed the Gatling 
guns, he would have also had sufficient information to avoid attacking in the first place. 
The suggestion from some authors that it was Custer’s decision not to bring the 7th 
Cavalry’s sabres along that doomed him is, if anything, even sillier than the debate around the 
Gatling guns. Almost no cavalry units still carried their sabres with them on the Western frontier. 
In the eyes of the army high command, sabres were a shock weapon, meant for massed close 
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quarters combat, as there had been in the Civil War, and of comparatively little value on the 
Great Plains. Sheridan’s concept of frontier warfare envisioned high speed pursuits over the 
plains and sudden dashes into unsuspecting Native camps with the foe overwhelmed through 
volume of small arms fire. Cavalry sabres had no place in this conception, and most of 
Sheridan’s subordinates stopped carrying them, viewing them as deadweight and a source of 
unwanted noise that might spoil an ambush. As Colonel Nelson Miles stated in his memoirs, 
“Swords, bayonets, knapsacks, cartridge boxes were regarded as obsolete. What the troops really 
needed were strong clothing, good food, rifles, and plenty of ammunition in cartridge belts. The 
experienced soldier relied upon his rifle, and knew how to use it most effectively.”404 Even if 
Custer had bucked this trend and ordered his men to bring their swords, it is not clear what the 
theory’s proponents think this would have accomplished. Most of the fighting at the Little 
Bighorn took place at long range, with two brief moments of intense melee combat, first during 
Crazy Horse’s pursuit of Reno and then during Two Moons and Yellow Nose’s drive up Last 
Stand Hill. In the first action, Reno’s men were already running by the time Crazy Horse bore 
down on them and no change in weaponry could have saved the fleeing troops from the 
tomahawks, warclubs, and lances of the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne. In the second action, the 
troopers gathered around Tom Custer on Last Stand Hill were the broken remnants of an already 
shattered battalion, surrounded and outnumbered by a confident and victorious enemy. Cavalry 
sabres might have let the soldiers last a little longer in the close-in fighting at the end, and 
perhaps would have let Tom Custer take Yellow Nose with him, but they would hardly have 
changed the outcome. Tom’s men were never going to withstand a determined charge by the 
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force accompanying Yellow Nose and Two Moons, and even if they somehow repelled that first 
assault they would have been gunned down by Gall and Crow King’s riflemen minutes later. 
The final charge historians have usually made against Custer is that by dividing his 
regiment into three separate battalions he made it easier for the Lakota and Cheyenne to defeat 
him in detail. And there is certainly some truth to these suggestions. Custer and Reno essentially 
fought separate battles, failing to support one another as the 7th Cavalry fell apart piecemeal. 
Benteen was even less of a factor in the primary engagement at the Little Bighorn, arriving only 
after Reno’s repulse and contributing nothing to Custer’s end of the battle. In Crazy Horse and 
Custer, Stephen Ambrose was adamant it was the splitting of his forces that got Custer killed, 
stating that had it been six hundred against 3000, the superior discipline of the American troopers 
would have seen off the Lakota, but that with 3000 against the two hundred odd of Custer’s 
battalion, victory became impossible.405 Ambrose was hardly alone in taking this position and 
many historians have echoed him over the years. Yet when examined closely, this claim hardly 
merits the consideration it has been given. Had Custer kept his men together, the odds against 
him would still have been, by Ambrose’s own reckoning, five to one.406 American soldiers faced 
similar odds on the plains and emerged triumphant, but always when fighting from defensive 
positions their Indigenous adversaries could not take by assault. Looking back over the history of 
the Plains wars, it is impossible to find a scenario in which an American cavalry force attacked a 
warband five times their own size and won. Custer himself routed forces of white soldiers 
significantly larger than his own during the American Civil War, most notably at Gettysburg, 
when his regiment shattered a Confederate brigade during an inspired counterattack.407 The key 
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word there, however, is counterattack. During that engagement, the Confederates were on the 
offensive and Custer lured them on, drawing them back until their lines thinned out and he could 
break them in two with a countercharge.408 Knowing when to charge was always Custer’s strong 
suit, and there is no better demonstration of that than in the encounter at Gettysburg. 
At the Little Bighorn, however, there was no appropriate time to charge. Key leaders 
within the hostile camp were aware of Custer’s presence and had readied some of their warriors 
for a defensive action. By the time Custer and Reno hit the encampment, Cheyenne scouts had 
already told Crow King and his confederates not only that Custer was attacking, but what his 
dispositions were.409 Keeping his troopers together would not have changed these facts. Little 
Wolf’s Cheyenne would still have been watching Custer the day before the battle. Lakota or 
Cheyenne outriders would still have gone running into the camp to tell Crow King or Gall or 
Crazy Horse or Lame White Man or any of the other notable war-leaders of the Plains that 
Custer was attacking and where he was coming from. Those same famous fighters and war-
chiefs would have rallied their people against Custer’s coming and, unlike in real life, would not 
have had to divide their own forces to confront attacks at both ends of the camp. Instead of Gall 
and Crow King holding the line against Custer while Crazy Horse chased out Reno and Lame 
White Man and Two Moons pulled the Cheyenne together, the hostiles would have been able to 
concentrate all their warriors against Custer’s single thrust—and it seems unlikely that, under 
those circumstances, the 7th Cavalry would have gotten very far into the camp. Granted, the 
greater firepower available to Custer under such conditions might have let him shoot his way out 
of the Lakota camp, retreating to fight another day, but surviving is hardly the same as winning. 
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When Oglala Lakota warrior He Dog was asked if Custer and Reno could have won by staying 
together, “he replied that there were too many Sioux there. They could not have succeeded no 
matter what they did.”410 It does not seem there was a way for Custer to emerge the victor at the 
Little Bighorn. Badly outnumbered, the best Custer could have hoped for was to get away safely. 
There was no choice he could have made once the battle was joined that would have seen him 
drive the hostiles from their camp. In choosing to fight at all, Custer lost. 
Nelson Miles, who finished the Great Sioux War on behalf of the government, and who 
one day rose to become Commanding General, United States Army, examined the Little Bighorn 
battlefield after the war, and came to the conclusion that Custer had done everything he could 
reasonably have been expected to do to save his command. In his two memoirs, Personal 
Recollections of General Nelson A. Miles, and Serving the Republic, Miles defended Custer’s 
decisions and pushed back against what he saw as smears against his dead colleague. A close 
friend of Custer’s, Miles was hardly an impartial witness, but he was also one of the best military 
minds to come out of the American Civil War and as will later be shown, an extremely 
competent frontier officer. In both his memoirs, Miles was harshly critical of Sherman and 
Sheridan for implementing a strategy that relied on sending divided, inferior forces into the field 
against an enemy whose true strength was unknown. “The government authorities greatly 
underestimated the strength of the hostile Indians,” Miles wrote.411 “They had little knowledge of 
the character of the country, and sent weak exterior columns, five hundred miles apart, into the 
field without concert of action against a superior body.”412  
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Confronting those who accused Custer of disobeying Terry’s orders, Miles contended 
Terry “placed at least fifty miles of rough country and an impassable river between the two 
columns, necessitating the granting of discretionary authority to the commander of the column 
thus isolated and moving into a country known to be occupied by a powerful body of Indians.”413 
Reproducing Terry’s orders, Miles emphasized Custer “was expected to pursue the Indians and 
to come in contact with them,” (italics in original) and that Terry’s claims after the fact that he 
had not ordered Custer to fight the hostiles were ludicrous.414 Quoting Sherman, Miles added, 
“Up to the moment of Custer’s defeat there was nothing, official or private, to justify an officer 
to expect that any detachment would encounter more than five hundred or eight hundred 
warriors.”415 John Gibbon concurred with Miles, who quoted him as saying, “‘When these 
various bands succeeded in finding a leader who possessed tact, courage, and ability to 
concentrate and keep together so large a force, it was only a question of time when one or the 
other of the exterior columns would meet with a check from the overwhelming numbers of the 
interior body.’”416 
Miles also blamed Reno and Benteen for not reinforcing Custer.417 Reno in particular 
deserves no accolades for his performance at the Little Bighorn; whether intoxicated, as often 
alleged, or simply out of his depth, he failed to provide his men with any real leadership and 
made the breaking of his battalion all the easier for Gall, Crazy Horse, and Two Moons. Yet as 
Miles and Gibbon both alluded too, the real problem was on the other side. Robert Utley, one of 
the great Western historians, once commented “the army lost largely because the Indians won. 
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To ascribe defeat entirely to military failings is to devalue Indian strength and leadership. The 
Sioux and Cheyennes were strong, confident, united, well led, well-armed, outraged by the 
government’s war aims, and ready to fight if pressed. Rarely had the army encountered such a 
mighty combination in an Indian adversary. Perhaps no strategy or tactics could have prevailed 
against Sitting Bull’s power.”418 Stephen Ambrose, despite his belief Custer could have and 
should have come out the winner, also acknowledged the important role of Native American 
leadership and particularly that of Crazy Horse, in the outcome, stating: “Custer was not only 
outnumbered, he was also outgeneraled.”419  
Both Utley and Ambrose (and Gibbon and Miles) were right in this regard. At the Little 
Bighorn, Custer was confronting not a lone warband led by a single well-known chief or warrior, 
but the best and the brightest military minds of all the free Lakota and Cheyenne bands. One 
week before, at the Rosebud, Crazy Horse attempted to wage a battle of annihilation against 
Crook, splintering his force and trying to encircle and swallow up the individual shards. He 
failed there due to possessing insufficient men to pull it off. At the Little Bighorn, facing a 
smaller American force and with not only more warriors at his own disposal, but with allies like 
Gall, Crow King, Lame White Man, Two Moons, and Yellow Nose to rely on, he got it right, and 
devoured Custer’s command in a short and bloody engagement that stamped both their names 
into American history. Sent out to fight an enemy his superiors knew nothing about, separated 
from anyone who could have helped him, and opposed by competent and numerous foes, Custer 
died not because of his own incompetency, but because under the circumstances he found 
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Following the skirmish at Sihayo’s, Lord Chelmsford’s column had little contact with the 
Zulu. With his advance obstructed by terrible road conditions, the Lieutenant-General was forced 
to halt for several days while his logistical train was brought up, parties of soldiers were detailed 
to clear the roads, and an extended reconnaissance of the nearby terrain was carried out. The War 
Office’s Narrative summarized these five days of immobility as follows: “From the 14th to the 
19th January the two portions of the column remained in the same positions, and during this time 
wagons and stores continued to be brought up from Helpmakaar and ferried across the Buffalo, 
and bad places in the road were rendered passable by strong working parties.”420 Realizing the 
use of the word “road” might confuse some readers about the infrastructure in place, the 
Narrative noted, “It must be observed that though footpaths and cattle tracks led through 
Zululand roads did not exist. The only wheeled transport which had previously traversed this 
region was the wagon of an occasional trader or sportsman, and the old grass-covered ruts which 
these had left were the sole guides in selecting the route for a line of advance.”421  
This was the countryside Sir Bartle Frere, Lord Chelmsford, and Sir Theophilus 
Shepstone conspired to invade, and it proved itself nearly as great an impediment to their plans 
as the Zulu army. Chelmsford’s plans called for his columns to move quickly, or at least as 
quickly as was possible for forces comprised mainly of infantry, in order to prevent the Zulu 
from fleeing beyond his reach as the Xhosa had for the better part of a year. Yet at every turn the 
lack of proper roads and the insufficiency of transport blocked him. That he chose to undertake 
his conquest of Zululand in the midst of the rainy season was also a part of the problem, as Nell 
Colenso, expressed in her book on the war. “We must hold,” she quipped, “that no ‘competent 
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military critic’ would recommend invading an enemy’s country during the rainy season, when 
rivers are in flood, plains are in many cases marshes, and roads almost impassable; especially if 
the invading force were required to move with a ponderous waggon-train.”422 Sir Bartle Frere 
and Lord Chelmsford tried to defend the timing of their invasion, but  Colenso had none of it, 
reprinting excerpts from several of Chelmsford’s own letters on the subject of transport and 
terrain, in which the Lieutenant-General himself disclosed his worries about the weather, 
including the one from January 12 in which he confessed to having no idea how they would get 
across the river near Sihayo’s homestead.423 Drawing on another letter from Chelmsford, this one 
written on January 14, Colenso laid out in detail how the rains ruined the general’s hopes of a 
speedy advance. “Between this camp and Greytown alone, a distance of some seventy miles, 
three rivers are now impassable, and waggons have to cross by ferries, a laborious operation 
requiring more skilled labour than we at present have available.”424 What roads there were, 
Chelmsford complained, were washed out and “in some parts the heavy rain frequently dislodges 
huge boulders from the hill-sides overhanging the roadway, and in many places water-courses 
become torrents after an hour’s rain.”425 Add a higher than expected mortality rate among the 
column’s oxen, which Lord Chelmsford admitted to and Nell Colenso preserved for posterity, 
and any chance of moving rapidly became impossible.426 
On January 17, Lord Chelmsford rode with his scouts as far as Isandlwana hill, where he 
determined there was firewood available for a campsite.427 On January 20, with his wagon trains 
more or less caught up to him and with the roads, such as they were, clear enough to travel on, he 
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and the Centre Column set out for Isandlwana, which he intended to use as their main base camp 
in the region.428 Chelmsford’s reasons for choosing the Isandlwana campsite were for the sake of 
convenience rather than defense. With wood on site, his men would be able to construct 
campfires without being entirely dependent upon the wagons for fuel.429 Given that the roads 
were still so boggy a third of the wagon train fell behind on the march and could not catch up for 
the better part of a day, Chelmsford’s concerns on this front were understandable.430 The need 
for firewood, however, should not have overcome the need for encampments to be made in 
defensible positions, and the Isandlwana campsite was, as events soon showed, not very 
defensible at all. The War Office’s Narrative described the land before Isandlwana as “an open 
plain extended to a distance of some 8 miles. This plain, which is much intersected by waterways 
is about 4 miles wide, and is bounded on the south by the ’Ndhlazagazi range, and on the north 
by rolling hills of no great height connected with the ’Ngutu range, which lies a few miles 
behind. Thus, while the view from the camp towards the front was extensive, it was limited on 
either side by the crests of these two nearly parallel ranges of hills between which the plain 
lies.”431 Archibald Forbes, war correspondent for The Daily News and one of Lord Chelmsford’s 
harshest critics, went further than this, calling Isandlwana the perfect place for an ambush. “Had 
the world been searched,” he said, “for a position offering the greatest facility for being 
surprised, none could have been well found to surpass it. The position seems to offer a premium 
on disaster, and asks to be attacked. In the rear laagered wagons would have discounted its 
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defects; but the camp was more defenceless than an English village. Systematic scouting could 
alone have justified such a position, and this too clearly cannot have been carried out.”432 
The possibility of being ambushed by the Zulu does not seem to have occurred to Lord 
Chelmsford. It has not occurred to many historians of the war either, with the historiography on 
Isandlwana divided between those like Ian Knight, who believe that the Zulu attack was purely 
opportunistic, and those like Ron Lock, who believe the Zulu deliberately set in motion a plan to 
render the camp vulnerable and then assault it.433 Of the two, Lock’s position seems the more 
defensible. There was a great deal of clandestine Zulu activity around Isandlwana in the days 
before January 22nd, so much so that to write it all off as coincidence seems more a product of 
colonialist thinking on Zulu strategic sophistication than a reasonable conjecture. Moreover, the 
claim that it was not an ambush heavily rests on the testimony of several Zulu foot soldiers and 
junior officers who stated they would never have attacked on January 22nd because an eclipse 
was scheduled to take place that day, and this would have brought them terrible luck.434 Knight 
and others assume this superstition was as common among the Zulu high command as among the 
rank and file; if it was, someone apparently forgot to tell Chief Godide, who struck Pearson’s 
marching column at the Nyezane on the same day Chief Ntshingwayo made his move at 
Isandlwana. Testimony from a number of other Zulu sources runs directly counter to the 
“eclipse” theory, putting forth tactical and strategic reasons for why they did not originally 
intend to attack on the 22, or, stating they always intended to attack on the 22.435  
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Where modern historians have failed to reconcile conflicting Zulu testimonials and 
actions, Nell Colenso experienced no difficulty. Her assumption, based on both the evidence and 
her family’s extensive contacts with King Cetshwayo, was that “In all probability they left the 
king with such orders—that is to say, to make terms if possible, but to fight if forced to it, and if 
the English intentions were plainly hostile.”436 Chelmsford’s behaviour in the days immediately 
prior to Isandlwana,  Colenso posited, would have been more than enough to confirm his ‘hostile 
intentions’ to both the local Zulu chiefs and Ntshingwayo, and they and the commanding general 
would have laid their plans accordingly437. Mehlokazulu kaSihayo, whose execution of his 
father’s adulterous wives provided Bartle Frere and Chelmsford with an excuse for starting the 
war, concurred with  Colenso. A junior officer in the Zulu Army, Mehlokazulu’s status as both 
the son of an important aristocrat and a pageboy to the King gave him greater access to the Zulu 
high command than was enjoyed by most of his rank. In a postwar interview, Mehlokazulu said, 
“he was sent with three other indunas (mounted) to see what the English were doing. On 
reporting to [Ntshingwayo], he said, ‘All right, we will see what they are going to do.’” Soon 
after, Mehlokazulu added, “I heard [Ntshingwayo] give orders for the Tulwana [sic] and Ngyaza 
[sic] regiments to assemble. When they had done so, he gave orders for the others to assemble 
and advance in the direction of the English camp.”438 Mehlokazulu’s story, which was 
corroborated in whole or in part by several other Zulu officers, does not suggest an army or a 
general that were anything other than ready for combat on January 22.439 Rather they suggest, as 
Colenso and advocates of the ambush theory do, that Ntshingwayo positioned himself to attack 
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the British at the first possible opportunity, and was waiting not for a favourable moon or any 
other omen, but for Chelmsford to make a foolish move he could exploit to his advantage.  
In his General Orders for the campaign, Chelmsford instructed his subordinates to laager 
whenever they entered camp. However, once the war was underway, the Lieutenant-General 
ignored his own advice and that of Colonel Richard Glyn and several of his Boer auxiliaries, 
who tried to tell him he would need to laager to be defended against Zulu strikes.440 During his 
first week in Zululand Chelmsford laagered none of his camps, and took no other precautions to 
prevent ambush; as the War Office Narrative reports, “Nothing of the nature of an entrenchment 
was formed for the defence of the camp, which was guarded by a chain of vedettes from 2 to 3 
miles distant, and by an infantry outpost line closer in.”441 When Glyn argued a laager should at 
least be erected at Isandlwana, which was meant to be an important base of operations, 
Chelmsford overruled Glyn, saying “It would take a week to make,” and he did not intend to 
refrain from taking the offense for that long.442 After Isandlwana, Chelmsford, Bartle Frere, and 
their defenders in the British Parliament turned to the General Order to laager as evidence 
Chelmsford told the men how best to protect the campsite, but the officers left behind disobeyed 
his instructions. Nell Colenso found the suggestion that Chelmsford’s subordinates should have 
been expected to make defensive preparations he himself refused to ridiculous, as did many of 
Chelmsford’s Parliamentary critics. “He says,”  Colenso snarled, “‘Had the force in question but 
taken up a defensive position in the camp itself, and utilised there the materials for a hasty 
entrenchment;’ but he does not point out how the ‘force in question’ was to know of the near 
approach of the Zulu army, he himself having neglected to search the country where that army 
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lay. He had prepared no ‘defensive positions;’ but he had selected a fatal spot for his camp, 
which, covering a front of about half a mile, was utterly indefensible as it stood; and he had 
‘pooh-poohed’ the suggestion of taking defensive precautions when made by Colonel Glyn.”443  
Lord Chelmsford subsequently disputed Colenso’s depiction of his defensive 
preparations, but his own writings tell against him. Secure in his notions of racial and cultural 
superiority over those he was up against, the English nobleman still viewed his Zululand 
campaign as little more than a matter of marching. In a letter to Evelyn Wood, written on 
January 16, Chelmsford amply demonstrated his reserves of self-confidence when he blithely 
assured his subordinate and confidante he would be moving to Isandlwana and would shortly 
thereafter obtain “the submission of the chiefs and Headmen residing in that District. Having 
settled that part I shall move onto ground between the Isepezi and Umhlabmkosi but nearest to 
the latter were there is wood—If you are then at Ingwee we might have another meeting 
somewhere between our two camps and again talk over the situation. The effect of two forces 
meeting has, I am sure, a good moral effect.”444 There is no hint in this letter, or in any of his 
other writings from the same period, that the Zulu might actually take the offensive against him. 
When presented with the possibility by one of the Natal government’s border agents, Chelmsford 
dismissed the notion. “I do not believe Mr Fannin’s report about a large force in the Inkandla 
bush,” he wrote to Sir Bartle Frere on January 21st. “Mr Fannin like a good many other Natal 
officials is an alarmist, and, not being able to appreciate what an enemy can do and what he 
cannot do, sees danger where there really is none.”445 With his belief that Africans would only 
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ever run from white men firmly fixed in his head, Chelmsford was entirely unwilling to even 
consider the possibility that the Zulu might try to attack his column. Any suggestion he might 
want to see to his defenses, whether made by Boer colonists, experienced Natal border agents, or 
professional soldiers like Richard Glyn, was treated with aristocratic disdain.  
When the Zulu attack came on January 22nd, Lord Chelmsford was not even in the camp 
to meet it. On the night of January 20th, Chelmsford began to receive reports of Zulu movement 
southeast of the camp, near the hilltop stronghold of the local Zulu baron, Matshana. The 
Mounted Volunteers, elements of the Border Police under Major Dartnell, and two battalions of 
the NNC under Commandant Lonsdale, were sent out into the hills to search for Matshana’s 
agents, and, upon locating them, to determine what they were up to.446 Dartnell and Lonsdale 
encountered stiff resistance on the 21, and halted their advance, with Dartnell sending 
messengers to Lord Chelmsford to ask for reinforcements. Chelmsford initially declined to give 
him any, but changed his mind when, late on 21, another message from Dartnell arrived saying 
the number of Zulu he could see from his bivouac was so large “he and Commandant Lonsdale 
did not consider the force at their disposal sufficient to attack, and [requested] that a 
reinforcement of two or three companies of the 24th might be sent out to them next morning.”447 
Instead of acceding to Dartnell’s request as written, Chelmsford, seeing a chance to ambush and 
destroy a significant Zulu force, decided not only to go to Dartnell himself, but to take more than 
half the army with him. Early in the morning of January 22, even as Pearson, miles away, was 
having his first battle with Godide at the Nyezane, Chelmsford took four artillery pieces, six 
companies of the 2/24th, and the whole of the Mounted Infantry and Native Pioneers with him 
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into the hills.448 To hold the camp he left five companies of the 1/24th, one company of the 2/24th, 
four companies of the NNC, and a few Mounted Volunteers, under the auspices of Lieutenant-
Colonel Henry Pulleine, commanding officer of the 1/24th. He also sent orders to Brevet Colonel 
Anthony Durnford at Rorke’s Drift, to “advance at once to Isandhlwana [sic] with all his 
mounted men and the rocket battery, and as senior officer to take command of the camp.”449  
Lord Chelmsford’s advance into the hills accomplished nothing beyond leaving the camp 
at Isandlwana even more vulnerable. Ron Lock and the other historians who view Isandlwana as 
a preplanned ambush, take the stance that Matshana had been asked by Ntshingwayo to stage a 
demonstration in the hill country with the intent of drawing out part of Chelmsford’s Centre 
Column, and enabling the attack on Isandlwana by Ntshingwayo’s army to proceed.450 Over the 
past several days, Ntshingwayo’s command, consisting of nearly 20 000 Zulu warriors, filtered 
into the region around Isandlwana in small detachments and patrols. Zibhehbu kaMaphitha, who 
had charge of Ntshingwayo’s reconnaissance, mapped out the British zones of patrol, and the 
Zulu moved between them, taking refuge in a valley only a few miles from Isandlwana451 So 
stealthily had they approached, none of Chelmsford’s scouts noticed their arrival; all reports to 
the Lieutenant-General indicated the only bodies of Zulu present in the area were to the southeast 
of him, in Matshana’s territory. Either Matshana just happened to be moving his own troops at 
the same time Ntshingwayo was positioning himself for a thrust against the Centre Column, or 
the proponents of the ambush theory are correct and the two chiefs had worked out a strategy 
meant to deceive Lord Chelmsford into dividing his army, making it all the easier to crush him. 
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Matshana’s behaviour lends credence to the second theory, for when Chelmsford reached 
Dartnell, the Zulu baron’s men neither fled nor stood their ground, but instead made a fighting 
retreat that drew Chelmsford ever further into the hill country.452 Zulu warriors would take a 
position and make as if to hold it, then retreat before Chelmsford, presenting the British general 
with the very thing he feared to encounter in Zululand: an enemy who, like the Xhosa, would not 
stand and fight.453 Nell Colenso, for one, fully believed Lord Chelmsford had fallen victim to a 
Zulu deception, writing that “The only person deceived by a ‘simulated retreat’ was Lord 
Chelmsford himself, whose troops during three hours had advanced ‘against a Zulu force that 
fell back from hill to hill…giving up without a shot most commanding positions.’”454 Her stance 
was supported by the evidence of Uguku, a Zulu officer who said Matshana was explicitly acting 
on Ntshingwayo’s orders, and the decision to mobilise for battle that day was made when they 
“heard the firing of the English advance guard who had engaged Matshana’s men.”455 
Chelmsford’s own descriptions of the skirmishing in the hills, while disputing Colenso’s 
characterisation, and insisting he beat Matshana, largely agree with her on the facts of the 
case.456  Matshana, it appears, made himself into a lure Chelmsford could not resist taking hold 
of, tricking the British commander into abandoning half his column in an indefensible campsite 
and setting him up for the body blow Ntshingwayo was about to deal to his plans.  
Horace Smith-Dorrien, a lieutenant with the Quartermaster’s Corps, was the officer sent 
to inform Colonel Durnford of his new orders. One of the very few officers who survived the 
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clash at Isandlwana, Smith-Dorrien went on to have a storied career in the British Army, rising to 
the rank of full General, and was still in service when World War I broke out in 1914. In his 
memoirs, Smith-Dorrien recalled the youthful energy with which he carried Chelmsford’s 
message to Durnford, writing: “It ought to have been a very jumpy ride, for I was entirely alone 
and the country was wild and new to me, and the road little better than a track; but pride at being 
selected to carry an important dispatch and the valour of ignorance (for I only realised next day 
that the country was infested with hostile Zulus) carried me along without a thought of 
danger.”457 He found Durnford just as the Colonel was “moving off with his levies towards 
Sandspruit (away from Isandhlwana [sic]), but on reading the dispatch, which conveyed 
directions to move up to reinforce the Isandhlwana [sic] camp (as Lord Chelmsford, with the 
main body of the force, leaving the camp standing, was moving out some miles to the east to 
attack the Zulu army), he at once changed the direction of his march.”458 Historians have often 
speculated on what went through Durnford’s mind when he received his new orders from 
Chelmsford. Everything from the belief this was his chance to gain some military glory to a 
weary annoyance at yet another change in instructions has been suggested, but there is little 
concrete evidence to support any of the possible interpretations. However, given Durnford’s 
manifest sympathies for the Zulu people and his belief that the war was being undertaken for all 
the wrong reasons, it must be said that those who see him as being out to salvage his reputation 
through battle honours do not have much of a leg to stand upon. Besides, it is only with the 
benefit of hindsight that we know Durnford was going to see combat that day. All Chelmsford’s 
despatch asked of Durnford was that he come to the camp and take control of it while 
Chelmsford fought the actual battle in the hills to the southeast. Together with the African 
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auxiliaries of his Natal Native Horse, Durnford rode out for Isandlwana, telling his wagons and 
NNC battalions to catch up with him when they could. 
The distances and the terrain being what they were, Anthony Durnford did not reach the 
Isandlwana camp until sometime between 10:00 and 11:00 that morning.459 By the time he got 
there and assumed command, the Battle of Isandlwana had already been lost, though as of yet, 
not a single British officer was even aware it had begun. Since eight o’clock that morning, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine had been receiving scattered reports from his cavalry outriders and 
infantry pickets of increased Zulu activity in the area. The first message came in at 8:00 sharp, 
when “a report was sent in by a few mounted men posted some 2,000 yards to the north, that a 
body of the enemy was in sight approaching from the northeast.”460 Pulleine dutifully sent a 
despatch to Lord Chelmsford to apprise him of this information and drew up a body of troops in 
skirmish line in front of the camp in the direction from which the enemy were reported to be 
coming. He did not, however, send out more scouts, or ask for reinforcements from 
Chelmsford—Pulleine appears to have feared, not unjustifiably, that any request for help would 
cause Chelmsford to label him an “alarmist” like the unfortunate border agent Mr. Fannin. The 
next contact with the Zulu came at nine o’clock, “when a small number were seen on the crests 
of the hills, apparently coming from the direction reported. These withdrew almost immediately, 
and about the same time the party on the heights sent in word that the enemy were in three 
columns of which two were retiring, and that the third had passed out of sight, moving in a north-
westerly direction.”461 Pulleine had no idea what he was seeing and would not figure it out for 
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some hours to come. When Durnford rode into camp and asked for an update on the situation, all 
Pulleine could tell him was they had numerous sightings of the Zulu, but no serious contacts.462 
What took place around  the Isandlwana encampment was as follows: early that morning, 
some of Pulleine’s scouts had stumbled onto the valley where Chief Ntshingwayo was holed up 
with his army. They had seen only a part of the Zulu force before retreating; in doing so, they 
had also been seen by the Zulu, and leading elements of several of the younger regiments surged 
up out of the valley, intending to catch the British spies before they could report back to 
Pulleine.463 Ntshingwayo and his senior officers moved to swiftly reimpose discipline on the 
unruly young men, and as their orders made their way down the ranks to the junior officers, the 
regiments were screamed back into order. His original order of battle shot, Ntshingwayo did not 
try to return to it and adapted his plans, reorganising his army so that while the regiments he had 
intended for his right were now in his centre, his centre on his left, and his left on the right, they 
were again set up in the classic “horns of the buffalo” formation the British would shortly learn 
to hate.464 With his soldiers now ready to execute a pincer attack, Ntshingwayo gave the 
command to advance, and was already in the process of surrounding Isandlwana. What 
Pulleine’s vedettes had seen and failed to comprehend was Ntshingwayo’s reorganising of his 
army, and the subsequent movements as the Zulu warriors fanned out over the plain, encircling 
Isandlwana mountain and the British camp at its base. Not a shot had been fired and not a man 
was yet dead, but Durnford and Pulleine were already losing the Battle of Isandlwana. Chief 
Ntshingwayo’s trap might have been sprung earlier than he intended it to be, yet it was still all 
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going according to plan, and it would be at least another hour before either of the British officers 
worked out that they were in the Zulu net at all. 
With Henry Pulleine having failed to make sense of the Zulu movements his vedettes had 
witnessed, it was left to Anthony Durnford to interpret the reports he was being given, and it is 
only justice to Durnford to remember he had seen none of the Zulu activity himself. All the 
information Durnford had and upon which he based his subsequent movements came to him by 
way of Pulleine; any missing details are therefore on Pulleine, rather than Durnford’s, head. For 
all the flak Durnford has absorbed, both from Chelmsford and his acolytes, and from modern 
historians, his only real error was trusting Pulleine had done a thorough job of intelligence 
gathering, and that the data he was being handed was substantially accurate. Deciding, as 
Pulleine had apparently not, that something was afoot, Durnford sent one of his troops of Natal 
Native Horse back to his column with orders to protect the ammunition wagons and to bring 
them up as quickly as they could.465 Another two troops were dispatched “to the heights on the 
left flank to reconnoitre, while he himself advanced into the plain in front with the remaining two 
troops of mounted natives, the rocket battery, and one company of the 1/1st Natal Native 
Contingent.”466 Durnford also asked Pulleine if he could spare two more companies of British 
troops to accompany him on his reconnaissance mission, but Pulleine demurred, saying it would 
violate his instructions from Chelmsford to protect the camp and only the camp. Horace Smith-
Dorrien, who viewed this meeting from a distance, thought it an acrimonious one, but Lieutenant 
Cochrane, who was actually in the tent, believed it was anything but, and described Durnford and 
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Pulleine as parting on amicable terms.467 With a total of about one hundred men, Durnford, in the 
words of the War Office Narrative “left the  camp about 11 a.m., and advanced along the plain in 
front with the object of preventing the columns of the enemy, reported as in retreat, from joining 
the force with which Lord Chelmsford was at the time believed to be engaged.”468 
Knight and Locke have both decried Durnford for splitting the forces available to defend 
the camp, but such accusations are made entirely with the benefit of hindsight—and with scant 
appreciation, it seems, for the minimal difference the two hundred fifty or so men of the NNH 
would have made against the 20 000 Zulu who were on their way. Pulleine told Durnford his 
men had spotted, at most, six hundred to eight hundred Zulu, moving away from the camp, in the 
direction of Lord Chelmsford’s expeditionary force. Under these circumstances it was entirely 
natural for Durnford to presume, as the War Office Narrative understood, that the Zulu were 
endeavouring to trap Lord Chelmsford, rather than Pulleine or himself.469 Durnford did not 
abandon the camp in some sort of mad dash for glory, intent on hurling his meagre body of men 
against thousands of Zulu, but in the belief that a few hundred Zulu warriors were trying to take 
Lord Chelmsford’s force in the back and needed to be delayed while Lord Chelmsford was 
warned. Had Pulleine’s reports been correct, Durnford’s ad hoc force might well have been 
enough to prevent Chelmsford from being flanked. His cavalry could have harassed the Zulu or 
moved past them to establish contact with Chelmsford, while his rocket battery had the potential 
to inflict serious casualties on an army of less than a thousand Zulu. In the event he ran into 
greater difficulties, he could fall back to one of the surrounding hills, and have the NNC 
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company, preferably reinforced by the two British companies he had asked Pulleine to lend him, 
hold off any charges by small Zulu units. Durnford was not an irrational man, making 
incomprehensible decisions. He was a competent, professional soldier taking appropriate 
measures to meet the enemy he expected to face. The failure of intelligence was not on 
Durnford’s part, but on Pulleine’s, and on Lord Chelmsford, whose misguided orders Pulleine 
insisted on adhering so closely to. 
In a set of orders written about border raiding during the Xhosa Wars, Lord Chelmsford 
stated that a force that remains “on the passive defensive, without endeavouring by means of 
scouting in small bodies or by raiding in large ones, to discover what the enemy is doing in its 
immediate front, it deserves to be surprised and overpowered.”470 During the early hours of the 
Isandlwana it was Durnford, not Pulleine, who was adhering to that maxim. Of course, Pulleine’s 
reluctance to scout or to take the danger from the Zulu seriously should not be overly surprising, 
given Lord Chelmsford’s manifest refusal to obey his own suggestions and do those same things. 
Chelmsford first became aware of the Zulu presence near his camp at 9:30 that morning, when 
the rider Pulleine sent to him reached his bivouac in the hills. Pulleine’s note was short and to the 
point: “Staff Officer—Report just came in that the Zulus are advancing in force from left front of 
the camp.”471 Chelmsford sent Lieutenant Milne of the Royal Navy up a nearby hill with a 
spyglass, but Milne, in the words of Chelmsford’s Assistant Military Secretary (and de facto 
chief of staff), Lieutenant-Colonel John North Crealock, said only that “the cattle had been 
driven into camp.”472 Milne later realised his error, saying that “it is just possible that what I took 
to be the cattle having been driven into camp may possibly have been the Zulu ‘impi’.”473 
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Crealock and Chelmsford did not question Milne’s initial misreading of the scene, however, and 
decided Pulleine must be seeing things. As Crealock later said, “our own attention was chiefly 
bent on the enemy’s force retiring from the hills in our own front”; the sight of fleeing Africans 
was apparently so enticing to Chelmsford and his staff they could not tear their eyes from it, even 
to consider their own camp might be in danger.474 Chief Matshana was showing the British 
officers what they wanted to see, and they were still being taken in by it. 
Concerned Pulleine was being “alarmist,” Chelmsford and Crealock decided the 
Lieutenant-Colonel and his men should be brought up to join their column as soon as possible. 
The Irish mercenary, Commandant George Hamilton-Browne, and his battalion of the NNC were 
ordered by Crealock to “return at once to camp and assist Colonel Pulleine to strike camp and 
come on here.” (Italics in original) Hamilton-Browne, who had had misgivings about the 
expedition into the hills from the beginning, was horrified. “I nearly fell off my horse,” he 
remembered. “Could these men know of the proximity of the enemy? Were we all mad or what? 
However I was only a poor devil of a Colonial commandant and as a simple irregular not 
supposed to criticize full blown staff officers, so I saluted and said, ‘If I come across the 
enemy?’” If the soldier-of-fortune hoped for a reassuring answer from Chelmsford’s AMS, he 
did not get it. “‘Oh,’ said he, ‘just brush them off and go on,’ and with that he went back to his 
breakfast.” Hamilton-Browne, realising the futility of arguing with Crealock, got his battalion 
together and marched for Isandlwana, in spite of his bad feeling about what he might find. Early 
in his progression, he captured a Zulu scout, who told him Cetshwayo’s army was on their way 
to Isandlwana, news that made the hardened soldier-for-hire all but panic. He sent a message to 
Chelmsford, saying, “I have just captured a Zulu scout who informs me the Zulu army is behind 
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the range of hills on the left flank of the camp. Will push on as fast as possible. The ground here 
is good for the rapid advance of men and guns.” Chelmsford said he never got Hamilton-
Browne’s message, or any of the other messages the Commandant sent to him over the next 
several hours. Hamilton-Browne strongly suspected this was John Crealock’s work; given 
Crealock’s antipathy towards Hamilton-Browne and his expressed opinion that a single battalion 
ought to be more than enough to brush the Zulu off, this cannot be said to be out of character.475 
Widely hated by the men under Chelmsford’s command, Crealock apparently thought it was his 
job to keep Chelmsford from being ‘bothered’ by news that went against the Lieutenant-
General’s expectations, an attitude that made him an object of loathing among the other officers 
of the command. Normally obnoxious, Crealock’s dedication to protecting his position as 
Chelmsford’s main source of information may have led to casualties at Isandlwana. 
Aided by Crealock, Lord Chelmsford’s ignorance of what was happening in his camp 
remained unchallenged until later that afternoon. Henry Pulleine’s ignorance, on the other hand, 
finally fell apart around noon. Before Durnford left, he told Pulleine to have a company of the 
1/24th “move to the heights some 1,500 yards north of the camp.”476 Pulleine sent one company, 
under a Lieutenant Cavaye, then “the rest of the troops who had been drawn up returned to their 
private parades, and were broken off.” The relative peace that descended over the camp was 
broken, however, at noon, when firing was heard from the hill where Cavaye’s men were posted. 
Lieutenant Charles Raw’s unit of the Natal Native Horse, which Durnford sent to reconnoitre the 
left flank, had, after a ride of three or four miles, “seen the Zulu army, about a mile off 
advancing in line, and extending towards its left.” Captain George Shepstone (son of Theophilus 
Shepstone) and civilian volunteer Mister Hamer, who had accompanied Raw, hurried back to 
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camp to tell Pulleine, while “the troop of Basutos fell back before the enemy,” fighting as they 
went. Raw, one of the few officers to stand with Durnford at Bushman’s Pass in 1873, was not 
one to turn tail and run. Cavaye’s company saw this engagement and as the Zulu right horn 
moved into the valley it “came under the fire of Cavaye’s company, which was on the ridge 
overlooking this valley. The Zulus, however, did not turn aside to attack the company; but 
passing its front at a distance of about 800 yards streamed onwards in loose order to carry out 
their usual encircling movement.”477  
Pulleine immediately discarded all the expectations Lord Chelmsford had impressed on 
him and began taking action to defend the campsite. A second company of the 1/24th under 
Captain Mostyn and a company of the NNC were ordered to the heights to back up Cavaye and 
the NNH. Five minutes later, Pulleine realised the position on the heights could not be held and 
gave the command for all the troops located there to retreat to the camp; “This retreat was carried 
out in good order,” the War Office Narrative reported, “and a fresh line was formed facing the 
heights, and about 400 yards from them, the two companies of the 1/24th being supported by a 
third (Captain Younghusband’s) was drawn up in echelon on their left, and like them in extended 
order.” Units of the 1/1st and 2/1st NNC were ordered out as pickets along the left, until 
Pulleine’s available troops were stretched out before the camp in a long, thin skirmish line, ready 
to receive the Zulu.478 A square or another massed formation would have allowed Pulleine to 
deliver a greater weight of fire into the Zulu, but would have left the way into the camp open 
from the front. Besides, experience in the Xhosa War had taught Lord Chelmsford, and through 
him, Pulleine, that British troops in extended skirmish order, armed with Martini-Henry rifles 
were more than capable of fending off charges from Indigenous Africans. That the Xhosa were 
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bush fighters whose charge had nothing on that of Zululand’s shock infantry was a lesson no 
British officer—save Charles Pearson, who was too far away to warn the others—had learned 
yet, and the teaching of that lesson would be a vicious affair indeed.  
From his position, George Hamilton-Browne could see many of the things Pulleine could 
not—including just how many Zulu were now en route to Isandlwana. Contrary to many artistic 
depictions of the battle, the Zulu army was no stranger to firearms, and the host Ntshingwayo led 
to Isandlwana had as many as 6000 guns among them, though many of these were badly 
outdated or in poor repair; many would have been Napoleonic era muskets sold off from British 
stores over the decades that followed.479 Having loaded their weapons with an exotic variety of 
homemade ammunition, including broken metal legs from cooking pots, nails and roughly 
hammered lead bullets, Zulu marksmanship was not particularly accurate,  but it could still fill 
the air with a lot of projectiles. Hamilton-Browne relayed his first sight of Zulu musketry in his 
memoirs saying, “I saw a puff of smoke rise from the hills to the left of the camp. It was 
followed by another. They seemed to come from a huge black shadow that lay on the hills.” It 
took Hamilton-Browne a moment to recognise what he was looking at: the Zulu army, firing at, 
and being fired upon by Pulleine’s men. While Chelmsford had taken most of the artillery with 
him on his wild goose chase in the hills, Pulleine still had two guns with him positioned in front 
of his line, and these presently opened up on the Zulu. Hamilton-Browne, on seeing this, sent a 
second message back to Chelmsford. “The Zulu army is attacking the left of the camp,” he wrote 
hurriedly. “The guns have opened on them. The ground here still suitable for guns and mounted 
men. Will push on so as to act as support to them.” Hamilton-Browne’s NNC men, however, 
were not eager to come to grips with the Zulu, and it took all the mercenary’s considerable 
 




reserves of brutality, and, in his own words, “all the muscular persuasion of my officers and all 
the dauntless blackguardism of my non-coms to kick a crawl out of them.”480 
Hamilton-Browne was not the only one trying to get in touch with Chelmsford. The 
general, deciding the Commandant was taking too long to reach Pulleine, sent out one of his staff 
officers, Captain Alan Gardner to ride to Isandlwana and convey the order to Pulleine to come 
up. Gardner reached Pulleine just as Captain Shepstone came racing into the camp to tell the 
Lieutenant-Colonel they were under attack.481 Gardner decided to stay and help Pulleine defend 
the camp, and both he and Pulleine sent riders into the hills to notify Chelmsford “our left was 
attacked by about ten thousand of the enemy.”482 If either of these messages got through to 
Chelmsford there was no record of it. Hamilton-Browne, who was still pushing his much abused 
auxiliaries towards Isandlwana, sent a third message to Chelmsford that read, “the camp is being 
attacked on the left and in front, and as of yet is holding its own. Ground still good for the rapid 
advance of guns and horses. Am moving forward as fast as I can.” Minutes later the second 
messenger the Commandant sent for Chelmsford returned to the battalion, and told Hamilton-
Browne “he had delivered my note to a staff officer and had received orders for me to push onto 
camp.”483 If this story is accurate, the mercenary’s denunciations of Chelmsford’s staff as a pack 
of incompetents may not be far off the mark, for at least one of the Lieutenant-General’s aides 
was deliberately refusing to inform his superior of the calamity unfolding only a few miles away. 
Where Hamilton-Browne could only insinuate that he knew which staff officer it was, Nell 
Colenso—whose book Hamilton-Browne referred readers who wished to know more to—was 
unafraid to say it out loud. “One message only is mentioned by the General or his military 
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secretary as having been received from the camp. But an officer (of rank) who had seen them,” 
(italics in original) she swore, “says that five or six messages were received from the camp 
during the day by the General or his staff; and he says distinctly that the messages were in the 
possession of Lieut.-Colonel Crealock.”484 
Hamilton-Browne’s fourth and final message to Lord Chelmsford was sent just before the 
camp’s defenses failed completely. “For God’s sake come with all your men,” it read, “the camp 
is surrounded and will be taken unless helped.”485 This message was intercepted at 1:15 by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Harness of the Royal Artillery, who was sent by Chelmsford to find a new 
camp. Harness immediately decided to move towards Isandlwana with his guns, hoping to lend 
support to the camp, though not before sending one of his subordinates, Major Gosset back to 
Chelmsford with Hamilton-Browne’s message.486 In the meantime, a man described as “a 
native”—possibly one of Hamilton-Browne’s NNC men—reached Chelmsford, and told him 
how badly the battle was going for Durnford and Pulleine. Chelmsford mounted a nearby hill and 
looked at the camp through his spyglass but could see nothing amiss. He determined “this report 
and a similar one which had previously been received from another native source were alike 
unfounded.”487 It was not until Major Gosset arrived with his messages from Hamilton-Browne 
and Harness that Chelmsford realised something might actually be wrong and decided to head 
back to Isandlwana to see for himself.  
Even then, Chelmsford did not seem able to take the situation seriously. A rider was sent 
to Harness to tell him that his message had been received, but also to demand that he abandon his 
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effort to move to the rescue of the men at Isandlwana and rejoin Chelmsford’s column.488 
Hamilton-Browne and Nell Colenso both found this order baffling at the least, with Colenso 
noting that despite Harness’ testimony to having received such an order, there was no mention of 
it in any of Chelmsford’s correspondence; Hamilton-Browne implied, though he did not outright 
state it was Crealock who told Harness to come back and Chelmsford was covering for his 
Assistant Military Secretary.489 It was not until after 2:00 pm that Chelmsford actually got his 
column moving towards Isandlwana. Along the way he met Hamilton-Browne and the 1/3rd 
Natal Native Contingent, who were beating a fighting retreat from Isandlwana in the wake of the 
defenders’ collapse. Chelmsford was very surprised by this meeting, exclaiming “What are you 
doing here, Commandant Browne? You ought to have been in camp hours ago.” The 
Commandant tried to tell the General the camp had fallen, but Chelmsford could not believe it. 
“How dare you tell me such a falsehood,” he snapped at Hamilton-Browne, “Get your men into 
line at once and advance.”490 Chelmsford subsequently apologised to the NNC commander for 
his rudeness, accepting Hamilton-Browne believed what he was saying when he said the camp 
had been seized. Chelmsford himself still had doubts though, which were not fully assuaged until 
they reached Isandlwana itself. By that point all the men left to hold it had been dead for hours.  
From the start there was very little Anthony Durnford or Henry Pulleine could have done 
to alter the outcome of the battle. Between them, the two British leaders had sixty-seven officers 
and 1707 men, of whom only twenty-one officers and five hundred eighty-two men were British 
regulars.491 The rest were Natal Native Contingent, Natal Native Horse, and several companies 
of Border Police and Natal Carbineers who were left in the camp when Chelmsford marched out 
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on January 21. Such a force was never going to prevail against Chief Ntshingwayo’s 20 000 man 
host, especially in open battle, without any entrenchments or earthworks to hide behind. Worse 
yet, by the time Durnford and Pulleine recognised they were under attack, Ntshingwayo was 
already in the process of surrounding them. There was nothing either of them could do with the 
forces and resources available to stop the Zulu general from completing his encirclement. That 
meant that Durnford, Pulleine, and most of their men were, in essence, already dead at nine 
o’clock that morning. All that occurred in the hours afterwards was mere detail. 
Their brief conference in Pulleine’s tent was the first and last time he and Durnford 
would meet. While Pulleine tried to get the men in line to defend the centre of the camp, 
Durnford was fighting his own battle miles away on Pulleine’s right, against Ntshingwayo’s left 
horn. Durnford was five miles out from the camp with his two troops of Natal Native Horse 
when a patrol of Natal Carbineers on extended picket duty ran into him and informed him the 
Zulu were attacking Pulleine, rather than Chelmsford.492 Minutes later, the leading regiments of 
Ntshingwayo’s left pincer came in view and Durnford gave the order for the men to retire 
towards the camp. “This,” the War Office Narrative applauded, “was carried out steadily, fire 
being maintained by alternate troops,” as Durnford did what he could to slow the Zulu advance, 
and buy the men in camp time to defend themselves.493 Zulu veterans concurred with the War 
Office’s assessment, voicing their frustration at Durnford’s delaying tactics. His men would ride 
several hundred yards, dismount, fire their carbines into the oncoming Zulu, then remount and 
ride another few hundred yards, before repeating the procedure. In this way, Durnford bought the 
camp perhaps twenty minutes to a half an hour, time that would be insufficient to salvage the 
situation for the British, but proved crucial to the few men who survived the coming massacre. 
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Durnford could not stop the whole of the Zulu left by himself, though, and as his men 
retreated it slowly became clear to him just how outnumbered and surrounded they were. As 
Durnford’s cavalry troopers fell back in the direction of Isandlwana, they passed by the 
wreckage of the rocket battery that had followed after them. Zulu musketry had driven off the 
battery’s NNC escort and frightened away the mules who were supposed to tow it. “The Zulus 
now rushing in, a hand-to-hand fight ensued, in which Major Russell, R.A., who commanded the 
battery, 5 of the 8 men, and the mule drivers were killed.”494 Durnford repelled the Zulu 
attackers and saved the three surviving artillerymen who told him they had only been able to fire 
a single rocket towards some Zulu on a nearby ridgeline before the Zulu skirmishers he had just 
driven away appeared from a ravine only one hundred yards off.495 With the British defenses all 
but nonexistent and Durnford and Pulleine fighting separate battles, Ntshingwayo’s warriors had 
managed to infiltrate behind Durnford’s lines taking out the rocket battery, and pushing on 
towards Isandlwana. With the cavalry vedettes in disarray, Pulleine busy in the centre, and the 
Zulu in increasing control of the battlefield, Durnford and his small force of Natal Native Horse 
were the only thing standing between the left horn and the Isandlwana campsite. Retreating 
again, Durnford made “a determined stand at the watercourse in front of the camp, where they 
were supported by those of the mounted infantry and Volunteers who had remained behind when 
the column had marched out that morning.”496 
Jabez Molife, a Basuto war-leader and non-commissioned officer in the Natal Native 
Horse, described the whirlwind of violence that enveloped the NNH and those of the Natal 
Carbineers and Newcastle Mounted Rifles who, under Captain Bradstreet, chose to stand with 
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them. “There were not very many of us,” he remembered proudly, “but because of the way we 
were handled by our leader we were enough to stop the Zulus on that side for a long time.”497 
The auxiliary horseman was filled with praise for Durnford whose bravery, he believed, was the 
main thing that kept the men going despite the odds being utterly stacked against them. “The 
Colonel rode up and down our line continually, encouraging us all, talking and even laughing 
with us—‘Fire away, my boys!’ ‘Well done, my boys!’ he cried. Some of us did not like his 
exposing himself so much, and wanted him to keep behind, but he laughed at us and said, ‘All 
right, nonsense.’ He was very calm and cheerful all the time.”498 Durnford’s crippled arm 
prevented him from joining in the fighting himself, yet Molife recalled the Colonel still found a 
way to help. “Sometimes, as he passed amongst us, one or another of the men brought him his 
gun with the old cartridge sticking, and he dismounted, and taking the gun between his knees, 
because of having only one hand with strength in it, he pulled the cartridge out and gave back the 
gun.”499 Officers like Hamilton-Browne and Evelyn Wood, who firmly believed African 
auxiliaries could not fight, would have struggled mightily with this scene, as Basuto horsemen, 
backed by only a minimal number of Boer and English colonial volunteers, singlehandedly 
delayed the Zulu left. Raised, armed, and trained at Durnford’s own expense, the Natal Native 
Horse were deeply attached to their Colonel, who treated them as soldiers rather than as cannon 
fodder. “Now we say that we shall always remember him by his commanding voice, and the way 
in which he gave us all some of his own spirit as he went along our line that day,” was Molife’s 
epitaph for his friend and superior.500 
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At last, however, the NNH ran out of ammunition, and on Durnford’s instigation fell 
back again, this time all the way to Isandlwana, with the intention of obtaining more cartridges. 
It was at just the right moment too, for the Zulu, unable to shift Durnford from his position by 
force, “extended their left, and crossing the watercourse still lower down outflanked the mounted 
men, and threatened to cut off their retreat.”501 The NNH avoided the trap and made it to 
Isandlwana just ahead of the Zulu and only minutes before Pulliene’s centre gave way. This was 
the moment Ntshingwayo’s subcommanders had been waiting for. “While we were getting our 
ammunition,” Molife said, “the Zulu army swept down right round the upper camp, shutting us 
out, but our leader was within, and we saw no more of him.”502 The Basuto trooper always 
regretted that he and the men had not forcibly taken Durnford from the field earlier that day, but 
knew Durnford would never have allowed it.503 Even now, as officers on horseback began to run 
from the camp, Durnford, who was mounted and a very capable horseman, refused to do so. 
Together with a few British regulars, Volunteer cavalrymen, and African auxiliaries who had not 
managed to get clear of Isandlwana, Durnford made his last stand in front of the right corner of 
the camp. In one of the war’s supreme ironies, the majority of those who chose to remain with 
Durnford in his final act of defiance were members of the Border Police and Natal Carbineers, 
the latter of whom had abandoned him at Bushman’s Pass six years earlier. Some historians, 
among them Ron Lock, have suggested Durnford ordered the Carbineers to remain with him and 
share in a deliberate attempt at martyrdom, but the highly independent nature of the Volunteer 
horsemen does not bear this out, and some of them were seen actively fighting their way towards 
Durnford when they could easily have vacated the camp. Wrote Archibald Forbes on seeing the 
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ring of dead men about Durnford, “Clearly they rallied around Durnford in a last despairing 
attempt to cover the flank of the camp, and had stood fast from choice, when they could have 
essayed to fly for their horses.”504 
The suggestion that Durnford forced anyone to stand with him was never made at the 
time, even by those who were most determined to make the blame for the defeat his, and his 
alone. Colonel Evelyn Wood, after talking to survivors of Isandlwana, wrote in fine Victorian 
purple prose of the courage of Durnford and his small band. “There comes a one-armed man, 
who, having shortly fallen back before the ever increasing foe is now determined to die. ‘Save 
yourself. As for me, I shall remain.’ He thus dismisses a staff officer and Hlubi’s black soldiers, 
who vainly urged the great chief to seek safety with them. Recognising his commanding courage, 
around him gather some twenty kindred spirits, who, nobly disdaining death, resolved to cover 
the retreat of the guns and die with him.”505 Wood’s writing was saccharine, but he captured the 
basic point well: by standing where he did, Durnford bought time for those still in the camp to 
get away. His efforts against the Zulu left kept the pincer trap from closing completely and 
opened a narrow pathway for Isandlwana’s few survivors to make their getaway through. 
 Mehlokazulu kaSihayo saw the end. Serving as a junior officer in the left horn, he was 
part of the force that finally killed Durnford. “It was a long time before they were overcome,” he 
said, “before we finished them. When we did get to them, they all died in one place, altogether. 
They threw down their guns when their ammunition was done, and then commenced with their 
pistols, which they used as long as their ammunition lasted; and then they formed a line, shoulder 
to shoulder and back to back, and fought with their knives.”506 In another interview, the Zulu 
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warrior added, “When we closed in we came on to a mixed party of mounted and infantry men, 
who had evidently been stopped by the end of our horn; they numbered about a hundred. They 
made a desperate resistance, some firing with pistols, and others using swords. I repeatedly heard 
the word ‘fire’ given by someone, but we proved too many for them, and killed them all where 
they stood. When all was over I had a look at these men, and saw an officer with his arm in a 
sling, and with a big moustache, surrounded by Carabineers, soldiers, and other men that I didn’t 
know.”507  
Durnford’s final stand came even as the last of Pulleine’s defensive efforts were flying 
apart. Supported by two cannons and by the NNC battalions, Pulleine’s British infantry and the 
Volunteer and auxiliary horsemen with them subjected the Zulu centre, or ‘boss’, to withering 
rifle fire, repeatedly halting the enemy infantry’s advance. The Zulu did not, however, take 
nearly as many casualties as the British expected they would. Contrary to its portrayal in films 
like Zulu and Zulu Dawn, Ntshingwayo’s warriors did not advance in a single massed horde, but 
in loose skirmish order in sections of five or ten under junior officers like Mehlokazulu, keeping 
wide spaces between them through which British rifle fire could pass harmlessly. The cannons, 
which might have been expected to break up the Zulu rush, were unable to do so for, as one 
survivor told it, the Zulu understood only too well how the artillery pieces were operated. “The 
cannon here began to fire harder than ever,” he wrote, “but the Zulus kept on pouring down in 
front and on our flank; those in front of the cannon when they saw the gunners stand clear would 
either fall down flat or divide in the middle, so as to leave a lane, and when the shot had passed 
would shout out ‘Umoya!’ (only wind). There was no confusion or hurry in these movements of 
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theirs, but all was done as though they had been drilled to it.”508 They may well have been. 
Ntshingwayo’s military record is harder to research than it should be, but it is probable he served 
in King Dingane’s army during the Zulu ruler’s battles against the Boers. He would have 
understood how dangerous firearms were and may well have taken precautions against them. 
One thing Ntshingwayo definitely did, and which Durnford and Pulleine could not, was 
exert direct personal control over the battle. Together with Cetshwayo’s advisor Mavumengwana 
kaNdlela—brother of Chief Godide and son of the general who faced the Boers in 1838 under 
Dingane—who was appointed as his second-in-command (and de facto political officer) and the 
group of hereditary chieftains and royal appointees who comprised, in a very real sense, his 
senior staff, the Zulu general climbed the iNyoni cliff-face, providing himself with a vantage 
point from which he could view the entire engagement. While the vast bulk of the Zulu army was 
made up of foot soldiers, the men with Ntshingwayo were all mounted, and horsemen regularly 
rode down from the iNyoni to the various subcommanders and chiefs who were leading the Zulu 
regiments in the field. This meant that shortly after the armies came to grips with one another, 
Ntshingwayo had command and control over his army, while Durnford and Pulleine, separated 
from each other by miles, did not. Pulleine may not even have been at the firing line with his 
men; very few of Britain’s Isandlwana veterans could honestly say they knew where Pulleine 
was at any given time and his movements are much more difficult to track than Durnford’s. 
Where Ntshingwayo was, conversely, was known to his whole army, and they were getting a 
steady stream of orders from him. The advantage this gave the Zulu is best exemplified by one 
key moment in the battle when the Zulu boss, confronting Pulleine’s skirmish line, stalled. Three 
hundred yards from the British, the Zulu were unable to advance any farther as the enemy riflery 
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was becoming too accurate, and the men took shelter in depressions in the ground waiting for the 
British to run low on ammo. Ntshingwayo, not wanting his assault slowed, sent one of his senior 
advisors, Mkhosana kaMdvundlana to get the centre moving again. Descending the cliffs, 
Mkhosana stood before the regiments and harangued them all for cowardice while bullets flew 
all around him but did not touch him. Shamed, the Zulu warriors rose and rushed at the British 
once more, even as a bullet took Mkhosana between the eyes and slew him.509 His sacrifice was 
not in vain, for once the Zulu centre started moving again, it did not stop. 
It was just after one o’clock in the afternoon. The NNC troops holding Pulleine’s left 
broke and ran when the Zulu got within two hundred yards of their position. In the words of the 
War Office Narrative “A gap in the line was thus left into which a mass of Zulus poured , and in 
an instant all was confusion. Before Mostyn’s and Cavaye’s companies of the 24th, which were 
extended on the left, had time to rally, or even fix bayonets, the Zulus were among them, and 
slaughtered them to a man.”510 The rest of the line imploded at this point, with Captain 
Younghusband’s company retreating up the cliffs and the rest of the men fleeing into the camp. 
Younghusband  eventually led his men in a suicide charge down the hills, and his whole 
command was gunned down by Zulu musketeers, who described the action to British traveller 
Bertram Mitford a few years later.511 The two artillery pieces, “after discharging a few rounds of 
case into the dense advancing mass of the enemy, limbered up,” and were cut down by the Zulu 
as they tried to cross a river.512 As for the men who made it back into the camp itself, they would 
find no shelter there. While Pulleine fought the Zulu boss, and Durnford delayed the left horn, 
the Zulu right horn, with no one to stop it after Pulleine withdrew Cavaye and Mostyn from the 
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hilltops, circled round the back of the valley, and entered the campsite through its rear. When the 
British troops retreated into their campsite, they found it already occupied by the enemy. 
The butchery that ensued has been described at length in many secondary sources and in 
the memoirs of those who survived. Horace Smith-Dorrien, who later commanded men in the 
bloodbaths of the First World War was still horrified when he wrote about it years later.513 So 
was Hamilton-Browne, who inspected the site the night after the slaughter and whose mercenary 
career might have been expected to toughen him against all but the most appalling of sights. “In 
their mad rush into the camp,” he recollected in shocked tones, “the Zulus had killed everything. 
Horses had been stabbed at their picket lines. Splendid spans of oxen were lying dead in their 
yokes, mules lay dead in their harness and even dogs were lying stabbed among the tents. Ripped 
open sacks of rice, flour, meal and sugar lay everywhere. They had even in their savage rage 
thrust their assagais [sic] into tins of bully beef, butter, and jam. Among all this debris, singly 
and in heaps, or rather in groups of two or three, lay the ripped and mutilated bodies of the 
gallant 24th, showing how, when their formation was broken, they had stood it out, and fought 
back to back or in groups until they had been run over and destroyed.”514 Those men who could 
get out did, their retreat covered by Durnford’s Natal Native Horse who, rather than running 
when cut off from their Colonel, instead did their best to help the infantry and the officers in the 
camp get out. Not all of those who got out made it very far, for the Zulu mounted an intensive 
pursuit and the men of the NNH could only fend off so many of Ntshingwayo’s warriors. 
Lieutenants Melvill and Coghill, endeavouring to save the Queen’s Colour from the Zulu, were 
among those who did not make it, cut down as they tried to cross a river. That there was even a 
chance for them to get away was thanks to Durnford, whose final act of defiance prevented the 
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Zulu left from linking up with the right as quickly as intended. Once he was dead, the left horn, 
like the right horn, flooded into the rear of the camp and escape became an impossibility. 
Of the men killed in the camp, the Zulu remembered the officers best for, armed with 
revolvers and swords, they were able to make a better fight of it in the melee that ensued as 
Ntshingwayo’s host stormed the British camp. Norris-Newman, the newspaper correspondent 
who accompanied Chelmsford, was told by a Zulu veteran that “two officers with pieces of glass 
in their eyes came forward shooting at him with their revolvers. One fell dead from a gunshot, 
and the other kept firing his revolver at the induna, a bullet grazing the right side of his neck, 
another grazing his left side, and another entering his leg. The induna flung an assegai which 
entered the officer’s breast. The officer, with supreme effort, almost succeeded in pulling out the 
weapon (here the Zulu writhed his body in pantomime of the efforts of the officer), but the 
induna fell on him and instantly finished his dreadful work with another assegai.”515 Norris-
Newman surmised that the officers in question were probably Lieutenants Austin and Pope of the 
2/24th, for they were the only officers in the regiment who perpetually wore monocles.516 
Another Zulu relayed the story of how an unarmed soldier tackled him to the ground and tried to 
choke him to death before being speared. Several remembered a tall man who resisted savagely 
in front of the wagons before being shot. His description does not match that of any of the 
regiment’s commissioned officers; he may well have been an NCO whose description would not 
have been recognisable by Chelmsford and his coterie.517  
As for Henry Pulleine, no one could say how he died. Some veterans thought they saw 
him cut down when the skirmish line disintegrated, but could not say for sure.518 The Zulu told a 
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different story. A warrior named Maqedinbaba told how when he entered a tent, searching for 
loot, he found an officer seated at a table inside who “plucked out a little gun and shot me 
through the cheek. I staggered, but found myself still alive. So I sprang upon him and finished 
him with my spear. That is why I am called Maqedinbaba (He Who Finishes The Matter), 
because I killed the chief induna of the army.”519 Some historians, including Ian Knight, have 
doubted Maqedinbaba could have known it was Pulleine he killed, for the Zulu would not have 
been able to read the officers’ ranks. Yet Mehlokazulu obviously knew the difference between 
soldiers and Carbineers, and recognised Durnford as an officer despite the Colonel being in his 
mess uniform where the only indicators of rank were his insignia. Horace Smith-Dorrien, who 
escaped largely because the Zulu ignored him, was told after the war that “they had been told by 
their King Cetywayo [sic] that black coats were civilians and were not worth killing. I had a blue 
patrol jacket on, and it is noticeable that the only five officers who escaped—Essex, Cochrane, 
Gardner, Curling, and myself—had blue coats.”520 Here is further evidence the Zulu had at least 
a working idea of British signifiers of rank and allegiance, only being confused by those who had 
more than one uniform type, as was the case for Smith-Dorrien in his dark blue patrol jacket. 
Pulleine was in uniform, and it is not at all impossible that Maqedinbaba, or one of his 
compatriots, was able to read his rank insignia and realise who the Zulu warrior had killed. 
By two o’clock that afternoon the killing was over. The Zulu pillaged the campsite then 
left it, taking most of their dead with them. When Lord Chelmsford arrived in Isandlwana at six 
thirty that night, he found a scene of slaughter and a career ending fiasco in the making waiting 
for him. The Zulu, by their admission, lost around 1000 men in the engagement. In exchange 
they killed fifty-two white officers, eight hundred six white troops, and four hundred seventy-one 
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African auxiliaries, a total of 1329 men.521 More officers were killed with Durnford and Pulleine 
at Isandlwana than died holding the line against Napoleon at Waterloo, a figure that would soon 
be on the front page of many British newspapers. Lord Chelmsford would seek a way to blame 
this most hideous of reversals on one of Durnford or Pulleine, but the blame in truth belonged to 
him, John North Crealock, and Ntshingwayo kaMahole.  
It was Chelmsford who neglected to laager the campsite, who left no orders for anyone 
else to laager the campsite, and who fell for Matshana’s ploy and led half his army into the hills 
to seek out a Zulu army that was, in reality, camped on his doorstep. It was Crealock who kept 
the news of the unfolding calamity at Isandlwana from Chelmsford, hiding evidence that the 
Lieutenant-General did not want to hear and ensuring that when the information at last did get 
through, Chelmsford would be even less inclined to believe it. And it was Chief Ntshingwayo 
who orchestrated a near-perfect ambush, slipping 20 000 warriors past Chelmsford’s scouts, 
baiting the British general into leaving his camp improperly guarded, and then falling on it 
before Durnford or Pulleine knew he was there. Durnford’s tactical decisions, and to a lesser 
extent, those of Pulleine, have been analysed to death by historians, yet the back and forth about 
whether Durnford should have led the cavalry out of camp or if it was a mistake to pull Cavaye 
and Mostyn off the hills, ignores the fact that by the time Durnford and Pulleine were making 
those choices, the battle was lost. There was nothing either officer could have done, with only 
1700 odd men, to prevail over Ntshingwayo’s 20 000 who were already enveloping the camp 
when their presence was uncovered. If anything, Durnford’s recon with the Natal Native Horse 
and his following stand at the right corner of the camp saved lives, by keeping an exit open at the 
rear of the camp, and allowing the fewer than four hundred men who escaped to do so. Having 
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ridden into a disaster in the making, Durnford made the best of a bad situation, and every man 
under his command who got out alive owed him for their survival.  
Ntshingwayo’s victorious army broke up upon leaving Isandlwana, the soldiers finding 
their own ways back to Ulundi, where the chief and his senior officers would report on their 
success to King Cetshwayo. Part of the Zulu reserve, under Prince Dabulamanzi kaMpande, half-
brother of Cetshwayo, took a more circuitous route than the rest of the army, stopping to attack 
the British supply station at Rorke’s Drift, held by one hundred thirty-nine men under 
Lieutenants John Chard and Gonville Bromhead.522 Prince Dabulamanzi’s ill-thought out and 
poorly coordinated assault, comprising a series of piecemeal attacks on Chard and Bromhead’s 
well-entrenched and fortified positions, was motivated not by strategic or tactical necessity, but 
by annoyance that he and the regiments under his command had not been committed to action at 
Isandlwana.523 In attempting to seize Rorke’s Drift, Dabulamanzi aimed to prove that he was as 
great a warrior as his brother, father, and uncles, and to show that Ntshingwayo had been wrong 
to keep him out of the battle. In the end he proved only that he had a lot to learn about warfare 
before he could rank himself the elderly chief’s military equal. The Battle of Rorke’s Drift, 
which began in the afternoon of January 22nd and lasted into the morning of January 23rd, won 
Dabulamanzi nothing, and cost him three hundred Zulu warriors, nearly ten percent of the 3000 
men he had with him. He returned to Ulundi not as a conquering hero, but as a chastened and 
humbled supplicant, throwing himself on his brother’s mercy. Cetshwayo forgave 
Dabulamanzi—though not before reaming him out in front of the assembled warriors—and the 
Prince who, while impetuous was a quick learner, went on to serve his king far more ably at 
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Eshowe where he put what he had learned about besieging British fortifications to good use. For 
all the attention the Western world has paid to Rorke’s Drift, it was, for the Zulu, a minor affair. 
Chard and Bromhead, in the meantime, were awarded Victoria Crosses for their defense 
of the fort and their feat of repulsing an army twenty times their size while taking only seventeen 
fatal casualties themselves. Five other Victoria Crosses would be handed out to Chard and 
Bromhead’s subordinates, both in tribute to their obvious courage and as a means of lessening 
the sting of Isandlwana by drawing public attention to the skirmish at Rorke’s Drift. Despite the 
undeniable bravery of those who had defended Isandlwana to the end, no VCs were handed out 
for that action—the reversal was simply too humiliating to acknowledge in such a way. A private 
was awarded the VC for saving the life of a fellow soldier during the retreat to Rorke’s Drift, and 
the high command eventually announced that Lieutenants Melvill and Coghill, who tried to save 
the Queen’s Colour, would have been recommended for the Cross had they lived (the medal 
could not, at the time, be given posthumously), but Isandlwana proper was not considered 
worthy of commemoration. Lord Chelmsford kept the focus on Rorke’s Drift and on the 
gallantry of Chard and Bromhead’s little band, rather than on the cataclysmic failure at 
Isandlwana. Together with Sir Bartle Frere, he worked to elevate Rorke’s Drift into a major 
strategic victory, with the men being awarded not only for their bravery, but for stopping 
Cetshwayo from invading Natal—something Cetshwayo had never intended to do.524  
Sir Garnet Wolseley, who took command of South Africa at the end of the war, saw 
through Chelmsford’s ploy and viewed the utilisation of awards in this fashion as entirely 
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demeaning and disgraceful. “I am sorry that both of these officers,” he wrote of Melvill and 
Coghill, “were not killed with their men at Isandlwana instead of where they were. I don’t like 
the idea of officers escaping on horseback when their men on foot are killed. Heroes have been 
made of men like Melvill and Coghill who, taking advantage of their having horses, bolted from 
the scene of the action to save their lives, it is monstrous making heroes of those who saved or 
attempted to save their lives while bolting or of those who, shut up in buildings at Rorke’s Drift, 
could not bolt, and fought like rats for their lives which they could not otherwise save.”525 
Wolseley’s comments were motivated at least in part by class animus—he would later describe 
both Chard and Bromhead as “stupid looking” fellows—but there was also contained within 
them the anger of a professional soldier at the ways in which Chelmsford was manipulating the 
awards system to obscure his failures at Isandlwana.526 The Duke of Cambridge, cousin to Queen 
Victoria and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, shared at least some of Wolseley’s concerns, 
observing that “we are giving the VC very freely I think.”527  
With the Victorian press hungry for heroes, Chelmsford and Bartle Frere’s depiction of 
Rorke’s Drift won out over that of Wolseley and Cambridge, and a skirmish at a trading post 
involving only a fraction of the British and Zulu armies became the most talked about and 
remembered battle of the war, memorialised in art, books, films, and even modeling kits. The 
bravery of Chard, Bromhead, and the men under their command should not, however, be allowed 
to distract historians in the same way that it did the British public. Rorke’s Drift was not a major 
setback for Zulu strategy since the battle was not supposed to have been fought in the first place. 
The three hundred casualties that Dabulamanzi sustained in his defeat there were significantly 
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fewer than the losses Ntshingwayo had taken from his triumph at Isandlwana. Dabulamanzi was 
not, as of yet, a particularly seasoned general and his inability to take Rorke’s Drift said more 
about his lack of experience than it did about the overall capabilities of the Zulu military. Neither 
the Prince nor his older brother had ever had any intention of conquering Natal, and thus the only 
lives the men at Rorke’s Drift saved were their own. Some historians have tried to claim Rorke’s 
Drift at least demonstrated that the proper way to fight the Zulu was from behind barricades and 
earthworks, but this was already known to the British who had years worth of Boer reports on the 
importance of laagering in Zulu country. Moreover, if Rorke’s Drift was such an important 
lesson, British officers were mighty slow to absorb it, for two months later, at Ntombe Drift and 
Hlobane, Captain David Moriarty and Colonel Evelyn Wood endured crippling defeats of their 
own when they ignored the need for proper defenses and instead fought the Zulu in the open.  
It was Isandlwana, not Rorke’s Drift, that truly mattered when it came to Chelmsford’s 
future strategy in Zululand, and Isandlwana was one of the worst colonial defeats ever inflicted 
upon a British army. Only Braddock’s Defeat, the First-Anglo Asante War and the First Anglo-
Afghan War could compare with it in scale and Chelmsford, unlike Edward Braddock, Charles 
McCarthy, and William Elphinstone, was still alive to deal with the consequences. Recognising 
the potential ruination of his career when he saw it, Chelmsford began the process of shifting the 
blame to Durnford who, being accommodatingly dead, would not be able to offer much in the 
way of a defense. It was Chelmsford, however, who created the framework in which Durnford 
was operating, both by dividing his army in the face of a superior foe and more broadly by 
assuming the Zulu would, like the Xhosa, prove incapable of mounting an attack on his columns. 
Chelmsford expected all Africans to fight the same way, and sycophants like John North 
Crealock did all they could to make sure the Lieutenant-General’s prejudices were never 
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challenged, even if it cost them the lives of officers and enlisted men. Sir Charles Ellice, 
Adjutant-General of the Army, encapsulated Chelmsford’s errors and the Duke of Cambridge’s 
opinion of them when he wrote: “HRH has come to the conclusion that the primary cause of the 
misfortune, and that which led to all the others, was the underestimate of the offensive fighting 
power of the Zulu Army. This was not unnatural as nowhere within Central or Southern Africa 
did such a powerfully organized, well disciplined, and thoroughly trained force of courageous 




It is the easiest thing in the world to overestimate the power of the officer on the scene, 
and to assume all that goes right or wrong is a product of his choices. In reality, the decision-
making powers of any field commander are always circumscribed by circumstances in which he 
finds himself, circumstances that are shaped and created by both enemy action and by the wider 
structuring of the campaign as envisioned by the high command. At the Little Bighorn and 
Isandlwana, Phil Sheridan and Lord Chelmsford invested a great deal of time, energy, and effort 
into creating situations that left George Custer and Anthony Durnford with little choice before 
them save to die as bravely as possible. In a very real way, both Custer and Durnford’s 
reputations were victims of the same Anglo-American arrogance and imperialism as their Native 
American and African enemies. 
Neither Sheridan nor Chelmsford believed their Indigenous adversaries would stand and 
fight, and both commanding generals constructed their operational plans accordingly. Both 
divided their men into small columns, intended not to fight major battles but to pursue an enemy 
they were certain was making preparations to flee. Both arranged for those columns to march as 
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far apart from one another as possible, in theory so they could cover more ground, but in practise 
making it impossible for any one field force to come to the aid of another. Both badly 
underestimated the strength of the foe they were up against, not only in numbers, but in 
determination to fight. Neither made any real arrangements for the transference of information 
between columns and commands, ensuring that even when genuine information about the enemy 
was uncovered it could not be transmitted from one field general to the next. Lastly, both 
allowed their already insufficiently strong forces to become even more divided in the field: 
Sheridan issuing no orders that would have stopped Terry from splitting up the Dakota column, 
Chelmsford actively dividing the Centre Column in order to chase after Matshana. Deeply 
committed to the idea their enemies would fight only one way, Sheridan and Chelmsford never 
allowed for the possibility their enemies might concentrate instead of breaking apart, and that in 
doing so, might have enough power to overwhelm the isolated American and British units. 
Custer and Durnford died because of their superiors’ colonial hubris, and there was next 
to nothing either man could have done to change that. Custer was sent on a suicide mission to 
attack a Lakota and Cheyenne encampment no one had seen and no one knew the true size of. 
When he finally found it, his options were to retreat and face censure or attack it and die: he 
chose the latter, and took half of his regiment with him. Durnford had even less agency than 
Custer: ordered to Isandlwana to aid in packing up the campsite, he rode into a battle that had 
been lost before he ever got there, the Zulu having encircled the British position before Pulleine 
or any of the other officers even knew they were present. All Durnford could do once he realised 
what was happening was try to save as many lives as he could, and it was largely thanks to him 
that any British soldiers survived Isandlwana. For both Custer and Durnford, the only way to 
leave the Little Bighorn or Isandlwana alive would have been to find a way not to fight there in 
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the first place: and with Sheridan and Chelmsford’s orders being what they were, that option was 
not on the table for either man. All they could do was try to make the best of a bad situation: one 
that, it must be stressed, was the product of their superiors’ decisions rather than their own. 
That said, it should be noted that even better planning by Sheridan and Chelmsford might 
have resulted in failure, for the Indigenous enemies they were up against were of a calibre no one 
on the Anglo-American side expected. At the Little Bighorn, Gall, Crow King, Crazy Horse, 
Lame White Man, Two Moons, Yellow Nose, and the other Lakota and Cheyenne war-chiefs 
and war-leaders put together a highly capable mobile defense that first repelled, and then 
wrecked, Custer’s 7th Cavalry. At Isandlwana, Ntshingwayo kaMahole launched a near-perfect 
ambush against an unsuspecting enemy. Throughout both battles, Lakota, Cheyenne, and Zulu 
leaders enforced and maintained tight control over their men and their environs, always aware of 
their own dispositions and of those of their opponents, while the Americans and the British 
struggled with divided command structures and insufficient information. No matter what colonial 
reasoning might say, neither Custer nor Durnford were idiots. They did not have to be. Their 



















Chapter 5: The Reaction at Home 
 
The American and British publics of the 1870s were no one’s idea of an audience that 
was likely to take a reversal well. Both the American and British presses were highly partisan 
and eager for scandal; ‘yellow journalism’ as a concept was very much born during this period. 
The news that a regiment of white men had been defeated by “primitives” was exactly the type 
of story the press of the day would latch onto, for the purposes of criticizing the officers involved 
and/or stirring up the public’s desire for revenge. Information might have travelled slowly in the 
1870s, but it did not travel slowly enough to let Phil Sheridan or Lord Chelmsford hide the 
magnitude of the setbacks they had suffered. The question for both generals then became how to 
manage the bad news without losing face. 
Sheridan proved more successful than Chelmsford when it came to playing the press 
game. Already a Union war-hero, Sheridan had a degree of protection from criticism Lord 
Chelmsford did not enjoy. While the Eastern papers were notably hostile to the US Army and its 
plans for Native America, its fury tended to be undirected, lambasting the Army as a whole, 
rather than Sheridan personally. When Sheridan began the process of moving the blame for the 
failure to Custer, many of these papers ended up going along with him. Moreover, Sheridan’s 
longstanding alliance with the Western papers, which, like him, wanted the Native American 
presence along the frontier eradicated, paid dividends when those papers came to his defense as 
they had many times before, changing the narrative from one of defeat to one of revenge. 
Sheridan was also aided by political division within the United States. At the time of the Little 
Bighorn, the USA was in the midst of one of its most bitterly contested elections and the 
outgoing Grant administration was embroiled in a series of scandals. The Republican press, 
friendly to Grant and his protégé Sheridan, was happy to hold the openly Democratic Custer 
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responsible for the massacre, while the Democratic press saw Custer’s death as ammunition to 
use against Grant, rather than Sheridan. The public outcry that ensued saw the Army 
embarrassed, but Sheridan himself largely escaped censure. 
Lord Chelmsford was nowhere near as lucky. The Cape Colony and Natal papers did not 
treat him well, and the papers in London were even more savage. Like Sheridan, he tried to 
blame his subordinates, particularly Durnford, and his allies in London did succeed in damaging 
the deceased Colonel’s reputation. Both Chelmsford and Sir Bartle Frere’s statuses as friends of 
Queen Victoria gave them a powerful ally, and who would help them when the time came to cast 
aspersions on the character of Durnford. However, Durnford was not a household name the way 
Custer was, and Sir Bartle Frere and Chelmsford’s enemies in the British Parliament were only 
too happy to ensure at least some of the responsibility stuck with the South African High 
Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief. The topic of the Anglo-Zulu War would be debated 
hotly in the House of Commons and House of Lords both, and Bartle Frere and Chelmsford 
would both be the targets of attacks by politicians who—rightly—blamed the two men for 
starting a war without Parliamentary (or Royal) clearance. With government disapproval 
looming over his shoulder, Chelmsford knew his time as South Africa’s top officer was limited. 
However successful they were in their efforts, Sheridan and Chelmsford both managed to 
distort the historical record, creating numerous difficulties for the historians who have come after 
them. Sheridan saw to it that the Little Bighorn was permanently associated with Custer’s name 
rather than his own, while Chelmsford at the least tricked generations of scholars into thinking 
anything Durnford did on the day of Isandlwana might have mattered. Their actions also had 
other, more immediate consequences, for their campaigns, as pressure from the press came to 
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influence the decisions officers were making in the field. To understand these developments, an 




The coverup of the circumstances around Custer’s death began soon after his corpse was 
discovered. Alfred Terry was only too aware that what he had on his hands could be a disaster 
for his career. Not only had a Lieutenant-Colonel and almost half his regiment died on Terry’s 
watch, but the Lieutenant-Colonel in question was the former “Boy-General,” George Custer, a 
media darling with strong family and political ties to the opposition Democratic Party. There was 
no way Terry could simply erase what had happened or pretend that it was anything other than a 
major setback for the Army. So it was that in his report to Sheridan on the matter, Terry did what 
he could to remove responsibility from himself and place it on Custer, and in doing so, provided 
Sheridan with a number of narrative threads the Lieutenant-General and his boss, William 
Sherman, would exploit in the coming weeks. 
Terry’s report did not outright blame Custer for the defeat. It did, however, insinuate it 
was Custer’s decision to break up his force into three parts that ensured that defeat, with Terry 
remarking Custer was only able to attack the Lakota and Cheyenne encampment with the 
minimal force he had at hand.529 Terry included a copy of his instructions to Custer, emphasised 
there had been no order to attack, and implied that the decision to take the offensive had been 
entirely in Custer’s hands, rather than his own…which of course meant the loss was Custer’s 
fault, rather than Terry’s. As related above, Nelson Miles eventually obtained a copy of Terry’s 
orders to Custer, and concluded the Brigadier-General had, in fact, encouraged Custer to assault 
any Native American force that he might encounter; if one accepts Miles’ analysis (and there is 
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little reason not to), Terry was being if not deceptive, at least disingenuous in his message to 
Sheridan. Terry also tried to save racial face by including in his report Major Marcus Reno’s 
entirely baseless claim that “there were a number of white men fighting with the Indians.”530 
This single line in Terry’s report shaped the upper brass’ narrative, as Sheridan and others tried 
to mitigate the stigma of the reversal by suggesting their enemies were led by renegade white 
men. 
Many of Terry’s claims made their way almost verbatim into Sheridan’s annual report, 
submitted to Army headquarters at the end of the year. In the opening pages of that document, 
Sheridan portrayed his own role as purely administrative, his task merely to support his 
Departmental Commanders with the resources they needed to be victorious.531 Later in the report 
Sheridan gave the lie to his prior statements by providing a full outline of his strategy for the 
campaign and how he forced Crook and Terry to implement it; this shows Sheridan knew he was 
not being truthful about his role in the war but was rather shuttling blame down the line to Crook 
and Terry.532 Custer, Sheridan wrote, expanding on the ideas provided to him by Terry, would 
doubtlessly have beaten the Lakota and Cheyenne if he had kept his regiment together or 
retreated to a defensible position.533 How Custer could have done either of these things, and how 
they would have allowed him to win, Sheridan did not detail. Instead he compared the Little 
Bighorn battle to the Rosebud, which he, like Crook, was now citing as a victory. Crook, 
Sheridan said, kept his detachment together where Custer had not, and thus beat the Lakota.534 
Crook, of course, had not beaten the Lakota and had not kept his units together; as described in 
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Chapter 3, Crazy Horse broke Crook’s party up into its constituent parts early in the encounter 
and eventually drove the Brigadier-General from the field. Sheridan did not directly reference 
Reno’s lies about the enemy being led by white men, but he did state there were no leaders of 
any note among the hostile Lakota.535 Truth was not high on Sheridan’s priority list in that 
report; preserving his reputation and to a lesser degree those of Terry and Crook was. 
Long before he turned in that report in November of 1876, Sheridan spoke to both 
William Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant and gave them his and Terry’s version of events. When 
the Senate, aghast at Custer’s demise, demanded Grant submit papers relating to the defeat for 
their review, Grant gave them a report from Sherman that incorporated the best parts of both 
Sheridan and Terry’s misrepresentations. The war, the report said, was started by the Lakota, not 
the Army, and the Army had only moved against the Lakota at the request of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs and the Department of the Interior. The gold in the Black Hills was said to have 
nothing to do with the war; the Army was trying to conquer the Lakota because the reservation 
Lakota wanted them to. Like Sheridan, Sherman presented Crook’s retreat from the Rosebud as a 
triumph and talked at some length about Crook’s merit and experience as an officer.536 Sherman 
also upped the ante when it came to fixing the blame on Custer, writing “for some reason as yet 
unexplained, Genl Custer who commanded the 7th Cavalry and had been detached by his 
commander Genl Terry at the mouth of the Rosebud…attacked en route a large Indian village, 
with only a part of his force, having himself detached the rest with a view to intercept the 
Expected retreat of the Savages, and experienced an utter annihilation of his immediate 
Command.”537 Here Sherman explicitly held Custer, and only Custer, culpable for the defeat, an 
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opinion suggested to him by Sheridan in a telegram two days earlier, when the latter wrote that “I 
deeply deplore the loss of Custer and his officers and men. I fear it was an unnecessary sacrifice 
due to misapprehension and superabundance of courage, the latter extraordinarily developed in 
Custer.”538 Grant also gave the Senate the part of Terry’s report with Reno’s story about white 
men commanding the enemy, further distorting the legislature’s image of what happened. 
Not content to let Sherman and Sheridan do all the talking, Grant took a direct role in the 
Custer blaming that September. In an interview with The New York Herald, Grant declared “I 
regard Custer’s massacre as a sacrifice of troops, brought on by Custer himself, that was wholly 
unnecessary—wholly unnecessary.”539 Custer, Grant said, “was not to have made the attack 
before effecting the junction with Terry and Gibbon. He was notified to meet them on the 26th, 
but instead of marching slowly, as his orders required in order to effect the junction on the 26th, 
he enters upon a forced march of eighty-three miles in twenty-four hours, and thus has to meet 
the Indians alone on the 25th.”540 Like Sheridan and Sherman, Grant also took time to praise 
Crook, still in the field, as “the best, wiliest Indian fighter in the country,” thus suggesting 
Custer’s death was not much of a reversal.541 Grant’s statements about Custer’s orders were, as 
has been shown, palpably untrue. Whether Grant himself believed it was another question. At the 
time, Grant was embroiled in the contested outcome of the 1876 election between Rutherford 
Hayes and Samuel Tilden and was having to consider the possibility of putting troops in the 
streets to head off another Civil War over the election results. How much attention Grant was 
paying to the events of the Great Sioux War is, accordingly, unknown. What is known is that 
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Grant had implicit faith in Sheridan, and Sheridan was not providing Grant or Sherman with the 
truth.  
Within the Army, Sheridan’s misinformation campaign worked out well. John Gibbon 
and Nelson Miles may have dissented from the party line, but Crook, Terry, and the rest of the 
officer corps dutifully repeated Sheridan’s version of events. This subsequently trickled down to 
the lower ranking men as well. In his diary, Crook’s aide, Captain John Bourke, wrote that 
Custer was a fool who attacked the Lakota with far too few men, and was then outgeneraled by 
the white renegades leading the Native American forces.542 First Lieutenant Charles King, whose 
unit was sent to reinforce Crook, remained contemptuous of the Lakota, and sure of Sheridan’s 
prowess as a strategist writing, “General Sheridan was right. Sitting in his distant office in 
Chicago, he was so thoroughly informed that he could order his cavalry to search out a region 
hitherto known only to the Sioux, and tell them just where they would find the highway by which 
the vast horde of hostiles under Sitting Bull were receiving daily reinforcements.”543 When 
Colonel Wesley Merritt took command of King’s unit, King assumed the Colonel’s status as a 
former member of Sheridan’s staff granted him unique powers when it came to locating the 
hostiles.544  
Outside the Army, the general mood of the nation was one of revenge. Grant, Sherman, 
and Sheridan were inundated with offers from governors, former Civil War officers, random 
civilians, and even ex-Confederates who wanted to raise regiments of Volunteer Cavalry to go 
out and avenge Custer (an offer from Sheridan’s former nemesis, Confederate war criminal John 
Singleton Mosby was, thankfully, among those turned down).545 Congress voted to allow 
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Sheridan to expand the size of the Regular Cavalry as well, with 2000 new recruits being 
inducted to reinforce the units at the frontier. Soldiers on guard duty in the Reconstruction South 
or monitoring the election activities were freed up by Grant and Sherman and sent West, giving 
Sheridan the increased body of men he always wanted.546 Newspapers in Chicago, Denver, and 
the rest of the West came to Sheridan’s support, demanding Custer be avenged, and circulating 
racist rumours that Sitting Bull not only relied on white men to lead his warrior, but was himself 
a white man and a rogue graduate of West Point at that. One inspired conman made a killing 
selling “The Complete Works of Sitting Bull, in the Original French and Latin,” to a credulous 
public that needed to believe a white enemy, not a ‘red’ one, bested Custer.547 
The whole of the public did not, of course, give into the desire for revenge. Grant 
received letters from humanitarians as well as from exterminationists, the former begging him 
not to abandon his Peace Policy or use Custer’s death as a reason to employ harsher measures of 
control against the Indigenous population. Bishop Henry Whipple, a notable reformer and an ally 
of Grant’s in the effort to overhaul the reservation system, wrote to the President saying that “a 
nation which sows broken faith, injustice & wrong will reap a harvest of blood—Thousands cry 
for extermination—There is ONE who can exterminate, and a people who have more than half a 
million of soldier’s graves within their borders ought to know that God is not blind.”548 The 
Peace Policy, Whipple said, had never been understood by the public, but that was not a reason 
to back away from it or to give in to the calls to slaughter the Lakota and Cheyenne.549 While 
Grant never approved the most draconian of Sheridan’s measures, the sad fact was the Peace 
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Policy had been given up on years ago, when Sheridan’s leash was slipped and the power of 
making Native American policy fell into his hands. Since the early 1870s, Sheridan had made 
war on every Plains tribe that fell under his jurisdiction, just as he was making war on the Lakota 
now, and would continue to make war on them until they were subjugated.  
Given the late George Custer’s ties to the Democratic Party, one might have expected 
them to take up his cause. Custer had, after all, formed close allegiances with the Democrats, and 
his testimony before Congress about corruption in the reservation system had embarrassed the 
Grant administration and won him further support from the Democratic opposition. There was 
even talk of his running for office on a Democratic ticket, with some historians, most notably 
Stephen Ambrose, suggesting that the office in question might well have been the Presidency 
(Custer supposedly told his favourite scout, Bloody Knife, that if he defeated Sitting Bull and 
Crazy Horse it would “make him the Great White Father.”).550 The Democrats absolutely made 
political capital out of Custer’s death but given it was an election year, and it was Grant, not 
Sheridan, who was the face of the administration, it was towards Grant they expressed their ire. 
Custer, the Democratic argument went, was a victim of Grant’s vacillating and weak-willed 
Peace Policy, which coddled and armed the ‘savages’ who killed the Lieutenant-Colonel and his 
men.551 The Peace Policy and Grant’s purported responsibility for Custer’s death became 
campaign issues for Samuel Tilden, along with the repeal of Reconstruction and the 
reestablishment of white supremacy over much of the country. Tilden never pointed the finger at 
Sheridan, however, and the Lieutenant-General’s continuation at his post was assured. 
It was Custer’s widow, Elizabeth Bacon Custer, who silenced her husband’s critics 
during her lifetime. Devoting herself to clearing George’s reputation, Libbie, as she was 
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generally known, interviewed every officer of the 7th Cavalry, published books defending Custer, 
and helped the publication of other books and articles defending Custer. Nelson Miles and John 
Gibbon were among the officers she spoke to, and after Sherman stepped down from the Army, 
and Sheridan died a few months after that, Libbie led a successful pushback against the idea that 
her husband’s death was all his own fault. Until her death in 1933, Libbie did all she could to 
enshrine Custer as a martyr; much of his mythical reputation for greatness stemmed not from 
anything said during his lifetime, but from things written by Libbie and her supporters after his 
death. Libbie could not, however, erase the things Sheridan and Terry said and Sherman and 
Grant repeated. Months after she passed away, the first ‘revisionist’ history of Custer, Glory-
Hunter, was published, portraying him as a lunatic and a madman, and relying on the statements 
of Terry and Sheridan, and of embittered enemies of Custer’s like Reno and Benteen, whose 
existence had been nearly forgotten while Libbie was alive, to smear him. It was from here on 
that the endless debates about Custer’s competency have raged, and while the truth is readily 
available to those who want it, they continue to rage to this day.  
Phil Sheridan would have been pleased. That current arguments continue to orbit the 
figure of Custer is evidence of the posthumous success of his efforts to pin all culpability on his 
dead subordinate. Sheridan’s manipulation of the press, of his subordinates, and of Grant and 
Sherman kept him from getting in trouble for Custer’s demise during his lifetime. The stories 
that he spread about Custer have kept the conversation on Custer, and away from Sheridan since. 
In doing so, Sheridan avoided having to examine his own role in the debacle, or the racial 
assumptions that underpinned his campaign plan. He would continue to prosecute the Great 
Sioux War as if it were the conflict that he had expected it to be, with serious repercussions for 






Lord Chelmsford, like Sheridan, wasted no time disavowing his responsibility for the 
disaster that took place on his watch. Unable to admit to his mistake in withdrawing more than 
half his column from the encampment, and likewise incapable of acknowledging Ntshingwayo 
outgeneraled European officers, Chelmsford chose Anthony Durnford as his scapegoat. He did 
not make this decision alone: Sir Bartle Frere, High Commissioner for South Africa, also had a 
reputation to protect and, like Chelmsford, believed the late Durnford was a convenient target to 
fix the public’s ire on. Whether the two men acted in concert or came to these conclusions 
independently is unclear. In Chelmsford’s January 23rd, 1879 letter to Sir Bartle Frere, he did not 
specify Durnford was to blame and granted he and Pulleine equal status as commanding officers 
in the camp. Explaining the defeat, Chelmsford said only that “the camp had been defended with 
the utmost gallantry, but the soldiers had been beaten by much heavier numbers.”552  
By January 27th, and his letter to Colonel Stanley at the War Office, Chelmsford was 
relaying a different story. In this letter Chelmsford emphasised that Pulleine had been told to act 
on the defensive, and the defensive alone, then told the story, repeated by many historians since, 
of the alleged argument between Pulleine and Durnford as to whether Pulleine could or should 
support Durnford’s reconnaissance.553 As already noted, this argument may have been altogether 
fictitious, and Nell Colenso was certainly able to find officers who would state unequivocally 
that it never happened. Chelmsford, however, made the argument sound like an irrefutable fact 
and, by playing around with his wording, even endeavoured to make it sound as if Durnford’s 
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recon was what brought the Zulu down on the camp. Chelmsford did credit Durnford’s Mounted 
Basutos with considerable bravery, stating they “behaved remarkably well, and delayed the 
advance of the enemy for a considerable time.”554 He did not, however, attribute their 
performance to Durnford’s leadership, and omitted the story of the Colonel’s last stand from his 
narrative.  
On the same day Lord Chelmsford wrote to Stanley, Sir Bartle Frere sent a despatch of 
his own to the Colonial Secretary, the Right Honourable Sir Michael Hicks Beach. Hicks Beach 
had not given Bartle Frere his approval to start a war with the Zulu, and consequently the High 
Commissioner was even more eager than Chelmsford to save his own skin. Where Chelmsford 
merely implied to Stanley that the fault might have lain with Durnford, Bartle Frere openly 
blamed not only Durnford, but all the dead men, for bringing disaster upon themselves. In open 
contravention of the facts, Bartle Frere told Hicks Beach “in disregard of Lord Chelmsford’s 
instructions, the troops left to protect the camp were taken away from the defensive position they 
were in at the camp,” and that this was why they were killed.555 He repeated these assertions in 
further letters on February 3rd and 12th, and stuck to this story as late as June 30th.556 That no one 
disregarded Lord Chelmsford’s instructions on defense more thoroughly than Lord Chelmsford 
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himself was not something Bartle Frere informed Hicks Beach of. He did, however, claim Lord 
Chelmsford was not told of the attack until late in the day and the Lieutenant-General had 
reacted immediately, another untruth.557 The delays in Chelmsford’s reaction time, occasioned 
according to George Hamilton-Browne and Nell Colenso by John North Crealock hiding 
communiques from his boss, were not discussed with the Colonial Secretary. 
Bartle Frere also tried to use the reversal as evidence that his policy of invading Zululand 
was the correct one. If Cetshwayo’s army could defeat a British column, after all, it followed that 
it was a highly dangerous force and one that was “incompatible with the existence of any 
civilised community near him.”558 Bartle Frere insisted to Hicks Beach that the Boers and other 
African tribes were watching the war closely, and defeating the Zulu would prove to these 
recalcitrant groups the invincibility of the British military. That said invincibility might be 
questioned after Isandlwana was something he admitted was a possibility but stated the only way 
to regain Britain’s reputation was by continuing the war to victory, which he still said would be 
only a matter of time. Zulu power, Bartle Frere maintained, was brittle and could be broken 
easily.559 That he said this after Isandlwana says a great deal about the man’s ego, a great deal 
more about his inability to accept responsibility, and most of all, perhaps, about his bigotry. This 
was not the only letter like this Bartle Frere mailed to Hicks Beach, either; he inundated the 
Secretary with a series of veritable essays on why the war was necessary and must be continued.  
Bartle Frere was not the only member of his family engaged in a letter-writing campaign 
either. Mary Frere, Sir Bartle Frere’s eldest daughter, sent a letter to Sir Henry Ponsonby, Queen 
Victoria’s Private Secretary, knowing full well the Queen would see it. In her letter, Mary 
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accused Durnford of being an incompetent whose entire unit had been killed under him at 
Bushman’s Pass.560 As has been shown, Durnford suffered only three casualties in that 
engagement, himself one of them, before his men ran and abandoned him. Mary assured 
Ponsonby, and through him, Victoria, that the Army maintained absolute faith in both Lord 
Chelmsford and Sir Bartle Frere, and the fault for the defeat lay wholly with Durnford who, she 
claimed, “coming up to the camp and not entrenching it engaged the Zulus and summoned those 
in camp to his aid.”561 That Ntshingwayo was already encircling the camp, and that it was 
Durnford’s reconnaissance that discovered the attack, was either something Mary Frere did not 
know or did not think the Queen needed to know. Friendly papers in Natal and the Cape Colony, 
urged on by Sir Bartle Frere and Theophilus Shepstone repeated variants of Mary’s claims, 
trying to stamp their version of the narrative onto the consciousness of South Africa’s white 
population before anything could emerge to challenge it. The Natal Mercury was a key ally in 
this, writing, “if the general orders had been obeyed, and had the wagons been formed into a 
laager, and everyone kept inside, all would have gone well.”562 Lord Chelmsford could not have 
put it better himself. 
The primary means by which Lord Chelmsford attempted to gain control of public 
opinion, however, was by way of an inquiry into Isandlwana, set up by Chelmsford himself and 
chaired by Colonels Hassard, Harness, and Law, all associates of Chelmsford, and all beholden 
to him. The inquiry was, from the start, micromanaged by Chelmsford and intended to come to a 
simple and foregone conclusion: nothing that happened at Isandlwana was the Lieutenant-
General’s fault. The inquiry’s lack of independence is best demonstrated by neither Chelmsford 
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nor his Assistant Military Secretary, John North Crealock, being asked to testify. Instead, 
Chelmsford had Crealock’s version of events privately transcribed and forwarded to the War 
Office independently of the inquiry results.563 Obtaining the transcripts of the inquiry for herself, 
Nell Colenso observed, “the evidence taken consisted of statements made by the above officers, 
not one of whom appears to have been questioned. The (so-called) inquiry seems to have been 
strictly limited to the occurrences at the camp, as we find Major Clery’s evidence finish abruptly 
‘I saw the column out of the camp and accompanied it.’ Colonel Glyn merely corroborated 
Major Clery’s statement; and the other officers gave their respective versions of the occurrences 
at the camp.”564 Colenso was not wrong in her conclusions; nowhere in the official inquiry did 
Chelmsford allow anyone to discuss the actual events of the battle. 
In fact, Chelmsford did a great deal to muzzle those who could have talked about the 
battle, something not only Colenso, but the papers, South African and British alike, picked up on. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Harness, the officer who tried to go to Durnford and Pulleine’s aid, only to 
be stopped by orders from Chelmsford and Crealock, was placed on the inquiry’s panel of 
judges, where he was forbidden from telling his own story or asking any questions of the 
witnesses. The Daily News wrote that “Colonel Harness should not have sat as member of the 
court of inquiry. How could it have been supposed that an officer who had taken so prominent a 
part in the doings of the 22nd of January was a fit and suitable member of a court assembled even 
to take evidence merely is more than we can understand. Besides, the very fact of his being a 
member, we are told, precluded Colonel Harness from giving his own valuable evidence.”565 The 
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Natal Witness took Chelmsford’s attempts to rig the inquiry as established fact, writing, “It is 
notorious that certain members of Lord Chelmsford’s staff—there is no need to mention any 
name or names—came down to ’Maritzburg after the disaster, prepared to make Colonel 
Durnford bear the whole responsibility, and that it was upon their representations that the High 
Commissioner’s telegram about ‘poor Durnford’s misfortune,’ was sent.”566 Nell Colenso quoted 
both The Daily News and The Natal Witness in her book, including their analyses alongside her 
own brutal critique of Chelmsford and his staff’s behaviour during the inquiry. 
“How a court of inquiry, assembled without the power, apparently, of asking a single 
question, was to throw much light on the causes of the disaster, does not appear,” Colenso 
sneered. “Its scope was limited to the doings at the camp; and under any circumstances it could 
not well criticise the faults of the General. The proceedings of this court of inquiry can therefore 
only be considered as eminently unsatisfactory.”567 Where Chelmsford tried to make the loss 
Durnford’s fault, Colenso attributed it to “the fatal position selected for the camp, and the total 
absence of any defensive precautions,” “the absence of systematic scouting, whereby an army of 
upwards of 20 000 Zulus was enabled to approach Isandhlwana on the 21st, and remained 
unobserved till 22nd,” “the subdivision of the force, and the absence of proper communications 
by signalling or otherwise,” and “the neglect of warnings given by the events of the day, and 
messages from the camp; also the withdrawal of a force actually on the march to the relief of the 
camp.”568 “For these principal causes of the disaster,” Colenso finished, “none of those who fell 
were responsible.”569  
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That Nell Colenso had personal issues with Lord Chelmsford and Sir Bartle Frere over 
Durnford’s death is unavoidable. However, her success in assembling as much evidence against 
the inquiry as she did speaks to Chelmsford’s comparative failure to control the narrative within 
Natal and the broader expanse of the South African colonies. Some newspapers took 
Chelmsford’s side, but others were prepared to speak against both the Lieutenant-General and 
the High Commissioner and to defend Durnford and the other dead from posthumous slander and 
libel. As has been demonstrated above, various officers, including Lieutenant Cochrane and the 
Irish soldier-of-fortune George Hamilton-Browne, refused to play along with the coverup. Their 
testimony, as well as the opinions of those independent newspapers, found their way into Nell 
Colenso’s book. With her father, the Bishop of Natal, protecting her, there was little Lord 
Chelmsford or Sir Bartle Frere could do to prevent Colenso’s compilation of her volume. When 
she left Natal in September of 1879, she was in possession of a formidable body of evidence 
against Lord Chelmsford and Sir Bartle Frere, evidence she converted into the first draft of her 
book during her voyage to England. The History of the Zulu War and Its Origin was released in 
England in January of 1880, where it stood as the principal piece of literature defending 
Durnford and indicting Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford for conspiracy and incompetence. 
It found a public eager to read it, for in the meantime, neither the British papers nor the British 
Parliament had been silent on the topic of the Zulu War.  
That public opinion ran decidedly against both Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford was 
acknowledged by most of the Members of Parliament involved in the ensuing debates. Even 
those newspapers that supported the continuation of the war attributed few positive qualities to 
the men who had begun it. Sir Robert Peel, who emerged as one of the key Opposition leaders 
during the debates surrounding Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford’s conduct observed, “I do not 
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remember before that public opinion has suddenly taken so great an interest in a question as it 
has in this. I never before saw the Press of the country take so extraordinary an amount of 
interest in a public question like this.”570 Peel, who sat in the House of Commons during the 
Crimean War and referenced the contention surrounding Lord Raglan’s command in that conflict 
in his own criticisms of Lord Chelmsford, knew what he was talking about.571 The London 
Gazette took to publishing despatches from the front in its supplement, and these included 
Chelmsford’s admission of defeat at Isandlwana and the excuses he offered to Hicks Beach and 
Stanley afterwards.572 War correspondent Archibald Forbes, writing for The Daily News, painted 
Chelmsford as an incompetent, and that opinion found firm echoes among the British man-on-
the-street. Humour magazine Punch ran a string of satirical cartoons mocking Lord Chelmsford 
and the war effort in general, with one titled “A Lesson,” proving especially popular. It depicted 
a Zulu warrior writing “Despise not your enemy,” on a blackboard while John Bull looked on in 
apparent confusion and fascination.573  
Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford had their defenders in Parliament, but those 
defenders were divided amongst themselves. Friends of Chelmsford sought to pass the blame up 
to Bartle Frere, suggesting Chelmsford was guilty only of enacting the High Commissioner’s ill-
considered policies. Friends of Bartle Frere tried to shift the culpability down the line to 
Chelmsford, implying the invasion had been a good idea badly executed by the bumbling 
Lieutenant-General. House Member Colonel Mure, friendly to both Bartle Frere and Chelmsford, 
blamed the Colonial Office for not sending the reinforcements the two men had requested, an 
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argument that did nothing to endear him to the very government he was representing and, at least 
in theory, defending.574 Sir Michael Hicks Beach and Colonel Stanley were particularly comic in 
their defenses of the High Commissioner and the Lieutenant-General, as they were forced to 
argue that while the government had not wanted a war, it now needed to see it through to the 
end. Hicks Beach’s rhetorical gymnastics must have been especially enthralling to witness in 
action as he contended that while Bartle Frere should not have started a war and did not have the 
authority to do so, he thought he had the authority to do so and was no doubt acting from the best 
of motives. The crux of Hicks Beach’s position, when stripped of the contortionist antics around 
it, was that Bartle Frere should be censured for starting the war but maintained in his position 
until he could finish what he had begun.575  
The one thing that Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford’s spokesmen, regardless of the 
ardency of their support for the two South African officials could agree upon, was that 
Isandlwana would not have been nearly as great a calamity as it was if Anthony Durnford had 
done his job better. The idea that Durnford should have fortified the camp against a Zulu assault 
became the closest thing to a mantra that those taking Bartle Frere and Chelmsford’s part could 
come up with. Durnford dividing his force and riding out of camp against Chelmsford’s 
supposedly precise instructions was a topic repeated ad infinitum by those taking the Lieutenant-
General’s part, with their critiques of the deceased Colonel taking on a tone that readers of 
Chelmsford’s letters or of the findings of his Court of Inquiry would find very familiar.576 It was 
not a very convincing argument, but it was, in many respects, the only one those who hoped to 
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help Chelmsford could employ. A British regiment had been soundly thrashed by ‘savages’ and 
to the colonial minds of the day that meant that some white man somewhere had made a fatal 
error in judgement. If they did not wish to hold Sir Bartle Frere or Lord Chelmsford responsible, 
they had two options: they could blame Sir Michael Hicks Beach and Colonel Stanley for not 
‘properly supporting’ the war or they could blame one of the dead men. Some Members of 
Parliament did attempt to execute the former strategy, but it was one that was fraught with 
political peril, especially for members of Hicks Beach and Stanley’s own Conservative Party. 
Casting aspersions on Durnford or Pulleine was easier, and a great deal safer, and Bartle Frere 
and Chelmsford had already indicated in their correspondence that of the two dead officers, it 
was Durnford rather than Pulleine who should be the proverbial whipping boy. Irish rather than 
English, and a Royal Engineer rather than a Regular officer, he was a far easier target. 
Modern historians typically see through the excuses Bartle Frere and Chelmsford’s allies 
made for them, yet still give credence to the slurs against Durnford. That Chelmsford failed his 
men by dividing the force and then marching out of camp is nearly universally acknowledged, 
but Durnford still comes in for criticism for further dividing the camp guards or for not helping 
Pulleine form a barricade around the camp.577 Pulleine, of course, had no intention of forming a 
barricade, and both he and Durnford were following practice as set out by Lord Chelmsford 
when they did not entrench or laager. George Hamilton-Browne and Nell Colenso could see this, 
as could the War Office in the final Narrative commissioned by the Duke of Cambridge. 
Opposition MPs could see through it too, with Sir Robert Peel remarking it was hardly fair to 
expect Durnford, in four hours, to erect the fortifications Chelmsford had not erected in forty-
 
577 Locke and Knight, fundamentally at odds when it comes to many details of Isandlwana, both hold Durnford 
responsible for dividing the command and not aiding Pulleine. 
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eight.578 Yet the stories of Durnford’s supposed incompetence persist in the modern literature, 
perhaps as a product of simple repetition more than anything else. The government, the personal 
friends of Sir Bartle Frere, and the personal friends of Lord Chelmsford were not united in much, 
but they were bound together in their determination to make Durnford responsible, and their 
consensus on that point has seen it taken more seriously now than it was at the time, the lack of 
cohesion in the rest of their arguments notwithstanding.  
Despite their best efforts, however, Bartle Frere and Chelmsford’s faction could not 
entirely conceal the truth, particularly given how the Opposition’s response was so much clearer 
than that of the government. They characterised the war as both illegal and unjust, with some 
even going so far as to express their personal sympathy for King Cetshwayo, who they saw as 
having been badly wronged by Bartle Frere and Chelmsford. MP E. Jenkins was the first to call 
for Chelmsford’s resignation, demanding to know how the Lieutenant-General could possibly be 
continued in his command after Isandlwana.579 MP Chamberlain maintained censuring Sir Bartle 
Frere was not enough and the High Commissioner must be recalled to answer for his actions; he 
accused Bartle Frere of starting not only the Zulu War, but the Xhosa War as well, and stated his 
opinion that if the High Commissioner were left in his position, wars the other independent tribes 
of South Africa could not be far behind. Bartle Frere had not committed an error in detail, but of 
policy, and to prevent that policy from being enacted again, he had to be removed from his place 
at the head of the South African government.580 To the High Commissioner’s defenders, who 
insisted Zululand was a threat to Natal, Chamberlain had this to say: “In a certain sense it was 
true the position of Cetewayo [sic] had been a standing menace to the Colony of Natal. It was 
 
578 “Orders of the Day. South Africa—the Zulu War—Sir Bartle Frere, March 28, 1879,” 485-486. 
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Zulu War 1879 Vol. 2, ed. John Laband, Ian Knight (London: Archival Publications, 2000): 373-376. 
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true, in the sense that every powerful State was a standing menace to all of its neighbours with 
whom it might have a difference of opinion; and it was an argument, if it was an argument at all, 
against all strong neighbours.”581 Regarding Bartle Frere’s demand that Cetshwayo disband his 
army, Chamberlain said “No doubt, disarmament was very desirable, not only in South Africa, 
but in Europe; and he did not suppose England proposed to force disarmament upon Europe by 
war, and without regard to time or opportunity.”582 Chamberlain also noted Sir Theophilus 
Shepstone’s role in the conspiracy to begin the war, stating the conflict raised questions on a 
whole about the “new imperialism” that was contaminating British policy the world over.583 
An MP by the unlikely name of Knatchbull-Hugessen, took up Chamberlain’s call, 
refuting Hicks Beach’s defense of Bartle Frere and Chelmsford on the grounds the government 
had yet to articulate any policy it could then subsequently defend and the House was well within 
its rights to chastise them for it. He also identified and condemned Bartle Frere and Chelmsford 
for their efforts to turn Anthony Durnford into a scapegoat saying, “he must altogether decline to 
follow Sir Bartle Frere in his endeavour to bury the faults of the living in the graves of the dead, 
and against that attempt on the part of a person in Sir Bartle Frere’s position he must record his 
indignant and solemn protest.”584 It was Mister Knatchbull-Hugessen’s considered opinion that 
Sir Bartle Frere “appeared to have attributed all Native misbehaviour in any part of South Africa 
to the machinations of Cetewayo [sic]; but there was no evidence to support such a theory. The 
only conclusion to be drawn from the facts was, as far as he could judge, that Cetewayo had been 
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to Sir Bartle Frere what ‘old Bogey’ was to naughty children. He appeared to have Cetewayo on 
the brain, and to have acted accordingly.”585  
If Knatchbull-Hugessen’s opinions of Sir Bartle Frere might be characterised as “less 
than positive,” Sir Robert Peel’s were outright hostile. Bartle Frere’s policy, Peel said, “had at all 
events, this quality—it was bold, energetic, and determined, and it resulted in a most complete 
fiasco.”586 Peel’s impression of Lord Chelmsford was no higher; Sir Henry Bulwer, he said, 
“seems to be the only prudent man there.”587 Bartle Frere, Chelmsford, and Shepstone Peel said, 
acted less on behalf of the government than in the interests of the slaver Boers, and to keep 
Bartle Frere on as High Commissioner was to countenance the end of responsible colonial 
government. The accusation that the Zulu military made Cetshwayo a dangerous military despot 
was brushed off by Peel, who said “what is this but the law of conscription? It occurs in France, 
Germany, and Russia, and I believe it would be a good thing if it occurred in this country.”588 
Bartle Frere’s demand that the Zulu adhere to English-style rule of law was equally silly, Peel 
said, “these regulations do not exist in Russia,” and he doubted Sir Bartle Frere would 
recommend invading that state to enforce them.589 Even Cetshwayo’s control over when his 
soldiers were allowed to marry, held up by Bartle Frere and Shepstone as evidence of his tyranny 
could not faze Sir Robert Peel; Britain’s soldiers could not marry whenever they liked either, 
Peel opined, and all Sir Bartle Frere was doing was offering “a bonus on improvident 
marriages.”590  
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Comparing Chelmsford to the generals who lost America, Peel called for his court-
martial, using Chelmsford’s own words against him. In a letter to the Secretary of War, 
Chelmsford asked for an officer of at least Major-General rank to be sent out with authority to 
replace both Chelmsford and Sir Bartle Frere if necessary. This, Peel said, showed Chelmsford’s 
own want of confidence in himself, and was clear evidence he should be fired from his post and 
punished for “the gallant fellows who fell in that miserable affair at Isandlana [sic]—53 officers 
and nearly 1, 400 men—through the gross incompetence of a General upon whose head rests the 
blood of these men.”591 Chelmsford got more men killed than died in any battle of the Crimean 
War and lost more officers than fell at the far larger Battle of Inkermann during the Indian 
Mutiny.592 For Peel that was more than enough reason to punish him. 
One might expect the House of Lords to be more inclined to protect the conspirators, 
especially given Lord Chelmsford was a fellow aristocrat, yet the debates in that body were 
every bit as vituperative as those in the House of Commons. Friends of Sir Bartle Frere and Lord 
Chelmsford, most notably the Earl of Carnarvon, did their best to protect both appointees and 
made much of Durnford and the supposed Zulu threat, while the Opposition was every bit as 
savage as Sir Robert Peel and his faction had been in the Commons. Lord Stanley of Alderley 
dubbed Sir Bartle Frere a “military tyrant,” and compared his conduct toward the Zulu to 
Napoleon’s conduct against England.593 The Earl of Kimberley criticized both Sir Bartle Frere’s 
judgement, and his reliance on the advice of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, whom Kimberley 
considered to be “more Boer than the Boers,” to the detriment of Britain’s relations with 
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Zululand.594 Kimberley believed Sir Bartle Frere’s despatches showed “a mind excited almost 
beyond belief, magnifying approaching danger in a most extraordinary way, and anticipating an 
immediate onslaught on the part of the Zulu King.”595 Kimberley, like Sir Robert Peel, wanted 
Bartle Frere recalled on the basis that “I look upon the aggression upon Cetewayo as being unjust 
and impolitic, as being calculated to involve this country in disaster, and certainly to create a 
most unfavourable impression as to the nature of our rule in the minds of the Natives of South 
Africa, whom it ought to be our endeavour to conciliate.”596  
Lord Chelmsford fared little better than Sir Bartle Frere; several months later, during the 
discussion surrounding the death of the Prince Imperial of France in Zululand, Lord Truro 
delivered a blistering condemnation of Chelmsford’s performance at Isandlwana, saying “He 
thought fit to go with proper security to ascertain what would be a proper and convenient ground 
for having a camp. It was said by competent military men that a more unfortunate position could 
not have been selected, and of that opinion the confirmation they had in the result was 
overwhelming.”597 Despite the differences in social status, the conversation in the House of 
Lords much resembled that in the House of Commons.  
In the end, the government got their way on Sir Bartle Frere, and the Opposition got their 
way on Lord Chelmsford. Sir Bartle Frere was retained as High Commissioner but was censured 
for disobeying orders. Lord Chelmsford got the reinforcements he sought so the war could be 
closed in Britain’s favour, but Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet Wolseley was put on standby, with 
orders to supersede Chelmsford if the latter failed again. Chelmsford was aware of this, and the 
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knowledge he was working on borrowed time significantly influenced his conduct in future 
operations, as demonstrated below. Despite his best efforts neither he, nor his patron, Sir Bartle 
Frere, were able to exert sufficient control over public opinion to put all the blame on Durnford. 
Their partisans certainly blackened the deceased Colonel’s good name, and their criticisms of his 
conduct made their way into future histories of the war, but so too would the opinions of Jenkins, 
Chamberlain, Knatchbull-Hugessen, and Peel on Bartle Frere and Chelmsford’s conduct.  
With the benefit of hindsight, one might well characterise Bartle Frere and Chelmsford’s 
campaign against Durnford as the classic public relations war in which nobody won. Separated 
from Great Britain by thousands of miles of ocean and lacking the enthusiastic protection of the 
government they had disobeyed, the High Commissioner and the South African Commander-in-
Chief could make Durnford look bad but could not succeed in making themselves look good. 
Too many negative stories from opponents like Sir Henry Bulwer, Archibald Forbes and Nell 
Colenso were already circulating in both South Africa and London, and despite their status 
within British society and the shield offered them by their friendships with Queen Victoria, they 
could not refute every allegation against them. Bloodied in the press and on the floor of 
Parliament, Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford would have to turn their attention back to the 




Defeat at the Little Bighorn and Isandlwana left Phil Sheridan and Lord Chelmsford both 
scrambling to preserve their reputations from the resultant backlash. Both Lieutenant-Generals 
chose their deceased subordinates, Custer and Durnford, as the logical scapegoats for all that had 
gone wrong, gambling the press and their governments would prefer to blame the man on the 
spot, and that the two dead men could not, in any event, defend themselves from slander or libel. 
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In doing so they tainted the historical record and forced all those who have studied the subjects 
since to sift through a tissue of untruths in order to get at the reality of what happened. 
Sheridan’s efforts at spin were more successful than Chelmsford’s. There were several 
reasons for this, including his own status as a hero of the American Civil War, the close 
relationships he had with the Western press, the turbulent election taking place at the same time, 
Custer’s own exalted status, and the unconditional backing of the government he served. The 
papers wanted to know how an officer of Custer’s calibre had been defeated, and that kept the 
conversation on Custer, not on Sheridan. Among Custer’s friends and admirers, partisan politics 
kept their hostility focused on the Grant administration rather than Sheridan’s own performance, 
with the general neatly sidestepping any negative coverage and allowing the ire that could have 
been directed at him to either flow up the chain of command to Grant or down it toward Custer. 
Grant’s unwavering support for his friend Sheridan was invaluable, as General-in-Chief William 
Sherman and the President himself both made strong statements supporting Sheridan and 
condemning Custer, which further poisoned public opinion against Custer while forcing his 
defenders to engage with these two loftier figures rather than with Sheridan. The debates over 
Custer’s competency that still pollute the historiography are largely the product of Sheridan’s 
public relations campaign during this period and of the responses to it. 
Lord Chelmsford was nowhere near as fortunate. Anthony Durnford was not a well-
known enough figure to absorb the same kind of attention Custer had, and while Chelmsford 
himself was known to the public, he did not have the halo of national heroism Sheridan 
possessed. More importantly, though, both he and Sir Bartle Frere ended up learning an 
important lesson about the costs of disobeying one’s superiors: unless your disobedience results 
in immediate and undeniable success, you can expect to lose the backing of the state. Michael 
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Hicks Beach and Colonel Stanley made only tentative efforts at defending Chelmsford and 
Bartle Frere, condemning their policies out of one side of their mouths while trying to save 
governmental face out of the other. These tepid, and at times contradictory, justifications for why 
Chelmsford and Bartle Frere should be kept in their positions fooled no one, forcing the two’s 
more impassioned defenders—represented largely by their personal friends—into conflict with 
one another, as well as the Opposition. Said Opposition was, conversely, united and adamant in 
its desire to punish Sir Bartle Frere for violating his orders and to condemn Lord Chelmsford as a 
military ignoramus. Their careers narrowly survived the Parliamentary investigation, but Bartle 
Frere was still censured, Chelmsford was put on notice that he could be replaced at any time, and 
in the eyes of much of the public, they were both guilty. 
The lies Bartle Frere and Chelmsford told however have, like the lies that Sheridan told 
about Custer, had a long afterlife. The misinformation that they spread about Durnford’s 
performance entered the official record in the period immediately after Isandlwana, and still 
recur in modern histories, often with little analysis as to their connection to reality. Many of their 
claims were refuted at the time by the likes of Nell Colenso and Parliamentary critics like 
Chamberlain, Knatchbull-Hugessen and Peel, but the notion Durnford had done something 
wrong persists, driven by the fact that statements from Bartle Frere and Chelmsford’s friends 
damning him are so easy to unearth. The claims Sheridan made about Custer are similarly 
available and still inform—or more accurately, deform—the way the Little Bighorn is discussed 









Chapter 6: Further Failure 
 
 The press furor in the metropoles  had serious repercussions on the frontlines of both 
wars. Neither Phil Sheridan nor Lord Chelmsford, as we have seen, were apt to take criticism 
well, and both reacted in decidedly unproductive ways to the waves of outrage in their respective 
capitals. Sheridan had did a better job than Chelmsford of finding scapegoats for his failures, but 
criticism of the frontier army still stung him badly and sent him on a search for a victory that 
would silence the Eastern reporters. Chelmsford, less pugnacious than Sheridan and under far 
heavier fire from the papers, was paralysed, trapped beyond the borders of Natal, his confidence 
shaken, and unable or unwilling to take the field again without reinforcements. It  fell to both 
men’s subordinates to salvage something from the strategic disasters that befell their armies. 
 One might  hope those subordinates had learned something from the reversals they had 
undergone, and that, going forward, they would endeavour to avoid their superiors’ mistakes. 
Institutions are, however, slow to accept challenges to orthodox thinking and militaries, with 
their adherence to doctrine, are slower than most. That the details of what happened at the Little 
Bighorn and Isandlwana were not fully understood by the rest of the armies only complicated 
this process further, leaving Sheridan and Chelmsford’s officers unsure of what, if any, tactical 
or strategic changes needed to be made. Sheridan and Chelmsford both spent significant time and 
effort holding Custer and Durnford responsible for the losses, and the structuring of defeats as a 
product of individual incompetence denied their subordinates any reason to ask if there were 
broader, structural issues within the campaigns that needed to be addressed. If Custer and 
Durnford were uniquely incompetent, then surely all that was needed to conquer the Indigenous 
threat was more capable leadership. Since no officer would grant that his own leadership was 
anything other than competent there was no reason to make any changes. 
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 Some of the officers should have known better. Brigadier-General George Crook, who  
acted as Sheridan’s primary lieutenant in the campaigning of August and September of 1876, had 
fought the Lakota and Cheyenne at the Powder River and the Rosebud, and should have 
understood their capabilities. Colonel Evelyn Wood, commanding the last column Chelmsford 
had in the field after January of 1879, was friendly with Durnford, and eventually wrote a 
defense of his leadership at Isandlwana lionising the deceased colonel for his heroism. Yet Crook 
and Wood both proceeded to make some of the worst blunders of the war and like their superior 
officers, resorted to distorting the truth to protect their reputations with Crook transmogrifying 
his defeat at Slim Buttes into a victory and Wood portraying the near-run Battle of Khambula as 
a resounding triumph of British arms.  
 The reasons for Crook and Wood’s failures are varied, as are the reasons for the less 
discussed, yet no less notable failures of officers like Alfred Terry, John Gibbon, Charles 
Pearson, and David Moriarty. There were issues with supplies and logistics, inabilities to stand 
up to unreasonable superiors, and bad weather, to name but a few. The chief cause, however, was 
that even after the Little Bighorn and Isandlwana, the American and British officers still did not 
understand what kind of opponent they were up against or how to best them. How this ignorance 
manifested itself varied between the American and British cases: Crook, Terry, and Gibbon 
knew the Lakota and Cheyenne were dangerous but could not figure out how to alter Sheridan’s 
strategy to effectively handle them, while Pearson, Moriarty, and Wood, still in the grip of 
colonial reasoning and racial bigotry, continued to underrate the Zulu threat to the detriment of 
their plans and the safety of their men. The outcomes of that ignorance, however, were the same, 
with the American and British armies flailing about blindly and accomplishing little beyond the 
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wastage of more time, money, and lives. It was an ignominious chapter in the histories of both 
frontier armies, though how ignominious has often been glossed over. 
 For the Indigenous foes of those armies, the exact opposite can be said. For the Lakota 
and Northern Cheyenne and the Zulu, the months immediately after the Little Bighorn and 
Isandlwana illustrated the capabilities of their warriors and warlords at their absolute finest. The 
Lakota and Cheyenne evaded Terry, Gibbon, and Crook with ease, inducing the latter to all but 
gut his own army in the infamous Horsemeat March. When Crazy Horse finally  offered Crook 
battle, at Slim Buttes it was a near repeat of the Rosebud, as the Oglala war-leader again 
outfoxed the “Grey Fox” of Arizona. In South Africa, Zulu generals Mbilini waMswati and 
Ntshingwayo kaMahole  butchered David Moriarty at Ntombe Drift, trounced Evelyn Wood at 
Hlobane, and came within inches of destroying Wood’s column at Khambula, while the coastal 
Zulu kept Charles Pearson penned up in Eshowe, under siege and out of action. In doing so they 
made it apparent the Little Bighorn and Isandlwana were not flukes, and the Indigenous military 




 From the end of June through early July, there was no action, and for that matter, no 
movement in the Department of the Platte, as George Crook sat at Goose Creek, unwilling to risk 
his army by advancing. Sheridan did not take Crook’s inactivity well. As June became July, and 
July itself wore on, Sheridan barraged Crook with telegrams urging him to move against the 
Lakota and Cheyenne or, failing that, to find Alfred Terry and John Gibbon, both still in the field 
after the Little Bighorn and link up with them. Crook’s replies to Sheridan have a tenor of  panic 
to them, with Crook reporting he was outnumbered three to one by the hostiles in his area of 
operations and could not move without endangering his whole command. In between these 
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expressions of terror Crook denounced Reuben Davenport of The New York Herald for “false 
reports” on the Rosebud and continued to assure Sheridan he had won a great victory there. More 
than ever, Crook needed the Rosebud to be a success so his current reluctance to resume 
campaigning could be viewed as something other than cowardice. Both his letters to Sheridan 
and Bourke’s summations of them in his diary became increasingly shrill the more time passed, 
and the more aggressively Sheridan demanded he strike out at the hostiles.598  
What is notably absent from Crook and Sheridan’s correspondence is any discussion of 
changes in strategy after the Little Bighorn. The topic of Native American “scatteration” and 
how to prevent it still dominated the conversation, even as Crook requested more and more 
reinforcements from Sheridan. Sheridan eventually gave in, and at the end of July he, and 
General-in-Chief William Sherman, telegrammed Crook to inform him every available man in 
the Division of the Missouri was being sent to reinforce either Crook or Terry. They also told 
Crook to ignore the press, and especially The New York Herald and its harsh critique of the war 
and the senior officers involved. That both the Commander of the Division of the Missouri and 
the General-in-Chief of the Army felt the need to tell a Departmental Commander to disregard 
the papers was an acknowledgement the bad press was getting to them, just as the decision to 
send reinforcements to Crook and Terry was a de facto admission that Sheridan’s original plan of 
using small, fast moving columns to entrap the Lakota and Cheyenne had not worked. It was an 
admission Sheridan never verbalised, and the question of whether the Lieutenant-General ever 
understood there were problems with his strategy remains unanswered. He sent Crook more men 
and told him to junction with Terry but provided no new instructions on how the campaign 
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should be fought or how Crook and Terry were to locate their targets. With no insights coming 
from Division, the decision making was left to the Departments of the Platte and the Dakotas.599 
 Crook’s main source of reinforcements was ten companies of the 5th Cavalry, under the 
auspices of Colonel Wesley Merritt, a veteran cavalryman who served under Sheridan in the 
Shenandoah Valley and Appomattox campaigns during the last two years of the Civil War. 
Previously assigned to Sheridan’s personal staff, Merritt was given command of the 5th Cavalry 
on July 1, 1876, the same day the regiment was ordered to embark for the Department of the 
Platte. Given the circumstances, and Merritt’s closeness with Sheridan, it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion Sheridan wanted a personal agent on the ground in the Great Sioux War, now that 
Custer was dead, and relations between himself and Crook ever more strained. Among Merritt’s 
junior officers was First Lieutenant Charles King, who one day became a novelist of some 
renown and whose memoir, Campaigning With Crook, is one of the major sources for the events 
of August and September 1876. An unrepentant bigot who spoke of the Lakota and Cheyenne in 
the most degrading of terms, King’s writing shows just how little the lessons of the Little 
Bighorn managed to penetrate the minds of American officers. For King the Indigenous peoples 
were still unsophisticated savages, incapable of intellectual competition with white men.600  
 Merritt’s rendezvous with Crook was delayed slightly by the news that a band of two 
hundred Cheyenne had left their reservation and were heading out into the wilds intent on linking 
up with their brethren on the Great Plains. Merritt decided to stop this exodus before it could 
become a problem and moved to intercept the Cheyenne war-party, colliding with them at 
Warbonnet Creek on July 17. The skirmish that ensued was noteworthy mostly for its brevity; 
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Merritt’s cavalrymen outnumbered the Cheyenne five to one and easily chased them back to the 
reservation. King, ever a storyteller, took great liberties with the details of the skirmish, and in 
his memoirs and an essay published in the Denver Post inflated the Northern Cheyenne numbers 
to more than eight hundred while reducing Merritt’s to less than four hundred. He also invented, 
possibly out of whole cloth, the story of William “Buffalo Bill” Cody killing Cheyenne war-
leader Yellow Hair in single combat, a story many of the papers repeated.601 Northern Cheyenne 
recollections of the skirmish situate it far more accurately as the minor affair it really was, and 
state Yellow Hair was killed not in single combat, but in a hail of bullets from multiple 
cavalrymen all firing at once. They also emphasise the Cheyenne warband did not belong to 
Yellow Hair, as King claimed, but to the war-chief Little Wolf, who was out on the Plains again 
within weeks, leading a war-party of Northern Cheyenne to a juncture with fellow war-chief Dull 
Knife.602 Merritt’s repulse of the Cheyenne at did not prevent the hostiles from receiving 
reinforcements; it merely delayed it. 
 Merritt and Crook joined forces on August 3 and Crook, with his command bolstered to 
over 2200 men at last decided he could delay no longer and broke camp. He abandoned his 
supply wagons and his wounded at Goose Creek; to quickly meet up with Terry, and from 
thereon, pursue the Lakota and Cheyenne, Crook believed he would need to travel light. Without 
the wagons the men could carry fourteen days worth of rations with them, and no more; Surgeon 
Bennett Clements had to limit his stock of medical supplies to what he could fit onto two pack 
mules. Crook (and Bourke) both believed these limitations on supply were necessary to catch the 
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Lakota and Cheyenne, but Clements had his doubts. Of particular concern to him was the lack of 
fresh fruit or vegetables; on a diet of nothing but hard bread, bacon, coffee, sugar, and salt he 
feared the men might soon be coming down with scurvy.603  
 On August 10, a week after leaving Goose Creek, Crook met up with Terry and Gibbon 
who had hung together since the Little Bighorn. Bourke’s journals and memoir and King’s 
writings are all rather contemptuous of Terry and his soldiers, who travelled with full supply 
wagons and were well-fed and dressed in fresh uniforms. To Bourke and King these men paled 
in comparison to the “real” soldiers of Crook’s command, with their ragged clothes and 
starvation diet. They extended their comparison to Terry himself, who Bourke thought more of a 
scholar than a soldier, and who King believed to be making deliberately slow and overcautious 
advances when compared to Crook and his troops.604 What neither Bourke nor King could hide, 
however, was that for the duration of their time together, Crook’s command was dependent upon 
Terry’s for supplies of food and medicine—even as Crook (and Bourke and King) criticized 
Terry for the way the supply wagons slowed their advance. On August 26, after sixteen days of 
travelling together and finding no signs of Native life, Crook cut loose from Terry, and marched 
off into the badlands unencumbered by supply wagons and carrying, again, only fourteen days 
worth of rations and medicine. Said Surgeon Clements, “I procured a few ounces of quinine from 
General Terry’s command and inasmuch as it was supposed that we would of necessity reach 
some point of supply at the expiration of the time for which we were now fully rationed—
fourteen days—and as no estimation to the contrary was given, it was deemed unnecessary to 
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make any further addition to the medical supplies.”605 What Clements did not know at the time 
was that Crook would keep the command in the field for not fourteen, but for forty days.  
 What precisely Crook’s thought process was in making this decision is not clear. Bourke 
and King both justified their commanding officer’s choice on the basis it was the only way they 
could hope to overtake the Lakota and Cheyenne warbands, and there was an element of truth to 
this. Terry and Gibbon, weighed down by their wagons, spent the next month searching futilely 
for the hostiles who easily stayed out of their reach; aside from a few scattered contacts, neither 
Terry nor Gibbon joined battle with the hostiles for the remainder of the campaign season. Yet 
Crook’s decision to abandon his supply line and march out into the unknown without a timetable, 
a preplanned route, or even a sense of where his enemies were, hardly seems like the appropriate 
counterpoint to Terry’s slow advance.  
Mocked by the papers, hounded by Sheridan, and up against an adversary whose measure 
he had still not taken, Crook went in blind, searching for a strategy, any strategy, that would 
bring him to grips with the hostiles. When no brilliant way ahead revealed itself to him, Crook 
appears to have decided to put aside all common sense and take his command out into the 
wilderness on the gamble they would trip over Sitting Bull or Crazy Horse and allow him to 
score a victory that would end the grumbling at home. Crook’s correspondence—and Bourke’s 
hagiography—from this period offer little insight into the Brigadier-General’s inner life, but his 
actions have a sense of desperation to them. The Grey Fox, who had so decisively ended the 
Apache troubles in Arizona, looks to have had no idea what he was doing in Montana. 
 What he was doing for certain was wearing out his men. “The Horsemeat March,” as it 
soon became known, had a horrific effect on Crook’s soldiers and left many of them scarred for 
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life, inside and out. Surgeon Clements’ recollections were candid, relaying the medical officer’s 
horror at the conditions the men endured and the utter lack of anything resembling good medical 
practice. As rations for the men and fodder for the animals gave out, Crook began killing cavalry 
mounts and pack mules to feed his men, earning the march its ominous moniker. The weather 
turned on Crook too, and of the forty days the command was in the field, twenty-two were 
marked by torrential rain. Since Crook left not only his supply wagons, but his tents, cooking 
utensils, and ambulances behind, the precipitation made the march a study in absolute misery, 
leaving sick and injured men trudging through mud and sleeping outside in the chilling rains.606  
  Clements had worried a diet of bacon and hardtack would produce scurvy among the 
troops. A diet of badly cooked horseflesh and mule meat did not serve their health any better. To 
make matters worse, the Indigenous scouts began to leave the force, through open desertion, or 
by applying to Crook for jobs as messengers. The auxiliaries did not know the Lakota territories 
well, but they knew them better than Crook did, and their absence left his expedition even more 
lost. “Under those unfavourable conditions,” Clements said, “the command moved from its camp 
directly south on the morning of September 6, and marched thirty miles over a broken, rolling 
country, and camped at some alkaline water holes, without enough wood to even boil coffee 
with.”607 More men sickened that night and on September 7 Clements remembered, “all the 
litters, nine in number, were in use this day; many entreaties of sick and exhausted men had to be 
resisted; many horses were abandoned, and men continued to struggle into camp until 10 pm.”608 
That same evening Crook officially began the process of issuing horsemeat to the troops, and a 
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scouting party under Captain Anson Mills was sent out to ascertain where the command was, and 
if there was anywhere nearby they could resupply from. 
 Bourke and King’s remembrances of the Horsemeat March, while kinder to Crook 
personally than Clements was, paint an equally unhappy picture of the experience. Bourke 
observed that Crook shared the men’s privations, and that his birthday celebration of September 
8 was an especially forlorn affair “nothing to eat, nothing to drink, no chance to dry clothes, and 
nothing for which to be thankful except that we had found wood.”609 King’s recollections of the 
march are mostly descriptions of thunderstorms and hailstorms with the occasional interjection 
about Colonel Merritt punishing men who dared to violate orders by collecting firewood. Eleven 
days of unremitting rain played havoc with King and his fellow cavalrymen, and “three fourths 
of our cavalry, of the Second, Third, and Fifth regiments, had made the last day’s march afoot. 
One half our horses were broken down for good, one fourth had fallen never to rise again, and 
dozens had been eaten to keep us, their riders, alive.”610 At the time of King’s writing, Crook had 
not fought a single battle against the Lakota or Northern Cheyenne, yet his cavalry complement 
was already broken beyond repair.  
 On September 9 the dreary monotony of the Horsemeat March was broken by the arrival 
of a messenger, who informed Crook that Captain Mills had stumbled upon a Native 
encampment near Slim Buttes and was undertaking to attack it. Mills requested Crook bring the 
rest of the army to reinforce him and Crook hastened to comply. By the time Crook caught up, 
Mills had already launched his assault on the camp which, defended by only a few warriors 
under the minor war-leader American Horse, fell quite easily. Unable to hold onto their camp, 
the mortally wounded American Horse and his closest followers holed up in a ravine on the 
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outskirts of the camp from where they sniped at Mills’ company with impunity. Mills, not 
wanting to risk his own small force in a direct attack on the natural trench line of the ravine, 
stayed where he was and waited for Crook and the infantry to arrive; only once Crook had gotten 
there would they have the men needed to storm the ravine and root out American Horse. 
Unfortunately for Mills there was a time limit in play: some of the Lakota in the ravine had 
shouted to him that Crazy Horse was nearby and was already riding to their rescue. If Crook did 
not get there first, Mills and his company might easily go the way of Custer and the 7th 
Cavalry.611 
 Crook beat Crazy Horse to American Horse’s encampment where, after several 
exchanges of fire, he succeeded in negotiating the peaceful surrender of American Horse’s band. 
Working through white scouts who were fluent in Lakota, Crook was able to, in Bourke’s words, 
persuade American Horse “that General Crook’s promises were not written in sand.”612 Crook 
first offered safe conduct to the women and children who were hidden in the ravine, and after his 
men had escorted the non-combatants to safety, continued to debate with American Horse who, 
seeing that he was outnumbered 2200 to thirty, surrendered to Crook. Crook kept his word to 
American Horse, and while the camp was ransacked by starving soldiers desperate for something 
to eat, none of the surrendered Lakota were hurt; Crook also made sure the confiscated food was 
used to feed the prisoners as well as his troops.613 It was the first surrender of a Lakota warband 
the Great Sioux War had seen and Crook must have felt elated. Then Crazy Horse arrived. 
 American Horse’s followers had not been bluffing. Crazy Horse was camped only a short 
distance away, with eight hundred or so of his Oglala Lakota warriors and their Northern 
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Cheyenne allies. A rider named Burnt Thigh, carrying word from American Horse, reached 
Crazy Horse and the Oglala leader set out at once.614 Arriving too late to stop Crook from 
occupying the encampment, Crazy Horse seized the bluffs around the camp using mirrors to 
signal to the disparate parts of his force and keep them acting tandem.615 After an initial thrust 
down into the camp was blunted by concentrated fire from the carbines of Merritt’s cavalry, 
Crazy Horse pulled back onto the bluffs and poured rifle and arrow fire into Crook’s positions. 
Said Charles King, “That there are hundreds of Indians is plainly apparent from their rapid fire, 
but they keep five or six hundred yards away behind the ridges, peppering every exposed point 
of our lines.”616 Crook sent several battalions of infantry and dismounted cavalry charging up the 
ridgeline to meet Crazy Horse’s men; rather than standing and fighting, the Lakota and 
Cheyenne flowed away from Crook’s troops and struck at another part of the line. At one point, 
King counted two hundred fifty warriors assaulting five companies under the command of his 
friend Mason, and casualties in that detachment steadily rose until nightfall put an end to the first 
day’s fighting.617 As Northern Cheyenne war-leader Tall Bull tersely summarised “we attacked 
the soldiers and fought most of the day.”618 As the shooting stopped, Crook posted sentries along 
the part of the bluff he had taken while his men settled in for a restless night. Every so often the 
air was punctuated by gunshots, reminding the soldiers Crazy Horse was still nearby. 
 Crazy Horse did more that night than take the odd pot shot at the American troops. His 
men reoccupied much of the bluffs, and the next morning began firing into the camp again. At 
9:00 am Crook ordered his men to take what they could carry and burn the rest of the camp as 
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they were leaving. To the disgust of Surgeon Clements, the soldiers burnt not only the bulk of 
the rations they had captured, but the tepees he hoped to convert into tents for the wounded.619 
As the Americans pulled out Crazy Horse went on the offensive again, flanking Crook’s army 
and striking at their rear with his warriors. Where Bourke dismissed the attack, King provided a 
more honest account of the rearguard action which illustrated how hard fought it was. “All along 
the line,” he said, “the attack has commenced and the battalion is sharply engaged—fighting 
afoot, their horses being already led away after the main column, but within easy call. Our orders 
are to follow, but to stand off the Indians. They are not wanted to accompany the march. It is one 
thing to ‘stand off the Indians’ and hold your ground—it is quite another to stand him off and fall 
back. They are dashing about on their nimble ponies, following up the line as it doggedly retires 
from ridge to ridge, far outnumbering us and all the time keeping up a rattling fire and a volley of 
aboriginal remarks at our expense.”620 Several pages later, describing the last stages of the 
combat, King added, “But all the time Crook is marching away faster than we can back and 
follow him. We have to keep these howling devils beyond range of the main column, absorb 
their attention, pick up our wounded as we go, and be ready to give the warriors a welcome when 
they charge.”621 King, who later in the book would insist Slim Buttes was a victory, does not 
seem to have recognised he was describing, a fighting retreat.  
 As Crook withdrew from American Horse’s camp, he was forced to turn most of the 
prisoners he had taken loose. Others took the chance to escape on their own initiative, while 
Lakota and Cheyenne raiders made forays against Crook’s horse herd and pack train. Many 
Shields, a Sans Arc Lakota, was given a detailed description of the retreat by one of the escaped 
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prisoners. “When they overtook the cavalry a running fight took place, in which she made her 
escape. The cavalry trail appeared to be very large; found many dead horses on the trail with 
their hams cut out, as though the troops or the Indians had been subsisting on them. This squaw 
reports that the Indians recaptured from the troops about three hundred head of horses.”622 Many 
Shields also spoke to one of Crook’s few remaining Native scouts, Man That Hurts Himself, who 
said there were no fewer than three running fights between Crook’s rearguard and Crazy Horse’s 
outriders, and the pursuit did not let up until Crook entered the foothills and escaped. Crazy 
Horse then salvaged what supplies he could from the wreckage of the camp and inducted the 
survivors of American Horse’s warband into his own.623 By the end of September 10 all the 
fighting was over and Crook and Crazy Horse had gone their separate ways.  
 In his despatches to Sheridan after the battle, Crook held up Slim Buttes as a resounding 
victory for the US Army. It was the same trick he pulled after the Rosebud and realistically, 
should have been subjected to the same level of ridicule. The oversight present at the Rosebud 
was not, however, present this time. Many reporters, including Reuben Davenport of the New 
York Herald, left Crook’s army partway through the Horsemeat March, and those remaining 
were among the Brigadier-General’s most devoted sycophants. They echoed Crook’s boasts, as 
have the majority of  historians since. Jerome Greene, whose book Slim Buttes, 1876, remains 
the only full-length monograph on the battle, proclaimed Slim Buttes was one of the most 
important battles of the war marking the first time the US Army decisively beat the Lakota and 
Cheyenne, as well as the first time Crazy Horse was defeated in open combat. How, precisely, 
Crazy Horse was defeated, Greene remained hazy on, and he, like most other white historians 
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who have written on the battle, struggled to explain what, if any advantage the Americans 
obtained from Slim Buttes. In his conclusion, Greene admitted that Slim Buttes, rather than 
shortening the war, likely prolonged it, an admission that undercut his entire thesis.624  
 In The Journey of Crazy Horse, Lakota historian Joseph Marshall III, put forth that Crazy 
Horse, rather than Crook, won the Battle of Slim Buttes.625 Based on the evidence, Marshall’s 
argument has more legs under it than Greene’s. With an inferior force, Crazy Horse compelled 
Crook to retreat from Slim Buttes and to give up the prisoners and supplies he had taken from 
American Horse’s camp. When the battle came to an end it was Crazy Horse, not Crook, who 
controlled the ground over which the battle was waged, and Crazy Horse, not Crook, who had 
accomplished any of the goals he fought for in the first place. Crazy Horse went into Slim Buttes 
to save American Horse’s followers from being taken prisoner, and he did so. Crook went into 
Slim Buttes to feed his men and capture American Horse’s band, and failed to do either. He also 
failed to deal a crippling blow to Crazy Horse, which was the objective of not only Slim Buttes, 
but the entire campaign. Crazy Horse’s ability to make war was unimpeded by Slim Buttes, 
while Crook lost more men and expended more calories to no gain.  
 The Battle of Slim Buttes over, George Crook’s command went back to starving. What 
little food the men carried away from Slim Buttes lasted less than two days, and from then on it 
was back to a diet of undercooked horseflesh. Inevitably, scurvy, dysentery, and malnourishment 
caused the sick list to grow longer and longer. Since August 30, Crook had permitted hunting 
expeditions to secure food for invalids but the results were poor; Surgeon Clements stated on 
September 11 the only food secured was “two ducks and one leg of antelope,” a testament to 
either the success of the Lakota in driving off game, the poor hunting skills of Crook’s sickening 
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command, or both.626 By September 12, as the expedition slogged through a plain the rains had 
transformed into “a most tenacious quagmire,” the men were unloading saddles, bridles, and 
ammunition boxes to lighten the load, and “caching” them in the mud for retrieval at some 
unspecified future date.627 Only two percent of the army was excused from duty for reasons of ill 
health, but as Clements reported, this had less to do with the men’s actual health and more to do 
with the lack of facilities for the sick. “Had it not been known that there were no hospital tents or 
shelter for them, a very much larger proportion of men would have been reported sick. Hundreds 
of men remained ‘on duty’ during the latter part of the march to the Belle Fourche, who, under 
ordinary circumstances would have been excused and transported.”628  
Clements, focussed on the physical health of his patients, did not touch on their mental 
health in his report, but that too, was under a constant strain. Lieutenant Walter Schuyler, who 
was attached to Crook’s staff, told his father in a letter, “I have told you what I experienced on 
this march, but you can gather from that no realization of the suffering of the men, particularly 
the Infantry. I have seen men become so exhausted that they were actually insane, but there was 
no way of carrying them except for some officer or mounted man to give them his own horse, 
which was done constantly. I saw men who were very plucky, sit down and cry like children 
because they could not hold out.”629 Dysentery, scurvy, starvation, and madness; Crook’s 
expedition visited no shortage of horrors on those entrapped in it.   
 The Horsemeat March officially ended on September 16, when the command reached the 
vicinity of Custer City on the Belle Fourche. Crook transferred authority to Merritt, then left the 
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column to report to Sheridan. The Departmental Commander put the best face he could on the 
expedition, but to any unbiased observer it was obvious the entire business was a fiasco from 
start to finish. While Crook lost only a few men, all in the Battle of Slim Buttes, the number of 
sick and injured ran into the hundreds. Every soldier who marched with Crook needed months to 
recuperate, and many were mustered out of the army, never to see combat again. The costs in 
monetary terms ran even higher: hundreds of cavalry horses and pack mules were slaughtered for 
food, or cut loose from the column to die, and had to be replaced at army expense. Most of the 
riding equipment and ammunition the men “cached” on the march to the Belle Fourche was 
never recovered, raising the price of the campaign still higher. The long-term damage to the 
army may have been even worse. In his memoirs, John Bourke reflected that, of the officers who  
accompanied Crook on the Horsemeat March, over fifty percent were either dead or no longer fit 
for active duty, despite  only sixteen years having passed. “If any of my readers imagines that the 
march from the head of Heart River down to the Belle Fourche was a picnic,” Bourke wrote, “let 
him examine the roster of the command and tell of the scores and scores of men, then hearty and 
rugged, who now fill premature graves or drag out an existence with constitutions wrecked and 
enfeebled by such privations and vicissitudes.”630  
 George Crook wrecked his own army with only a little help from the Lakota and 
Cheyenne. With no real plan of advance and deserted by his Indigenous scouts, Crook spent 
forty days groping blindly about the Plains, and the one time he touched the Lakota, Crazy Horse 
slapped his hand away. Even historians like Jerome Greene, who see Slim Buttes as a triumph 
admit the rest of the campaign was a debacle, and the Army gained no strategic advantage over 
the Lakota and Cheyenne as a product of Crook’s efforts. If we accept Marshall’s contention that 
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Slim Buttes was yet another defeat for the Army then Crook’s leadership looks even worse. He 
may have had only a fraction of the men killed that Custer did at the Little Bighorn, yet when 
one begins to add up those troops who were permanently disabled by starvation and disease, the 
losses to the Army in able-bodied soldiers may exceed the Little Bighorn’s death toll. For forty 
days Crook put his command through a rainy, muddy Hell, and all he had to show for it was a 
lost battle and hundreds of men who could never fight again. How could Crook, a veteran officer 
with a reputation as a great “Indian” fighter, allow this to happen? 
 The answer is Crook allowed it to happen because he had no other options, or at least 
none he could see. Sheridan’s demands for action constricted Crook’s opportunities and left him 
with few real choices if he wanted to continue his career. Crook helped Sheridan draft the 
strategy for the Great Sioux War in the first place, and if he were to candidly tell his boss he now 
had no idea how to proceed, he might very well have lost his job. Yet having no idea how to 
proceed was very much the position Crook was in after the Rosebud. He knew the Lakota and 
Northern Cheyenne did not fight the way the Apache had, but he had no notion how he could 
alter his strategy to beat them. Crook’s immobility after the Rosebud was the paralysis of a man 
who knew nothing good lay ahead of him, and he put off making any decisions as long as he 
could until Sheridan forced his hand and inaugurated the chain of events that led, inexorably, to 
the life-destroying conditions of the Horsemeat March.  
 As the one in charge of the war effort, Sheridan should have been giving Crook strategic 
guidance. The only thing that came out of Chicago, however, were promises of reinforcements 
and telegrams demanding action. Sheridan could not or would not admit his original strategy was 
faulty, so he did nothing but feed more men into the warzone while providing Crook—and Terry 
and Gibbon for that matter—with no overall direction. Their commanding officer uninterested in 
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helping them, Sheridan’s subordinates were left to make their own way, resulting in Terry 
finding nothing and Crook finding famine and further reversal. The upper echelons of the 
American Army had not absorbed the lessons of the Rosebud or the Little Bighorn and urged the 
Departmental Commanders onto victory without giving them a strategy for achieving it. The 
Departmental Commanders, knowing the strategy they were given was flawed but lacking the 
resources or information to come up with a better plan, improvised as best they could, but their 
best was far from good enough. With over 2000 men apiece, Terry and Crook’s armies were too 
large to be dissected the way Custer’s had been, but they were also too large and unwieldy to 
catch anything and required more supplies than their logistics systems grant them. Terry, chained 
to his supply wagons, kept his men healthy, but never caught any Natives. Crook, after ditching 
his cumbersome transports, was able to find the Natives, but with a force that, weakened by 
exhaustion, malnutrition, and sickness, was in no condition to fight them. With the high 
command mired in ignorance and the Departmental heads only somewhat more enlightened, no 
one in the US Army it seemed, had any idea how to beat the Lakota and Cheyenne. It would be 
another month before an officer came up with a viable strategy, and when that finally happened, 




 With Lord Chelmsford’s withdrawal from Zululand, his surviving column commanders 
found themselves isolated and alone, cut off from one another and their leader by distance and 
the Zulu forces. Chelmsford’s initial plans to get back in the field were repeatedly delayed by 
insufficient reinforcements, and by February it was apparent that Charles Pearson and Evelyn 
Wood would be left to their own devices for the foreseeable future. Chelmsford’s instructions to 
both men were vague and left most of their decisions up to their own discretion, the one 
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overriding concern being that they maintain the integrity of their columns and take as few risks 
as possible. Chelmsford, despondent after the loss of Durnford, Pulleine, and the 1/24 at 
Isandlwana, was not prepared to let his remaining subcommanders take any serious chances. If 
the Zulu pounced on another of his columns Chelmsford might lose both the war and any further 
chances for promotion, prospects that daunted the Lieutenant-General. Accordingly, Pearson and 
Wood were ordered to refrain from undertaking any chancy operations, though if the chance to 
deal a serious blow materialised, Chelmsford expected them to take it. 
 For the Zulu, the situation was rife with opportunity. Despite the reversal at Nyezane and 
the high casualties sustained at Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift, Cetshwayo’s overarching strategy 
of dividing and conquering the British columns was working well. The Centre Column, 
identified by the King and his councillors as the most existential threat to Zululand, had been 
badly damaged and sent running back to Natal, while the Coastal Column had obligingly trapped 
itself at Eshowe, which, with the removal of Chelmsford’s column, was now well behind Zulu 
lines. So long as Wood could be prevented from advancing too far into Zululand, and he and 
Pearson kept from linking up with each other, Cetshwayo’s plan for frustrating and delaying the 
British until they sued for peace could be kept in working condition.  
 How Cetshwayo’s strategy was to be implemented was in the hands of his field 
commanders, and over the course of February and March 1879, two separate yet mutually 
supportive operations were undertaken by the King’s officers and liegemen. At Eshowe a loose 
coalition of local chieftains and royal representatives, of whom Cetshwayo’s brother Prince 
Dabulamanzi seems to have been first among equals, kept Pearson’s men in a state of siege. No 
trench lines were dug and no earthworks erected around the fort, but through constant patrols and 
frequent raids against sentries, work gangs, and livestock, the Zulu denied Pearson the freedom 
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of movement he required to leave Eshowe. At the same time, Zulu irregulars, assisted by Swazi 
auxiliaries under the direction of the exiled Prince Mbilini waMswati, launched a succession of 
forays against British allies around Luneberg, killing British sympathisers, threatening mission 
stations, and bogging down Evelyn Wood, who had the largest British army in the area, in a 
game of raid and counterraid. In contrast to his Zulu patrons, whose tactics were built around 
open battle during daylight hours, Prince Mbilini and his Swazi were guerillas and night fighters, 
and their activities kept the border communities of Natal in a steady state of panic, fixing 
Wood’s attention on the vicinity of Luneberg. Wood quickly came to loathe Mbilini, detailing 
men to sack Indigenous homesteads under the Prince’s protection.631 All along the front, the 
British and the Zulu found themselves in a stalemate—a situation that suited King Cetshwayo 
just fine. 
 For Colonel Charles Pearson a stalemate might as well have been a defeat. When Pearson  
chose to retreat behind the walls of Eshowe, it was on the assumption the Zulu could not 
maintain a proper siege. Over the seventy-two-day ordeal that followed, Pearson and his men 
discovered that Prince Dabulamanzi, having failed to take Rorke’s Drift by storm, had given 
some thought to how to run a siege and quickly mastered the fundamentals. Zulu snipers 
harassed Pearson’s sentries, outriders, and cattle drivers, with the former, as Pearson reported, 
finding themselves “constantly under fire; one was killed at his post; another, Private Carson, 
99th Regiment, was attacked by about a dozen Zulus who crept up near him in the long grass. 
They shot off two fingers of his right hand; he had a bullet through each thigh, and another in his 
right arm. His horse was also assegaied [sic].”632 On another occasion, the Zulu sprang upon an 
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unescorted herd of 1000 cattle, six hundred of them.633 Initially, Pearson was able to use horse-
messengers and runners to keep Chelmsford apprised of his circumstances, but as the Zulu net 
tightened this became harder to do. “Very soon after our arrival at Ekowe [sic],” Pearson 
recalled, “we found ourselves being gradually cut off from all communication with Natal, though 
occasionally a native messenger was persuaded to run the gauntlet through the enemy.”634 By 
mid-February, Prince Dabulamanzi’s screen of patrols was fully in place and for nearly a month 
Pearson was unable to communicate with Chelmsford at all; in the Colonel’s own words, 
“Between 11th February and 2nd March we had no communication whatever with the Lower 
Tugela,” a statement that serves as a testament to the efficacy of the Zulu skirmishers.635 Pearson 
eventually found a workaround to this problem, using a heliograph to flash signals to British 
outposts in Natal, but communications remained uncertain for the whole of the siege.636 
  Still more troubling for Pearson was his entire dearth of knowledge as to Zulu intentions 
and movements; in his report after the siege he stated honestly that “Our information regarding 
the movements of the Zulus was absolutely nil.”637 Often Pearson only became aware of the Zulu 
presence when they opened fire on his men, as happened repeatedly to the work gangs improving 
the roads around the fort. In general, the Zulu allowed Pearson’s soldiers free rein for a few 
miles in each direction from the fort but reacted strongly to any efforts to push further into 
Zululand, or to re-establish links to Natal, tearing up roadwork during the night and turning out 
in force to oppose any advances. In the more than two months he was at Eshowe, Pearson was 
only once able to go on the offensive, sending a raiding party to burn one of Prince 
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Dabulamanzi’s homesteads on March 1. On that occasion, Pearson’s marauders marched the 
seven miles to the homestead easily enough, but on their way back found themselves pursued by 
an ever-growing army of Zulu which chased them back into Eshowe. In his report Pearson tried 
to downplay the danger his men were in, but it is telling that in his remaining month at Eshowe 
he never again deigned to take the offensive.638 Interviewed after the war, Dabulamanzi stated 
his belief that he, rather than Pearson,  got the better of the encounter, and the Zulu Prince may 
have been right.639 He lost a homestead, but Pearson lost what freedom of action was left to him.  
 The real danger to Pearson’s troops was, in any event, not from Zulu fire, but from 
starvation and disease. Pearson did his best to prepare Eshowe for the siege, sending excess 
mouths back to Natal before the Zulu finished surrounding him and confiscating supplies from 
those so evacuated. Eshowe fortunately had its own water supply, so dehydration was not a 
concern, but that was the only front on which Pearson found himself lucky. Rot and infestations 
of weevils rendered ten percent of his stock of flour and biscuits inedible and required higher 
rations of meat be issued to make up the loss.640 The men soon ate through the herd of cattle that  
accompanied the Coastal Column to Nyezane, and in a decision reminiscent of George Crook’s 
Horsemeat March, they began to eat the trek oxen that  pulled their wagons. The meat from these 
animals was, unsurprisingly, almost too tough to chew and the troops experimented with 
numerous means of preparing it for human consumption including, apparently, frying it in boot 
polish and axle grease, a concoction that, according to those who tried it, did remarkably little to 
improve the taste or consistency of the meat.641 Slowly, but steadily, malnutrition set in among 
the Eshowe garrison, with men losing weight or developing early symptoms of scurvy. Diseases, 
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including typhoid and dysentery also started working their way through the garrison, and by 
April, nine officers and one hundred men were on the sick list, while four officers and twenty-
one men were dead from illness. “The large percentage of deaths,” Pearson believed, “were 
probably due to the want of proper medicines and medical comforts.”642 The unending rains did 
not help and Pearson attributed much of the sickness among his troops to “the constant wet 
weather, and the overcrowding of the fort, the work having been constructed for a much smaller 
garrison.”643 Prince Dabulamanzi never studied European siege tactics, but as Pearson’s report 
indicates, his efforts at Eshowe were enough to make the Coastal Column miserable. 
 Pearson said he always believed his men could hold Eshowe. Lord Chelmsford was not 
nearly so sanguine about their chances. In a communication with Pearson on February 2, 
Chelmsford asked the Colonel a series of questions about his ability to retreat from Eshowe to 
Natal, telling him if the Zulu attacked, Pearson’s job was to beat them, then immediately retire to 
the Lower Tugela where he could be more easily fed.644 In a letter to Evelyn Wood written the 
following day, Chelmsford told Wood “Pearson’s force will have to fall back upon the 
Umsindoosi river.” Revealing again the trust he placed in Wood, Chelmsford confided 
“[Pearson] cannot remain at Ekowe [sic] many weeks, as his food supply will not last—I do not 
see any advantage in his holding out there, as to feed him would require a bush fight, or battle of 
Inyazana [sic], every time supplies were sent, and we have not the number of men sufficient to 
escort the waggons.”645 Depressed after Isandlwana, Chelmsford all but gave up Eshowe as lost, 
telling Wood, “my idea is that our only chance of making any real impression in Zululand is to 
 
642 “From Colonel Pearson, commanding No. 1 Column, to the Military Secretary…April 9, 1879,” 73. 
643 “From Colonel Pearson, commanding No. 1 Column, to the Military Secretary…April 9, 1879,” 73. 
644 “Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford to Colonel C.K. Pearson, February 2, 1879,” in Lord Chelmsford’s 
Zululand Campaign 1878-1879, ed. John Laband (Phoenix Mill: Alan Sutton Publishing Ltd, 1994): 88-90. 
645 “Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford to Colonel H.E. Wood, February 3, 1879,” 90. 
312 
 
reinforce your column to the fullest extent with mounted men.”646 Locked in an ever more bitter 
battle with the press and his superiors in London, Chelmsford did not trust Pearson or, 
apparently, himself to reverse the course of the war. He did, however, trust Wood, and Wood’s 
cavalry commander, Sir Redvers Buller. “I wish I saw my way with honour out of this beastly 
country, and had you as my travelling companion,” Chelmsford signed off his letter to Wood. 
“Best love to Buller—You two will have to pull me out of the mire.”647  
 With only a single column and conflicting orders as to how many risks he was permitted 
to take, Wood’s odds for pulling Chelmsford out of the mire were less than stellar. Chelmsford 
knew this too, and in his correspondence with Colonel Stanley of the War Office did his best to 
present every minor raid perpetrated by Wood and Buller as a significant military 
achievement.648 Sir Bartle Frere, taking his cues from Chelmsford, did the same in his letters to 
Michael Hicks-Beach at the Colonial Office, and both branches of government were inundated 
with reports about how many Zulu homesteads Wood and Buller had burnt and how many Zulu 
cattle they had rustled.649 The actual facts were that these operations were of little more than 
annoyance to the Zulu and were repaid tit for tat by Prince Mbilini, whose guerillas marauded 
into territories loyal to the British, pillaging mission stations and setting collaborationist 
homesteads aflame. Local Africans friendly to the British were terrified they would be next on 
Mbilini’s list of targets, and Boer settlers in Luneberg and Utrecht, never excited about the war 
effort, became more reluctant to assist the British than they already were, wanting to keep their 
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men and guns at home in the event the renegade Swazi paid them a visit.650 The result of this 
back and forth terrorism between Wood and Mbilini was dozens of dead and a great deal of fear 
on both sides of the border, but little in the way of tangible military benefit. For Mbilini, who 
was fulfilling his obligations to Cetshwayo by keeping Wood busy, that was itself a victory. For 
Wood, an ambitious officer with high hopes for accolades and promotion, it was degrading work 
that earned him nothing. 
 Wood did create a diplomatic coup for the British when he secured the defection of 
Prince Hamu kaMpande, half-brother of Cetshwayo and a favourite of their late father. Hamu, 
who thought he should have been king instead of Cetshwayo, spent most of the latter’s reign 
seeking to undermine his brother and improve his own position. He was against not only war 
with the British, but against even trying to resist their advance, and began negotiations with 
Wood and various of Wood’s proxies in February. Found out by Cetshwayo’s agents, Hamu and 
a few retainers raced across the border into Swaziland, narrowly avoiding capture by Mbilini, 
who was sent to intercept his party. Chelmsford and Bartle Frere both crowed about the 
importance of Hamu’s defection in letters to Stanley and Hicks-Beach and predicted many Zulu 
chiefs would follow him. In this they were wrong: Hamu, who reached Wood’s camp on March 
10, was all but alone in his decision to switch sides and remained the lone chief of any 
prominence to side with the invaders until well into the war.651 Still, his changing his allegiance 
to Wood did give the Colonel’s No. 4 Column two hundred reinforcements in the form of his 
household warriors, a welcome addition given Wood was now the only British force in Zululand.  
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 Shortly after Hamu’s arrival, Wood was notified of another military catastrophe, this time 
at Ntombe Drift in his own area of operations. In fairness to Wood, it should be said he had no 
immediate control over the events that transpired on the banks of the Ntombe River and was 
unaware the action had taken place until after the fact. That it happened at all, however, did 
nothing for Wood’s prospects of saving Chelmsford’s campaign, or furthering his own career. 
The details were as follows: on March 5, a supply column from Luneberg abandoned a large 
portion of its wagons when they broke down in the mud (an article in the Transvaal Argus 
alleged the wagons were sabotaged by the Zulu, which, given Mbilini’s predilection for guerilla 
tactics was just possible).652 Two days later, a unit of one hundred six men and officers led by 
Captain David Moriarty was sent out from Luneberg to retrieve the wagons which had, in the 
meantime, been robbed several times by Prince Mbilini’s Swazi. On March 11, Moriarty tried to 
move the wagons across the Ntombe River but, with the river swollen with floodwater, found it 
was impossible to get all of them across. Giving up after getting the first few over, Moriarty 
pitched camp on both sides of the river, his soldiers divided from one another by the waters of 
the Ntombe—a risky proposition, but one the Captain apparently saw as necessary for the 
protection of all the wagons. He did order both forces to laager, but gaps were left between the 
wagons and Moriarty only posted two sentries that evening, despite one of his wagon drivers 
recognising Mbilini himself conversing with one of the African porters and trying to warn first 
Sergeant Anthony Booth and then Moriarty an attack was imminent.653 
 What David Moriarty was thinking will never be known. It seems almost unrealistic that, 
in the aftermath of Isandlwana, a British officer could have encamped in Zulu territory without 
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taking even the most elementary precautions against attack. It was not as though Moriarty were 
an inexperienced ‘base wallah’ either; he was a forty-two-year-old frontline officer in the 80th 
Infantry Regiment and a veteran of campaigns in India and South Africa both.654 Major Charles 
Tucker, commanding officer of the 80th and Moriarty’s immediate superior, visited the camp on 
March 11 and told Moriarty the wagons were too widely spaced for effective defense, yet did not 
instruct Moriarty to fix this problem. With no orders from Tucker to overrule his own decisions, 
Captain Moriarty decided his incomplete barricades were good enough—even though those on 
the south side, where only two wagons remained, could not form an entire wall, let alone a 
laager. With seventy-one men on the north/left bank of the river under Moriarty, and thirty-five 
on the south/right bank under Lieutenant Henry Harward, the British company was dangerously 
divided, with neither portion of the company able to adequately defend itself or come to the aid 
of the other. The War Office’s Narrative of Field Operations castigated Moriarty for his 
disposition of his forces but could not provide any insight into what was going through his 
mind.655 It may be this really was a case where the white officer was just plain stupid. Or it may 
be that Moriarty, who had not been with Chelmsford during the first invasion, was unwilling, in 
his colonial arrogance, to credit that the Zulu were any kind of menace to his troops.  
 Prince Mbilini waMswati was, unfortunately for the British, neither stupid nor (militarily) 
arrogant. He was also, by personal preference and cultural training, a master of nocturnal 
ambush, something the British had not yet come up against in Zululand. Indeed, it may have 
been his belief the Zulu did not attack at night that made Captain Moriarty so lax in his 
preparations. If so, British soldiers  once more paid the price for their officer’s assumption that 
all Africans fought the same way. Early in the morning of March 12, Mbilini moved into position 
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on the north bank of the Ntombe with a force of eight hundred exiled Swazi warriors and local 
Zulu levies. Stripping naked and leaving their shields and muskets behind to be as stealthy as 
possible, the Prince’s entourage carried only their spears and clubs as they swam across the 
Ntombe and slipped through the British lines. The lone sentry Moriarty posted on his side of the 
river was killed by Swazi infiltrators at 4:30 am, though not before getting off a shot which 
alerted the men on the south bank, but not, apparently, those on the north whom he was 
theoretically guarding. At 5:15, having infiltrated to within seventy yards of Moriarty’s camp, 
Mbilini gave the order to charge.656 His warriors swarmed over the walls of the laager and killed 
almost every man inside as they slept, arming themselves with the very rifles Moriarty’s wagons 
were transporting. Captain Moriarty rushed out of his tent naked, brandishing a revolver. His 
courage greatly exceeding his intelligence, he shouted for the men to rally to him and fired off 
three rounds, killing three of Mbilini’s guerillas before they cut him down where he stood.657 
 Ntombe Drift was not a battle but a butchery; the only way Moriarty could have made 
things easier for Mbilini was if he had shot his men himself. Josiah Sussens, a wagon driver who 
survived Mbilini’s storming of the camp, recalled the horror he witnessed in an interview with 
one of the Transvaal papers, saying: “Seeing I was powerless to do anything, having no arms of 
any kind, I ran down between the oxen, and made for the river, which was about 60 yards off. I 
found the Zulus shooting and stabbing the people in all directions. The sight was a most 
horrifying one, and never to be forgotten. I had to dodge about to save myself, and am now 
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surprised to find that I managed to get through at all.”658 Sussens and a few others threw 
themselves into the river to escape the African raiders, only to find the Zulu and Swazi were 
better swimmers than the British. Sussens got away, but many others were shot or speared by 
Mbilini’s men who either dove in after the British or stood “on the banks, and at the edge of the 
river, as thick as thieves, throwing assegais and aiming their guns wherever they saw a head.”659 
Sussens was saved by the soldiers on the south side of the river who, under Sergeant Anthony 
Booth, the senior NCO left alive in the camp, were just barely holding together; Booth, who was 
told by the waggoneer of Mbilini’s visit had been sitting up all night awaiting an attack and was 
consequently the only person in the camp ready for it when it came. Lieutenant Harward, in 
command on the south bank, was gone, fleeing on horseback and leaving his men to die.660  
 In an action that would (rightfully) earn him a Victoria Cross recommendation from Sir 
Garnet Wolseley, Sergeant Booth succeeded in extricating his soldiers from Ntombe Drift, 
beating a fighting retreat for Luneberg, harried much of the way by two hundred of Mbilini’s 
warriors, who swam across the river  hoping to finish what they started on the north bank.661 The 
rest of Mbilini’s troops set about looting the British camp which was stripped of ammunition, 
livestock, and anything else the renegade Prince felt was worth taking. Of the one hundred six 
men who accompanied Moriarty to Ntombe Drift, sixty-six were known to be dead. Many more 
were wounded or missing, their bodies lost to the river. The final body count, tallied up days 
later, was put at eighty-six British officers and men, and fifteen black African waggoneers; of the 
one hundred fifty personnel, soldiers and civilians alike, present at the Ntombe, over two-thirds 
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were dead. The supplies they were sent to retrieve were lost to the British for good, and included 
more than three hundred cattle, as well as several wagonloads of rifles and ammunition.662 Major 
Tucker, seeking to protect his own reputation and that of Lieutenant Harward tried to cover up 
the entire business, but could not stop word from leaking out. Wood, when told of what  
happened, was aghast.663 Mbilini had embarrassed the Colonel again, and this time his victims 
had not been African converts or collaborators, but British soldiers, men who were not only 
under Wood’s protection, but under his command. In the grand scheme of things, Ntombe Drift 
was a fairly small defeat, but it ratcheted up Wood’s hatred of Mbilini another notch, and in 
doing so may have contributed to the next calamity that would befall the British, this time at 
Hlobane.  
 The other major contributing factor to the coming disaster at Hlobane was Evelyn 
Wood’s hatred of Indigenous Africans. Paternalistic contempt for non-whites was a trait shared 
by the bulk of the British officer class, but in Wood’s case it went deeper than that. Since the 
Second Anglo-Asante War and his appointment to Sir Garnet Wolseley’s expedition to the 
Asante Empire, Wood had harboured a dislike for and disgust with Native Africans that decades 
of life would harden rather than erase. As one of Wolseley’s Special Service officers, Wood was 
detailed to manage Britain’s Fanté allies, arranging them into an auxiliary battalion that 
Wolseley dubbed “Wood’s Irregulars”—a name Chelmsford reused for the portions of the Native 
Contingent commanded by Wood in the Xhosa and Zulu conflicts. The Colonel did not see this 
as much of an honour, and his recollections of the Asante War in his memoirs are less a 
description of the war and more a diatribe on the presumed racial failings of the Fanté. Wood 
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viewed his black troops as useless, saying they would only fight under threat from white officers 
and even then were prone to running. Wood blamed every Asante victory on the cowardice of 
the Fanté auxiliaries and insisted the only way to win was to utilise as many white troops as 
possible.664 In attributing all his and Wolseley’s difficulties to Fanté perfidy, Wood also 
denigrated the battle prowess of the Asante Empire, which had crushed a previous British 
invasion, and gave Wolseley a hard fight this time around; Wood was of the opinion the sun was 
far more dangerous to British soldiers than the Asante warriors.665 Locked into the same colonial 
mindset that made Chelmsford assume the Xhosa and Zulu would fight the same way, Wood 
reapplied his descriptions of the Fanté and Asante to the Ninth Frontier War as well, structuring 
the Mfengu auxiliaries he led as cowards and incompetents and the Xhosa as dangerous only 
when hidden. Any failures Chelmsford endured in the Xhosa War were the fault of the Mfengu 
not following orders, any triumphs were due entirely to the white men and officers of the British 
Army.666  
 This is not to suggest Wood was unable to view Africans as human, or that his attitudes 
were uniquely monstrous—far from it. In the Asante War Wood threatened a white officer with 
deportation for unjustly striking his black troops and he struck up an enduring friendship with 
Fanté chief Essevie, whom Wood saw as personally brave, trustworthy, and intelligent.667 On his 
return to London the Colonel would, at considerable personal expense, purchase a top hat, 
walking stick, and umbrella for Essevie and ship them all the way to the Gold Coast so his friend 
would have clothes befitting a Victorian gentleman.668 After the Ninth Frontier War, when the 
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Boer settlers advocated the extermination of the Xhosa, Wood spoke against them and assigned 
men to prevent any atrocities from taking place.669 His conviction African auxiliaries were 
cowards by nature were also far from uncommon—it was shared by no less a personage than Sir 
Garnet Wolseley, Wood’s commanding officer in the Asante War and a man widely regarded as 
Britain’s best colonial soldier of the nineteenth century. Wolseley told his superiors he needed 
more white troops because Africans would always fail him, and in his own memoirs harped on 
the ingrained cowardice and stupidity of the Fanté to a point that might have given even Wood 
pause.670 To Wolseley, the Fanté were not only cravens but liars, and scouting reports from black 
auxiliaries that were unconfirmed by white eyes could not, and should not be trusted, a notion 
Wood seems to have absorbed from his former chief.671 The point, it must be emphasised, is not 
that Wood was a uniquely bigoted man, but that his bigotry, nurtured in the Asante and Xhosa 
Wars, and reinforced by comments from patrons like Wolseley, would have harsh consequences 
for his men in the Anglo-Zulu War. To Wood, Mbilini, as an African, could only be a rogue and 
a bandit, and his evasion of Wood to date a humiliation. The other facets of Mbilini: the Swazi 
royal pretender, the Zulu baron, the borderlands guerilla general, eluded Wood, and prevented 
him seeing the renegade Prince as anything other than a savage. The stage was thus set for 
Hlobane and the worst British defeat since Isandlwana. 
 In the last days of March, Lord Chelmsford sent Wood a letter requesting the Colonel 
stage a distraction to draw off Zulu forces from Eshowe. Pearson’s situation was desperate and 
Chelmsford meant to march to his relief but was reluctant to do so in the face of the whole Zulu 
army. Chelmsford wanted Wood to make a demonstration “about the 27th of this month, so that 
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the news of it may reach the neighbourhood of Ekowe [sic] by the 29th I think it might have a 
good effect.”672 Chelmsford told Wood he was going to give similar orders to the officers at the 
border posts between Natal and Zululand and that he aimed for “demonstrations all along the 
line.”673 Wood took these instructions from Chelmsford as cause to seize Hlobane mountain, a 
Zulu fortress he had previously refrained from assaulting because “the position is stronger and 
more difficult to take than I anticipated.”674 This was an understatement: Hlobane was a towering 
escarpment of stone networked with caves and tunnels that the abaQulusi Zulu, a local, half-
Swazi tributary of the larger Zulu Kingdom, used as a refuge for their cattle and non-combatants 
in times of war. The mountain came to two separate peaks: Hlobane proper and the slightly 
lower Ntendeka plateau which were joined by a steep, rocky pass that became known after the 
battle, as Devil’s Nek.675 Since early March, Hlobane had been used as a bastion by not only the 
abaQulusi, but by Prince Mbilini, whose Swazi enjoyed good relations with the abaQulusi and 
recruited many of their Zulu warriors from among them. Wood had pondered how to take 
Hlobane since mid-March, and by capturing it now aimed to not only provide Chelmsford with 
the distraction he required, but to take Mbilini and the abaQulusi out of the war. It was a bold 
plan, though one that had been insufficiently researched. Thanks to inconsistent testimony, 
whether Wood did no scouting before Hlobane, or sent out his African scouts and then ignored 
their reports, is debated by historians, but the answer is, in most respects, irrelevant: what matters 
is that Wood, either through a refusal to scout or a refusal to believe what his scouts told him, 
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was ignorant as to the true geography of Hlobane and to the strength of the forces holding it—or 
the strength of the forces deployed nearby.  
 On the 27 of March, Redvers Buller and Cecil Russell, with the bulk of Wood’s cavalry 
and African auxiliaries, marched from their base at Khambula Hill to a position a few miles from 
Hlobane. As they settled in for the night, the men reported seeing three great fires springing to 
life atop Hlobane and Ntendeka.676 The British would not find out until after the war what those 
fires were for. Unbeknownst to Wood, a Zulu force more than 15 000 strong had left Ulundi on 
March 25 and was marching to the relief of the abaQulusi. Cetshwayo’s leading counsellor, 
Chief Mnyamana of the Buthelezi, had charge of the army with Chief Ntshingwayo kaMahole, 
the victor of Isandlwana, as his de facto field commander. Prince Mbilini and the abaQulusi 
Chief Manyanyoba, aware that Mnyamana and Ntshingwayo were coming to join them, lit the 
fires to signal to the approaching Zulu host that Wood was finally making his move on Hlobane 
and their help would be needed on the morrow. Wood, though warned by Chelmsford that he 
might well find himself confronting the bulk of the Zulu military, had no idea Mnyamana and 
Ntshingwayo were even in the region.677 In his memoirs Wood said he knew the Zulu were 
gathering at Ulundi, but thought they would not be ready to march until the 27 and would not 
reach Hlobane until at least the 29, by which time he expected to have already conquered the 
mountain.678 No mention of this specific knowledge is made in Wood’s correspondence with 
Chelmsford, and the line in From Midshipman to Field Marshal may well be self-serving 
distortion. Even accepting it, however, does not shine a good light on Wood’s intelligence 
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gathering. On the eve of Hlobane, Wood did not know where the Zulu army was, while Mbilini, 
Manyanyoba, and now Mnyamana and Ntshingwayo knew exactly where Wood was. 
 At three in the morning on March 28, Wood and his staff officers rode out from 
Khambula to the base of Hlobane where they met up with the scouting force under Redvers 
Buller and Cecil Russell. Wood’s scheme for Hlobane involved a two-pronged, rapid advance by 
his Volunteer cavalry and African auxiliaries, with Buller leading one wing of the assault up 
Hlobane proper while Russell led the other up Ntendeka, pushing the Zulu occupants of the 
mountains before them. If all went according to plan, Buller and Russell would pin the Zulu 
between them on Devil’s Nek, where they could then be eliminated. Wood believed the bulk of 
the abaQulusi were away from Hlobane, and he only had to deal with Mbilini’s immediate 
followers.679 That a cavalry charge up a mountain face went against basic principles of warfare 
does not seem to have occurred to Wood, or if it did, to have bothered him in the least. In neither 
his memoirs nor his letters to Chelmsford, did Wood explain why he relied on the cavalry and 
the auxiliaries to the extent he did at Hlobane—though an earlier section of his autobiography, 
extolling the accomplishments of Sir Redvers Buller and his Volunteer cavalry against the Xhosa 
may offer a glimpse into his thinking.680 Certainly, Wood thought of Buller as his most 
accomplished subordinate and the man he could most trust to handle an operation of this import. 
He may also have believed the members of Prince Mbilini’s warband, be they Swazi or Zulu, 
would be as intimidated by the sight of a cavalry charge as the Xhosa were a year before. Giving 
Wood his due, it should be remembered that at Isandlwana, Durnford and a mixed force of 
colonial and Native cavalry held up a much larger Zulu army for quite some time, and that 
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Wood, who defended Durnford from the worst of Chelmsford’s accusations, may have drawn 
some inaccurate conclusions from that battle about the efficacy of massed cavalry against the 
Zulu. Whatever else Wood may have taken away from Isandlwana, he does not appear to have 
understood the salient lesson of the battle: namely that the Zulu had triumphed there because 
they understood the terrain and had far better battlefield control than the British did. Wood’s plot 
for Hlobane built around two separate columns, operating in tandem, but isolated from one 
another physically, played directly into the enemy leadership’s hands. The Swazi Prince and the 
Zulu Chiefs knew Hlobane and Ntendeka far better than Wood did and knew where one another 
were. Buller and Russell, conversely, would be moving in ignorance of one another, and their 
lack of detailed knowledge about the terrain of Hlobane proved a crucial weakness. 
 The Battle of Hlobane began with Sir Redvers Buller’s charge up the side of the titular 
mountain, and at first all went as Wood hoped. Buller’s command, comprising four hundred fifty 
white troops and five hundred Indigenous auxiliaries, bulled their way towards the summit of 
Hlobane, driving Mbilini’s Swazi and Zulu warriors before them. In his after-action report, 
Buller attributed this initial success to the misty weather which concealed his men until the 
moment of their attack, allowing him to take Hlobane’s defenders by surprise.681 A firefight near 
the summit cost Buller two officers and one trooper, before Mbilini’s men vanished into the 
caves pockmarking the mountain. Buller then set about rustling the abaQulusi Zulu’s cattle 
which were left at the top of Hlobane for safe keeping.682 Shortly afterwards, Russell reached the 
summit of Ntendeka (referred to as Lower Hlobane in Buller’s report), where he discovered 
Devil’s Nek was nearly impassable, and Wood’s plan of pinioning Mbilini between Russell and 
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Buller was not practicable: not only was Devil’s Nek partially blocked by a landslide (whether 
natural or manmade), but the Zulu, rather than allowing themselves to be cornered, disappeared 
into the caves and tunnels of Ntendeka, just as their compatriots had on Hlobane.683 The 
blockage of Devil’s Nek made communication between Buller and Russell extremely difficult, 
with the lieutenant-colonels having to navigate a treacherous goat path just to speak to one 
another.684  
 The communication difficulties experienced by the British forces only became more 
convoluted as the day wore on. The Volunteer cavalry of the Border Horse, under Commandant 
Weatherly, were separated from Buller during the ascent of Hlobane and joined up with Wood 
who, with several of his staff officers, was following Buller’s track to the summit of Hlobane.685 
Near the top, Wood and Weatherly were fired on by Zulu (or more likely, Swazi) snipers hidden 
in the caves; their efforts to clear the caves cost them several men, including Wood’s aide 
Lieutenant Lloyd and his friend Captain Ronald Campbell. Wood, overcome with grief, 
descended Hlobane, taking Weatherly’s Border Horse with him, and held a funeral service for 
Lloyd and Campbell.686 In doing so, Wood cut himself off from easy contact with Buller and 
Russell and prevented Weatherly’s Border Horse from linking up with Buller on the summit of 
Hlobane. The division of forces was then made permanent when a force of between 2000 and 
3000 abaQulusi Zulu, whom Wood thought safely away from Hlobane, appeared on the plains 
before Wood. Some of the abaQulusi went after Wood and the Border Horse while others began 
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scaling Hlobane.687 As they did, Mbilini’s warriors emerged from the caves and fired on Buller’s 
troops. Recalled Buller, “I found that the Zulus had been largely reinforced and that, owing to 
the great size of the mountain, and the great difficulty of the path by which we had to retire, there 
was every probability of the enemy being able to assemble at one end of the fire, and then rush 
upon us as we retired.”688 The peak of Hlobane, so easily taken by Buller,  now became a 
deathtrap for the cavalrymen and their auxiliaries. Mbilini and Manyanyoba were choking Buller 
off from Russell and Wood and pressing against his command from all sides. As Buller was 
trying to come to a decision about what course to take, he “observed a very large number of 
Zulus advancing in order across the flats on the south-east.”689 Mnyamana and Ntshingwayo, 
with 15 000 Zulu warriors, were marching on Hlobane. 
 Russell’s troopers saw the oncoming Zulu army as well. As Mnyamana and Ntshingwayo  
deployed their men about Hlobane and Ntendeka, threatening to surround the entire mountain 
with their warriors, Russell sent a runner to Wood asking what action to take. Wood ordered 
Russell to withdraw to Zunguin Nek; Russell, unclear on where that was, pulled all his men off 
Ntendeka and fled in the opposite direction from Wood.690 After the battle, there would be many 
recriminations between Wood and Russell, with Wood alleging Russell disobeyed his orders and 
Russell arguing Wood’s orders had been unclear and unhelpful.691 Russell initially tried to take 
the cattle his men had stolen along with them but “the Zulu army assumed such very large 
proportions and moved with such extreme rapidity that at about 10 A.M. I thought it necessary to 
abandon the cattle, as I did not see how I was to protect the large number of natives who were 
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driving them.”692 Russell’s retreat might not have been especially heroic, but it did save the lives 
of most of his troopers; of the British forces engaged on March 28, it was Russell’s who suffered 
the fewest casualties. Buller and Weatherly’s men were not nearly as lucky. 
 After coming down from Hlobane, Weatherly was dispatched to “push round the 
southern side of Thlabana [sic], as a large impi of the enemy had been seen on that side.”693 
Weatherly’s men had not gone much more than a mile and a half when they ran into Mnyamana 
and Ntshingwayo’s army and were made to retreat, pursued by elements of both the main Zulu 
army and the local abaQulusi levies. Chased to the edge of a cliff by the Zulu, the majority of the 
Border Horse met a decidedly horrendous end when the pursuing Zulu rammed into the milling 
cavalry and shoved them off the cliff face to their deaths on the rocks below. Only a sliver of the 
Border Horse, led by Captain Dennison, lived to report their fate to Buller and Wood.694 Wood, 
who spent pages eulogising Lloyd and Campbell in his autobiography did not even mention the 
annihilation of the Border Horse in his chapter on Hlobane. Their demise is likewise absent from 
his March 30 despatch on Hlobane—a letter in which Wood had the audacity to claim that 
Hlobane was a victory (he reported it as the “Inhlobana Mountain was successfully assaulted and 
its summit cleared”) but not the humanity to acknowledge the sacrifice of an entire colonial 
unit.695 Wood himself was, by this point, in retreat to Khambula with his surviving staff officers 
and those troops who accompanied them. That left Buller alone to cut his way out from Hlobane, 
with no aid coming from Russell, Wood, or the now deceased Weatherly. 
 Sir Redvers Buller’s career would have many ups and downs, but the ignominious retreat 
from Hlobane may have been the future general’s finest moment. Recognising that he could not 
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go back the way he came, Buller led his troops down Devil’s Nek to Ntendeka, and from there 
descended to the plains below. Describing the effort, Buller said “our line of retreat was most 
difficult, descending onto the plateau of the Lower Hlobana [sic] Mountain, which had earlier in 
the day been occupied by Colonel Russell, but which he had now left, by a narrow—almost 
perpendicular—cattle track down a Krantz some 120 feet deep, with scarcely room for three 
horses abreast, by rocky steps, in many cases only a few inches broad, and with jumps of three, 
four, and even five feet between them; and having crossed that plateau, we had then the 
mountain itself, very steep, rocky, and precipitous to descend.”696 Mbilini’s Swazi and the 
abaQulusi hounded Buller the entire way down, firing on his horsemen and at other points 
closing with their spears. “In such a descent,” Buller stated, “a certain amount of confusion was 
unavoidable, and this was increased by the Zulus crowding on our rear and flanks, and 
commencing a heavy fire, which killed a large number of the horses.”697 With a large portion of 
Buller’s command composed of African auxiliaries, cases of mistaken identity abounded, and 
when a party of Zulu were mistaken for allied Natives, it resulted in a disaster: “they did cease 
firing, and in a moment the Zulus were among us. In the struggle that ensued we suffered 
heavily, losing 1 officer, 15 men, and Mr. Piet Uys, who had got down safely but returned to 
assist his son and was assegaied.”698 Buller’s cavalry, many of them now dismounted, were 
chased by the Zulu all the way back to Khambula, losing still more men in the process; as Buller 
himself confessed, the retreat came very close to being a rout. Buller, in contrast to Wood, 
acknowledged the deaths of Commandant Weatherly and his men in his report, and the 
decimation of a group of scouts under Captain Barton, who tried to go to Weatherly’s assistance, 
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“Captain Barton and 18 out of his 32 men, and Commandant Weatherly, with 44 of the 54 
Border horse being killed.”699  
 Whether Hlobane was a spirited Zulu defensive effort or a deliberate ambush, with 
Mbilini drawing Wood’s men up the mountain so the abaQulusi and the army from Ulundi could 
entrap them, is a matter of some debate among historians. The number of casualties is also a 
matter of serious dispute, not helped by Wood’s casualty numbers shifting between reports, 
letters, and memoirs. A figure of two hundred dead, eighty of them British soldiers or white 
colonial volunteers and the other hundred and twenty of them Native auxiliaries is often given, 
but this is far from the highest number that has been offered.700 One of the Natal papers reported 
seven officers and four hundred men had been killed, a number that made its way to London and 
featured in a House of Commons debate.701 Ron Lock, whose Blood on the Painted Mountain is 
the only full-length study of Hlobane, contends all these numbers are too low. Wood, Lock 
believes, lowballed the number of colonial volunteers who were killed, and entirely ignored the 
casualties among the African auxiliaries, knowing his superiors would never check those 
statistics. Lock’s estimates place Wood’s casualties at one hundred thirty colonial volunteers, 
one hundred of Prince Hamu’s retinue of warriors, and between two hundred and three hundred 
of Wood’s Irregulars, the latter number being the hardest to determine as virtually the entire unit 
deserted later that same day. In total, Lock believes Wood had between four hundred thirty and 
five hundred thirty men killed, out of a total army of around 3000; a sixth of his force.702 
Commandant Schermbrucker of the Kaffrarian Rifles, who fought under Buller at Hlobane, gives 
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added weight to Lock’s assertions, stating Buller’s casualties alone included “125 Europeans and 
more than 300 Natives and over 300 horses.”703 Add in the desertions from the Irregulars, and 
Wood had somewhat less than 2000 men with him at Khambula as March 28 rolled into the 29. 
 As to the question of defense versus ambush, that issue cannot easily be settled. As at 
Isandlwana, however, the evidence leans in favour of ambush.704 Indeed, if one accepts 
Isandlwana was an ambush, it becomes easier to accept Hlobane as one, given one of the key 
players at Hlobane, Ntshingwayo kaMahole, was the commanding general at Isandlwana. 
Examining the two battles together, striking similarities in style emerge. At both battles local 
Zulu leaders staged distractions that divided the British armies, with Chief Matshana tricking 
Lord Chelmsford into chasing him into the hills and Prince Mbilini goading Wood into sending 
Buller and Russell up Hlobane while Manyanyoba maneuvered his abaQulusi to keep them there. 
Both times, the British fell for the Zulu distraction tactics, chasing the decoys while missing the 
true threat lurking only miles away: Ntshingwayo, who only began moving once the British were 
too scattered to direct their firepower against his host. Even more interesting is the extent to 
which the Zulu played to British fears of a protracted guerilla campaign, Matshana and Mbilini 
acting the part of the raiders who would not stand and fight, encouraging the invaders to deploy 
for counterinsurgency work only for Ntshingwayo to force them into open battle with his shock 
troops. It is not hard to see Mbilini’s two months of skirmishing with Wood as an elaborate con 
job, setting Wood up to think he was only dealing with marauders, when in truth he would be 
facing a frontal assault from Ntshingwayo as soon as Mbilini could separate the Colonel from his 
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cavalry. Wood’s seemingly ludicrous decision to order a cavalry charge up a mountain becomes 
at least mildly less ridiculous when one considers he only expected to be facing night-raiding 
insurgents. There was nothing in the Colonel’s experience that prepared him for the notion that 
one kind of African enemy might suddenly metamorphosis into another. If Hlobane was a 
deliberate trap, it was one that took full advantage of the British belief that Africans could only 
fight one way, with Mbilini’s bush fighters, Manyanyoba’s militia, and Ntshingwayo’s heavy 
infantry seamlessly melding into a combined arms force that neither Evelyn Wood nor, perhaps, 
any other British officer of the day was emotionally or mentally equipped to expect.  
 The question of ambush aside, what is obvious is that at Hlobane, as at Isandlwana, the 
Zulu exercised far tighter control over the battlefield than the British did. Wood, Weatherly, 
Russell and Buller fought separate battles, split off from one another by the terrain, each officer 
having to act on his own for lack of information about the others. Mbilini, Manyanyoba, and 
Mnyamana and Ntshingwayo, in the meantime, were working in tandem, with the Swazi Prince 
holding the mountain, the abaQulusi Chief severing Buller and Weatherly’s lines of retreat, and 
the Zulu generals fanning out to envelop the entire theatre of operations, securing Hlobane and 
nearly swallowing Wood’s whole expeditionary force in the process. The Zulu also did all they 
could to magnify the communication difficulties between the whites: Mbilini and the geography 
of Hlobane separating Buller from Russell, Manyanyoba keeping Weatherly and Wood from 
Buller, and Ntshingwayo threatening to choke off all the forces at Hlobane from those at 
Khambula. This meant once Wood lost contact with his subordinates he had no ability to recover 
it. The links between him and his cavalry officers were blocked by the size of the Zulu army, 
which used its numerical advantage to not only overwhelm the British in individual clashes, but 
to assert authority over the whole battlefield. Aware of the threat British firearms posed to them, 
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the Zulu leadership used their manpower and knowledge of the terrain as an antidote, keeping 
Wood’s commands apart and unable to concentrate their guns against one target. As the British 
high command disintegrated, the Zulu leaders kept a firm grip on the details of the battle and in 
doing so, routed an enemy that thought it could easily drive them from their greatest fortress.  
 On March 29, it was the turn of the Zulu to try to drive Wood from his fortress. It would 
not be an easy task. Wood had been camped at Khambula for weeks and had transformed the 
scenic hilltop into a formidable bastion. Two separate laagers had been constructed, one for the 
infantrymen and one for the livestock, the latter garrisoned by a company of the 13th Light 
Infantry, while the remainder of the 13th and Wood’s own regiment, the 90th Light Infantry, held 
the former. An artillery redoubt was erected and equipped with two of the Royal Artillery’s 7-
pounder guns; there was room in the redoubt for Wood and his staff and for two more infantry 
companies to be stationed to protect the cannons. Four more 7-pounders were on standby 
between the redoubt and the main laager, ready to be redeployed at a moment’s notice.705 How 
many men Wood had to defend Khambula is rather hazy, as are his numbers for the campaign as 
a whole: secondary historians, privileging different sources have put Wood’s total manpower 
between 2000 and 3000 before Hlobane, and between 1500 and 2000 at Khambula.  
Chelmsford’s aide, William Molyneux, placed Wood’s strength at 2278 men during the 
initial invasion of Zululand, comprising the 90th Light Infantry, the 1/13th Light Infantry, six 7-
pounder guns in a Royal Artillery battery, a battalion of Wood’s Irregulars, and Buller’s Frontier 
Light Horse. Over the course of February and March, Wood’s resources fluctuated: the Frontier 
Light Horse’s term of service expired, a second battalion of Wood’s Irregulars was recruited, and 
no fewer than eight units of Volunteer cavalry were hired to replace the departed members of the 
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Frontier Light Horse. Estimates of the size of the irregular units vary too; Wood’s Irregulars, for 
instance, are given as numbering anywhere from eight hundred to 1000 men (Wood himself put 
their number at 2000 in his memoirs, but as previously demonstrated, Wood is not particularly 
trustworthy on this topic). Still, by adding the more conservative estimates for the strength of 
these units to the initial figure of 2278, and throwing in Prince Hamu’s two hundred warriors, 
one comes up with an army well in excess of 3000 strong prior to the engagement at Hlobane. 
 Hlobane cut the heart out of the colonial Volunteers, killed half of Prince Hamu’s 
warriors, and prompted Wood’s Irregulars to desert almost to a man. Ron Lock puts Wood’s 
surviving army at Khambula at 1850 men: 1000 Imperial infantry, six hundred fifty colonials, 
and two hundred wagon drivers and livestock handlers, hastily armed from Wood’s stores of 
spare rifles.706 Commandant Schermbrucker of the Kaffrarian Rifles gives a similar number, but 
with the proportions inverted: Schermbrucker guessed there were 1000 Volunteer cavalry, six 
hundred British regulars, and two hundred camp followers in Wood’s lines, totalling 1800 men 
in all.707 The War Office Narrative assessed Wood’s strength at 1998 men.708 Historian Adrian 
Greaves, a leading expert on the Anglo-Zulu War puts the total slightly higher, at 2086 men.709 
For simplicity’s sake, the defenders of Khambula will be counted as roughly 2000 in number, 
with the stipulation that a sizeable portion of that 2000 may well have been impromptu 
“volunteers” from among the teamsters, baggage boys, and cattle herders. Certain that 
Mnyamana and Ntshingwayo would strike at him on March 29, Wood spent the night of the 28 
reinforcing his defenses: shelter trenches were dug within the main laager and ramparts of sod 
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had been built under the wagons, their outer walls lined with mealie bags.710 Wood knew the 
Zulu had been repulsed from Rorke’s Drift and had not yet taken Eshowe. He had heard stories 
from Boer leaders about how their laagers fended off the Zulu in the past. Now he was banking 
on the fortifications at Khambula to save his army from a host of 15 000; for Evelyn Wood and 
the men of the Number 4 Column, it was do or die time. 
 Mnyamana and Ntshingwayo began their advance on Khambula at 11:00 the morning of 
March 29. Wood gave the order to strike the tents so they would not be damaged in the coming 
battle, and in doing so, gained the British their first advantage of the day. The leading regiments 
on the Zulu right, seeing the British tents disappear, concluded the invaders were about to retreat 
and hurried to catch them, outdistancing the rest of the host.711 Sir Redvers Buller, spotting an 
opportunity to interfere with Zulu command and control, asked Wood’s permission to lead a 
sortie with his surviving horsemen aiming to provoke the Zulu right into an early charge. In his 
memoirs the ordinarily egotistical Wood granted Buller full honours for this plan, summarising: 
“When still 3 miles distant, 5000 men moved round to our Left and attacked the side held by the 
90th Light Infantry, prior to the remainder of the Zulu Army coming into action. This fortunate 
circumstance was due to Colonel Buller’s skilled tactical handling of the mounted men, whom he 
took out and dismounted half a mile from the Zulus. The Umbonambi regiment suffered a galling 
fire for some time, and then, losing patience, rushed forward to attack, when the horsemen, 
remounting, retired 400 yards, and, repeating their tactics, eventually brought on a determined 
attack from the Zulu right flank.”712 Attacking by themselves, with no support from the distant 
left and centre of the army, the Zulu right was stopped dead by heavy rifle fire from the British 
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fortifications. As Wood described it “the Umbonambi followed up the horsemen until they were 
within 300 yards of the Laager, when their further advance was checked by the accurate firing of 
the 90th Light Infantry, greatly assisted by the enfilading fire poured in from the northern face of 
the Redoubt.”713 By inducing the Zulu right into this premature assault, Wood and Buller 
disrupted not only Zulu discipline, but Ntshingwayo’s battle plan which must have called for 
simultaneous strikes on the right, left, and centre of the British position. Outnumbered 
somewhere between eight and ten to one, Wood needed the Zulu to attack him piecemeal, that he 
might deal with each part of their army as it came to him, rather than having to fend off the entire 
host at once. 
 Ntshingwayo still had control over his left and centre, and as the Zulu right found itself 
deadlocked against the 90th Light Infantry, the other regiments of the Zulu army swung into 
action. Braving the fire of the British artillery, which started barraging them from a range of 
2500 yards, the Zulu surrounded Khambula from every side and closed the gap between 
themselves and the British, using depressions in the ground and other natural features of the 
terrain to avoid cannon fire and riflery alike. Schermbrucker paid tribute to the bravery of the 
Zulu, saying “nothing could excel the dash, élan, and fearlessness of the enemy.”714 Zulu 
musketry, often poor, was notably better at Khambula than in any other engagement of the war, 
and Zulu snipers, operating from crevices in the hillside and behind Wood’s own refuse dumps 
took a steady toll on the British defenders. The sharpshooters behind the refuse dumps proved 
especially irritating to Wood, and “induced [him] to withdraw a company of the 13th, posted at 
the right rear of the cattle Laager, although the front was held by another half company for some 
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time longer.”715 This is the closest Wood, who authored his memoirs in exultation of his own 
genius, comes to acknowledging how dangerous the fighting at Khambula was. The beating he 
took at Hlobane shook Wood, and he knew if word of what happened got out, it would tarnish 
his sterling reputation. That was why his report on Hlobane took pains to pretend away the defeat 
and shave off casualties. It was also why he tried to obfuscate what happened next at Khambula. 
 At quarter past two the Zulu seized the cattle laager, and routed the men of the 13th Wood 
assigned to hold it. Schermbrucker could scarcely believe it: “Literally mowed down by the fire 
from the fort…by the small arm fire from the cattle laager and by the fire of two companies of 
the 13th Regiment, maneuvering outside the fort and laager, these splendid Zulu warriors came 
on again and again right up to the trenches of the redoubt on one side and to the enclosure of the 
cattle laager on the other, with such irresistible impetuosity that they actually succeeded in taking 
possession of several wagons, forcing the troops defending the cattle laager to retire.”716 A 
correspondent for one of the Natal papers, writing on the same incident said, “The most 
desperate attempt was made on the cattle kraal; the troops defending it had to retire, and the Zulu 
took possession of several wagons, from which they opened fire on the laager at short range, and 
made an attempt to advance on the wagons.”717 Lieutenant Alfred Blaine, in a letter to his cousin 
said “We all admire the pluck of the Zulus. I wish you could have seen it. Under tremendous fire 
they never wavered, but came straight at us. They got into the cattle kraal, which was only 
twenty yards outside the laager. A company of soldiers had to retire from there.”718 With the 
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cattle laager fallen, the Zulu  massed within it and using the cattle laager as a springboard, 
launched two separate assaults on the main laager, briefly penetrating its defenses. 
 For the rest of his life, Wood denied the loss of the cattle laager and the very existence of 
a Zulu attack on the main laager. This results in Wood’s accounting being deeply confusing to 
read at points. He describes how his friend Major Hackett lost both eyes and the bridge of his 
nose while leading a bayonet charge to drive the Zulu back into the ravine but does not say from 
where the Zulu were being driven.719 In the version of events published in his memoirs Wood 
states the Zulu had to be pushed back into the ravine to prevent them massing in the ravine, a 
claim that makes no sense whatsoever.720 Testimony from other officers and the Natal papers 
clarifies the issue: Hackett’s charge was made not into the ravine, but against the Zulu who were 
invading the main laager and, having successfully repelled them, continued on towards the cattle 
laager, as part of Wood’s effort to retake it—an effort that also included a company of the 13th 
Light Infantry, which with bayonets fixed, drove into the Zulu force attacking the southwest 
corner of the laager. Schermbrucker and the Kaffrarian Rifles witnessed this clash and gave 
testament to its importance: “almost simultaneously with [Hackett’s] sortie upon the Zulus at the 
cattle laager a similar occurrence happened at the south-western corner of the cavalry laager, 
unflinchingly and desperately held by the Kaffrarian Riflemen. A dense mass of Zulus with an 
impetuous rush came up almost near enough to grasp the guns of the defenders, when a company 
of the 13th Regiment sallied forth and drove them back at the point of the bayonet. This was 
about 3pm.”721   
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The action by the company of the 13th was also witnessed by one of the reporters with 
Wood’s column, who, like Schermbrucker, closely compared the incident to Hackett’s sortie. 
“The Zulus,” his paper reported, “made a similar attempt on the south-west corner of the laager, 
and were driven back at the point of the bayonet by a company of the 1-13th. Both these sorties 
were most gallant affairs, and many acts of heroism were performed by both officers and men, 
which no doubt will be mentioned in the despatches.”722 The paper was wrong on that last point: 
Wood spoke at some length of Major Hackett’s bravery, and the gruesomeness of his wounding 
(which proved mortal), but the charge by the company of the 13th he wrote off in his report and 
memoirs both as a minor action, meant only to stop the Zulu from rustling cattle.723 The Zulu 
threat to the laager, in Wood’s portrayal of the battle, never happened, and so a charge could not 
have been made to stop it. It was a shameful coverup of the extraordinary courage and sacrifice 
shown by not only Hackett, but by all the men of those companies of the 90th and the 13th, in one 
of the bloodiest actions of the Battle of Khambula. Hackett’s two companies, after retaking the 
cattle laager, made the error of attempting to continue their charge into the ravine where they 
were shot to pieces by enfilading Zulu fire from the refuse dump, and from the huts that once 
housed Wood’s Irregulars, and which were occupied by Zulu marksmen early in the battle. Not 
only Hackett, but forty-four of his officers and men were wounded or killed by Zulu musketry, 
and Wood was obliged to order their recall before both companies were entirely cut apart.724 
Wrote one reporter of the scene “many of our troops were shot in the back by the enemy in the 
rear while firing at those in front, for the bullets whizzed across the camp like a perfect 
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hailstorm.”725 Dead and wounded officers and men piled up not only at the ravine, but within the 
main laager, and there were even casualties in the artillery redoubt, where Lieutenant Nicholson, 
manning the 7-pounders, was mortally wounded by a Zulu musket.726 
 Hackett’s charge and the Zulu retreat from the cattle laager did not mark the end of the 
battle, though anyone relying solely on Wood’s testimony might be forgiven for believing 
otherwise. Wood’s report ignored the next two and half hours of fighting, while in his memoirs 
he went even further and claimed Hackett singlehandedly ended the Zulu menace to 
Khambula.727 This was a gross misstatement, though one that can perhaps be attributed to 
Wood’s affection for his late friend, rather than deliberate malfeasance. The Zulu made multiple 
additional attempts to storm Khambula and there were many other close shaves. “Then 
followed,” said Schermbrucker, “with short intervals between each other, a series of fierce 
attacks and stern repulses for two hours; at one time the Zulus coming almost within grasp of the 
artillery horses, kept outside the fort in the open, and it was not until about 5 p.m. that it could be 
distinctly perceived that the attack was slackening.”728 Of the Zulu attempt to capture the 
artillery, Wood said next to nothing in his report, writing only “the horses of the other four guns, 
under Lieuts. Bigge and Slade were sent inside the laager when the Zulus came within 100 yards 
of them, but these officers with their men and Major Tremlett R.A., to all of whom great credit is 
due, remained in the open the whole of the engagement.”729 Just as the sortie by the 13th was 
meant to stop cattle rustlers, so too was the Zulu’s near seizure of his artillery a brief withdrawal 
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into the laager; when Wood could not outright deny a mishap had taken place, he did all he could 
to diminish it.  
 The Zulu attack on Khambula finally came to an end at 5:30 pm. Sir Redvers Buller at 
last put a stop to the Zulu snipers in the refuse dumps, ordering his men to fire through the 
rubbish heaps instead of around them.730 The last Zulu presence within Khambula proper 
removed the battle wound down and the Zulu army, spent of energy, started to retreat. As the 
Zulu withdrew from the vicinity of the hilltop, Wood unleashed Sir Redvers Buller, Cecil 
Russell, and the rest of his still-living cavalry. Buller and Russell were eager for revenge after 
the grinding they took at Hlobane, and they gave no quarter in their pursuit of the departing Zulu, 
cutting down any who tried to surrender. In total the Zulu left around 1000 dead on the ground at 
Khambula, though many of those on the British side inflated those figures to 2000 or even 
3000.731 The Zulu host dispersed on its way back to Ulundi, having suffered their first defeat 
since the Battle of the Nyezane, three months earlier. Wood penned a report in which he gloated 
about his glorious victory, a theme he elaborated on at length in his memoirs. If From 
Midshipman to Field Marshal is to be believed, Khambula was a crushing, one-sided British 
triumph that singlehandedly broke the back of the Zulu Army.732 Wood was hardly alone in this 
sentiment; Schermbrucker too claimed that, after Khambula, the Zulu were never the same kind 
of threat they had been before.733 These assertations are sometimes taken at face value, and not a 
few monographs turn Sir Evelyn Wood into the hero of the Anglo-Zulu War, finding in a 
Victoria Cross winner a protagonist far worthier of than the buffoonish Lord Chelmsford. 
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 The problem is Khambula was hardly the signal achievement Wood and other veterans 
wanted it to be. Months of hard-fought battles awaited the British. Just days after Khambula, 
Lord Chelmsford spent hours routing a Zulu army from Gingindhlovu near Eshowe, and the 
climactic Battle of Ulundi, fought in July of that year, saw another 20 000 Zulu take the field 
once more under the leadership of Chief Ntshingwayo. The Zulu lost the Battle of Khambula but 
they were not the beaten people Wood made them out to be, and they were still able to give the 
British more than a few scares in the months ahead. That men like Schermbrucker, who  
narrowly evaded death at Hlobane would make Khambula out to be more than it was is 
understandable; for Evelyn Wood to do it was the act of a careerist determined to protect his 
reputation at all costs. In this Wood succeeded; reports of his bungling at Hlobane were vastly 
outstripped by reports of his magnificent triumph at Khambula, and the news of both arrived in 
London at the same time, sparing him the criticism Chelmsford accrued after Isandlwana. Wood 
did not celebrate Khambula merely out of arrogance or to burnish his own star, but to hide what 
occurred at Hlobane, whitewashing his failure beneath a patina of victory. 
 That was why Khambula had to not only be a success, but an unrivalled success, 
unmarred by any risk of defeat. It was on this point that Wood and subordinates like 
Schermbrucker parted ways. Wood’s reports, and the articles and memoirs he wrote years later, 
insisted there was never any danger of his army being beaten at Khambula. Schermbrucker, and 
others who served with Wood, were far more candid, describing the struggle for the cattle laager 
and the Zulu assault on the main laager as the desperate affairs they truly were. Reading their 
accounts, it is clear the Zulu could have, and nearly did, take Khambula from Wood, and that it 
may well be that only the disorder of their initial attack prevented Khambula from being a repeat 
of Isandlwana. Wood is often given credit for sending out Buller to provoke the Zulu into an 
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early charge, yet the converse—that the junior officers of Ntshingwayo’s right wing signally 
failed their commanding general—is rarely stated. Inflamed by the belief the British were about 
to run, the leading elements of the Zulu right had already broken with the rest of the army, and it 
was their incautious advance that gave Wood the idea to use Buller as a lure. Ntshingwayo 
quickly got control over his men again, but the damage was done; rather than a single great 
attack on all sides of the laager, Ntshingwayo had to settle for a two-pronged strike against the 
right and the centre, his own right wing having stalled before Wood’s left. Even then, 
Ntshingwayo’s warriors, afire with bravery and ably led by their general, took the cattle laager, 
pierced the walls of the main laager, and came within a hairsbreadth of taking Wood’s artillery. 
Khambula was not the walkover Wood said it was, but a very near-run thing, with Wood and 
Ntshingwayo trading ploy for ploy until after a four-and-a-half-hour battle the former won out. 
 Wood’s actions after the battle reflect this. Rather than pursuing the Zulu any farther, he 
remained in Khambula, and, after a few days passed, withdrew to Natal. His army was 
exhausted, supplies of almost everything were low, and his casualties  too great to risk any 
further adventuring. Different sources again give differing figures for the casualties at Khambula, 
but all agree around a hundred men were killed or wounded, with much of the disagreement 
surrounding the proportion of dead to maimed. Unlike at Hlobane, Evelyn Wood’s casual 
relationship with the truth was not the sole cause of the confusion; a high proportion of those 
hurt at Khambula died of their injuries over the subsequent weeks and months which may well 
have complicated the counts of those attempting to work out the death toll. However, one 
balances the dead and the injured, what should be obvious is that Number 4 Column absorbed 
utterly catastrophic losses. Death, desertion, and crippling wounds reduced Wood’s command 
from more than 3000 able-bodied men to fewer than 1900. Over two days of fighting, Wood lost 
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more than a third of his force to Zulu bullets and spears, and those who were left alive were in no 
shape to prosecute the war any further. That Khambula was a triumph for Evelyn Wood is not in 
dispute, but the nature of that triumph should be. Wood did not crush the Zulu at Khambula, or 
even decisively beat them. He won a Pyrrhic victory and spent the rest of his life covering it up.  
 Evelyn Wood could have, and should have, performed better. He was a decorated soldier 
and a respected officer with years of experience in Africa. The Second Anglo-Asante War gave 
him ample opportunity to see a first-rate African military power in action, and he was aware, 
even before Isandlwana, that British arms could be surpassed by Indigenous African enemies. 
The Ninth Frontier War only added to Wood’s resume of African warfare and showed him not 
all African armies fought the same way; having experienced both the guerilla tactics of the 
Xhosa tribes and the conventional gunpowder warfare of the Asante Empire, Wood had a deep 
reservoir of knowledge he could have drawn on when determining how to best battle the Zulu. 
Yet Wood’s bigotry blinded him, not only to the competency of the Zulu, but to the lessons he 
might have taken from the Asante and Xhosa Wars. Prone to blaming black auxiliaries for every 
stumble made by British armies, Wood went into Hlobane without bothering to scout, trusting 
that a cavalry charge by white Europeans would put any African army on the run—even an army 
that had already twice defeated the British. Wood’s arrogance cost him a third of his column and 
left him in the fight of his life at Khambula, where he emerged victorious only by the skin of his 
teeth. Wood’s March campaign was cataclysmic for his troops and it was Wood’s assumption, 
even after all he had seen in the Asante War, and all that had transpired at Isandlwana, that the 
Zulu were not a danger to him that was to blame. 
 Wood was not alone in these blunders. Sir Redvers Buller and Cecil Russell share the 
blame for Hlobane with him, as does Lord Chelmsford. Buller and Russell could have objected 
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to Wood’s plan; Buller in particular was a friend of Wood’s, and one of the few officers Wood 
reliably listened to. Neither of them did, however, indicating they both believed Wood had the 
right idea in ordering a mounted charge uphill, into the teeth of Mbilini’s defenses. Chelmsford, 
for his part, gave Wood no strategic or tactical guidance, instead begging Wood (and Buller) to 
save his reputation for him. Pressure from Chelmsford and a belief he had to draw off as many 
Zulu as possible so Chelmsford’s march to Eshowe could proceed unhindered, joined with 
Wood’s bigoted assumptions about Zulu capabilities and the very real skills of Mbilini and 
Ntshingwayo to produce the catastrophe at Hlobane. Flush with victory from Isandlwana and led 
by chiefs who were every bit as experienced as their British counterparts, the Zulu military was 
too effective a fighting force to be safely underestimated. Wood’s dismissal of what the Zulu 
could do left him vulnerable to being lured into an ambush, and that is precisely what Mbilini 
did, encouraging Wood, Buller, and Russell in their suicidal assault on Hlobane, then letting the 
abaQulusi and Ntshingwayo close the jaws of the trap. At Hlobane, Wood was not only 
outnumbered, but tactically overmatched, with the combination of Prince Mbilini, Chief 
Ntshingwayo, and abaQulusi potentate Manyanyoba, proving more than he could handle. The 
following day at Khambula it was a breakdown in Zulu discipline as much as any decisions made 
by Wood that prevented this formidable alliance of Zulu leaders from finishing the job. 
 Throughout February and March of 1879, the Zulu demonstrated that Isandlwana was not 
a fluke. Charles Pearson expected the Zulu to prove incompetent in maintaining a siege, then had 
to endure a seventy-two-day blockade of his fortress ably run by Prince Dabulamanzi. David 
Moriarty thought he could camp in Zulu territory without taking any proper defensive measures, 
and he and the majority of his command were eviscerated by Mbilini. Wood anticipated Hlobane 
would easily fall and endured the worst defeat of his career, then only narrowly escaped 
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Khambula with his life. When one discards Wood’s lies about Khambula and examines the 
primary evidence on its own merits one fact looms large: for the two months after Isandlwana, 




 Defeat is a painful thing for any army, and doubly so for a colonial force outfought by the 
locals it despises. In the months after the Little Bighorn and Isandlwana the American and 
British armies tried but failed to come to terms with what had happened to them, and as a 
product of that failure, found only further humiliation. Phil Sheridan and Lord Chelmsford, the 
men in charge of both wars, abdicated their responsibilities to their men, leaving the direction of 
the conflict in the hands of their subordinates. Neither man contributed anything to the war 
effort, beyond hectoring their underlings into rash moves that had more to do with fighting bad 
press than battling the Lakota and Cheyenne or the Zulu. In a sense, Sheridan and Chelmsford 
were both prisoners of their preconceived notions about Indigenous peoples and of the 
ramifications of those notions. Any reassessment of Lakota and Cheyenne or Zulu capabilities 
would require an admission that colonial reasoning could not explain everything there was to 
know about the “primitives” they were warring with, and that was not an acceptable outcome.  
 With their commanders out of the picture, George Crook, Alfred Terry, John Gibbon, 
Charles Pearson, David Moriarty, and Evelyn Wood had to fight the Great Sioux War and the 
Anglo-Zulu War to the best of their own abilities, with no strategic instructions from the men 
who were supposed to be issuing them. Each field officer thus had to examine the evidence 
available to them on their enemies and determine for themselves how to proceed. In the 
American case, Terry, Gibbon, and Crook understood Sheridan’s plans were built atop faulty 
data, but they did not yet have any ideas of their own about what needed to change. Fearful of 
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ending up like Custer, Terry (and Gibbon) and Crook took full advantage of Sheridan’s offer of 
reinforcements, building armies that were too large to be overwhelmed, but also too unwieldy to 
be sustained in the field without an enormous logistical train. Terry and Gibbon, reliant on their 
wagons, suffered few casualties but found no Native Americans; Crook, cut loose from his 
wagons, found Crazy Horse, but gutted his expedition in the process. In South Africa, Pearson, 
Moriarty, and Wood did not have the Americans’ sense that something was wrong with the 
original plan and continued to operate on the premise that the Zulu were no different from the 
Xhosa. This thinking saw Pearson bottled up at Eshowe, Moriarty liquidated at Ntombe Drift, 
and Wood trounced at Hlobane. The parallels between Crook and Wood become especially 
fascinating here, as both officers dismantled their own armies through poor planning and 
underestimation of the risks at hand then tried to save their careers by lying about the results. 
Crook’s reports turned the defeat at Slim Buttes into a victory, while Wood downplayed his loss 
at Hlobane and exaggerated Khambula into the most important triumph of the war. These 
obfuscations of the facts have tainted much of the historiography on both Slim Buttes and 
Khambula, and the degree to which Crook and Wood are still taken at their word is a tribute to 
both men’s talents as spin-doctors, if not as commanders. 
 While Crook, Wood, and other Anglo-American officers were embarrassing themselves, 
Indigenous war-leaders like Crazy Horse, Dabulamanzi, Mbilini, and Ntshingwayo turned in 
some of their best performances of the war. At Slim Buttes Crazy Horse rescued American 
Horse’s band from captivity and routed an army that was over twice the size of his own, 
cementing his place as one of the best light cavalry generals ever produced on the North 
American continent. In Zululand, Dabulamanzi showed that he could maintain a siege as well as 
any European, while Mbilini wiped out Moriarty at Ntombe Drift and baited Wood into 
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Ntshingwayo’s path at Hlobane. Even the one undeniable Indigenous defeat at Khambula, still 
showcased Ntshingwayo’s talents as a general. Despite a temporary loss of control at the start of 
the battle, his warriors punctured Wood’s fortifications and nearly took Khambula several times 
over; it is very possible that had a couple of junior officers kept a tighter rein on their men, 
Ntshingwayo kaMahole, rather than Evelyn Wood, would have come out of Khambula the 
winner. The Lakota and Cheyenne and the Zulu confirmed they were as brave, as tactically 
sophisticated, and as well-led as any American or British army. For the colonisers to win their 

































Chapter 7: Lessons Learned? 
 
That the United States and Great Britain would ultimately prove victorious in the Great 
Sioux and Anglo-Zulu Wars is often taken for granted by historians. Just as the defeats of the 
Little Bighorn and Isandlwana are written off as flukes brought about by incompetence on the 
part of the officers in command, the eventual successful conclusion to both wars is taken as no 
more than the white man’s due. The question of how the Americans and the British finally bested 
their indigenous adversaries is rarely asked, and in most studies of the conflicts occupies a 
secondary, if not tertiary place in the work. The nature of the final conquest of the Lakota and the 
Zulu is not widely seen as being worthy of detailed examination; it is portrayed as inevitable. 
To an extent, this view is understandable. The American Republic and the British Empire 
possessed resources on a scale that neither the Lakota-Cheyenne confederation nor the Zulu 
monarchy could match. As long as the American and British governments remained committed 
to war, and continued to feed troops to Sheridan and Chelmsford, they stood a good chance of 
winning through simple attrition if nothing else. To the colonial powers, the losses of the Little 
Bighorn and Isandlwana, while distressing and rightly regarded as catastrophic reverses, were far 
from disabling to their military efforts. Both had immense reserves of manpower that could be 
drawn upon, while for the Native Americans and the Zulu alike, every man lost was 
irreplaceable. An argument can indeed be made that it was through sheer weight of numbers, 
rather than superior technology, better organization, or modern tactical and strategic thinking, 
that the two imperial projects subdued their native enemies. 
However, such an analysis would ignore the fact that, despite their manifest advantages, 
the Americans and the British were repeatedly bested by their resource-poor opponents. The 
Lakota and Cheyenne halted Crook at the Rosebud, slaughtered Custer at the Little Bighorn, and 
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again drove Crook from the field at Slim Buttes. The Zulu destroyed Durnford and Pulleine at 
Isandlwana, wiped out Moriarty’s command at Ntombe Drift and massacred Wood’s advance 
force at Hlobane. Even the one undeniable British triumph at Khambula was nothing spectacular, 
while the Americans lacked any definitive victories over the hostiles, with only Crook’s 
distortions about the Powder River and Slim Buttes fights to alleviate their sense of complete 
failure. The battles to this point may well have been exhausting to Sitting Bull and Cetshwayo’s 
forces, yet battlefield victories had eluded Sheridan and Chelmsford both. 
That was all about to change. The American Army would decisively beat the Lakota and 
Cheyenne at Cedar Creek, at Dull Knife’s camp, at Wolf Mountain, and finally at Lame Deer’s 
camp. British troops would likewise recover, smashing the Zulu at Gingindhlovu, reinvading 
Zululand and finally shattering the Zulu regiments at Cetshwayo’s Ulundi homestead. These 
developments were not only the result of increased wear and tear on the Lakota-Cheyenne and 
Zulu forces—though these factors cannot, should not, and will not be overlooked—but of a 
complete tactical and strategic reorganization on the part of the American and British war efforts. 
Prior to, respectively, Cedar Creek and Gingindhlovu, both wars went against the colonists. After 
those battles, neither power was beaten again. The question remains: what changed?  
The answer in the British case is comparatively simple: Lord Chelmsford, faced with an 
embarrassing and potentially career ending string of losses, overhauled his entire approach to the 
war. Gingindhlovu proved a testing ground for new ideas on Chelmsford’s part, ideas he then 
refined and put into play in his second invasion of Zululand. On the American side, conversely, 
Sheridan never changed his opinions on the best way to defeat Native Americans. He continued 
on much as he had before, only for his ideas to be altered or even outright rejected by new 
subordinates, notable among them Nelson Miles and Ranald “Bad Hand” Mackenzie, who were 
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more interested in winning than following Sheridan’s doctrine to the letter. Miles especially all 
but inverted Sheridan’s philosophy of frontier warfare, creating an effective, war-winning 
strategy that brought the Lakota and Cheyenne to their knees. In doing so he hit on some, though 
not all, of the same ideas Chelmsford did three years later in Zululand, demonstrating in the 
process that there were general principles for success in nineteenth century colonial warfare, 




The conclusion of Crook’s summer campaign left the strategic situation on the Great 
Plains virtually unchanged. Large warbands of Lakota and Northern Cheyenne continued to 
roam across the territories the government claimed, unchecked by the American Army’s efforts 
to corral them. Phil Sheridan’s fear of “scatteration” on the part of the Natives, which his entire 
campaign plan was designed to prevent, had seemingly been realised. The great war-party that 
overwhelmed the 7th Cavalry at the Little Bighorn had split into a multitude of smaller, but still 
considerable, groupings. Only the tiny following of American Horse had been neutralised by the 
Army, while Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, and the other major warlords of the Plains tribes 
remained undefeated. Sheridan had to do something to regain the momentum, lest the short, 
cheap operation he envisaged drag into the next year or longer. 
Upon their return to their bases of supply Crook and Terry’s expeditions broke up. Some 
units were disbanded or transferred out of the warzone while others were sent to occupy the 
reservations. Sheridan had at last received authorisation to occupy the reserves and disarm the 
agencies, and he set about doing so with rapidity, using Crook, Merritt, and the newly arrived 
Ranald Mackenzie as his instruments. With the reservations under military control, the Lakota 
351 
 
and Cheyenne could receive no further reinforcements from their agency brethren. Sitting Bull, 
Crazy Horse and the rest of the hostiles were now on their own.734 
While the seizure of the reservations was an important step, it did not represent a major 
shift in Sheridan’s thinking. Martial law on the reserves was part of his vision for the war from 
the beginning and was something he spent the prior seven years of his career arguing for. With 
Congress’ belated assent to Sheridan’s request, his concept for the Great Sioux War was now 
fulfilled, yet he was no closer to subduing the hostiles than he was in March. True, the lockdown 
on the reservations meant the free Lakota and Cheyenne could no longer replenish their numbers, 
but until Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, et al were crushed, it would not mean much.  
With much of Crook’s force invalided out after the Horsemeat March, Sheridan again 
began the process of transferring new units to the Departments of the Platte and the Dakotas. 
Accompanying these fresh troops was a new group of younger field commanders Sheridan hoped 
would instill some backbone into Terry and Crook, whose inability to implement his flawed 
designs caused Sheridan to lose faith in them. As when he assigned Wesley Merritt to Crook’s 
summer expedition, Sheridan expected the infusion of new blood to tilt the odds in the Army’s 
favour and prevent the Lakota and Cheyenne from evading his clutches. In Sheridan’s thinking, 
the only problem with his orders was Crook and Terry’s apparent reluctance to carry them out. It 
was with this in mind that Sheridan now turned to Crook’s two greatest rivals in the Army, 
Nelson Miles and Ranald Mackenzie, believing their presence would force his old friend into 
greater displays of aggressiveness. As it turned out, Mackenzie and Miles would fundamentally 
change the face of the Great Sioux War, though not necessarily the way Sheridan intended.  
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Of the two new arrivals, Nelson Appleton Miles is easily the better known, and with good 
cause. Enlisting in the Union Army as a Lieutenant in the early days of the Civil War, Miles, a 
former crockery store clerk, was a Brevet Major-General of Volunteers by the time the war 
ended. Commissioned as a Colonel in the Regular Army, Miles, who had no formal military 
training, eventually rose to the rank of Commanding General, United States Army, where he 
masterminded the Spanish-American War, and publicly fell out with President Theodore 
Roosevelt over the subject of American colonialism in Asia. Along the way, he married Mary 
Hoyt Sherman, daughter of Judge Charles Sherman and niece to Senator John Sherman and 
General William Tecumseh Sherman, a move many saw as calculated to improve his career 
prospects. A controversial figure in his day and within the historiography, Miles left behind a 
legacy of significant military achievement and a reputation as a backbiting egotist fully prepared 
to backstab his fellow officers to increase his own chances for promotion.735 
How much of Miles’ image as a narcissistic martinet is true is open to question. Certainly 
he was a ruthless careerist and the two separate autobiographies he left behind, as well as various 
letters and personal writings, certainly track with the image of a man with a great deal of self-
regard and an unshakeable belief he was surrounded by idiots. Yet it is also true that many of 
Miles’ enemies in the Army reviled him not for his personal failings, but because of his refusal to 
close ranks and keep the Army’s dirty secrets in-house. A devoted human rights activist in an era 
before human rights activism had the legitimacy it has today, Miles believed America’s colonial 
enemies, be they Native American or Filipino, were human beings and were entitled to many of 
the same protections as the white man. On multiple occasions Miles jeopardised his career to 
investigate human rights abuses by his subordinates and call out those committed by his peers, 
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decisions that earned him the undying enmity of the Army’s more reactionary factions. Miles’ 
efforts to punish the perpetrators of the Wounded Knee Massacre, for instance, made him a 
target for criticism by John Schofield, then Commanding General, United States Army, while his 
attempt to protect Filipinos from war crimes committed by his own troops cost him his job 
during the Theodore Roosevelt administration.736  
What is not controversial about Miles is his competency, or the respect and esteem in 
which his enlisted men held him. Sent out West after the Civil War, Miles first saw active 
service against Native Americans in the Red River War of 1874 to 1875 against the Comanche 
and Kiowa. Assigned command of the 5th Infantry, Miles led one of Sheridan’s converging 
columns, and his defeat of a significant Comanche war-party at the Battle of the Staked Plains 
was a key moment in the American conquest of the Southwest. In his annual report for 1874, 
Sheridan credited Miles’ active pursuit of Comanche and Kiowa warbands as instrumental to the 
subjugation of those tribes. Sheridan believed by staying in the field for as long as he did Miles 
denied the Comanche and Kiowa the opportunity to resupply and recuperate from their losses, 
and it was this steady attrition that eventually forced the surrender of both tribes.737 While 
commending Miles for his service, Sheridan did not examine precisely how Miles achieved these 
results, a theme that recurred during the Great Sioux War. Following the conclusion of hostilities 
in 1875, Miles dedicated the winter to arranging provisions for the captured Native Americans 
and relentlessly drilling his infantry.738 When Miles and the 5th Infantry were summoned north in 
late 1876, he was leading one of the most disciplined infantry regiments in the US Army. 
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If Nelson Miles was one of the post-Civil War army’s greatest success stories, Ranald 
Slidell Mackenzie, better remembered to posterity as “Bad Hand” was one of its most profound 
tragedies. A member of the West Point class of 1862, Mackenzie and his classmates were 
graduated a year early and thrown into a Union war machine desperate for junior officers. By the 
end of the war Mackenzie was a Brevet Major-General in the Volunteers, a Colonel in the 
Regulars, and was described by no less a person than Ulysses S. Grant as “the most promising 
young officer in the army.”739 He had also lost two fingers and the better part of his mental 
health, though the latter remained an invisible wound for some time to come. 
Mackenzie’s post-war service record was erratic, to say the least. Coming to Sheridan’s 
attention during the war, Bad Hand became one of the Division Commander’s favourite hatchet 
men, sent to do jobs too sensitive or, in some cases, too illegal, for Sheridan to trust to anyone 
else. In 1872 Sheridan ordered Mackenzie to pursue a Lipan Apache war-party across the border 
into Mexico, triggering an international incident when the Colonel not only attacked several 
Apache camps, but brutalised Mexican citizens to uncover their whereabouts. When 
Mackenzie’s troopers discovered their mission was illegal, they mutinied, and it was only by 
holding them all at gunpoint that Bad Hand restored order and got his command back to the 
United States. Sheridan, nevertheless, saw this as a great accomplishment, and his report for 
1873 credited the lack of hostilities in the Department of Texas to Mackenzie’s raid.740 Deployed 
against the Comanche and Kiowa in 1874 through 1875, Bad Hand became notorious in both 
tribes, manhandling them at Palo Duro Canyon and running down the last free band of Qahadi 
Comanche under Quanah Parker. In a somewhat remarkable about face, Mackenzie and Parker 
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became friends, and Bad Hand leant his support to the efforts of Nelson Miles and diverse others 
to keep the surrendered Comanche and Kiowa fed through the famine winter of 1875.741  
Bad Hand Mackenzie’s oscillating attitude towards Native Americans, and his entire 
reputation as a brilliant but unstable officer, is something that is difficult to examine without 
touching on the subject of mental illness. Normally a tough but fair-minded officer, Bad Hand 
was subject to sudden outbursts of irrationality, and even violence, throughout his post-war 
service. As the years went by these bouts of instability became both more extreme and 
increasingly frequent, eventually resulting in his discharge from the army and his incarceration in 
an asylum due to “mental wounds sustained in service to his country.” Mackenzie is a clear 
example of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder exacerbated by his continued involvement in military 
actions after the Civil War and a series of severe headwounds suffered during the Indian Wars.742 
How sick Mackenzie was at any given time, and the rate at which his illness progressed, is 
something we cannot know but accepting it was a major part of his makeup is key to grappling 
with how the same man who tortured Mexicans, massacred Apache villages, and threatened to 
summarily execute his own men could, when lucid, dedicate himself to feeding Native 
Americans who were on the verge of starvation. Regardless, it was not for his humanitarian 
qualities that Sheridan brought Bad Hand north; the decision to call Mackenzie into the war and 
assign him to George Crook’s command shows how worried Sheridan was about the progress of 
the war, and how disillusioned he was with what he saw as Crook’s lack of killer instinct. 
On the surface, Nelson Miles and Ranald Mackenzie did not have much in common 
beyond belonging to the same generation. However, both men had qualities that proved 
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invaluable in the coming months. In contrast to Crook, who was used to pursuing tiny cadres of 
Apache across Arizona, and Terry, who was first and foremost, a siege engineer, Miles and 
Mackenzie had practical experience combating the Comanche and the Kiowa, large tribes of 
horse-borne warriors who were capable of, if not always willing to, engage the army in massed 
actions. Both also had extensive sympathy for Native Americans which, paradoxically, made 
them far more effective at battling indigenous forces than did Sheridan’s contemptuous 
disregard. Miles especially had a high regard for the capabilities of Native American generals 
and a seething contempt for those who misconstrued what they could do. Writing in his memoirs, 
Miles observed “the art of war among the white race is called strategy, or tactics; when practiced 
by the Indians it is called treachery. They employed the art of deceiving, misleading, decoying, 
and surprising the enemy with great cleverness. The celerity and secrecy of their movements 
were never excelled by the warriors of any country. They had courage, skill, sagacity, endurance, 
fortitude, and self-sacrifice of a high order.”743 “In vain,” he said, “might we search history for 
the record of a people who contended as valiantly against a superior race, overwhelming in 
numbers, and defended their country until finally driven toward the setting sun, a practically 
annihilated nation and race.”744 Armed with the knowledge they were facing competent 
opponents, neither Miles nor Mackenzie felt beholden to Sheridan’s plan, and Miles outright 
turned it on its head. 
When Nelson Miles arrived in the Department of the Dakotas, he found neither Phil 
Sheridan nor Alfred Terry’s plans for him and the 5th Infantry were particularly expansive. With 
the government having granted him permission to construct forts in Lakota territory, Sheridan 
instructed Miles to build a cantonment at the mouth of the Tongue River and to garrison it until 
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the spring, while larger commands under Crook and Mackenzie undertook the job of actively 
campaigning during the winter. Miles, who thought Sheridan’s entire approach to the Great 
Sioux War wrongheaded, chafed at this inaction and at the continuation of an operational plan 
that had, up to this point, singularly failed. Miles had been close friends with George Custer, and 
held Sheridan, and his boss William Sherman, responsible for Custer’s death. Both of Miles’ 
memoirs contain lengthy dissections of Sheridan’s strategy, and he harshly critiqued the 
Divisional Commander for underestimating the numbers and fighting ability of the Lakota and 
for dividing his forces into weak columns that could not overpower Sitting Bull and Crazy 
Horse’s warbands.745 Likewise, Miles saw Sheridan’s reliance on fodder-dependent cavalry as a 
serious error. The Red River War persuaded Miles that infantry, rather than cavalry, was the 
proper arm of the military to battle the horse tribes with, thinking that flew in the face of army 
orthodoxy. During a conversation with Terry, Miles vainly tried to bring the Departmental 
Commander around to his way of thinking, insisting, “if he would give me supplies and a 
reasonable command I would clear a zone of that country of hostiles before spring.”746 Lacking 
official authorisation for his plans, Miles set out to implement them anyway. 
During the Red River War Miles set up a spy ring inside various Southwestern Indian 
Agencies, and used informants to keep him apprised of Comanche and Kiowa movements. He 
now organised a similar system on the Red Cloud and Spotted Tail Reservations and was 
rewarded with detailed information about the movements of Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse’s 
factions of the great Lakota army from the Little Bighorn.747 Upon hearing Sitting Bull was 
moving north of the Yellowstone towards the valley of the Big Dry, Miles put together an 
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expeditionary force of three hundred ninety-four men of the 5th Infantry, equipped, in his own 
words, “as if they were going to the arctic regions.”748 Hiring Native guides and white scouts 
alike—of whom “Buffalo Bill” Cody and “Yellowstone” Kelly were two of the more famous—
and taking a single Rodman gun along for artillery, Miles tracked Sitting Bull to Cedar Creek, 
where on the 21st of October, he and the Hunkpapa leader entered negotiations.749 
Lakota and American accounts of the negotiations differ greatly. Miles admired Sitting 
Bull as a man and a leader, but viewed him as intransigent and unwilling to compromise during 
negotiations, even going so far as to suggest some of Sitting Bull’s subordinates sought to 
assassinate the American party under the flag of truce.750 The Lakota, meanwhile, had little 
reason to trust “Bear Coat”, as his choice of cold-weather gear caused them to dub Miles, and 
alleged Sitting Bull offered Miles peace, only for the colonel to insist upon initiating combat.751 
Both sides concur negotiations went nowhere during the first day and broke down completely on 
the 22nd, resulting in a general engagement each blamed the other for starting. What emerges 
most clearly from this incident, perhaps, is the fact that neither side could offer the other 
anything: Sitting Bull was committed to preserving the territorial integrity of the Lakota 
domains, while Miles, as an agent of US imperial expansion, had to attempt to seize them. 
Whoever started the battle, it was undoubtedly Miles who won it. The colonel’s 
experience in the Red River War taught him “the Indian’s marksmanship is very accurate within 
the range to which he is accustomed to killing game—say within two hundred yards; but in use 
of the long range rifle, where he must take account of the elevated sights, the distance, and the 
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effect of the wind upon the flight of the bullet he is inexperienced.”752 Armed with longer 
barrelled rifles, Miles’ infantrymen significantly outranged the cavalry firearms borne by Sitting 
Bull’s Lakota. Drilled throughout the winter and given extensive target practise the 5th Infantry 
closed the accuracy gap John Gibbon noted as existing between white soldiers and Plains 
warriors. Miles’ Rodman gun further added to his firepower, and for the first time in the Great 
Sioux War an American officer successfully brought the artillery to bear: not to kill Natives in 
large numbers, but to keep them at range and break up charges before they could finish 
massing.753 It was a completely different style of frontier warfare, one the Lakota had not 
experienced before.  
Lakota testimony on the Battle of Cedar Creek is scarce, and consequently it is not 
entirely clear which of the Lakota war-leaders took command of the force confronting Miles, or 
for that matter, how large a party of warriors Sitting Bull had at his disposal. American estimates 
of his strength range from six hundred to a thousand warriors, while American accounts of the 
action acknowledge the presence of Gall, White Bull, Low Neck, and Pretty Bear among the 
Hunkpapa mystic’s retinue of followers, advisors, and allies.754 All these men were experienced 
warriors and commanders and had seen action at the Rosebud and the Little Bighorn. Gall 
especially played a key role at the Little Bighorn in the blunting of Reno’s attack, and in the 
eventual entrapment and destruction of Custer’s detachment, with he and Crow King acting as 
the anvil upon which the other Lakota and Cheyenne war-leaders hammered the 7th Cavalry 
apart. Gall knew how to fight the white man, and had a thoroughly enviable record when it came 
to defeating him. Yet Nelson Miles and the 5th Infantry confounded his best efforts. 
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 Sitting Bull, Gall, and the other Lakota leaders chose their position well, atop a series of 
ridges intersected by deep, difficult to navigate ravines. Warriors positioned on the ridgeline and 
within the ravines could fire upon approaching soldiers with near impunity, and under normal 
circumstances, would have been able to gather for charges unimpeded by American fire. 
Lieutenant James Worden Pope, one of Miles’ junior officers, deduced the Lakota tactics to be 
“disclosed by the nature of the ground so admirably adapted to Indian maneuvering. This was to 
yield in front, and then while the troops pressed forward and became entangled in the ravines to 
pour his warriors around the flanks and rear, and play his magazine guns upon the disordered 
mess.”755 If Pope is correct, the Lakota were practising a variation of the scheme Crazy Horse 
first tried at the Rosebud, and that he, Gall, and Lame White Man used to dissect Custer’s 
regiment at the Little Bighorn, aiming to encircle part of the American force and then destroy it 
in detail. The Lakota decision to fire the grass in front of the soldiers lends credence to Pope’s 
deductions, as the resulting smokescreen blinded some of the soldiers and could have been used 
to funnel them wherever the Native war-leaders wanted them to go.756 
Miles, however, frustrated Lakota intentions by deploying his men in skirmish line and 
sending them up not only the centre, but the sides and rear of the ridgeline, assaulting each of the 
Lakota positions simultaneously, forcing the Lakota back with ranged fire followed by infantry 
charges as they moved steadily up the ridgeline. Said Pope “the main line continued to advance, 
now pouring a rattling fire into the Sioux who, from behind hills, returned it, or dashing forward 
in wild circles and delivering a rapid fire from Henry rifles, would fleetly seek cover followed by 
the showers of bullets that responded.”757 Sitting Bull and Gall, evincing the same tactical 
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flexibility that served them well in prior battles, adjusted their plan of attack, attempting to 
surround not part of Miles’ force, but the entire command. As Miles described it, “at one time the 
command was entirely surrounded by Indians, and the troops were formed in a large hollow 
square in open order and deployed at five paces, with all the reserves brought into action, yet not 
a single man left his place or failed to do his full duty. The engagement demonstrated the fact 
that the Indians could not stand artillery, and that there was no position they could take from 
which the infantry could not dislodge them.”758 With the artillery denying them the opportunity 
for a massed charge, the Lakota could not break Miles’ square; as he summarised the 
engagement “the infantry soldiers presented but a small target, and their skilled long-range 
marksmanship kept the Indians at a very good distance.”759 The Lakota were shoved off the 
ridgeline and made to flee as Miles’ infantry stormed into their camp. 
Miles did not let things go there. Having concluded the first battle of any size that the 
American Army had won during the Great Sioux War, he proceeded to pursue the Lakota. His 
infantry were obviously nowhere near as fast as the Native horsemen, yet Miles believed, given 
sufficient time, his men could walk the Lakota into the ground. The increasingly cold weather 
and lack of forage, as well as the strain of the battle they had just fought, exhausted the Lakota 
horses and made outrunning Miles’ slow-moving but relentless infantry, more than many of the 
Natives could bear. “Thus they were pursued,” Miles boasted, “for two days at a distance of 
forty-two miles. Wherever they made a stand the troops would deploy and drive them out. They 
would never remain for a close, decisive battle, although they outnumbered us at least three to 
one.”760 Thoroughly demoralised by defeat, the resolve and the political unity of the Lakota in 
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Sitting Bull’s party began to fracture. On October 25, the bulk of them decided they were tired of 
running; while Sitting Bull and Gall, with four hundred or so of their closest companions struck 
north, the rest of the Hunkpapas and their Minneconjou and Sans Arc allies sent out peace feelers 
to Miles. “Bear Coat,” agreed to talk, and negotiated the surrender of five major chiefs and about 
2000 of their followers.761 As the beaten Lakota filtered into the agencies, Miles returned to his 
Tongue River cantonment to resupply and ready himself for further pursuit of Sitting Bull.  
Miles’ was not the only army officer preparing an expedition against the Lakota and 
Cheyenne. After several months in camp or supervising the occupation of the reservations, 
George Crook was ready to take the field again and was under mounting pressure from Sheridan 
to do so. Several exchanges of letters between the Divisional and Departmental Commanders 
show the depth of the discord between the two former friends, with Sheridan pushing Crook to 
act and Crook pleading for further reinforcements and supplies. By November, an exasperated 
Sheridan gave Crook the troops he wanted in the form of eleven companies of cavalry under Bad 
Hand Mackenzie and eleven companies of infantry and four of artillery under Colonel Richard 
Irving Dodge. Dodge, an inveterate diarist, maintained a journal throughout the enterprise, 
recording, in sharp contrast to John Bourke, his thorough disgust with Crook’s administrative 
abilities. In Dodge’s eyes, the November effort against the Lakota and Cheyenne was the worst 
organized military force he ever had the displeasure to be part of.762 Ironically, one of the things 
that makes Dodge’s journals such a useful source is they demonstrate how much Crook had 
improved his logistical train since the Horsemeat March; while still beset by supply problems 
there were far fewer casualties from cold and malnutrition that November than in September. 
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Even more importantly than the improvements to logistics, Crook and Mackenzie used 
their months at the Indian agencies to recruit the one element missing from all of Crook’s 
previous endeavours: knowledgeable Indigenous scouts. In the spring and summer months 
political problems on the reservations and Sheridan’s disdain for Native scouts left Crook with 
only a few Crow and Shoshone rangers available to him. With the Red Cloud and Spotted Tail 
agencies under the Army’s heel, however, Crook was now in position to recruit from among the 
nonhostile Lakota, Cheyenne, and Arapaho at which he was very successful. Bourke and Dodge 
both recorded Crook’s speeches to the assembled peace chiefs, and both marveled at his talent 
for getting Native warriors to enlist against their own people. Pointing out the Army now had the 
power to deny food and other necessities to the agencies unless cooperation was forthcoming, 
Crook secured the assistance of a large number of reservation warriors who could see the writing 
on the wall. Many of the Lakota, Cheyenne, and Arapaho in Crook’s pay maintained extensive 
contacts with the hostiles under Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Dull Knife, Little Wolf, and their 
allies and had a clearer picture of where their camps were located than either the Army, or enemy 
Natives like the Crows, Shoshone, and Arikara did.763  
Crook struck out on November 14th, 1876, with 1900 men: 1500 infantry, cavalry, and 
artillery, and nearly four hundred Native scouts.764 By November 22nd, they were on the trail of 
what they at first believed to be Crazy Horse’s following, but was subsequently proved to be a 
Cheyenne band. On November 23rd, Sitting Bear, an agency Cheyenne sent out to negotiate with 
the hostiles sometime earlier, rode into Crook’s camp, and provided him with the location of a 
major Cheyenne encampment under the prominent war-chiefs Dull Knife and Little Wolf. Along 
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with Two Moons and the late Lame White Man, Dull Knife and Little Wolf were among the 
most experienced and prestigious of the Northern Cheyenne war-leaders, and their defeat and 
capture were a top army priority. Acting quickly, Crook decided he and Dodge would remain in 
camp with the infantry and artillery while Bad Hand took the cavalry and the scouts for a rapid 
strike against Dull Knife (Army accounts of the battle invariably refer to it as the “Dull Knife 
Fight,” even as they acknowledge the presence of Little Wolf and other Cheyenne notables).765  
Aided by the Lakota, Cheyenne, and Arapaho auxiliaries, Mackenzie’s November 25th 
assault on Dull Knife and Little Wolf came as a total surprise to the Northern Cheyenne. Native 
accounts record their shock at the presence of the soldiers and their bitterness towards the 
reservation warriors who made the attack possible.766 Bourke, who accompanied Bad Hand’s 
vanguard, reported Dull Knife and Little Wolf’s people pleaded with his auxiliaries to go home 
as they could not fight the white men and their own people. Swiftly driven from their 
encampment by Mackenzie’s ambush, Dull Knife and Little Wolf rallied in the ridgelines and 
ravines northeast of the camp where they repulsed a cavalry charge by Lieutenant McKinney, 
killing him and several of his troopers with repeating rifle fire. Unwilling to risk the lives of any 
more of his cavalrymen, Bad Hand sent a message to Crook requesting Dodge come up and join 
him; since Dodge’s rifles had significantly greater range than his cavalry’s carbines, Mackenzie 
believed they would allow him to win the sniper duel the battle had now settled into.767 
Dodge, who, like Miles, considered the infantry to be the appropriate weapon with which 
to fight Native Americans—and had told Crook as much that March—was glad to get the chance 
to put his theories to the test and set out at once. Partway there, however, he was ordered to turn 
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back; running out of ammunition Dull Knife and Little Wolf had retreated from their campsite 
and Bad Hand, after firing everything of value in the camp, was returning to link up with 
Crook.768 It was Crook’s first unambiguous triumph over the Lakota-Cheyenne coalition, and he 
immediately sent dispatches to Sheridan announcing Mackenzie had won an important victory. 
Crook had made similar reports before, after the Rosebud and Slim Buttes, but this time there 
was a difference: he was telling the truth. Robbed of their homes and supplies in the dead of a 
Montana winter, Dull Knife and Little Knife’s followings were ruined as an effective fighting 
force. Refugees from their bands attempted to link up with other Lakota and Cheyenne chiefs 
and leaders with disappointing results. The bulk of the refugees sought safety with Crazy Horse 
and Two Moons who, while willing to accept them, had little in the way of rations to share, 
embittering many Cheyenne against their Oglala Lakota allies. This bad blood eventually spread; 
Dull Knife and Little Wolf had been transporting not only their own supplies, but those of much 
of the Northern Cheyenne coalition, and the arrival of winter meant there was no way to replace 
them. The loss of their food stocks had repercussions across the entire Northern Cheyenne nation 
as a starvation winter set in.769 Dull Knife, who had briefly considered surrendering to 
Mackenzie after the capture of his encampment, was now convinced the war, which had been 
going so well to this point, could no longer be won. This was not cowardice on Dull Knife’s part, 
but an honest appraisal of the facts: with their rations gone, his Cheyenne could only keep their 
freedom by facing a famine. Little Wolf came around to Dull Knife’s thinking and the Northern 
Cheyenne chiefs bowed out, awaiting spring peace feelers from the Army.770 
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Sheridan recognized the import of the Dull Knife Fight quickly, and his congratulations, 
and those of William Sherman, were conveyed to Crook and Mackenzie via dispatch. After 
resting for a few days, Crook and Mackenzie again headed out into the winter with the hope of 
encountering another warband. They spent most of December looking, but aside from a few brief 
skirmishes with Northern Cheyenne raiders, found nothing. In stark contrast to the past, this was 
not because of mistakes on Crook’s part. Continuing to utilise the strategy that worked so well at 
the Dull Knife Fight, Crook kept his infantry in camp after marches, then sent out his Native 
scouts to reconnoitre. If signs were found, the cavalry under Mackenzie was sent to follow up; 
only after all his outriders reported back did Crook move again. This method conserved the 
health of the infantry and of the mules in the pack team, the latter of whom were already 
sickening due to the cold. If there was a reason why Crook was unable to find the Lakota and 
Cheyenne this time it is mostly because there was no one to find. Sitting Bull and Gall were in 
retreat from Miles, Dull Knife and Little Wolf’s followings were in the process of disintegrating, 
and hundreds of other warriors had been trapped on the reservations since the assumption of 
military control at the end of the summer. Only Crazy Horse and Two Moons were left for Crook 
and Mackenzie to hunt for, and they were far closer to Miles’ territory than Crook’s.771 
On December 29th, Crook headed back into Fort Fetterman. Mackenzie was recalled to 
Washington by Sheridan and on January 3rd, Richard Dodge dismissed the men to their 
regiments of origin. Officially, the expedition was terminated because of logistical issues, 
especially a lack of forage for horses and mules. This was true, but there may have been an 
additional problem: namely the deteriorating mental health of Bad Hand Mackenzie. Shortly 
after the Dull Knife Fight, Mackenzie approached Dodge in the midst of a mental breakdown, 
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stating if he had any personal courage he would “blow his brains out” for his failure against the 
Cheyenne.772 Dodge reported this to Crook, who spent hours playing cards with Mackenzie to 
cheer him up. The accolades offered to Bad Hand by Sheridan briefly improved his morose 
mood, but it did not last; Mackenzie sank back into depression and irrationality, ordering a 
spurious court-martial against a subordinate who irritated him. Dodge’s journals reveal the deep 
concern he, Crook, and Bourke shared vis-à-vis Mackenzie’s mental state, and it is not at all out 
of the question that the expedition was ended and Bad Hand ordered to Washington because 
Crook believed the Colonel was becoming a danger to himself and his men.773 
Ranald Mackenzie’s brief service in the Great Sioux War, despite the man’s own angst 
about it, proved decisive. Dodge may have seen the Dull Knife Fight as a fluke, and one that, 
given Crook’s inability to administrate, could not be repeated, but Dodge did not have the full 
picture of what was going on. In their month together in the field George Crook and Bad Hand 
Mackenzie proved a highly effective team, one that could transform Sheridan’s ill-considered 
plans for the war into an actual recipe for victory. Crook’s way with Native scouts and 
Mackenzie’s ability to get the most out of the men under his command, synergised together to 
remove Dull Knife and Little Wolf from the war, and with them, most of the Northern Cheyenne 
who were not traveling with Crazy Horse and Two Moons. Crook trusted Mackenzie enough to 
delegate the attack on the Cheyenne camp to him alone, stripping down his force and creating a 
command that moved fast enough to catch the Cheyenne by surprise. Mackenzie, for his part, 
was willing to trust Crook’s Indigenous scouts knew their jobs and followed their advice to the 
letter; as Bourke noted, it was the cooperation of Lakota, Cheyenne, and Arapaho auxiliaries that 
made the conquest of Dull Knife and Little Wolf possible. Sheridan wanted Mackenzie’s 
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presence to put some spine into Crook and it did: the spine to manipulate Sheridan’s order to 
take over the reserves in to a recruitment drive for auxiliaries. Still plagued by logistical failures, 
Crook at least knew where he was going this time, and that made all the difference. 
Crook and Bad Hand’s obliteration of Dull Knife’s camp and following and the political 
tensions it created between the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne went a long way towards taking 
the latter out of the war, though several bands led by Chief Two Moons and the medicine man 
Big Crow had yet to be neutralised. The vise, however, was closing in on them. While Crook and 
Mackenzie struck out at the Cheyenne, Nelson Miles busied himself with removing Sitting Bull 
and Gall from the equation. Despite a blizzard that temporarily blinded his men, Miles persisted 
in chasing the Hunkpapa leaders and his command “crossed and recrossed the Missouri River 
with artillery and loaded trains on the solid ice, the cold being intense.”774 Miles’ men were well-
enough equipped he was able to report no casualties from starvation or frostbite, a significant 
achievement when one considers the Horsemeat March, and the damage cold wreaked on 
Crook’s expeditions that November and the previous March. Tracking the Lakota in the 
snowstorms of November and December was not possible, but Miles adapted, sending out 
frequent patrols to scout the regions he wished to place under military control. It was an area 
denial strategy, intended not to capture Sitting Bull and Gall, but to run them out of the 
Department of the Dakotas. It was also the exact opposite of Sheridan’s orders to prevent 
“scatteration”; rather than trying to keep the Lakota together and capture them all at once, Miles 
aimed to break up the large bands and drive them out of American territory. Aside from one brief 
encounter between Sitting Bull and a patrol, there were no battles between Miles and the 
Hunkpapa chiefs, yet by the end of December Sitting Bull was driven from American holdings 
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and into Canada. “Sitting Bull,” Miles decided, “had now been driven far enough north to be 
practically out of the field of operation, and the command retreated to the cantonment.”775 Of the 
war-leaders who slew Custer, only Crazy Horse and Two Moons were still free and on soil the 
Americans claimed.  
Miles had no intention of allowing Crazy Horse to remain at large for long. While Miles 
and the 5th Infantry were hounding Sitting Bull and Gall, Crazy Horse took the opportunity to 
harass the cantonment on the Tongue River, mounting a series of raids on Miles’ wagon trains 
and supply depots in open defiance of the American Army and the notion the Lakota and 
Cheyenne did not make war in the winter. Even as Sitting Bull, Gall, Dull Knife, and Little Wolf 
were driven towards flight or surrender, Crazy Horse and Two Moons continued to prosecute 
their war. Returning to the cantonment December 23rd, Miles rested his men for six days then 
struck out again on December 29th with the goal of finding and forcing a confrontation with 
Crazy Horse’s warband. Miles took four hundred thirty-six infantry, a scattering of white and 
Indigenous scouts, and two artillery pieces disguised as covered wagons. As on his previous 
expeditions, Miles outfitted his troops for Arctic conditions, and Surgeon Henry Tilton was able 
to report only a few cases of frostbite, none of them serious—at least by the standards of the 
Great Sioux War. Provisioned against the cold, Miles and the 5th Infantry set out to deal with 
Crazy Horse’s Oglala Lakota and their Cheyenne compatriots.776 
Rather than withdrawing, as Sheridan feared would be the case, Crazy Horse chose to 
oppose Miles’ advance from the start. Skirmishes between Miles’ advance scouts and Lakota and 
Cheyenne war-parties were frequent, and Miles reported two men killed in Native ambushes over 
the duration of the first week of the march. With contacts between their men so frequent, Miles 
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and Crazy Horse were both well-informed of their opponent’s whereabouts; it may have been the 
first time in the Great Sioux War where both sides had an equally clear picture of the enemy 
before them. What, precisely, Crazy Horse, Little Big Man, Big Crow, Two Moons, and the 
other Oglala and Cheyenne war-leaders planned for this campaign remains elusive, though Miles 
speculated he was being drawn out from his cantonment so that when he was defeated returning 
to American-controlled territory without casualties would be next to impossible.777 Wooden Leg 
of the Northern Cheyenne and Eagle Shield of the Oglala, for their part, denied there was any 
idea of fighting with Miles, and said the Cheyenne and Oglala camps were getting ready to 
separate in order to better evade him.778 Whatever their operational goals, the actions of the 
Indigenous commanders are clear: they maintained a screening force of warriors out front at all 
times, keeping Miles busy and preventing any contact between his men and the more vulnerable 
elements in the Native camp. 
On January 7th, however, that screening effort broke down, and Miles’ scouts captured a 
small group of Cheyenne women and children, including Wooden Leg’s sister.779 Between two 
hundred and three hundred Cheyenne attempted to rescuing the captives that night but were 
driven back by the massed rifle fire of Miles’ troops. Recognising an opportunity to make Crazy 
Horse come to him, Miles encamped along the Wolf Mountain ridgeline and prepared his 
positions for the next day. Edmond Butler, one of his captains, described their placement: “[three 
companies] were deployed across the valley—the first mentioned to the west of the Tongue 
River—the other two to the east of the stream, all fronting to the south, the left resting at the base 
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of a bluff under which the train was parked.”780 On the front of the plateau, Miles placed one of 
his artillery pieces, flanked by another two companies, while two more companies held the rear 
of the valley. Miles then settled in to see what Crazy Horse would do.781 
What Crazy Horse did was launch an infantry assault down the valley, across the frozen 
river, and into the centre and right flank of Miles’ defenses. It was a move unprecedented in 
Lakota or Cheyenne warfare: a foot attack in the dead of winter on an entrenched American 
force. It was not something that, according to the colonial reasoning of men like Sheridan, the 
Plains tribes were supposed to be capable of. Yet Crazy Horse, Two Moons, and Big Crow not 
only attempted it, but came close to pulling it off. It was the last great Lakota and Cheyenne 
offensive of the war, and it made manifest just how firm the Indigenous leadership’s grasp on 
tactics really was. As Miles’ artillery blunted the thrust down the centre of the valley and fierce 
back and forth fighting continued on the right, Crazy Horse and his comrades took the 
opportunity to occupy the bluffs to the left of Miles’ fortified camp, threw up breastworks of 
cedar logs and stones, and poured repeating rifle fire into the 5th Infantry.782 While Crazy Horse 
took a leading role on the gunline, Big Crow, the Cheyenne shaman, danced along the top of the 
bluff, daring the Americans to shoot him. Miles and Butler saw this as part of Big Crow’s 
“medicine” to empower the Lakota and Cheyenne.783 According to Wooden Leg it was a 
distraction meant to draw American fire while the rest of the warriors kept their heads down.784  
Surrounded, and with his left under fire by Native American riflemen, Miles was in 
significant danger. The discipline of his troops held, however, and the artillery continued to 
 
780 Edmond Butler, “The Battle of Wolf Mountain,” in Battles and Skirmishes of the Great Sioux War, ed. Jerome A. 
Greene (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993): 197. 
781 Butler, “The Battle of Wolf Mountain,” 197. 
782 Butler, “The Battle of Wolf Mountain,” 201’ “Wooden Leg,” Lakota and Cheyenne, 130-131. 
783 Butler, “The Battle of Wolf Mountain,” 202; Miles, Personal Recollections of General Nelson A. Miles, 238. 
Miles, Serving the Republic, 155. 
784 “Wooden Leg,” Lakota and Cheyenne, 131. 
372 
 
prevent Crazy Horse and Two Moons from pushing home any of their charges. Miles then sent a 
countercharge up the bluffs on the left, cracking the Lakota and Cheyenne defenses in a close-
quarters firefight that mortally wounded Big Crow and sent Crazy Horse into a retreat along the 
ridgeline. Falling back to a spur that commanded the left flank of the ridgeline, Crazy Horse 
massed another two hundred warriors for a charge to retake the left bluff and regain control of 
the battle and Miles’ position. Miles and Butler both recognized the threat this posed, with both 
noting after the fact that a failure to take and hold the left would have demoralised the soldiers 
and fired up the Lakota and Cheyenne to the point they never would have broken. Pulling Butler 
from his spot at the rear, Miles reinforced his company with elements of two others, then charged 
them up the spur, into Crazy Horse’s gathering warriors. It was the call that decided the battle, 
with Butler seizing the spur and splintering the Lakota fortifications. With the American left now 
firmly held and their own flanks threatened, Crazy Horse and Two Moons sounded retreat and 
evacuated the battlefield, taking the dying Big Crow, and the rest of their casualties with them.785  
Uncommonly for the time, Miles did not exaggerate the number of Native Americans he 
killed, and in his memoirs admitted “the engagement was not of such a serious character as to 
cause great loss of life on either side.”786 Killing the Lakota and Cheyenne had not, however, 
been the point. “It demonstrated the fact,” he said, “that we could move in any part of the 
country in the midst of winter, and hunt the enemy down in their camps wherever they might 
take refuge. In this way, constantly pursuing them, we had made them realize that there was no 
peace or safety for them while they remained in a hostile attitude.”787 It was the same thing Miles 
did to the Comanche and Kiowa in the Red River War, and to Sitting Bull that October: a 
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strategy of area denial in the form of a dogged infantry pursuit and, taken together with the Dull 
Knife Fight, the Battle of Wolf Mountain had a major deleterious effect on those Lakota and 
Cheyenne still in the field. Crazy Horse’s prestige suffered when he could not feed the Northern 
Cheyenne after the Dull Knife Fight. Now he had finally, after an unbroken streak of victories, 
found an American officer who was his match. The aura of invincibility that surrounded him, 
and those like Two Moons who rode with him, began to waver. However minor the physical 
results of Wolf Mountain, the psychological impact on the Lakota and Cheyenne was severe, and 
for many proved the last straw. Just as the Hunkpapa had after Cedar Creek, the Oglala and 
Northern Cheyenne were now wondering if it was time to give in to the Army. 
The Great Sioux War petered out after January of 1877. Both Crook and Miles sent 
runners from the Indian agencies to make contact with the hostiles and convince them it was time 
to surrender. Sitting Bull stayed in Canada, but as the snow on the plains began to thaw, Dull 
Knife, Little Wolf, Two Moons, Crazy Horse, and the other leaders of the Lakota and Cheyenne 
confederacy trickled into the reservations to surrender.788 There were still occasional skirmishes, 
and violent incidents on the reserves themselves, one of which led to Crazy Horse’s death, but by 
April of 1877, only the sixty Lakota lodges under Lame Deer remained free on the plains. Their 
independence did not last long. Nelson Miles, assisted by surrendered Lakota and Cheyenne, 
tracked Lame Deer down and surrounded his camp. Miles tried to convince Lame Deer to 
surrender, but a misunderstanding caused the negotiations to turn violent and a short, sharp battle 
was fought, ending with Lame Deer dead and his following in Miles’ custody. When those 
captives were marched into the reservations, the Great Sioux War was officially over.789 
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There is some debate among historians as to whether Miles or Crook, or sometimes Miles 
or Mackenzie, deserves more of the credit for closing out the war. At the time, it was Miles who 
got the lion’s share of the accolades. Sheridan praised him in his annual report, as did Sherman, 
and both men wrote to now former President Grant about Miles’ performance.790 In a letter to 
Sherman, Grant observed “Miles has done good work since, which, with what he had done 
before, must rank him high with our young officers.”791 What none of the correspondence 
between these important men ever discussed was how Miles did it. If Sheridan grasped the ways 
in which Miles went against his doctrine for frontier warfare, he never wrote about it and never 
communicated it to Sherman or Grant, his two closest confidantes. He took the defeat of the 
Lakota and Cheyenne as his due, and never analysed how it happened. 
Phil Sheridan ended the Great Sioux War with all his illusions and his reputation intact. 
He shifted most of the culpability for the Little Bighorn onto Custer, and was now took credit for 
Crook, Mackenzie, and Miles’ winter operations. He never re-examined his ideas about how 
Native Americans fought and never reappraised the likes of Gall or Crazy Horse as tacticians. 
Insulated by his position and his prejudice alike, Sheridan did not have to question his colonial 
reasoning or consider whether he had engineered and then fought an entire war on false 
premises. The public might not have been entirely happy with how things had gone, but they 
were inclined to blame Custer or Crook or Terry or even Grant before they sought to blame 
Sheridan. Sheridan, accordingly, did not have to learn anything. He could just accept the 
victories that Crook, Mackenzie, and Miles handed him, and claim his strategy of winter 
campaigning was a resoundingly good idea. 
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The men who won the war, on the other hand, had to look past colonial reasoning and 
past Sheridan’s commands. Beating the Lakota and Cheyenne required an awareness that they 
were an enemy worth respecting, and taking appropriate steps to counter their capabilities. 
Nelson Miles and Bad Hand Mackenzie were both willing to regard Native Americans as 
potentially formidable opponents. So was George Crook when his decision-making process was 
not impaired by Sheridan watching over his shoulder. Crook may not have been able to admit to 
losing at the Rosebud or Slim Buttes, but he learned from his experiences, and made sure come 
the November campaign he had the Indigenous scouts he needed (even if he had to gain them by 
coercion), Sheridan’s opinion be damned. Abandoning the idea the Lakota and Cheyenne would 
fight like the Apache had, and mitigating, if not solving his logistical issues, Crook obtained the 
triumph that so long eluded him.  
Mackenzie and Miles did not have any illusions to shed. Their previous combat against 
the Comanche and the Kiowa gave them a crash course in the strategies and tactics used by the 
Plains tribes, and their sympathy for the peoples they were fighting made them aware that there 
were innovative commanders on the other side who might well alter those tactics if given the 
chance. Miles is the standout on this front; at Cedar Creek and Wolf Mountain he met the tactical 
improvisation of Gall and Crazy Horse with innovations of his own and showed the men who 
killed Custer could themselves be stopped. More broadly, Miles reconceptualised the entire war, 
not as the pursuit of Lakota and Cheyenne warbands before they could “scatter,” but as a 
campaign of area denial, intended to show Sitting Bull and his compatriots they could not hold 
any territory the United States Army was not willing to let them hold. He did not try to destroy 
the Lakota and Cheyenne physically, but instead targeted their psyche, chipping away at the 
prestige of their leaders until the coalition collapsed.  
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In his memoirs, Miles reflected that the weakness of the Lakota and Cheyenne militaries 
were not tactical or strategic, but cultural. “War,” he wrote, “is entirely voluntary with [the 
Native]. If he thinks it is a good day for scalps and plunder he is very daring, but if he thinks the 
signs are not favourable and he and his companions are receiving serious injury he can withdraw, 
with no loss of caste or reputation with his fellows. There is no such thing as order, positivity 
authority, or discipline among them. Knowing this, I found it to our advantage to hold them at a 
safe distance, to keep them losing and never gaining anything, and by constantly acting on the 
offensive I found they could be discouraged and dispersed. It was amusement for them to raid 
and make war during the summer, but when constant relentless war was made upon them in the 
severest of winter campaigns it became serious and most destructive.”792 This assessment is 
overly harsh (and carries some of its own stereotypes about “lazy” Indigenous peoples), but 
nevertheless reflects an underlying truth: the hostile Lakota and Cheyenne were a coalition of 
allied warbands, not an army with a hierarchical chain of command. War-leaders like Crazy 
Horse and Gall could only hold onto their followers for as long as they continued to win, and the 
alliance itself could only hold so long as diplomats like Sitting Bull were present to make sure it 
held. Miles grasped this and laid his plans accordingly. His tactics were based on his 
understanding of Plains warfare. His strategy was based on his understanding of their culture. In 




Lord Chelmsford’s situation in the spring of 1879 was if anything far worse than 
Sheridan’s was in winter of 1876. Where Sheridan was able to transfer much of the blame for the 
Little Bighorn to Custer, Chelmsford was not nearly as successful at making Durnford the 
 
792 Miles, Serving the Republic, 163. 
377 
 
scapegoat for Isandlwana. London was not, as we have seen, unwilling to blame Durnford, but 
many Members of Parliament still thought Chelmsford should be held to account for the debacle. 
With Parliament openly debating his competency and the press and some MPs demanding his 
recall and replacement, Chelmsford’s reputation, like his intentions for the war, was in tatters. 
His strategic situation was also considerably worse than Sheridan’s. Not only had he 
failed to conquer Zululand, and suffered terrible reverses at Isandlwana and Ntombe Drift 
(Hlobane was not yet known to the public or to Chelmsford himself) but he had been pushed 
onto the defensive. Pearson was besieged at Eshowe, Wood was skirmishing with Mbilini near 
Luneburg, and Chelmsford was on the Natal side of the border trying to put his army back 
together. His strategy of converging columns had come up disastrously short, while Cetshwayo’s 
plot to divide and isolate the British forces was working as intended. Chelmsford had to break 
Cetshwayo’s momentum and regain the initiative. Relieving Eshowe was the only practical 
method open to him. 
Since February, Chelmsford had promised Pearson, Bartle Frere, the War Office, and 
anyone else who would listen that he was preparing to break the siege of Eshowe. He had also 
told them that without reinforcements he could not hope to succeed. In consequence, the date of 
his relief expedition was constantly pushed farther and farther back. By the end of March these 
excuses were no longer sufficient. New regiments from Great Britain and other colonies had 
disembarked in South Africa, and additional auxiliaries were raised from the colonial and Native 
populace of Natal. At Chelmsford’s disposal were a Naval Brigade from the Shah, Tenedos, and 
Boadicea, the 57th and 91st Foot, five companies of the 99th Foot, six companies of the 3/66th 
Rifles, two battalions of Native auxiliaries, and the auxiliary cavalry under Barrow. 
Chelmsford’s artillery complement also grew considerably: the Naval Brigade brought with them 
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two Gatling guns, two 9-pounder cannons, and four 24-pounder rocket tubes.793 In total the 
troops available to Chelmsford exceeded 5500: 3390 white men, and 2280 Indigenous 
Africans.794 It was a larger and better armed column than the one Chelmsford first invaded 
Zululand with in January. 
Chelmsford took no chances this time around. After wiring Wood and requesting he stage 
a distraction—an order that led to the fiasco at Hlobane and the close-fought victory at 
Khambula—he marched into Zululand with the simple and specific objective of extracting 
Pearson’s column from Eshowe. Chelmsford’s letters from the time reveal a man whose 
expectations were much altered from January. Writing to Colonel Stanley at the War Office, 
Chelmsford informed him that while reports had reached him that Cetshwayo was having trouble 
gathering his army again after the casualties at Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift, he did not believe 
these reports and expected “that the Zulus as a nation will be found once more in the field when 
we advance.”795 In a letter to Wood, he confessed his fears regarding the coming operation 
saying “it seems almost certain that we shall be attacked and I have been anxious therefore to 
make my column as strong as possible so that we may read the Zulus a severe lesson.”796 The 
man who once harboured dreams of subjugating Zululand with only a few thousand men was 
now worried that over five thousand might not be enough to salvage the situation at Eshowe. 
In a memorandum to his officers on March 26th, Chelmsford exposed the ways in which 
his thinking had changed. Officers were charged with always keeping their units in close order 
and ammunition was to be readily available with the box lids already unscrewed. Troops were 
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instructed to stay on the defensive if attacked, and standing orders were to construct not only a 
laager but a shelter trench around the campsite every night. Troops were required to be under 
arms from four in the morning onwards, and sentries posted during the night were forbidden 
from smoking or speaking above a whisper on any subject save duty. Native scouts were to be 
sent out a mile ahead of the sentries during the night, and each face of the laager was to be 
guarded by a full company, relieved on the hour. During marches the troops were to halt every 
hour for at least ten minutes so they could pull together again and avoid becoming strung out and 
vulnerable.797 In these orders Chelmsford showed his absorption of the lessons of Isandlwana 
and Ntombe Drift: in the event of a Zulu ambush he wanted to bring massed firepower to bear as 
swiftly as possible. Chelmsford knew the Zulu commanders could outgeneral him and that their 
army was faster and stealthier than his own. He thus organized the Eshowe column around his 
one indisputable advantage over his Indigenous nemeses: the ability to put out a high volume of 
shot from a block of infantry and artillery. 
After ferrying his army across the Tugela River, Chelmsford marched straight for 
Eshowe, guided by Natal Native scouts and Cetshwayo’s former white advisor, John Dunn. 
Dunn was purportedly appalled the first time he saw the British soldiers attempt to laager, telling 
Chelmsford’s aide William Molyneux “we shall have to do better than this if we are to beat 
Cetewayo’s impi.”798 Dunn’s comments were echoed by Commandant Hamilton-Browne, the 
Irish mercenary who observed the carnage at Isandlwana, and who saw the botched laager as the 
kind of bungling only a British staff officer could produce.799 By March 30th Dunn and 
Hamilton-Browne were happier with the soldiers’ talent at laagering, which proved fortuitous 
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timing: later that day first contact was made between Chelmsford’s scouts and those of the Zulu 
at Eshowe. On the night of April 1st, Dunn helped Chelmsford select the evening’s campground 
at Gingindhlovu, a Zulu homestead only a short distance from Eshowe.800 Determined to fight on 
the defensive, Chelmsford declared there would be no advance the next day. Instead, the white 
troops would hold to their positions inside the laager, while the Indigenous auxiliaries were sent 
out to induce the Zulu to attack their fortifications.801 Chelmsford no longer had any belief he 
could defeat the Zulu military in open battle, and instead hoped they could be provoked into 
dashing themselves to pieces against his defenses. It was the same tactic that, unknown to 
Chelmsford, Wood used days earlier at Khambula—with the difference that Chelmsford’s 
column was much larger than Wood’s and had not sustained a cataclysmic reversal the day 
before.  
Chelmsford did not have to goad the Zulu into offensive action. At six in the morning on 
April 2nd, just as he was preparing to send out his scouts to locate the Zulu army, said army 
appeared on his doorstep. Alerted by their own scouts, the scattered Zulu units maintaining the 
blockade around Eshowe pulled together into one army, reinforced by veteran regiments from 
Ulundi and recently raised Tsongo auxiliaries from the coast. Somopho kaZikhale, Chief of the 
Themba Zulu and Cetshwayo’s personal armourer and gunsmith had charge of the combined 
forces, while Prince Dabulamanzi, who coordinated the siege of Eshowe, acted as his second-in-
command.802 Testimony from Zulu veterans of Gingindhlovu is sparse when contrasted with 
Isandlwana or Khambula, but Somopho and Dabulamanzi’s purpose within Cetshwayo’s grand 
strategy is not difficult to deduce: they were to prevent Chelmsford from breaking through to 
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Eshowe, keeping Pearson locked up behind the walls of the fort until he starved. They were 
aware the main army under Mnyamana and Ntshingwayo had been sent to eliminate Wood, and 
by interposing their 11 000-man detachment between Chelmsford and Pearson, Somopho and 
Dabulamanzi sought to act in concert with their fellow chieftains, chasing Chelmsford back to 
Natal and immobilizing Pearson while Mnyamana and Ntshingwayo disposed of Wood.803 
The Zulu advanced in skirmish line, using the long grass in front of the laager as cover. 
Within ten minutes they surrounded the laager, and despite withering fire from the Naval 
Brigade’s Gatling guns made it within musket range of the square, releasing a volley of shot in 
its direction.804 Most of this shooting was inaccurate, but the volume of musketry was enough to 
rattle some of the soldiers manning the laager. Ten minutes later, at 6:20, the Zulu made their 
first charge on the defensive works with nearly simultaneous strikes by the horns and boss of the 
pincer formation.805 Over the next hour, the Zulu assault rolled about the laager, trying every side 
of the square in turn, and, in the face of constant British riflery, closing to within twenty or thirty 
yards of their enemies.806 The terrain provided the Zulu with some defense against the British 
guns, and attacks massed in the long grass or in depressions in the ground before rushing towards 
the laager. The sight of the Zulu charge proved a serious strain on the greener troops, and neither 
the cannons nor the rockets were able to slow the Zulu appreciably; Chelmsford, Molyneux, 
Norris-Newman, and Hamilton-Browne credited the maintenance of their defenses to the Gatling 
 
803 “Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford to Colonel F.A. Stanley, April 10, 1879,” in Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand 
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guns.807 The Zulu appeared to concur with this assessment, for efforts were made to take the 
corners of the square held by the machineguns, with one Zulu warrior touching the barrel of a 
Gatling before being shot down.808  
Regardless of Chelmsford’s careful preparations and the technological advantages 
offered to him by the Naval Brigade’s machineguns, the Battle of Gingindhlovu was hardly one-
sided, and there were two key moments of crisis for the British. The first came on the 
northeastern face of the square, held by five companies of the 3/60th Rifles. The 3/60th was a new 
battalion, raised for the Anglo-Zulu War, and comprised of green troops. When Zulu sniper fire 
mortally wounded their Lieutenant-Colonel the 3/60th began to waver, and as the Zulu shortened 
the gap between themselves and the laager, the 3/60th’s firing grew highly erratic. Several of the 
battalion’s junior officers later admitted their men were scared out of their minds, and some of 
the nearby Naval officers were afraid that the 3/60th might break altogether. The most scathing 
indictment of the battalion’s performance came from Hamilton-Browne. The soldier-of-fortune 
attached himself to the 3/60th during the opening stages of the battle, and it was his opinion that 
they were on the verge of openly running. “It was only the frantic efforts of the officers of one 
regiment,” he reported, “that, on the death of their Colonel, prevented their men from making a 
clean bolt of it, and that just at the most critical moment when the charging Zulus were within 
one hundred yards of the shelter trench. Troth it was a near call and for a few minutes it was a 
toss-up whether the laager at Ginginhlova [sic] was not to be a second shambles like 
Isandlwana.”809 The 3/60th did, in the end, hold and the Zulu attack on their line was broken up 
by the Gatling guns and Marines of the Naval Brigade, but it was a near thing.  
 
807 Hamilton-Browne, Lost Legionary, 154; “Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford to Colonel F.A. Stanley, April 
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808 Quoted in Castle and Knight, Fearful Hard Times, 198. 
809 Hamilton-Browne, Lost Legionary, 153. 
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The second crisis occurred as the first Zulu offensive faltered. Chelmsford, seeing the 
Zulu falling back from his right front corner, ordered Captain Barrow and his Mounted Infantry 
to keep the Zulu on the run. The Zulu, however, were not actually running, and as Barrow 
charged out after them, the Zulu reformed their ranks, and encircled his cavalry, in much the 
same manner Mnyamana and Ntshingwayo’s men trapped Buller’s horsemen at Hlobane. 
Luckily for Barrow, Chelmsford quickly recognised his error and sent out William Molyneux 
and another body of cavalry to rescue the Mounted Infantry and usher them safely back inside 
the laager. Three men were killed, Barrow was wounded, and Molyneux’s horse was shot out 
from under him, an experience that still disturbed him years.810 
The Battle of Gingindhlovu lasted until 7:30 am, and during that time the Zulu made 
several more unsuccessful attempts to storm the laager, causing few casualties among the British 
but provoking many more tense moments. After seven o’clock the Zulu offensive finally lost 
steam, with the warriors settling in to shoot at the British, rather than massing for another charge. 
Judging the time was right to try the cavalry again, Chelmsford sent out Barrow with the 
Mounted Infantry and his Volunteer and auxiliary horsemen. This time around, the tactic 
worked, and the cavalry charge went through the Zulu line, sending the army into full retreat. 
Somopho and Dabulamanzi left over four hundred bodies behind and are thought to have 
suffered a thousand casualties or so in total, nearly ten percent of their force. Chelmsford lost 
nine men killed and six officers and forty-six men wounded. In his report to the War Office, 
Chelmsford stated “our casualties are small considering the easy mark the laager afforded the 
assailants, and, had it not been for the cover afforded the troops by the broad shelter trench, I 
should have had to report a much heavier loss.”811 No longer blind to danger, Chelmsford did not 
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linger long in the vicinity of Gingindhlovu. Breaking through to Eshowe, he relieved Pearson’s 
starving garrison then abandoned the fortress, retreating to Natal.  
Post-war propaganda by Evelyn Wood and the historical writings derived from his 
account, privilege the Battle of Khambula and discount Gingindhlovu as turning points in the 
war. In this narrative, it is Khambula that showed the way to defeating the Zulu, while 
Gingindhlovu (and eventually Ulundi) were mere afterthoughts, won by Chelmsford with the 
tactics Wood pioneered. This version of events does not survive an examination of the facts at 
hand. At the time of Gingindhlovu, Chelmsford did not know about Khambula or what tactics 
Wood used there. Chelmsford’s dispositions at Gingindhlovu were his own, based on his own 
bitter experience and the advice of local experts like John Dunn. Moreover, Wood at Khambula 
was on the tactical and strategic defensive. Hlobane shredded his column and Wood’s only 
concern the next day at Khambula was staying alive. Chelmsford, conversely, was on the tactical 
defense at Gingindhlovu, but on the offense strategically. He came to save Colonel Pearson and 
the Eshowe garrison and marched deep into Zulu territory to do so. He then assumed a defensive 
position not because he was trying to prevent his force from being overwhelmed and destroyed, 
but because Isandlwana and Ntombe Drift convinced him that only by keeping his men together 
and making the most of his technological superiority could he be victorious over the Zulu. 
Gingindhlovu was won by massed rifle fire and by the Gatling guns of the Naval Brigade, but 
also by Lord Chelmsford’s realisation he needed to maximise those advantages to best the Zulu. 
It was the first time British offensive operations against the Zulu ended in unqualified success. 
For the Zulu, on the other hand, Gingindhlovu was a major setback. Khambula was a 
defeat, but not one that notably altered the strategic picture. In the days immediately after it, 
Wood was far too battered to advance again, while in the other field of operations, Chelmsford 
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and Pearson remained separated by miles of ground and a second Zulu army. Had Chelmsford 
been halted at Gingindhlovu, it is far from unbelievable that Mnyamana and Ntshingwayo could 
have launched a second attack on Wood, finishing what they started and completing 
Cetshwayo’s plan for the isolation and elimination of the individual parts of the British army.  
With Somopho and Dabulamanzi in retreat from Gingindhlovu and the siege of Eshowe 
broken, the strategic picture was now entirely different for the Zulu King. Chelmsford and 
Pearson were headed back across the border into Natal and Wood’s column would join them 
shortly. The British armies had reunited and would soon be joined by further reinforcements. The 
Zulu military, on the other hand, had taken more than 3000 casualties since January and had no 
way to replace those numbers. For now, Zulu morale was holding, but Cetshwayo knew if the 
war went on much longer both the people’s will, and the agrarian economy would break down as 
the young men who were needed to work the fields were kept under arms or killed in action. 
Chelmsford knew it too, and the Anglo-Zulu War was now steadily moving into its final phase. 
While Chelmsford was busying himself at Eshowe and Gingindhlovu, the extra men he 
had requested from Great Britain continued to arrive at South African docks. The 58th Foot, 94th 
Foot, and elements of the 60th Rifles, 4th Foot, 21st Foot and 58th Foot, were all in the colony by 
April 11th, as were new drafts for the 1/24th Foot, still tattered after Isandlwana. Batteries of 
cannon and Gatling guns from the Royal Artillery were sent out as well, freeing Chelmsford 
from his reliance on the Naval Brigade for his artillery complement, and the 1st Dragoon Guards, 
3rd Dragoon Guards, and 17th Lancers gave him the dedicated heavy cavalry he previously 
lacked.812 The 30th Company of the Royal Engineers and new drafts of Special Service officers 
rounded out Chelmsford’s new army which exceeded 22 500 men when completed.813 The 
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number of officers of general rank was also far higher than previously; Major-General Henry 
Hope Crealock (brother of Chelmsford’s Assistant Military Secretary, John North Crealock), 
Major-General Edward Newdigate, and Major-General Henry Hugh Clifford were all sent to 
Natal, while Evelyn Wood was Breveted Brigadier-General at Chelmsford’s recommendation.814 
Chelmsford now had a real army under his command, one that nearly matched Cetshwayo’s in 
number and, with increases in artillery and cavalry, should easily outperform it in flexibility.  
Chelmsford spent the remainder of April and May carefully moving his forces towards 
frontline bases along the border between Natal and Zululand but did not begin his advance until 
May 31st despite frequent exhortations from the War Office and regular criticism in the press. 
Superficially, his plan resembled the one that ended so poorly at Isandlwana, with three columns 
moving into Zululand in tandem with one another to trap the Zulu between them. There were, 
however, important differences. In January, Chelmsford’s columns, intended for the rapid pursuit 
of guerilla bands, were too weak to withstand an assault from the main Zulu army. By the second 
invasion Chelmsford rectified his errors on this front. The First Division, under HH Crealock, 
tasked with Pearson’s old mission of advancing along the coast, numbered 9414 men, almost 
twice the number that successfully repulsed the Zulu at Gingindhlovu. The Second Division, 
theoretically under Newdigate but in practise commanded by Chelmsford himself, counted 4822 
men in its ranks and was accompanied by the 1100 British heavy cavalry and auxiliary scouts of 
the Cavalry Brigade. Evelyn Wood commanded the Flying Column with 3849 men and was 
instructed to remain close to Chelmsford and Newdigate’s Second Division so they could 
support one another. Each column had its own artillery support as well. On the Natal side of the 
border, Clifford was left in charge of their base.815 Having incorporated the lessons of Khambula 
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and Gingindhlovu, Chelmsford’s second invasion of Zululand immunised itself against Zulu 
attack through technological superiority and overwhelming force. 
As it turned out, the Zulu, despite Chelmsford’s best precautions, were still more than 
capable of upsetting his plans and dragging his name through the mud. On June 2, the third day 
of the invasion, a Zulu scouting party ambushed a small cavalry patrol and wiped it out. In itself 
this was no great setback, but among the dead cavalrymen was Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, 
exiled Prince Imperial of France. The Prince came to South Africa as a staff officer, and 
Chelmsford promised Cambridge, and through him, Queen Victoria and the deposed Empress 
Eugenie, he would keep the young man safe.816 Indeed, Chelmsford’s standing orders regarding 
the Prince Imperial were that he remain on the Lieutenant-General’s staff, and never be sent into 
action. Louis-Napoleon went behind Chelmsford’s back, however, and bullied his way into 
accompanying a cavalry patrol, a bad decision that gained him nothing beyond a pointless death 
at the hands of Zulu scouts. Chelmsford’s apologist, Norris-Newman, was right for once when he 
proclaimed the Prince Imperial’s loss a minor skirmish blown entirely out of proportion by the 
press at home but being in the right could not help Chelmsford.817 Even more than Isandlwana, 
the death of the last heir to Napoleon was frontpage news all over Europe, and Chelmsford’s 
culpability was debated in the House of Commons and House of Lords alike.818 Under pressure 
from Parliament, the War Office sent Sir Garnet Wolseley to South Africa with a mandate to 
supersede Chelmsford and Bartle Frere both.819 
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Lord Chelmsford’s career was now over and he knew it. All that remained was for him to 
salvage something of his dignity and reputation. Abandoning the comparative civility that 
characterised his first effort to conquer Zululand, Chelmsford implemented a policy of scorched 
earth warfare, burning Zulu homesteads and crops, slaughtering Zulu livestock, and ordering 
Crealock and Wood to do the same.820 Where military victories had failed to bring the Zulu to 
heel, the devastation of their agriculture and destruction of their economy might now do it 
instead. No Phil Sheridan at heart, Chelmsford still tried to avoid excess casualties among Zulu 
non-combatants, but some inevitably occurred and the malefactors, whom Chelmsford had 
previously threatened with severe punishments, now escaped without even a warning. The Zulu 
had taken Chelmsford’s standing as a Victorian gentleman from him and he abandoned his 
gentlemanly notions of honourable warfare as he tried to gain that standing back, marching 
straight for Ulundi.  
Cetshwayo knew Chelmsford was coming and was waiting for him. There was not much 
else the Zulu King could do at this date. He made additional peace overtures to Chelmsford and 
to Bartle Frere, but the British officials, driven to save themselves from the wrath of their 
superiors, were not interested in anything but his unconditional surrender.821 Cetshwayo was 
going to have to fight Chelmsford again, and his ability to do was badly impaired. Chelmsford’s 
new columns were far too large for the divide-and-conquer strategy the King and Ntshingwayo 
used in the early months of the war; the First Division by itself and the Second Division and 
Flying Column together being of such size only the full Zulu army would have a chance against 
them. The death of Prince Mbilini in a minor skirmish that April further limited Cetshwayo’s 
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options; the exiled Swazi Prince had been his best guerilla leader, and with him gone there was 
no Zulu commander who could successfully mimic the kind of delaying tactics that so frustrated 
Evelyn Wood.822 The only card Cetshwayo had left to play was an open battle with Chelmsford 
at Ulundi, a scenario the King knew favoured the British. His councillors and generals were 
determined to make a last-ditch bid to stop Chelmsford though, and for the final time the Zulu 
levies were mustered at Ulundi. Prince Ziwedu kaMpande, Cetshwayo’s brother, held command, 
but it was Ntshingwayo kaMahole, triumphant at Isandlwana and Hlobane, who seems to have 
been really in charge. Apprised of Chelmsford’s movements by their scouts, and unwilling to 
give in without a last stand, Ziwedu and Ntshingwayo lay in wait for Chelmsford with 20 000 
Zulu warriors.823  
On July 3, Chelmsford and Wood reached the outskirts of Ulundi and made camp. A 
force of light cavalry, under Sir Redvers Buller was sent to scout the region around Ulundi and 
uncover the Zulu dispositions if any. Buller, who fought under Chelmsford in the Xhosa Wars 
and served Wood so ably at Hlobane and Khambula, was Chelmsford’s preferred scout 
throughout the advance on Ulundi, and had, over the last months, burned more Zulu homesteads 
and rustled more Zulu cattle than any of the Lieutenant-General’s other officers. Once described 
as “brave to the point of insanity,” Buller was nevertheless careful with the lives of his white 
troops, and the Volunteer cavalrymen always loved him.824 He was therefore a natural choice to 
scout the vicinity of Ulundi and determine the route for Chelmsford’s advance. 
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As luck would have it, the selection of Buller proved fortuitous for an entirely different 
set of reasons. As a survivor of Hlobane, Buller had seen what a Zulu ambush could do to an 
unprepared cavalry force and kept a wary eye out for any signs of a trap. Shortly after leaving 
camp, Buller’s cavalry encountered first a small party of warriors, then several goatherds, and 
finally a band of mounted Zulu under Zibhebhu kaMaphitha, who led the Zulu scouts at 
Isandlwana and was responsible for a recent series of sniper attacks on parties of soldiers. Buller 
chased after Zibhebhu, aiming to end the Zulu officer’s menace for good, only to stop short when 
he recognised something was wrong. Zibhebhu’s horsemen, the small band of warriors, and even 
the goatherds, had all been fleeing in the same direction, drawing Buller into another Zulu 
ambush. At the banks of the Mbilane stream, just past the homestead of Nodwengo and three-
quarters of a mile from Ulundi, Buller’s suspicions became too much and he ordered his 
command to fall back, only moments before a hidden Zulu war-party raised the net they had 
concealed in the long grass. Essentially a low-tech equivalent of a minefield, the net was meant 
to entangle the legs of Buller’s mounts, unhorsing the cavalry, and leaving them easy prey to the 
5000 Zulu waiting in the grass. Their plan thwarted by Buller’s acutely tuned sense for danger, 
those 5000 Zulu emerged from hiding and opened fire on Buller’s Mounted Infantry who beat a 
hasty retreat to Chelmsford’s army and the protection of the laager and infantry square.825  
The July 3 ambush is alluded to in some form in most histories of the Anglo-Zulu War, 
but its implications have often gone unexplored; usually it is seen as little more than a prequel to 
the real battle at Ulundi the next day. Yet the elaborate attempt to eliminate Buller, and with him 
the better part of Chelmsford’s reconnaissance force should probably be viewed as another 
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example of Zulu tactical sophistication. The Zulu saw at Khambula and Gingindhlovu just how 
lethal British cavalry could be, especially when the terrain favoured them. They also understood, 
after observing Chelmsford’s advance over the last month, that the Mounted Infantry and 
Volunteers under Buller were Chelmsford’s eyes and ears in Zululand’s countryside. At 
Nodwengo, Ntshingwayo and Zibhebhu tried to remove Buller and his scouts from the table, a 
move which, if successful, would have blinded Chelmsford, with no way to distinguish the best 
route towards Ulundi. This would have left the Lieutenant-General at a crucial disadvantage the 
next day and could, potentially, have tipped the odds at Ulundi in favour of the Zulu. Despite 
what some historians have suggested since, Nodwengo should be an obvious sign that the Zulu 
were still trying to win and had every intent of making a fight of it at Ulundi.  
Nodwengo should also provide some insight into the Zulu plans for the battle. 
Throughout the conflict Ntshingwayo, in his capacity as King Cetshwayo’s most trusted general, 
left his personal imprint on each engagement at which he held the command. At Isandlwana, he 
waited until Chief Matshana lured Lord Chelmsford away from the British campsite, before 
enveloping Durnford and Pulleine with his 20 000 man army, which was concealed a short 
distance away. At Hlobane, he had Prince Mbilini and Chief Manyanyoba bait Buller and Russell 
into chasing them up the mountain, then struck at Wood and Weatherly with his 15 000 warriors, 
encircling Hlobane and aiming to prevent escape. Now, at Nodwengo, he once again orchestrated 
an ambush of a detached piece of Chelmsford’s army, and did so while his own host, 20 000 
strong, was camped less than three-quarters of a mile away. The possibility must be considered 
that the Battle of Ulundi, as it took place, was actually the fallback plan, and Ntshingwayo’s 
original idea was not only to blind Chelmsford by taking out his cavalry, but to then assault him 
while he was on the march, as Godide had done to Pearson in January. Such an attack, made 
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against an army in transit and with no warning from its scouts, could have done real damage to 
Chelmsford’s column, particularly if they were hit while trying to cross the Mbilane. It would 
certainly have been Ntshingwayo’s best bet for winning the war at this late date. That Zibhebhu, 
who did so much to enable the surprise attack at Isandlwana, was the one coordinating the 
attempt on Buller is even more suggestive as to Ntshingwayo’s intentions. Since no one bothered 
to interview the Zulu general after the war his strategy remains undisclosed, but it may be that 
Buller, in evading Ntshingwayo’s trap, also spared the army from a full-scale ambush on July 3rd.    
Chelmsford broke camp early the next morning and, following the route Buller 
recommended, crossing the river between Nodwengo and Ulundi at 6:45am. Those injured 
during the march, and the 1/24, reconstituted by drafts from England, were left to hold the camp, 
while the rest of the Second Division and the Flying Column moved against Cetshwayo. Buller 
located a favourable position the day before, and Chelmsford set up his army along it, on “high 
ground uncommanded from any point, and with but little cover beyond long grass near it.”826 As 
at Gingindhlovu, Chelmsford formed his infantrymen into a huge, hollow square with the cavalry 
inside and the corners anchored by Gatling guns. With four of the Gatlings in hand this time, 
instead of the two he had at Gingindhlovu, Chelmsford was able to place a machinegun in each 
corner of the square, defending his most vulnerable points with automatic gunfire. Each face of 
the square was reinforced by a battery of artillery loaded with cannister and primed to devastate 
the Zulu infantry.827 This superiority in artillery was key to Chelmsford’s battleplan since, unlike 
at Khambula or Gingindhlovu, he did not intend to entrench or laager. To Molyneux, Chelmsford 
explained his belief that the Zulu, having bested the British at Isandlwana, Ntombe Drift, and 
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Hlobane, would never accept that they had been defeated as long as the only British victories 
were won from behind laagers and trench lines.828 The Zulu army had to be shattered in open 
battle before Cetshwayo’s generals would admit the war was over. In his memoirs, Evelyn 
Wood, as he so often did, claimed credit for this idea, saying Chelmsford got it from him.829 
William Molyneux’s memoirs disagree, not only attributing the plan to Chelmsford, but stating 
that Wood wished to entrench.830 Whichever of the men the notion originated with, it showed a 
much better understanding of their Zulu foe than either of them possessed at the start of 
hostilities.  
The Battle of Ulundi commenced at 8:45 the morning of July 4 as Chelmsford’s cavalry, 
led by Redvers Buller, rode out to harass the approaching Zulu. Here, Buller played the same 
role he had at Khambula, with almost identical results. The younger Zulu warriors gave chase 
and were drawn within artillery and rifle range, where Chelmsford’s gunners and riflemen 
stopped them cold as Buller pulled back inside the square. The Zulu loss of control was only 
temporary, however; Ziwedu and Ntshingwayo soon imposed discipline, and by 9:00 the British 
square was surrounded. Khambula and Gingindhlovu taught the Zulu the strengths and 
weaknesses of the British square as a formation, and at Ulundi that knowledge was put into use, 
with the Zulu boss attacking the frontal face of the square while the horns circled round back to 
strike almost simultaneously at the rear corners.831 The Zulu have sometimes been criticized for 
their reliance on infantry assaults, but the reality of their situation was that nothing else was 
liable to work. In a shooting match Zulu musketry would be overmatched by British riflery, 
artillery, and machineguns. Only with a shock attack on the vulnerable corners of the square 
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could Ziwedu and Ntshingwayo hope to crack the British defenses and trigger a route. It was a 
high-risk, high-reward plan, typical of the Zulu in general and Ntshingwayo in particular. 
When the war was over, Evelyn Wood told his readers the Zulu had not fought very hard 
at Ulundi. He aimed to bolster the image of his own triumph at Khambula, by making it the 
battle that broke the Zulu.832 Chelmsford too downplayed Zulu effectiveness at Ulundi to make 
his victory clearer. Both general’s claims are belied by reports from their subordinates who 
spoke admiringly of the courage of the Zulu charge. At the right rear corner the Zulu, despite 
British marksmanship and machine gunnery reached within thirty yards of the square, their final 
push broken up by cannister fire and close range riflery.833 Still undaunted, some Zulu, led by 
Zibhebhu, forced their way closer still, reaching within nine paces of the British line. Officers 
were drawing swords and revolvers in anticipation of a close-quarters bloodbath, when 
Chelmsford redeployed his reserves to the right corner and quashed the Zulu attack with seven 
rounds of case shot at point blank range.834 If the attack on the left face of the square was not 
quite so ferocious it was still intense enough that the infantry were ordered to fix bayonets in 
case the Zulu broke through the barrier of British fire.835 
By 9:30 the Zulu knew they could not take the square. Bitter experience at Khambula and 
Gingindhlovu showed them that British defensive positions, if not taken swiftly, were unlikely to 
be taken at all. Chelmsford, sensing this was his chance, ordered a charge by Colonel Drury-
Lowe and the 17th Lancers. The heavy cavalry, armed with their namesake polearms, scythed 
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into the Zulu at the rear of the square, clearing the ground between Nodwengo and Chelmsford’s 
army in a matter of minutes, killing an estimated hundred and fifty Zulu. The fight did not go out 
of the Zulu, however, and they briefly rallied, subjecting Drury-Lowe’s lancers to a fusillade of 
musketry that stopped him in front of the hills leading to Ulundi. Drury-Lowe, not wishing to 
repeat the errors of Hlobane, declined to pursue the Zulu into the hills and chose instead to 
regather his men, a decision Chelmsford endorsed in his report after the battle.836 
Chelmsford, in the meantime, sent out Buller and the Mounted Infantry, and it was this 
second cavalry charge that made the Zulu rout a general one. As the Zulu broke and ran, 
Chelmsford advanced two of his nine-pounder guns and opened up on the retreating enemy, 
hastening their departure even as first Buller, and then Drury-Lowe, took off in pursuit. 
Chelmsford estimated that four hundred and fifty Zulu were slain in the retreat, a number which 
most historians view as a fairly accurate one. Mustering his men into marching formation, 
Chelmsford pushed forwards to Ulundi and set fire to the royal homestead. The next day 
Chelmsford resigned his command, leaving Garnet Wolseley the unglamorous job of tracking 
down Cetshwayo who had vanished into the hills. The Zulu losses likely exceeded 1500 and may 
have been as much 2500; with so many dead, the Zulu army was never again able to offer any 
meaningful resistance to the British.837 
Evelyn Wood’s opinion notwithstanding, it was the consensus at the time that Ulundi was 
the battle that broke the Zulu. Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Michael Hicks Beach certainly though so, 
with Hicks Beach reading Bartle Frere’s opinion on the matter into the Parliamentary minutes.838 
Wolseley, who had to negotiate the actual end of the war, found Zulu chiefs, previously defiant 
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in the face of British offers of surrender, were willing to talk after Ulundi and gave Chelmsford 
the credit was due to him for this.839 Molyneux reported speaking to Zulu veterans who 
concurred that the war was not over until Ulundi.840 The general acknowledgement of his 
triumph was not enough to save Chelmsford’s career. Recalled home after his resignation, he 
became a personal military advisor to Queen Victoria but never held another field command. 
Even the patronage of the Queen was insufficient to overcome the stigma of Isandlwana and the 
death of the Prince Imperial, and the Duke of Cambridge refused to trust Chelmsford again.  
Chelmsford was not the only member of the conspiracy to lose his job. When the First 
Anglo-Boer War began in 1880, Bartle Frere, who justified the Zulu campaign on the premise it 
would reconcile the Boers to British rule, was recalled to London. There he faced a 
Parliamentary inquiry into his misconduct as High Commissioner for South Africa. Theophilus 
Shepstone, the third member of the triumvirate, was ordered to London at the same time, 
ostensibly to advise the government on the situation in the Transvaal. Shortly after, he was 
pushed into early retirement, the trust Parliament had once had in him long since dissipated.  
All three men deserved to lose their jobs. Yet it should be said, in a lukewarm defense of 
Lord Chelmsford, that for all the recklessness he displayed in starting the war, and for all the 
blundering arrogance that led to Isandlwana, he did learn from his mistakes and did, in the end, 
conquer Zululand for the British. Chelmsford’s errors in judgement, most notably his 
underestimation of the Zulu and his belief they would fight him in the same manner the Xhosa 
had, were also far from unique to him. Colonial reasoning of this kind was common throughout 
the British establishment with Sir Bartle Frere, Lord Chelmsford, and Sir Theophilus Shepstone 
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being only the most prominent victims of it. Sir Evelyn Wood, whose career was helped, rather 
than hindered by the Anglo-Zulu War, and who would eventually be granted a Field Marshal’s 
baton, was every bit as guilty of bad judgement and colonial thinking as Chelmsford. Indeed, 
Wood’s behaviour at Hlobane is, if anything, even more open to criticism than Chelmsford’s 
before Isandlwana; Isandlwana had shown the British precisely how competent the Zulu were, 
yet Wood refused to accept it and earned the British Army another embarrassing loss in the 
process. It took the reversal at Hlobane and a life-and-death struggle at Khambula for Wood, 
widely acknowledged as a capable officer, to remove his own blinders and see the Zulu for the 
dangerous, professional adversary that they were. 
Chelmsford’s blinders were off after Isandlwana, and he spent months reformatting his 
strategy in accordance with his newfound appreciation for Zulu generalship. At Gingindhlovu he 
used overwhelming technical superiority, fortifications, and thousands of reinforcements from 
Great Britain to relieve the Siege of Eshowe. He then integrated what he learned at 
Gingindhlovu, what Wood learned at Khambula, and what the army all learned at Isandlwana, 
Ntombe Drift, and Hlobane into a war-winning strategy based around attrition, artillery, and the 
economic degradation of the Zulu Kingdom. Chelmsford was not a brilliant general but he was 
competent enough to know Zululand could not match the resources of the British Empire. So 
long as the London government was more worried about saving face than punishing 
insubordination, Chelmsford would have all the resources he needed to win the war, while 
Cetshwayo’s economic base and reserves of manpower would continue to shrink. Unable to win 
the war through superior strategy, Chelmsford fell back on the advantages he held from the start 
and won by employing of technology the Zulu could not match. At the Battle of Ulundi, 
Chelmsford was not the best general present. He was, however, the general with the Gatling 
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guns, the cavalry, the artillery, and the masses of riflemen he needed to overcome his more 
skilled opponent. Chelmsford finally understood what the Zulu army could and could not do, and 




When contrasting the conclusions of the Great Sioux and Anglo-Zulu Wars it is the 
differences, rather than the similarities that become immediately apparent. Phil Sheridan and 
Lord Chelmsford were, after all, very different men and their reactions to the reverses they 
suffered were diametrically opposed. Sheridan, widely regarded as one of the best of the Civil 
War generals, refused to alter his preconceptions, and to the end, tried to prosecute the war along 
the lines he first drew up in January 1876. It was the innovations and talents of subcommanders 
like Bad Hand Mackenzie and Nelson Miles that ended the Lakota and Cheyenne threat by early 
1877 and prevented the war from dragging on for another year or more. This is quite different 
from South Africa, where Lord Chelmsford, often derided as incompetent, absorbed the lessons 
his prior embarrassments handed him, and went into Gingindhlovu and Ulundi with an entirely 
new set of tactics, enabling him to beat the Zulu military that had previously humbled him.  
Nothing in the two men’s personal histories accounts for this discrepancy. The difference 
lay in their motivations, not their pasts. Sheridan’s skillful manipulation of the press saw most of 
the culpability for the Little Bighorn assigned to Custer, with the few dissenters targeting Crook, 
Terry, or even Grant, rather than Sheridan. No matter how poorly the Great Sioux War went, it 
had little impact on Sheridan’s career, which continued to trend upwards, with his eventual 
succession to the post of General-in-Chief on William Sherman’s retirement. Lord Chelmsford, 
however, was fighting for his public life. Durnford and Pulleine were not famous like Custer, and 
Chelmsford’s distance from London made controlling the press a much more daunting task for 
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him than for Sheridan. Chelmsford knew any more mistakes would result in his professional 
ruin, and he was thus highly motivated to find a way to win the war, and win it quickly, before 
Garnet Wolseley could displace him and claim all the glory for Cetshwayo’s downfall. 
Chelmsford ultimately failed to save his career, but his decision to change tactics was indicative 
of the desire to do so; faced with the loss of his job and the degradation of his reputation, 
Chelmsford discarded his colonial reasoning. Sheridan was never confronted with that same 
problem, and as such, never had his outlook transformed to the extent Chelmsford’s was. The 
American general also had subordinates, like Mackenzie and Miles, who could win the war for 
him while he remained behind his desk; Chelmsford, having taken the field once had no choice 
but to take it again, and whatever aid he might have been given by Evelyn Wood and Redvers 
Buller had to finish the war himself. Chelmsford had to find his own war-winning strategies and 
tactics; Sheridan had those supplied to him by Mackenzie and Miles. 
 It is when examining those war-winning strategies that one again begins to see the 
overlap between the Great Sioux and Anglo-Zulu Wars. This is especially true when comparing 
Lord Chelmsford’s victories at Gingindhlovu and Ulundi to Nelson Miles’ triumphs at Cedar 
Creek and Wolf Mountain. Miles and Chelmsford both took the strategic offensive, but the 
tactical defensive, marching into enemy territory, taking a strong position and allowing their 
opponents to come to them. Both relied on massed riflemen, artillery, and at times, 
entrenchments and fortifications to counter the greater mobility and numbers of their enemies. 
The technological superiority of Euro-American armies is so widely accepted as fact that it is 
sometimes glossed over, yet it was critical to both Miles and Chelmsford’s schemes. Miles used 
the superior range of his rifles to hold the Lakota and Cheyenne at a distance, and the power of 
his artillery to break up cavalry charges that might have otherwise endangered his infantry 
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squares. Chelmsford used squares of riflemen in the same way, while his artillery and Gatling 
guns backed up the infantry, defending the weak points of the square and reducing the number of 
Zulu who came within close-combat range even further. Miles and Chelmsford were victorious, 
in large part, because their tactics maximised the edge that their technological advantages gave 
them. On the tactical offense, against highly mobile indigenous enemies, artillery, Gatling guns, 
and lines of riflemen were next to useless; on the defense they created impassable walls of fire 
the Lakota-Cheyenne and Zulu could not overwhelm. 
On a related note, Miles and Chelmsford’s other discovery was that they could not beat 
Native armies on Native terms. Indigenous leaders like Crazy Horse, Gall, Mbilini, and 
Ntshingwayo were able generals, and the warriors under their command were competent to a 
degree that confounded their white enemies. The Lakota and Cheyenne were among the best 
light cavalry in the world, while the Zulu shock troops excelled in open infantry engagements. 
When the American Army fought the Plains tribes with cavalry, or the British forces confronted 
the Zulu in the open, they invited defeat at the hands of an enemy who understood that kind of 
warfare better than they did. At Cedar Creek, Wolf Mountain, Gingindhlovu, and Ulundi, Miles 
and Chelmsford changed the rules, employing tactics their white troops could easily execute, and 
leaving the Lakota-Cheyenne and Zulu on unfamiliar ground. There was an acknowledgement, 
explicit in Miles’ case, tacit in Chelmsford’s, that the American and British armies were 
overmatched at, respectively, cavalry warfare and open infantry fighting. Given Miles’ use of 
infantry assaults in the final stages at Cedar Creek and Wolf Mountain, and Chelmsford’s 
unleashing of the cavalry in the last moments of Gingindhlovu and Ulundi, the importance of 
combined arms warfare should not be overlooked either. The Lakota and Northern Cheyenne 
were superior to the US cavalry arm, the Zulu better at open fighting than the British infantry, 
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but Miles and Chelmsford did not have to rely on cavalry or infantry alone to win their battles. 
By changing which arms of the military they were emphasising, Miles and Chelmsford could 
employ a tactical flexibility the mono-arm forces of the Plains tribes and Zululand lacked. 
This is not to suggest Indigenous leaders were incapable of innovation. At Wolf 
Mountain, Crazy Horse’s surprise infantry attack threatened Miles’ lines, while his use of 
fortifications made Miles’ own infantry charge a far more hazardous prospect than it would 
otherwise have been. At Ulundi, Ziwedu and Ntshingwayo’s plan of attack made it obvious that 
they had analysed and comprehended the strengths and weaknesses of Chelmsford’s square 
formation, even if they did not have the resources necessary to break it. Native American and 
African commanders displayed every bit as much inventive spirit, tactical skill, and drive to win 
as their Euro-American enemies, and sometimes more. Given sufficient time, it is not 
unbelievable that the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne could have mastered infantry combat, or 
that the Zulu would have found a solution to the British square and its machineguns. Sufficient 
time, however, was not available. 
From the very beginning, the Great Sioux Anglo-Zulu Wars were on time limits. The 
Lakota-Cheyenne coalition and Zululand did not have the economic resources or manpower 
reserves to fight it out with the American and British imperial projects over the long term. White 
soldiers were frequently outnumbered in individual battles, but there were always more 
reinforcements waiting in the wings. The Lakota, Northern Cheyenne, and Zulu did not have that 
same luxury. With far smaller populations to draw upon, any defeat was a potential demographic 
disaster. The Americans and the British also had the funds and the willpower to prosecute the 
wars for as long as it took to win, while the Indigenous peoples, tied to respectively the hunting 
season and the agricultural cycle, could not do the same. The Lakota and Cheyenne needed 
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enough food supplies to last them through the winter. Bad Hand Mackenzie’s attack on Dull 
Knife and Little Wolf’s camp may not have produced many casualties, but the capture or burning 
of their winter food stores proved far more deadly to the Northern Cheyenne. King Cetshwayo 
was in the same position, as he could only raise Zululand’s levies for a short period without 
depriving the economy of men needed to bring in the harvest and manage the herds. 
Chelmsford’s cattle rustling and burning of homesteads exacerbated these problems and the 
economic collapse was a major reason for the Zulu to give up after Ulundi. 
The comparatively fragile state of the Indigenous polities was the last ingredient in Miles 
and Chelmsford’s conquests. The Lakota and Northern Cheyenne did not have a single leader, 
and it took a steady stream of successes to keep them in line behind any one cause. Sitting Bull 
was at the centre of the Native American alliance, but he was not chief of all the Lakota, and he 
had no influence save diplomacy over the Northern Cheyenne. When Miles chased Sitting Bull 
into Canada and Mackenzie burned the Northern Cheyenne’s winter food stocks, the coalition, 
founded on the premise the united tribes could beat the white man, began to fray. Zululand, 
despite its history of civil wars, held together far better and there were comparatively few 
defections before Ulundi, with Prince Hamu the one notable exception. After Ulundi was lost 
and Cetshwayo went on the run, though, most of the Zulu barons were prepared to come to terms 
with the British invaders. Zululand’s feudal structure bound the great chiefs of the kingdom with 
oaths of loyalty to the king, but once he was no longer ruling each chief felt free to make his own 
decisions and come to his own accommodations with the British.  
Some historians have posited that these internal divisions among the Lakota, Cheyenne, 
and Zulu—and more broadly, amongst Indigenous peoples the world over—made their 
subjugation by Euro-American imperialism inevitable. This goes too far. The Lakota-Cheyenne 
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alliance held together for a year, and only came apart when their most prominent leaders were 
beaten and half their number reduced to starvation. Prince Hamu aside, Zululand showed little 
internal dissent, with those chiefs who favoured making terms with the British—Ntshingwayo 
among them—staying loyal to the king until his favourite homestead was sacked and he himself 
went into hiding. Internal fault lines were present in both Indigenous polities, but it took action 
on the part of the Americans and the British to promote the collapse of both systems. In the 
absence of American or British battlefield triumphs, both the Lakota-Cheyenne coalition and 
Zululand could have survived for months to come; they had to be beaten, and beaten repeatedly 
at that, before surrender to the whites became an option many were prepared to embrace.  
In the final months of the Great Sioux and Anglo-Zulu Wars, Nelson Miles and Lord 
Chelmsford hit on the same war-winning strategy: offensive operations couched in defensive 
tactics, using massed riflemen to keep their enemies at range and artillery or Gatling guns to 
shatter charges. While there were aesthetic differences in their formations, the same basic tactics 
underlay them both and the same strategic concepts governed their employment. That Europeans 
and Americans beat Indigenous peoples through use of more advanced armaments is an old 
canard of military history, but it is one that has not been dissected enough. As the Rosebud, the 
Little Bighorn, Slim Buttes, Isandlwana, Ntombe Drift, and Hlobane show, “more advanced” 
armies could be, and were, crushed by “primitives” when they failed to take maximum advantage 
of their high-tech arsenal, or when Indigenous peoples utilized tactics that limited the efficacy of 
those armaments. To achieve victory, Miles and Chelmsford had to come up with tactics that 
made the best use of their arms while covering up deficiencies in other parts of their armies. That 
the tactics they used were as similar as they were is profoundly interesting, and raises questions 
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about whether there were underlying rules for this kind of colonial war, and if those rules can be 













































Conclusion: Due to the Victors—and the Vanquished 
 
If the Great Sioux War and the Anglo-Zulu War proved anything, it was that bigotry was 
a poor basis for a plan of campaign. American and European officers who based their 
assumptions about enemy behaviour on the colour of that enemy’s skin made critical mistakes 
that damaged their own reputations and got their men hurt or killed. Two of the most famous 
disasters in colonial history, the Battle of the Little Bighorn and the Battle of Isandlwana 
stemmed from fatal miscalculations on the parts of white generals who did not—and perhaps it 
might be said, could not—appreciate that their Indigenous foes were every bit as resourceful and 
tactically adept as they themselves were.  
The generals who made these mistakes were not stupid men, and to claim they were 
would be to brush off the deeply ingrained prejudices of the day and how they twisted the 
perceptions of even the most capable of professional soldiers. It would also be to denigrate the 
efforts of the Indigenous commanders who fought so hard to defeat those professional soldiers. 
Philip Henry Sheridan might have been a brutal man, and even a cruel one, but he was not, by 
any means, a mentally deficient one. A Lieutenant-General by thirty-eight, Phil Sheridan was 
one of the American Civil War’s top generals and an early theorist of total war, a concept that 
only grew more important as the nineteenth century turned over into the twentieth. His British 
counterpart, Lord Chelmsford, did not have Sheridan’s lustrous reputation but he was still an 
experienced and competent soldier, with nothing in his record to suggest he would turn in a 
subpar performance when trying conclusions with the Zulu, his experiences in Ethiopia and the 
Xhosa frontier seemingly making him the perfect choice for another African command. 
Sheridan and Chelmsford were misled not by their lack of intelligence, but by their ample 
reserves of prejudice, which convinced them that their enemies would not stand and fight and 
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would instead have to be run down and cornered like rats. It was the premise both men based 
their campaigns upon, and it set up their operations to fail from the very start. Conceived on 
faulty logic, both Sheridan and Chelmsford’s operational schemes were destined to be stillborn, 
and that had nothing to do with either general’s intellect—or with the intellects of their 
subordinates. George Crook, Alfred Terry, John Gibbon, Charles Pearson, Evelyn Wood, and 
Redvers Buller were all well-educated veteran commanders with resumes ranging from the 
solidly serviceable to the brilliant. Analyses of their actions should not be predicated on the idea 
that failure against Indigenous enemies exposed them as fools; rather it should cause us to ask 
what made these men, none of them devoid of common sense, turn in such uncharacteristically 
poor performances? It does them, and those who battled them, a disservice to ask otherwise.  
The same rules can be—and must be—applied to Lieutenant-Colonel George Armstrong 
Custer and Brevet Colonel Anthony Durnford, the two men whose reputations were most 
damaged by the events of the two wars and who, dead at the Little Bighorn and Isandlwana 
respectively could not defend themselves when Sheridan and Chelmsford needed scapegoats. 
Custer’s decision to attack Sitting Bull’s 3000 warriors with his six hundred soldiers may have 
been a bad one, but it was a decision he should never have been placed in a position to make. 
Sheridan’s plans and Terry’s instructions said Custer was supposed to attack any Native 
American encampment he found. That he did as he was told was on Terry and Sheridan as much 
or more than it was on him. Durnford was even more blameless: arriving at Isandlwana after 
Lord Chelmsford marched off with half the column and after Henry Pulleine failed to register the 
presence of Zulu ambushers, Durnford was left to extricate the 24th Regiment from a trap sprung 
hours before he got there. He managed to buy his men time to get away, and in doing so saved a 
few hundred lives—which was likely all he could realistically have been expected to do. 
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Custer and Durnford died, not because of their own incapacity for field command, but 
because they were shackled by their superiors’ expectations and presuppositions. Phil Sheridan 
had not bothered to involve, or even, it seems, to interview, any veterans of America’s last war 
against the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne when he went about laying his plans. Instead, he 
consulted almost exclusively with George Crook, who had brought the Apache to heel, but had 
never confronted the tribes of the Northern Plains. Lord Chelmsford dismissed the testimony of 
Boer settlers, local Africans, and his own intelligence service alike, relying on his own 
experience against the Xhosa to determine how the Zulu would fight. Both Sheridan and 
Chelmsford were prisoners of the notion all Native Americans or Africans would fight the same 
way, and a campaign plan tailored to defeating one Indigenous people could be adapted to defeat 
another with minimal effort. This vision of Native Americans and Africans as cultural and 
military monoliths convinced the men at the top that if one Indigenous group broke and ran when 
faced with white troops, all others would do the same. When Alfred Terry detached George 
Custer from his column and sent him out searching for Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse, he was 
following Sheridan’s instructions to prevent “scatteration” on the part of the Lakota and 
Cheyenne. When Lord Chelmsford marched out of his Isandlwana camp and left Anthony 
Durnford and Henry Pulleine to defend it from a Zulu host, he was likewise trying to chase down 
what he thought were fleeing Africans. That the enemy would not—could not—fight back was a 
core tenet of their plans. When the foe did not conform to stereotype, it ended in catastrophe. 
These same problems underpinned the other defeats of both wars, which are often glossed 
over due to the fame of the Little Bighorn and Isandlwana. At the Rosebud, George Crook was 
taken completely by surprise when Crazy Horse launched a sudden attack on his lines. Crook’s 
forces, which thought themselves invulnerable to assault, were not prepared in the slightest for a 
408 
 
Native American offensive and dissolved into chaos, surviving through weight of numbers and 
the competency of Crook’s junior officers. When the Little Bighorn confirmed the Rosebud was 
not a freak accident, Crook had no idea how to alter Sheridan’s orders to achieve success, and his 
confused wanderings about the Plains led to the twin calamities of the Horsemeat March and the 
retreat from Slim Buttes. At Ntombe Drift, David Moriarty, despite the lessons of Isandlwana, 
did not post sufficient sentries, his continued, baffling belief his company was immune to Zulu 
action resulting in its near total extermination at the hands of Prince Mbilini’s Swazi warband. At 
Hlobane, Evelyn Wood declined to scout and acted as if the mere advance of his cavalry would 
be enough to repel Mbilini, buying himself several hundred dead horsemen, and a narrow escape 
from obliteration at Khambula the next day. Sheridan and Chelmsford’s overconfidence infected 
the men under them, and they all had to learn for themselves what the reality on the ground was. 
For some, like Moriarty, that learning cost them their lives. 
Beyond the dangers inherent in letting racial bias lead to the underestimation the enemy, 
what lessons about colonial warfare can be gleaned from the Great Sioux and Anglo-Zulu Wars? 
The first is that the classic claims about the importance of Anglo-American technological 
superiority need to be taken with a grain of salt. That the power of modern weapons like the 
Springfield and Martini-Henry rifles was important to the victories of the colonial powers is 
indisputable. So too are the advantages provided by the possession of artillery, and, in the British 
case, the Gatling gun. Each of these weapons had the killing power of whole squads of riflemen, 
and they were vital force multipliers for the Americans and the British. That said, ideas about 
technological determinism should be seriously examined and critiqued, for as the many reversals 
of the wars show, Indigenous militaries could overcome the difference in weapons technology 
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through clever tactics, indicating factors beyond rifles, cannons, and early machineguns need to 
be discussed when tallying up the advantages enjoyed by the Americans and the British. 
At the Rosebud, Crazy Horse’s attack broke Crook’s army into multiple parts, preventing 
the Americans from concentrating their fire against the Lakota and Cheyenne. At the Little 
Bighorn, the divisions between Custer, Reno, and Benteen achieved much the same result. At 
Sim Buttes, Crook could barely see Crazy Horse and his carbine fire again went wild. The 
British officers experienced similar problems. At Isandlwana, Pulleine’s outnumbered troops, 
strung out in skirmish line with limited artillery support, could not halt the Zulu advance. At 
Ntombe Drift, Moriarty’s divided company was set upon in the night and massacred. At 
Hlobane, Wood’s decision to send his cavalry uphill without infantry or artillery support gave 
Mbilini and Ntshingwayo a perfect opportunity to catch him. In each of these cases, the 
American and British forces engaged could not, be it a result of tactical error on their part or 
tactical genius on the part of their adversaries, bring their technological advantage to bear. 
Conversely, there were times when the Lakota, Cheyenne, and Zulu had the edge in weaponry. 
Whenever the fighting degenerated into melee combat, as it did during Reno’s rout and the final 
drive on Last Stand Hill and in all three African triumphs of the Anglo-Zulu War, the Indigenous 
armies held the upper hand. American cavalrymen and the rank-and-file of the British infantry 
had no way to fight back against Lakota and Cheyenne lances, tomahawks and warclubs, or 
against Zulu spears and knobkerries, The bayonets of the British infantrymen, useful in massed 
charges, achieved little in individual encounters, while the American cavalry only revolvers for 
close-in defense. If the Lakota and Cheyenne or the Zulu could get their men in among white 
troops who were no longer in formation, they usually won. 
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It was not having more advanced weaponry that gave American and British forces the 
edge over their Native American and African enemies, but the way that weaponry was employed. 
All the victories won by the colonial powers were won by men who did everything they could to 
magnify the technology gap between the opposing armies. Nelson Miles relied on the greater 
range of his Springfield rifles and artillery pieces to hold the Lakota and Cheyenne back, using 
the artillery to break up charges, and the massed riflery from his infantry squares to outdistance 
the missile weapons used by the Native American cavalry. At Khambula and Gingindhlovu, 
Evelyn Wood and Lord Chelmsford hid behind fortifications and let the foe come to them, using 
cannons, Gatling guns, and volleys of fire from their infantry formations to kill charging Zulu. At 
Ulundi, Chelmsford did not fortify his position to the same degree but brought even more 
artillery and again allowed the Zulu to take the offensive. Whether they were strategically on 
defense or offense, the American and British commanders learned to remain on the tactical 
defense, as it gave them the best chance of maximising the lethality of their guns. Only when the 
enemy had dashed themselves against the defenses could pursuits be ordered and cavalry 
unleashed. American and British triumphs were the triumphs of combined arms against foes 
whose militaries were focused upon a single arm: it took the joint efforts of Anglo-American 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery to defeat Lakota and Cheyenne horsemen and Zulu shock troopers, 
whose mastery over their particular specialties was such that they would always best their 
immediate American or British counterparts in open combats. 
Both the United States and Great Britain needed officers who understood their nemeses 
well enough to use the right tactics. On the Great Plains, Phil Sheridan never changed his views, 
but Nelson Miles preferred to take his own advice anyway and, disregarding Sheridan’s fears 
about “scatteration” pursued a strategy of area denial that pushed the Lakota and Cheyenne onto 
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the reservations or out of the country. Miles could do this because he respected Lakota and 
Cheyenne culture and put in the time and effort to achieve a genuine understanding of their 
military capabilities. His success enabled other officers like George Crook to overcome their 
fears of Sheridan and adopt winning strategies of their own. At Isandlwana and Hlobane, Lord 
Chelmsford and Evelyn Wood learned the hard way about the correct means with which to 
engage the Zulu, discovering they could not be at anything less than their very best if they 
wanted to avoid career ruination. Neither man ever took the tactical offense again, and during the 
second invasion of Zululand they brought far more men and far more guns; the Zulu were not, 
they now knew, the Xhosa, and would require enormous quantities of men and ammunition to 
crush. Knowing the Zulu were better than their own men in open battle, Chelmsford and Wood 
never obliged them again, protecting their men behind laagers and Gatling guns. What Nelson 
Miles understood going in, Lord Chelmsford and Evelyn Wood discovered in the aftermath of 
humiliation: never fight your enemy on his terms. 
Good leadership is essential for military success. That maxim, generally accepted in 
conversations about conventional wars between European states, is sometimes ignored in 
colonial conflicts. A look at the Great Sioux and Anglo-Zulu Wars shows how wrong that 
attitude is. The Lakota and Cheyenne chieftains and war-leaders who opposed American 
imperialism in the 1870s, were experienced, veteran commanders, who could formulate tactics 
and strategies as complex as those of any American regiment—and whose charisma and 
medicine could galvanize their warriors in ways American officers only poorly understood. 
Ntshingwayo kaMahole and Mbilini waMswati were warrior-aristocrats of the old school, and 
heirs to a sophisticated Zulu (and in Mbilini’s case, Swazi) military tradition. Conflict with the 
Boers taught the Zulu what they needed to know about using their heavy infantry against 
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European guns, and the more than 2000 British soldiers and auxiliaries who died at Zulu hands 
show Ntshingwayo and Mbilini’s confidence in their men and their stratagems was not 
misplaced. Indigenous leaders knew their territories better than the invaders did, had greater 
immediate reserves of manpower to draw on, and knew far more about fighting the white men 
then the white men did about fighting them  On numerous occasions they showed they were 
better informed and more tactically adroit than their white counterparts and could maintain better 
battlefield control. These were not easy men to out-strategize, and if Anglo-American 
commanders could not accept that, they could not win. 
Overcoming the Lakota-Cheyenne coalition and the army of Zululand, required colonial 
commanders to take their opponents seriously. It required they understand not all Indigenous 
peoples fought the same way. It required the removal of racial blinders, and officers who ignored 
what their enemies were “supposed” to be like and focused on the realities they encountered. It 
required knowing that fighting their adversaries on their adversaries’ terms was a loser’s game, 
and that adhering to a failing strategy was throwing good money after bad. What made Nelson 
Miles America’s best colonial soldier was his determination to do what worked, rather than what 
Sheridan wanted, and of the Anglo-American officers who have been examined in these pages, 
his is probably the standout talent. He was prepared to accept that enemies like Crazy Horse 
could be talented too, which was why he was the one to finally beat the Lakota warlord. Lord 
Chelmsford had little of Miles’ brilliance about him. For all his grandiose sense of self-worth, 
Evelyn Wood did not either. But they showed themselves to be adaptable, and if their second, 
defensive advance through Zululand did not make military history, it also did not make any 
mistakes that Ntshingwayo could exploit, and that was (barely) enough to win the day at Ulundi. 
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If the Great Sioux War and the Anglo-Zulu War produced any true military geniuses, 
they were on the Indigenous sides. Crazy Horse of the Oglala Lakota and Ntshingwayo 
kaMahole of Zululand were the two most skilled generals on, respectively, the Great Plains and 
the South African veldt, and it took all the weight of technology and manpower that two modern 
imperial states had at their disposal to handle the Native American war-leader and the African 
nobleman. It is to the lasting credit of both of them—and of their allies whose names fill these 
pages—that in order to overcome them the white colonial states had to, for a moment at least, 





































Archives of South Africa-Zululand: The Anglo-Zulu War 1879 Volume 1. Edited by John  
Laband, Ian Knight. London: Archival Publications, 2000. 
 
Archives of South Africa-Zululand: The Anglo-Zulu War 1879 Volume 2. Edited by John  
Laband, Ian Knight. London: Archival Publications, 2000. 
 
Archives of South Africa-Zululand: The Anglo-Zulu War 1879 Volume 3. Edited by John  
Laband, Ian Knight. London: Archival Publications, 2000. 
 
Archives of South Africa-Zululand: The Anglo-Zulu War 1879 Volume 4. Edited by John  
Laband, Ian Knight. London: Archival Publications, 2000. 
 
Archives of South Africa-Zululand: The Anglo-Zulu War 1879 Volume 5. Edited by John  
Laband, Ian Knight. London: Archival Publications, 2000. 
 
Battles and Skirmishes of the Great Sioux War. Edited by Jerome A. Greene. Norman: 
 University of Oklahoma Press, 1993 
 
Bourke, John G. On the Border With Crook. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,  
 1891. 
 
Bourke, John G. The Diaries of John Gregory Bourke Volume 1. Edited by Charles M.  
Robinson. Denton: University of North Texas, 2003. 
 
Bourke, John G. The Diaries of John Gregory Bourke Volume 2. Edited by Charles M.  
Robinson. Denton: University of North Texas, 2003. 
 
Cheyenne Memories of the Custer Fight. Edited by Richard Hardorff. Lincoln: University of  
Nebraska Press, 1995.  
 
Colenso, Frances Ellen. History of the Zulu War and Its Origin. Piccadily: Chapman and Hall  
Limited, 1880. 
 
Crook, George. General George Crook: His Autobiography. Edited by Martin F. Schmitt.  
 Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960. 
 
The Custer Myth. Edited by WA Graham. New York: Bonanza Books,  
 
Dodge, Richard. The Powder River Expedition Journals of Richard Irving Dodge. Edited by  
Wayne R Kime. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997. 
 




Gibbon, John. Adventures on the Western Frontier. Edited by Alan and Maureen Gaff.  
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. 
 
Grant, Ulysses S. The Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant: The Complete Annotated Edition.  
Edited by John F Marszalek. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,  
2017. 
 
Hallam Parr, Henry. A Sketch of the Kafir and Zulu Wars. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co, 1880. 
 
Hamilton-Browne, George. A Lost Legionary in South Africa. Driffield: Leonaur, 2012. 
 
Indian Battles and Skirmishes on the American Frontier 1790-1898. Edited by Joseph P. Peters.  
New York: Argonaut Press Ltd, 1966 
 
Indian Views of the Custer Fight. Edited by Richard Hardorff. Norman: University of Oklahoma  
Press, 2004. 
 
King, Charles. Campaigning With Crook. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms Inc, 1966. 
 
Lakota & Cheyenne: Indian Views of the Sioux War 1876-1877. Edited by Jerome Greene.  
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994. 
 
Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign 1878-1879. Edited by John Laband. Phoenix Mill: Alan  
Sutton Publishing Ltd, 1994. 
 
Miles, Nelson. Personal Recollections of General Nelson A Miles. Chicago: Werner Company,  
1897. 
 
Miles, Nelson. Serving the Republic. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1911. 
 
Mitford, Bertram. Through the Zulu Country: Its Battlefields and People. London: Greenhill  
Books, 1992. 
 
Molyneaux, William Charles Frances. Campaigning in South Africa and Egypt. London:  
Macmillan and Co, Ltd, 1896. 
 
Norris-Newman, Charles. In Zululand with the British Throughout the War of 1879. London:  
W.H. Allen and Co., 1880. 
 





The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant Volume 26. Edited by John Simon. Carbondale: Southern  
Illinois University Press, 2003. 
 
The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant Volume 27. Edited by John Simon. Carbondale: Southern  
Illinois University Press, 2005. 
 
The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant Volume 28. Edited by John Simon. Carbondale: Southern  
Illinois University Press, 2005. 
 
Philip Henry Sheridan Papers. Library of Congress: mss39768 reel 86. 
 
Rothwell, J.S. Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879. London: 
 Greenhill Books, 1989. 
 
Sheridan, Philip H. Personal Memoirs of P.H. Sheridan Volume 1. New York: Charles Webster 
 & Company, 1888. 
 
Sheridan, Philip H. Personal Memoirs of P.H. Sheridan Volume 2. Piccadilly: Chatto & Windus, 
 1888. 
 
Smith-Dorrien, Horace. Smith-Dorrien: Isandlwhana to the Great War. Driffield: Leonaur, 2009. 
 
Terry, Alfred. The Field Diary of General Alfred H Terry. Bellevue: The Old Army Press, 1970. 
 
Washita Memories. Edited by Richard Hardorff. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006. 
 
Wolseley, Garnet. South African Journal 1879-1880. A.A. Balkema: Capetown: 1973. 
 
Wolseley, Garnet. The Story of a Soldier’s Life Volume 2. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
 1903. 
 
Wood, Evelyn. From Midshipman to Field Marshal Volume 1. Pickle Partners Publishing, 2013. 
 
Wood, Evelyn. From Midshipman to Field Marshal Volume 2. Pickle Partners Publishing, 2013. 
 





Ambrose, Stephen. Crazy Horse and Custer. New York: Meridian Books, 1975. 
 
Bailey, John W. Pacifying the Plains: General Alfred Terry and the Decline of the Sioux.  
417 
 
Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979. 
 
Bartlett, W.B. Zulu: Queen Victoria’s Most Famous Little War. Stroud: The History Press, 2010. 
 
Bray, Kingsley M. Crazy Horse: A Lakota Life. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 2006. 
 
Castle, Ian and Ian Knight. Fearful Hard Times: The Siege and Relief of Eshowe, 1879. London: 
 Greenhill Books, 1994. 
 
 Connell, Evan. Son of the Morning Star. New York: Promontory Press, 1984. 
 
Cozzens, Peter. The Earth is Weeping. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016. 
 
DeMontravel, Peter R. A Hero to His Fighting Men: Nelson A Miles, 1839-1925. Kent: Kent  
State University Press, 1998. 
 
Donovan, James. A Terrible Glory. New York: Back Bay Books, 2008. 
 
Dunlay, Thomas. Wolves for the Blue Soldiers. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982. 
 
Elliott, Michael. Custerology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
 
Ellis, Richard N. General Pope and U.S. Indian Policy. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
 Press, 1970. 
 
Greaves, Adrian. Forgotten Battles of the Zulu War. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2012. 
 
Greaves, Adrian and Xolani Mkhize. The Tribe That Washed Its Spears. Barnsley: Pen & Sword  
Military, 2013. 
 
Greene, Jerome. Slim Buttes 1876. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982. 
 
Gump, James. The Dust Rose Like Smoke. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016. 
 
Hedren, Paul L. Great Sioux War Orders of Battle. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,  
2011. 
 
Hedren, Paul L. Rosebud, June 17, 1876: Prelude to the Little Bighorn. Norman: University of  
Oklahoma Press, 2019. 
 
Hutton, Andrew Paul. “Phil Sheridan’s Frontier.” In The Great Sioux War 1876-77: The  
 Best from Montana The Magazine of Western History. Edited by Paul L. Hedren.  




Hyde, George. Red Cloud’s Folk. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1937. 
 
Knight, Ian. The Anatomy of the Zulu Army. London: Greenhill Books, 1995. 
 
Knight, Ian. Great Zulu Battles, 1838-1906. London: Cassell & Co, 1998. 
 
Knight, Ian. Zulu Rising: The Epic Story of Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift. London: Pan Books,  
2010. 
 
Laband, John. Kingdom in Crisis. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992. 
 
Lock, Ron. Blood on the Painted Mountain: Zulu Victory and Defeat, Hlobane and Kambula,  
1879. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1995. 
 
Lock, Ron. Isandlwana: The Revelation of a Disaster. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2017.  
 
Magid, Paul. George Crook: From the Redwoods to Appomattox. Norman: University of  
 Oklahoma Press, 2011. 
 
Magid, Paul. The Gray Fox: George Crook and the Indian Wars. Norman: University of  
 Oklahoma Press, 2015. 
 
Marshall, Joseph. The Journey of Crazy Horse. New York: Penguin Group, 2004. 
 
Michno, Gregory. Lakota Loon: The Indian Narrative of Custer’s Defeat. Missoula: Mountain 
 Press Publishing Company, 1997. 
 
Morris, Roy Jr. Sheridan: The Life and Wars of General Phil Sheridan. New York:  
 Crown Publishers Inc, 1992. 
 
Philbrick, Nathaniel. The Last Stand. New York: Penguin Books, 2010. 
 
Price, Richard. Making Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
 
Rein, Christopher. “‘Our First Duty Was to God and Our Next Was To Our Country’: Religion,  
Violence, and the Sand Creek Massacre.” Great Plains Quarterly 34, no. 3 (Summer 
 2014). 
 
Robinson, Charles M. Bad Hand: A Biography of General Ranald S Mackenzie. Abilene: State  
House Press, 2005. 
 





Scott, Douglas et al. Archaeological Perspectives on the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Norman:  
University of Oklahoma Press, 1989. 
 
Sears, Stephen W. Lincoln’s Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac. 
 Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017. 
 
Stiles, TJ. Custer’s Trials. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2015. 
 
Utley, Robert M. Frontiersmen in Blue. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967. 
 
Utley, Robert M. The Commanders: Civil War Generals Who Shaped the American West.  
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2018. 
 
Utley, Robert M. Custer: Cavalier in Buckskin. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001.  
 
Utley, Robert M. The Indian Frontier of the American West. Albuquerque: University of New  
Mexico Press, 1984. 
 
Utley, Robert M. Sitting Bull. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1993. 
 
Victoria’s Generals. Edited by Steven J. Corvi & Ian F.W. Beckett. Barnsley: Pen & Sword 
 Military, 2009. 
 
Welch, James. Killing Custer. New York: WW Norton & Company, 1994. 
 
Wittenberg, Eric J. Little Phil. Washington: Brassey’s Inc, 2002. 
 
Wooster, Robert. The Military and United States Indian Policy. New Haven: Yale University  
Press, 1988. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
